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The LORD reigns, He is clothed with majesty;  
The LORD has clothed and girded Himself with strength; 
Indeed, the world is firmly established, it will not be moved. 
Your throne is established from of old; You are from 
everlasting… The LORD on high is mighty. Your testimonies 
are fully confirmed; Holiness befits Your house, O LORD, 
forevermore. (Ps. 93) 
TABLE OF CONTENTS 
ABSTRACT ......................................................................................................................................... iii 
 
ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS…………………………………………………………………………………………….… iv 
 
LIST OF ABBREVIATIONS…………………………………………………………………………………………… vii 
 
INTRODUCTION ................................................................................................................................ 1 
 
CHAPTER I  LIFE AND INFLUENCES:  
CHARNOCK WITHIN HISTORICAL AND ACADEMIC CONTEXT .................................... 9 
Biographical & Historical Background ....................................................................................... 9 
Formative Stimuluses ................................................................................................................. 14 
Theological Sources ........................................................................................................... 14 
Scripture ................................................................................................................... 14 
Patristic Literature ................................................................................................... 17 
Medieval Theology ................................................................................................... 19 
Reformation and Post-Reformation Theologies ................................................... 20 
Literary and Methodological Sources .............................................................................. 22 
Humanism and scholasticism ................................................................................ 22 
Philosophical Sources....................................................................................................... 24 
Aristotelianism ........................................................................................................ 24 
Ramism .................................................................................................................... 27 
 
CHAPTER II METHOD AND CONTENT:  
FUNDAMENTALS IN CHARNOCK'S DOCTRINE OF THE EXISTENCE AND 
THE ATTRIBUTES OF GOD ......................................................................................................... 32 
Methodological Considerations................................................................................................. 32 
Ontic and Epistemic Principles: Charnock and the principia theologiae ..................... 34 
Divine Revelation: Natural and Supernatural Knowledge of God ................................. 35 
Hermeneutics: Exegesis and Biblical Interpretation...................................................... 38 
Divine Essence and the Attributes of God....................................................................... 42 
Taxonomic Diversity of the Divine Perfections: Patterns of Classification ................... 45 
Simplicitate Dei: The Foundational Proposition ..................................................................... 47 
Definition and Theological Import .................................................................................. 48 
Divine Simplicity in Charnock’s Doctrine of God ........................................................... 52 
CHAPTER III  AN SIT DEUS:  
CHARNOCK ON THE EXISTENCE OF GOD (THE ONTOLOGICAL PRINCIPLE) ....... 56 
Introduction: Does God Exist? .................................................................................................. 56 
Exegetical Foundation ............................................................................................................... 58 
Doctrinal Formulae .................................................................................................................... 62 
Atheism is irrational ......................................................................................................... 62 
Reason (1): The Universal Sense of God ................................................................ 63 
Reason (2): The Testimony of the Natural Order ................................................. 67 
Reason (3): The Composition and Superiority of the Human Nature .................. 77 
Reason (4): Extraordinary Occurrences ................................................................ 82 
 
CHAPTER IV QUID SIT DEUS:  
CHARNOCK ON THE ATTRIBUTES  OF THE FIRST ORDER ........................................... 84 
Introduction: Divine Perfections per essentiam Dei ............................................................... 84 
Spirituality (De Spiritualitate Dei) .................................................................................. 86 
Eternity (De Aeternitas Dei) ............................................................................................ 92 
Immutability (De Immutabilitas Dei) ........................................................................... 102 
Omnipresence (De Omnipraesentia Dei) ...................................................................... 117 
Pars Practica: Practical Application of the Doctrine .............................................................. 125 
 
CHAPTER V QUID SIT DEUS:  
CHARNOCK ON THE ATTRIBUTES  OF THE SECOND ORDER (I) ...............................129 
Introduction: Divine Perfections per intelligentia Dei ...........................................................129 
Knowledge (De Scientia Dei) ..........................................................................................129 
Wisdom (De Sapientia Dei) ............................................................................................ 157 
Pars Practica: Practical Application of the Doctrine .............................................................. 175 
 
CHAPTER VI QUID SIT DEUS:  
CHARNOCK ON THE ATTRIBUTES  OF THE SECOND ORDER (II) ............................. 178 
Introduction: Divine Perfections per voluntas Dei ................................................................. 178 
Power (De Potentia Dei) ................................................................................................. 178 
Holiness (De Sanctitate Dei) ..........................................................................................199 
Goodness (De Bonitate Dei) .......................................................................................... 225 
Dominion (De Dominium Dei) ...................................................................................... 247 
Patience (De Patientia Dei) ........................................................................................... 262 
Pars Practica: Practical Application of the Doctrine ............................................................. 273 
 
CONCLUSION ................................................................................................................................ 289 
 
BIBLIOGRAPHY ............................................................................................................................ 293 
  
 iii 
ABSTRACT 
This research explores the method and theological content in Stephen 
Charnock’s discourses on the attributes and the existence of God with the 
intention to determine whether this material is structured upon the influence 
of the scholastic method. This is accomplished (1) by locating Charnock within 
his own academic and historical context and by interpreting his works 
according to the theological genre to which they belong, (2) by identifying the 
conceptual and methodological presuppositions that framed the discourses, 
(3) by examining and accounting for the order of exposition found in the 
discourses, and (4) by performing a descriptive analysis of the material 
seeking to identify traces of the scholastic method and style of argumentation. 
The findings of this investigation indicate that Charnock’s discourses are 
theological sermons primarily intended for homiletical purposes and yet 
organised and reasoned per the scholastic method.     
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INTRODUCTION 
In recent times, a growing number of scholars have manifested an 
academic interest for the type of theology that was practiced by the Reformed 
divines in Continental Europe and England during the period known as 
Protestant orthodoxy.1 In the last two decades there has been a significant 
increase in the volume of academic literature available on a variety of themes 
concerning Reformed scholasticism including the treatments of specific 
doctrinal subjects, methodological considerations, and the analysis of specific 
theologians.2 This renewed attraction for Reformed orthodox theology has 
                                                             
1 In this study, the term ‘orthodoxy’ is used to indicate a specific era during the history 
of Protestantism (ca. 1560-1790). Unless otherwise noted, references to ‘scholasticism’ and 
the compound ‘Reformed scholasticism’ are meant to denote, respectively, a method of 
academic investigation and an academic school of theology during Protestant orthodoxy 
distinguished by being methodologically shaped by the scholastic method and theologically 
determined by the confessions of the Reformed tradition. See Willem J. Van Asselt and Pieter 
L. Rouwendal, "Introduction: What Is Reformed Scholasticism?," in Introduction to 
Reformed Scholasticism, ed. Willem J. Van Asselt, et al. (Grand Rapids: Reformation 
Heritage Books, 2011), 5-9.    
2 J. Martin Bac, Perfect Will Theology: Divine Agency in Reformed Scholasticism as 
against Suarez, Episcopius, Descartes, and Spinoza (Leiden: Brill, 2010); Aaron C. 
Denlinger, Reformed Orthodoxy in Scotland: Essays on Scottish Theology, 1560 -1775 
(London: T&T Clark, 2015); Aza Goudriaan, Reformed Orthodoxy and Philosophy, 1625-
1750: Gisbertus Voetius, Petrus Van Mastricht, and Anthonius Driessen (Leiden: Brill, 2006); 
Adriaan Cornelis Neele, Petrus Van Mastricht (1630-1706): Reformed Orthodoxy: Method 
and Piety (Leiden: Brill, 2009); Sebastian Rehnman, Divine Discourse: The Theological 
Methodology of John Owen (Grand Rapids: Baker Academic, 2002); Herman J. Selderhuis, A 
Companion to Reformed Orthodoxy (Boston: Brill, 2013); Willem J. Van Asselt et al., eds., 
Introduction to Reformed Scholasticism (Grand Rapids: Reformation Heritage Books, 2011); 
Willem J. Van Asselt et al., Reformed Thought on Freedom: The Concept of Free Choice in 
Early Modern Reformed Theology, Texts and Studies in Reformation and Post-Reformation 
Thought (Grand Rapids: Baker Academic, 2010); Willem J. Van Asselt and Eef Dekker, eds., 
Reformation and Scholasticism: An Ecumenical Enterprise (Grand Rapids: Baker Book 
House, 2001); Maarten Wisse et al., eds., Scholasticism Reformed: Essays in Honour of 
Willem J. Van Asselt (Leiden: Brill, 2010); Dolf te Velde, The Doctrine of God in Reformed 
Orthodoxy, Karl Barth, and the Utrecht School: A Study in Method and Content. Studies in 
Reformed Theology (Leiden: Brill, 2013). 
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been prompted by a series of investigations aimed at reassessing the 
theological value of the material belonging to the post-Reformation Protestant 
era.3 As well as accounting for the recent academic consideration of Reformed 
scholasticism, these studies have been fundamental in at least two other ways: 
(1) they have presented a more judicious interpretation of the method, 
sources, and content in the Reformed scholastic theological tradition; (2) they 
have created a new paradigm for the ongoing development in historico-
theological studies by undermining the predominant (mostly negative) 
assessment concerning Reformed scholasticism in the academic world ever 
since the nineteenth-century.4 Therefore, in seeking to partake with the 
current academic exploration on themes related to Reformed scholastic 
theology, this dissertation investigates the method, the presuppositions, and 
theological content of the discourses treating the doctrine of the existence and 
the attributes of God according to Stephen Charnock (1628-1680). 
Even though Charnock was a highly-educated scholar, a well-respected 
theologian, a powerful preacher, and a highly-regarded minister within the 
corridors of political power within the nonconformist party of his time, and in 
                                                             
3 Originally published in 1987, the magisterial work on this matter still is Richard A. 
Muller, Post-Reformation Reformed Dogmatics: The Rise and Development of Reformed 
Orthodoxy, Ca. 1520 to Ca. 1725., 4 vols. (Grand Rapids: Baker Academic, 2003). In addition, 
consult Idem., Christ and the Decree: Christology and Predestination in Reformed Theology 
from Calvin to Perkins (Grand Rapids: Baker Academics, 2008; repr., Baker Academic; 
Grand Rapids, 1988), 1-13; John Platt, Reformed Thought and Scholasticism: The Arguments 
for the Existence of God in Dutch Theology, 1575-1650 (Leiden: Brill, 1982), 1-9; Carl R. 
Trueman, The Claims of Truth: John Owen's Trinitarian Theology (Carlisle, Cumbria, UK: 
Paternoster Press, 1998); Willem J. Van Asselt, The Federal Theology of Johannes Cocceius 
(1603-1669) (Leiden: Brill, 2001).  
4 For a detailed review of the literature representing the older school of thought, 
consult Richard A. Muller, After Calvin: Studies in the Development of a Theological 
Tradition (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2003), 63-102. Cf. Van Asselt and Rouwendal, 
"State of Scholarship," 22-25. 
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spite of the fact that his Discourses cover a substantial range of doctrinal and 
practical themes, his theology has remained virtually neglected by academia.5 
One can roughly quantify the scale of this gap in the current scholarly material 
by observing that the number of doctoral dissertations on figures akin in time 
and location to that of Charnock are counted by the dozens, if not more, whilst 
only two monographs have been completed where Charnock’s theology is the 
primary object of exploration.6 In addition to the works of Lee and Siekawitch, 
there are a few other dissertations that include a passing discussion of 
Charnock’s theological beliefs. Amongst these, a couple are worth noting in 
this introduction as they contain disperse observations about certain aspects 
of Charnock’s theology.7  
It is significant to note, in justifying this research, that in reviewing the 
academic literature on Charnock only one monograph, Lee’s Trinitarian 
Theology and Piety, decisively delivers an examination of Charnock’s theology 
concerning the nature and perfections of God.8 Apart from the 
aforementioned work, there are only a few published articles and a scarce 
                                                             
5 For a more detailed bibliographical account of Charnock’s life, refer to pp. 9-14 
below in this study.  
6 Hansang Lee, "Trinitarian Theology and Piety: The Attributes of God in the Thought 
of Stephen Charnock (1628-1680) and William Perkins (1558-1602)" (Ph.D. dissertation, 
University of Edibunrgh, School of Divinity, 2009); Larry Daniel Siekawitch, "Stephen 
Charnock's Doctrine of the Knowledge of God: A Case Study of the Balance of Head and Heart 
in Restoration Puritanism" (Ph.D. Dissertation, University of Wales, 2007).  
7 Steven J. Duby, "Divine Simplicity: A Dogmatic Account" (Ph.D. Dissertation, 
University of St Andrews, School of Divinity, 2014); Wallace W. Marshall, "Purtitanism and 
Natural Theology" (Ph.D. Dissertation, Boston College, Theology, 2007); Bruce A. Ware, "An 
Evangelical Examination of the Doctrine of the Immutability of God" (Ph.D. Dissertation, 
Fuller Theological Seminary, School of Theology, 1984). 
8 However, even in this case the dissertation is not devoted entirely to the analysis of 
Charnock’s doctrine of God.  
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number of chapters in books (including partial segments or disperse 
references) discussing aspects of the doctrine of God in Charnock’s theology.9  
The limited number of scholarly sources dealing with Charnock’s 
doctrine of God is staggering even for a relatively unknown figure such as 
Charnock given that the scant recognition he does enjoy is due to what has 
been described as his magnum opus: the material contained in the discourses 
upon the existence and the attributes of God.10 This fact by itself provides an 
opportunity, in general, to partake in the expansion of the scholarship on the 
subject of Reformed orthodoxy and, in particular, to contribute in increasing 
the secondary literature on Stephen Charnock’s doctrine of God.  
In specific terms, this study consists of an in-depth descriptive analysis 
of Charnock’s theology focused primarily, but not exclusively, in the 
discourses pertaining to the existence and the attributes of God. Furthermore, 
this examination considers Charnock’s thought in its own context, that is, in 
relation to the historical, intellectual, and religious milieu of seventeenth-
century Britain. A conscious effort is made to interpret Charnock’s theology by 
                                                             
9 This material lacks homogeneity and, thereby, varies in length and depth from one 
author to the other. Consult Joel Beeke and Mark Jones, A Puritan Theology: Doctrine for 
Life (Grand Rapids: Reformation Heritage Books, 2012), 59-84; James E. Dolezal, God 
without Parts: Divine Simplicity and the Metaphysics of God's Absoluteness (Eugene, Or.: 
Pickwick Publications, 2011), 202-204; F. K. Drayson, "Divine Sovereignty in the Thought of 
Stephen Charnock " in Puritan Papers: Volume One (1956-1959), ed. J. I. Packer (Phillisburg, 
New Jersey: P&R Publishing, 2000); Colin Gunton, Act and Being: Towards a Theology of 
the Divine Attributes (London: SCM, 2002), 89-92, 113, 117; Jan Hoek, "God Nearby and God 
Far Away: Stephen Charnock on Divine Attributes," In die Skriflig: The Journal of the 
Reformed Theological Society 48, no. 1 (2014); Rob Lister, God Is Impassible and 
Impassioned: Toward a Theology of Divine Emotion (Wheaton, Ill.: Crossway, 2013), 119-
122; Carl R. Trueman, "Reason and Rhetoric: Stephen Charnock on the Existence of God," in 
Reason, Faith and History: Essays in Honour of Paul Helm, ed. Martin Stone (Abingdon, 
UK: Ashgate Publishing Group, 2008). 
10 Stephen Charnock, The Works of Stephen Charnock, 5 vols., vol. 1 (Edinburgh: 
James Nichol, 1864; repr., Banner of Truth Trust: Edinburgh, 2010); ibid., 2.  
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acknowledging not only the pious and intellectual ethos commonly associated 
with those linked to the puritan and Reformed tradition, but also by 
considering the literary genre of Charnock’s Discourses (viz., theological 
sermons). This is significant as one should not expect to find in Charnock’s 
material, much less impose on it, the doctrinal systematisation and thematic 
taxonomy required for other literary genres of the seventeenth-century such 
as the systema, the compendia, and the medulla.  
This dissertation argues, then, that the influence of scholasticism can 
be observed in Charnock’s style of argumentation and in his method of 
organising the different subjects pertaining to the doctrine of God. That this 
dissertation argues for the influence of the scholastic method upon Charnock’s 
doctrine of God does not dispense with the fact that the Discourses primarily 
reflect the characteristics of a work on homiletical theology rather than the 
features of those works written in explicit scholastic style.11 More specifically, 
it is contended that, in his own homiletical style, Charnock’s methodus of 
presentation for the discourses on the existence and the attributes of God 
follows a sequential pattern of analysis that is primarily dictated by the 
quaestio, the method of investigation used by the schoolmen of the medieval 
and post-Reformation eras wherein the study of a subject generally included: 
(1) the attestation of the existence of a being/object (an sit), (2) the analysis of 
the being’s/object’s quiddity (quid sit), and (3), an examination of what sort of 
being/object is being studied (qualis sit).12 Additionally, the forgoing proposal 
                                                             
11 See the explanation provided in Muller, PRRD: 3:115-119.  
12 Marie-Dominique Chenu, Nature, Man, and Society in the Twelfth Century; 
Essays on New Theological Perspectives in the Latin West, edited and translated by Jerome 
Taylor 
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is presented throughout this study by an exposition of Charnock’s exegetical, 
doctrinal, and practical material with constant reference to well-known 
representatives of the Reformed scholastic tradition. In like manner, this 
study intentionally visualises its thesis by a projection of it in both the 
structure and the sequence of chapters three to six of this dissertation, being 
chapters one and two the introductory sections that framed the project.13    
This study is, therefore, structured in the following manner. Chapter 
one provides a biographical and historical account seeking to locate Charnock 
within his own historical context. This chapter also includes a discussion 
about the different theological sources and the philosophical influences 
shaping Charnock’s theological reasoning.  
Chapter two draws upon the Reformed scholastic systems some 
methodological considerations implicit in Charnock’s theological enterprise. 
This chapter also includes an introduction to the notion of divine simplicity 
and a discussion of its import for explaining the doctrine of the divine 
attributes in Charnock’s discourses. Specifically, this chapter touches upon 
those features that, while not being explicitly addressed anywhere in the 
Discourses, are nevertheless foundational and, hence, implicitly assumed by 
Charnock in his construal of the divine perfections.14 In the final section of this 
                                                             
Lester K. Little (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1968), 291. Muller has 
indicated that the quaestio method is not per se a scholastic invention. In fact, important 
features of it have been detected in the works of classical authors and ancient philosophers 
such as Quintilian (35-100) and Aristotle (384 B.C.-322 B.C.). See Muller, After Calvin: 28. 
13 For a better visual of this point, see ‘Table of Contents’ below.  
14 The use of the term ‘Reformed orthodox’ throughout this thesis refers to the 
mainstream within the post-Reformation Reformed tradition and, thus, it does not assume an 
absolute uniformity amongst its representatives.   
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chapter, this investigation discusses the meaning and significance of the 
doctrine of divine simplicity and it argues that this notion is, in fact, 
foundational for Charnock’s concept of the divine nature.  
Chapter three discusses the first question of the quaestio method: An 
sit Deus? (whether God exists?). The chapter is divided in three main sections: 
the first section proposes an explanation dealing with some preliminary 
concepts including the place and function of the theme of the ‘existence of 
God’, and a brief overview of the types of arguments for the existence of God 
used by the Reformed divine during the seventeenth-century. This is followed 
by the second section wherein Charnock’s exegetical insights are discussed in 
anticipation of the subsequent doctrinal formulation and conclusive 
assessment that atheism is irrational. 
Chapters four to six of this paper expounds on the second question of 
the quaestio method: Quid sit Deus? (what God is?). Though these three 
chapters are one conceptual unit, as far as they attempt to answer the same 
inquiry of the quaestio, they are treated independently for methodological 
reasons. Accordingly, chapter four discusses the attributes of the first order 
vis-à-vis the scholastic notion of the via negativa (the way of negation), that 
is, it contains an analysis of Charnock’s theology on those attributes 
exclusively pertaining to the divine existence (spirituality, eternity, 
immutability, and omnipresence).15 The chapter ends with a section dedicated 
                                                             
15 The analysis for each attribute in this chapter includes its exegetical foundation and 
their corresponding doctrinal formulation, in addition to a recurrent interaction with other 
primary sources of the Reformed orthodox era and with occasional commentaries on more 
contemporary theologians. This pattern repeats itself throughout chapters six and seven, 
though there are instances in these chapters wherein the reader will find a more in-depth 
conversation with some of Charnock’s critics.    
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to explain Charnock’s thoughts on the practical use of the attributes of this 
order.  
Chapter five and six are both about the attributes of the second order, 
involving the perfections of God that are analogically reflected in the creature 
(knowledge, wisdom, power, holiness, goodness, dominion, and patience). 
Once more, these chapters are divided both for the sake of organisation and to 
reflect that the order listed in the Discourses matches the scholastic 
distinction between attributes according to the divine intellect (knowledge and 
wisdom) and according to the divine will (power, holiness, goodness, 
dominion, and patience).16 
                                                             
16 Chapters five and six conclude with a recapitulation of the practical application of 
knowing the attributes according to the divine intellect and the divine will.    
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CHAPTER I 
 
LIFE AND INFLUENCES: 
CHARNOCK WITHIN HISTORICAL AND ACADEMIC CONTEXT 
Biographical & Historical Background  
Historical-theological investigation occasionally identifies influential 
individuals who have been overlooked in modern academic discussion, though 
in their own days and in generations afterwards, they enjoyed prestige and 
public respectability among their peers. This is certainly the case of Stephen 
Charnock, the seventeenth-century British divine, whose theological acumen 
and pious character was recognised by his early biographers and editors: ‘In a 
word, for weight of matter, for energy of thought, for copiousness of 
improving reflection, for grandeur and force of illustration, and for accuracy 
and felicitousness of expression, Charnock is equalled by few, and surpassed 
by none of the writers of the age to which he belonged.’17 Still, biographical 
accounts of Charnock are scarce and mostly sympathetic (rather than 
critical).18  
                                                             
17 William Symington, "Life and Character of Charnock," in Discourses Upon the 
Existence and Attributes of God (New York: Robert Carter & Brothers, 1853; reprint, 
BakerBooks: Grand Rapids, 1996), 17. Citations refer to the BakerBooks edition.      
18 For the sources used in this biographical outline, besides Symington’s Life and 
Character referenced above, see Edmund Calamy and Samuel Palmer, The Nonconformist's 
Memorial, 2 vols. (London: W. Harris, 1775), 1:159-161. Particularly, consult James M'Cosh, 
"Introduction," in The Complete Works of Stephen Charnock (Edinburgh: James Nichol, 
1864; reprint, Banner of Truth Trust: Edinburgh, 2010), vii-xxvii. Unfortunately, M’Cosh 
reports to his readers (in ibid., 1:vii.) that what it could have been the most comprehensive no 
longer in existence. For recent literature containing descriptions about Charnock’s life 
(including a revision of Calamy’s work), see J. I. Packer, Puritan Portraits (Ross-shire, UK: 
Christian Focus, 2012), 47-56; Trueman, "Reason and Rhetoric," 29; Joel R. Beeke and 
Randall Gleason, Meet the Puritans: With a Guide to Modern Reprints (Grand Rapids: 
Reformation Heritage Books, 2006); Richard L. Greaves, Oxford Dictionary of National 
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Stephen Charnock (Charnocke)19 was born in the ancient parish of St. 
Katharine Creechurch in London in the year of 1628; his ancestry can be 
traced through his father, a solicitor named Richard Charnock, back to the 
Lancashire kinfolk, ‘the Charnocks of Charnock.’20 On May 30th, 1642, at the 
age of 14 years old, young Charnock was matriculated at Emmanuel College, 
the puritan stronghold at Cambridge University during the seventeenth-
century.21 Charnock’s matriculation at Cambridge took place during a time 
when the university’s enrolment was in decline due to concerns posed by the 
beginning of the civil war and by the socio-political havoc coming with it.22 In 
1646 and 1649, Charnock obtained respectively the degrees of Bachelor of Arts 
and Master of Arts.   
In 1650, Charnock was appointed Fellow of New College at the 
University of Oxford by the elected visitors representing the parliament, two 
years later he was incorporated Master of Arts, and in 1654 designated Senior 
Proctor of the university, a position Charnock held until his departure to 
                                                             
Biography,  s.v. "Charnock, Stephen (1628-1680)."; J.C. Spalding, Biographical Dictionary of 
British Radicals in the Seventeenth Century,  s.v. "Stephen Charnock."; A. G. Matthews et al., 
Calamy Revised: Being a Revision of Edmund Calamy's Account of the Ministers and Others 
Ejected and Silenced 1660-1662 (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1934), 111.  
19 As the surname is spelled in some early editions of Charnock’s works, as for 
instance in Several Discourses Upon the Existence and Attributes of God (London: D. 
Newman, et. al, 1682).  
20 M'Cosh, "Introduction," vii. 
21 John Venn and John Archibald  Venn, eds., Alumni Cantabrigienses: A 
Biographical List of All Known Students, Graduates and Holders of Office at the University 
of Cambridge, from the Earliest Times to 1900, 10 vols. (Cambridge: Cambridge University 
Press, 1924), 1.1:326.  
22 See Victor Morgan and Christopher Brooke, A History of the University of 
Cambridge: Vol. 2 1546-1750 (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2004), 464-468.    
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Ireland in 1655.23 In general, the sentiment at Oxford before and during the 
civil war was sympathetic to the royal agenda; however, by June 1646 the city 
of Oxford surrendered to the parliament prompting an internal purge that was 
executed by the new regime in its attempt to exercise control over the 
university.24 As an institution, Oxford was committed to develop a breed of 
scholars that were academically able as fervently committed to living a moral 
life and even though some feared that this new ethos at Oxford might have 
fostered a ‘somewhat narrow scholarship’, this concern never materialised.25 
On the contrary, during the 1650’s Oxford enjoyed an intellectual flourishing 
in the sciences as never before.26 
In 1655, Charnock accepted an invitation to go to Ireland; he arrived to 
Dublin in July of the same year.27 Once there, he became chaplain of Henry 
Cromwell, chief governor of Ireland and brother of Robert Cromwell, Lord 
Protector of England, Scotland, and Ireland.28 A powerful preacher, known for 
his expository depth, prodigious memory, and vivid imagination, Charnock 
                                                             
23 Spalding, Biographical Dictionary of British Radicals in the Seventeenth Century. 
24 Anthony Wood and Philip Bliss, Athenae Oxonienses: An Exact History of All the 
Writers and Bishops Who Have Had Their Education in the University of Oxford: To Which 
Are Added the Fasti, or Annals of the Said University, 3 ed., Anglistica & Americana 
(Hildesheim: Olms, 1969); M'Cosh, "Introduction," xiv.  
25 Idem., "Introduction," xv.      
26 See A. L. Rowse, Oxford in the History of the Nation (London: Weidenfeld and 
Nicolson, 1975), 118. 
27 In personal communication with the archivist at New College Oxford it was added 
that, ‘[i]n 1655 he [Charnock] received a licence signed by Oliver Cromwell, dated 5 May, to be 
absent from the college yet still enjoy the income of his fellowship while being employed on 
special service for the State in Ireland.’, Jennifer Thorp, electronic message to this author, 
December 12, 2013. 
28 Henry Cromwell, Oliver Cromwell’s son, was also Chancellor of Trinity College, 
Dublin. Peter Gaunt, Oxford Dictionary of National Biography, s.v. "Cromwell, Henry (1628-
1674)." 
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was appointed by the city council minister for a weekly lecture at Christ 
Church and shortly after he replaced Thomas Wilkinson at St. Werburgh’s 
church.29 Charnock continued cultivating his academic career during his time 
in Ireland where he was made Bachelor of Divinity and Fellow of Trinity 
College by the University of Dublin.30              
The imposition of a draconian legislation after Charles II was restored 
to the throne in 1660 forced Charnock to leave his posts in Ireland and to 
return to England.31 Charnock disappeared from public life from 1660 to 1675 
as a result of the ban imposed on non-conformists partisans, it is believed that 
during this time of obscurity Charnock travelled to France and Holland where, 
most likely, he was exposed to Continental Reformed theologies.32 In 1666, a 
few years after being banned from office, Charnock lost his personal library 
                                                             
29  M'Cosh, "Introduction," xvi-xviii; Trueman, "Reason and Rhetoric," 29; John 
Seymour, The Puritans in Ireland, 1647-1662, ed. C. H. Firth and Walter Raleigh, 12 vols., 
Oxford Historical and Literary Studies (London: Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1921), 12:141. 
Charnock’s role as preacher was extended to at least other five well-known churches in 
Dublin, including St. Patrick, St. John, and St. Catherine. In Spalding, Biographical 
Dictionary of British Radicals in the Seventeenth Century. Cf. Seymour, The Puritans in 
Ireland: 12:111. 
30 M'Cosh, "Introduction," 1:xviii, note ‡. However, according to one modern 
biography, Henry Cromwell did not succeed in appointing Charnock Senior Fellow at Trinity 
without giving up his fellowship at New College, Oxford. Greaves, Oxford Dictionary of 
National Biography.    
31 The new legislation is explained in the Corporation Act and the Clarendon Code, see 
J. A.  Cannon, The Oxford Companion to British History (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 
2009), s.v. "Corporation Act."; J. R. Jones, ibid.(2002), s.v. "Clarendon Code." There are 
accounts that locate Charnock in Dublin after 1660, as in M'Cosh, "Introduction," xix; 
Greaves, Oxford Dictionary of National Biography. Charnock was officially expelled from the 
established Church two years after Charles’ restoration to the throne. 
32 M'Cosh, "Introduction," xxii. Cf. Trueman, "Reason and Rhetoric," 29. Greaves says 
that Charnock might have used his knowledge in medicine as a means for living/travelling 
during this time of isolation, Biographical Dictionary of British Radicals in the Seventeenth 
Century.  
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and all his manuscripts during the great fire that consumed great part of 
central London.33  
In 1675, once the impositions of the Clarendon Code strictness began to 
dwindle, Charnock received a call to co-pastor with Rev. Thomas Watson 
(1620-1686) a congregation in Crosby Hall, London. Albeit preceded by a 
great reputation and respectability, Charnock’s last years as a preacher at 
Crosby Hall were not as successful as before. His lack of memory and limited 
eyesight, forced him to read his sermons with a glass reducing his preaching 
prowess significantly.34 On July 27 1680, Stephen Charnock died at the age of 
52 years old. Three days after, Charnock’s body was buried at St. Michael’s 
Church, in Cornhill, where John Johnson preached a funeral sermon based on 
Matthew 3:43-49.35 Charnock’s was honoured with the publication of a series 
of poems, the compilation of some of his sayings, and a requiem upon his 
death.36 All of Charnock’s works were published posthumously apart from one 
sermon that was printed in 1676.37 From 1677 to 1680, Charnock was invested 
                                                             
33 It would be difficult to measure with certitude the loss accrued by the fire in what 
could have been a sizeable part of Charnock’s theological work.     
34 Nevertheless, his sermons never were considered jejune; on the contrary, they were 
criticized for being  ‘too thoughtful’, M'Cosh, "Introduction," xxiii. 
35 John Johnson, Eklampsis Ton Dikaion, or, the Shining Forth of the Righteous: A 
Sermon Preached Partly Upon the Death of That Reverend and Excellent Divine, Mr. 
Stephen Charnock (London: Parkhurst, Miller, and Alsop, 1680). According to M’Cosh, 
Johnson had originally prepared the sermon for another funeral but due to Charnock’s 
sudden death, he was forced to adapt it to the new circumstances. M'Cosh, "Introduction," 
xxv, n. †.  
36 "New Poems Upon the Death of That Eminent Servant of God, and Truly Pious and 
Learned Minister of the Gospel Mr. Stephen Charnock," (London: Thomas Snowden, 1680); 
Stephen Charnock, "The Sayings of That Reverend and Great Preacher Mr. S. Charnock, Who 
Departed This Life on Wednesday the 28 of July, 1680, and Was Solemnly Interred the 30th 
Following," (London: [s.n.], 1680); "An Elegy on the Death of the Truly Reverend, Learned, 
and Pious, Mr. Stephen Charnock," (London: J.A for Thomas Cockeril, 1680). 
37 Included in the nineteenth-century edition, see Stephen Charnock, "A Discourse of 
the Sinfulness and Cure of Thoughts," in The Complete Works of Stephen Charnock, ed. 
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in completing a series of lectures on the attributes of God, though the project 
was cut short by his death in 1680.38  
Formative Stimuluses 
Like any other theologian in history, Charnock’s religious mind was 
shaped under the stimulus of a myriad of interrelated factors. Charnock was 
exposed to the academic milieu during the seventeenth-century in England, he 
was determined to find ways to interconnect mind and heart echoing the pious 
impulses of a devoted puritan.  
In what follows, this study offers a brief description of the theological, 
literary, and philosophical influences that shaped Charnock’s writings. This 
sections draws from the material listed as being part of Charnock’s personal 
library, which, in addition to Charnock’s own writings, and the existent library 
at Emmanuel College around the time he was a student at Cambridge, provide 
the most significant sources for the identification of Charnock’s early 
intellectual influences.39  
                                                             
Richard Adams and Edward Veal, Nichol's Series of Standard Divines: Puritan Period 
(Edinburgh: James Nichol, 1864; reprint, Banner of Truth Trust: Edinburgh, 2010), 5:288-
316. 
38 In volumes 1 and 2, Idem., The Works of Stephen Charnock, 5 vols. (Edinburgh: 
James Nichol, 1864-1866; repr., Banner of Truth Trust: Edinburgh, 2010). ‘God’s Patience’ 
was the last theme treated in the series. 
39 Charnock’s library was originally destroyed during the great fire of London, but 
rebuilt in the following years, as it is attested in Bibliotheca Charnockiana Sive Catalogus 
Librorum... Viri Domini Steph. Charnock, S.T.B. (London: 1680).  
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Theological Sources 
Scripture 
Charnock’s formative years at Cambridge (and later at Oxford) were 
shaped by the religious ethos that followed the Reformation. The new 
sentiment at Cambridge was evidenced by the effort to accomplish three main 
objectives: (1) the education of the student body, (2) the solidification and 
development of the mind considering the Reformation, and (3) the pursuit of 
knowledge.40 These goals were framed within a clear theological context 
wherein the Bible was the ultimate source of divine revelation and, thus, 
normative for the Christian life.  
Cambridge was an epicentre of the ‘golden era’ of biblical scholarship 
during the late sixteenth and early seventeenth centuries. The Protestant 
advancements in biblical exegesis, textual studies, and linguistics during 
seventeenth-century are firmly established in modern scholarship.41 For 
instance, three decades before Charnock enrolled at Cambridge, a massive 
amount of editorial work on a new translation of the Bible (the Authorized 
Version) was completed by a joint effort of scholars from Oxford and 
Cambridge, comprising notable puritans like Laurence Chaderton and 
William Branthwaite, master and fellow of Emmanuel College respectively.42  
There is no explicit treatment of the doctrine of Scripture in Charnock’s 
published material; however, a cursory overview of the Discourses will suffice 
                                                             
40 Morgan and Brooke, A History of the University of Cambridge: 441. 
41 Muller, After Calvin: 49-51. 
42 Morgan and Brooke, A History of the University of Cambridge: 442. 
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to demonstrate that Scripture played a foundational role in structuring 
Charnock’s theology. For example, every discourse in Charnock’s works begins 
with an exposition of a biblical text and each theological point is buttressed by 
a battery of biblical references and their corresponding exegetical insights. 
Thus, it comes as no surprise to read that: ‘All truth is to be drawn from 
Scripture… Scripture is the source of divine knowledge; not the traditions of 
men, nor reason separate from Scripture.’43 In this sense, one can argue that 
there are no substantial differences in the doctrine of Scripture between a 
seventeenth-century divine such as Charnock and the magisterial teaching of 
the reformers. In fact, recent scholarship concerning the doctrine of Scripture 
in Reformed theology has proven that the differences between Reformation 
and post-Reformation Reformed theologies are not essential but purely 
formal.44  
According to post-Reformation Reformed theology, the verbum Dei is 
the word of God acknowledged as: (1) the eternal Word, (2) the incarnate 
Word, (3) the inspired word of Holy Scripture, and (4) the internal word of the 
Spirit.45 Comprehended as (3), the verbum Dei is distinguished as internum 
(i.e., as divinely inspired to the writer and thus principal) and externum (i.e., 
                                                             
43 Charnock, Works, 2: 8.  
44 John V. Fesko, "The Doctrine of Scripture in Reformed Orthodoxy," in A 
Companion to Reformed Orthodoxy, ed. Herman J. Selderhuis (Leiden: Brill, 2013), 429-
464; esp. 430, 455, 464. For the authority and self-authentication of Scripture during the 
periods of Early and High Orthodoxy, consult Henk van den Belt, The Authority of Scripture 
in Reformed Theology: Truth and Trust, Studies in Reformed Theology (Leiden: Brill, 2008), 
117-177. 
45 Richard A. Muller, Dictionary of Latin and Greek Theological Terms: Drawn 
Principally from Protestant Scholastic Theology (Grand Rapids: Baker Academics, 1995), 
324. 
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as rendered by the writer and thus instrumental).46 Furthermore, the verbum 
Dei externum is understood as agraphon and engraphon, that is, the word of 
God communicated to the prophets and apostles and the written word 
divinely inspired by the Holy Spirit.47 Thus, Scripture (i.e. verbum Dei 
externum et engraphon) is the special vehicle whereby God had decided to 
disclose himself and his will to the human race. Moreover, the content of 
Scripture is autopistos in se et per se (trustworthy in and by itself) and thus its 
weight does not depend on any given-authority conferred by the church or by 
tradition. In other words, the commanding nature of Scripture is independent 
from any form of human validation as far as Scripture’s auctoritas (authority) 
lies in its divine origin as verbum Dei (word of God).48   
Patristic Literature 
Echoing the reformers’ critical appreciation for patristic teaching, the 
puritan movement of the seventeenth-century welcomed the instruction of the 
Fathers since they were part of a tradition that carried with it a qualified form 
of authority: auctoritas patrum.49  
                                                             
46 Belt, The Authority of Scripture: 143. 
47 This distinction can be traced back to Heinrich Bullinger (1504-1575), see The 
Decades of Henry Bullinger, 4 vols. (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1849-1852), 
1:36-37.  
48 The Westminster Confession states that ‘[the authority of Scripture] dependeth not 
upon the testimony of any man, or church; but wholly upon God (who is truth itself) the 
author thereof: and therefore it is to be received, because it is the Word of God.’ (§I. 4) See 
also ‘autopistos’ in Muller, Dictionary: 54. 
49 The most recent comprehensive case-study of the puritan’s reception of the Fathers 
is Ann-Stephane Schäfer, Mainzer Studien Zur Amerikanistik, Volume 58: Auctoritas 
Patrum?: The Reception of the Church Fathers in Puritanism (Frankfurt: Peter Lang AG, 
2012). For the reception of the Fathers within Reformed orthodox circles, see Irena Backus, 
"The Fathers in Calvinist Orthodoxy: Patristic Scholarship," in The Reception of the Church 
Fathers in the West: From the Carolingians to the Maurists, ed. Irena Backus (Leiden: Brill, 
1997), 839-866; E.P. Meijering, "The Fathers in Calvinist Orthodoxy: Systematic Theology," 
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Although Charnock’s Discourses are not saturated with direct quotes 
from the early fathers—or from any other literary source for that matter—his 
familiarity with patristic sources is manifested by the variety of authors he 
refers and by the ample range of topics he covers.50 Charnock’s appeal to the 
writings of the church fathers add up to the eclectic nature of his theology, 
which is anchored in the most venerable sources of the Christian tradition.51 
On the one hand, Charnock relishes the early fathers’ teachings as he 
considers that they represented the earliest form of the apostolic message to 
the church after the New Testament era, a post-apostolic mode of authority: a 
testes veritatis [witness of the truth].52 On the other hand, it must be noted 
that Charnock’s appreciation of the argumentum patrum was always qualified 
by the Reformation conviction concerning the supremacy of the authority of 
Scripture over tradition.53 In sum, the puritans acknowledged the primacy of 
the Word of God (i.e. Scripture) as a direct consequence of its divine origin 
                                                             
ibid., 867-888. For patristic reception amongst the magisterial reformers, see Manfred 
Schulze, "Martin Luther and the Church Fathers," ibid., 2:573-626; Irena Backus, "Ulrich 
Zwingli, Martin Bucer and the Church Fathers," ibid., 2:627-660; Johannes van Oort, "John 
Calvin and the Church Fathers," ibid., 2:661-700; A. N. S. Lane, John Calvin: Student of the 
Church Fathers (Edinburgh: T&T Clark, 1999).   
50 A list of the patristic writers referred, cited, and/or quoted in Charnock's writings 
as they appear in the 1865’s edition of The Complete Works includes: Ambrose (340-397), 
Athanasius (296-373), Augustine (354-430), Basil (330-379), Boëthius (480-524), 
Chrysostom (349-407), Clement of Rome (?), Cyprian (200-258), Epiphanius (315-403), 
Eusebius (260-340), Gregory of Nazianzen (330-389), Jerome (342-420), Justin Martyr (100-
165), Lactantius (240-320), Origen (185-254), Tertullian (155-240), and Theodoret (393-466). 
Charnock seems to be also acquainted with specialised literature on patristics, as it is attested 
in Millington, Bibliotheca Charnockiana.  
51 In this sense, Charnock’s appropriation of the Fathers echoes the manner wherein 
patristic material was managed by other puritan authors (e.g. William Perkins or John Foxe). 
Cf. Schäfer, Auctoritas Patrum?: 53-64. 
52 Ibid., 144. Cf. Meijering, "The Reception of the Church Fathers," 867. 
53 Though no explicit treatment of the doctrine of Scripture is found in the Discourses, 
the Reformation concept of sola scriptura remains implicit throughout all of his theological 
sermons.  
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and, thereby, they concluded that any attempt to replace Scripture by 
tradition was an affront to God himself.54  
Medieval Theology 
It would be mistaken to assume that the theological traditions at 
Emmanuel College during the 1640s were wholly unified around Puritanism. 
On the contrary, the historical evidence indicates that despite the strong 
puritan ethos of the time, a broad variety of Protestant traditions resided 
within the College during the early decades of the seventeenth-century.55 The 
concomitance of Puritanism with other Protestant trends within the confines 
of institutions of higher learning, in addition to the former’s appreciation for 
the academic education of the day, the established catholicity of Reformed 
theology, and the reading of the reformers in light of its immediate context 
(i.e. late medieval theology), prevented the censorship of sources that in many 
ways could have been considered prima facie hostile towards the core tenets 
of the Reformation.56  
                                                             
54 See David C. Steinmetz, Reformers in the Wings: From Geiler Von Kaysersberg to 
Theodore Beza (New York: Oxford University Press, 2001), 102  Cf. J. I. Packer, "The Puritans 
as Interpreters of Scripture," in Puritan Papers: Volume 1 (1956-1959), ed. J. I. Packer 
(Phillipsburgh, New Jersey: P&R Publishing, 2000), 193-195. 
55 Morgan and Brooke, A History of the University of Cambridge: 475-476. This 
coexistence at Emmanuel College, however, should not to be understood as to indicate some 
sort of conceptual recognition among the parties, particularly between Protestants and 
Roman Catholics. See Paul R. Schaefer, "Protestant Scholasticism at Elizabethan Cambridge: 
William Perkins and a Reformed Theology of the Heart," in Protestant Scholasticism: Essays 
in Reassessment, ed. Carl R. Trueman and R. Scott Clark (Carlisle: Paternoster Press, 1999), 
153. 
56 Muller, After Calvin: 47-62.     
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Akin to the church fathers’ writings, the literature of the medieval 
doctors is hardly ever mentioned directly in Charnock’s Discourses.57 A full 
explanation accounting for such austerity in Charnock’s writings is beyond the 
aim of this section; however, it is doubtful that this ‘anomaly’ had been caused 
by Charnock’s ignorance of the main theological trends discussed during the 
Middle Age. This can be seen in Charnock’s lecture on the existence of God 
wherein he deploys a series of metaphysical and philosophical principles 
drawn from the schoolmen of the medieval era, which included the use of the 
laws of logic, the notion of efficient causality, the concept of necessity, the 
appeal to teleology, the impossibility of infinite regressions, etc.58  
Reformation and Post-Reformation Theologies  
Material assessments of the theological content found within the works 
of the Protestant divines during greater part of the seventeenth-century 
(Charnock’s Discourses included) points towards a significant doctrinal 
continuity with the magisterial divines of the previous century. Besides John 
Calvin (1509-1564), Charnock positively refers to the work of other reformers 
including Johannes Oecolampadius (1482-1531), Martin Luther (1483-1546), 
Philip Melanchthon (1497-1560), Wolfgang Musculus (1497-1563), Paul 
Fagius (1504-1549), Girolamo Zanchi (1516-1590), and Martin Chemnitz 
                                                             
57 Thomas Aquinas’s Summae and Peter Lombard’s Sentences are the two most 
prominent medieval theologians cited in Charnock, Works. Charnock refers to non-Christian 
medieval sources, including the Jewish philosopher Moses Maimonides (1138-1204) and the 
‘Turkish Alcoran’, the first English translation of the Koran (1649). See ibid., 1:65, 271, 426; 
5:160, 289 and 1:58, respectively. 
58 The core of Charnock’s argument for the existence of God has been described, and 
rightly so, as the ‘context in which Charnock develops the metaphysical heart of the 
discourse’, the place where the reader observes the ‘standard kind of theistic proofs so 
common in theology from the Middle Ages onwards.’ In Trueman, "Reason and Rhetoric," 35.  
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(1522-1586). In accordance with the catholic nature of his theology, Charnock 
appears to be familiar also with the work of important Roman Catholic 
theologians such as Thomas Cajetan (1469-1534), Pierre Charron (1541-1603), 
Francisco Suárez (1548-1617), Denis Pétau (1583-1652), and Pierre Gassendi 
(1592-1655).      
Like other seventeenth-century Reformed divines, whose theological 
material was built up upon sources within the Christian tradition ranging 
from Patristic and Medieval theologies to the doctrines of the first and second-
generation reformers, Charnock’s theology is in essential continuity with the 
fundamental teachings of the divines (within the Reformed tradition) who 
preceded him during the Reformation era.59 In terms of religious 
identification, Charnock belonged to a particular breed of seventeenth-
century’s Protestants in England known as ‘puritans’.60 A comprehensive 
analysis of the complexities involved in the identification of the nature of the 
                                                             
59 This study assumes that just as there is a continuity between certain aspects of 
medieval theology with that of the Reformation era, there is a substantial agreement between 
Reformation and post-Reformation Reformed theologies. Richard A. Muller’s reappraisal of 
the nature of Reformed theology during the Reformation and of its development and 
accommodation into the systems of the seventeenth-century has become a powerful resource 
supporting the position assumed in this monograph. For a historico-theological assessment of 
the transition from Reformation to post-Reformation Reformed theologies see, “Calvin and 
the ‘Calvinists’: Assesing Continuities and Discontinuities between the Reformation and 
Orthodoxy” parts 1 and 2 in Muller, After Calvin: 47-80; Idem., PRRD: 1:37-40; Idem., Calvin 
and the Reformed Tradition: On the Work of Christ and the Order of Salvation (Grand 
Rapids: Baker Academic, 2012), 13-69.    
60 In its origin, the tag ‘puritan’ was a slur not a medium of self-identification; it was a 
discriminatory term of abuse dedicated to those—in the clergy and the laity—who strove for 
reforms within the Church of England. The aim of the moniker was to ‘stigmatize its targets as 
busybodies, hypocrites or political deviants, or sometimes all three together.’ John Spurr, 
English Puritanism 1603-1689 (New York: Macmillan, 1998), 17. Interestingly, some have 
noted that it was the Arminian party the responsible for the semantic transposition of the 
term: from its purely sociological (derogatory) meaning to its theological characterization 
(Orthodox Calvinism). See, Nicholas Tyacke, Anti-Calvinists: The Rise of English 
Arminianism C.1590-1640, Oxford Historical Monographs (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1987), 
45-55; cf. Ian Hugh Clary, "Hot Protestants: A Taxonomy of English Puritanism," Puritan 
Reformed Journal 2, no. 1 (2010): 47.       
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puritan movement is out of the scope of this investigation. It suffices to 
indicate that conceptions of Puritanism prompted by anti-puritan sentiments, 
as the ones propagated after the nineteenth-century wherein puritans are 
depicted as religious bigots and pre-modern obscurantists, must be rejected as 
they are historically inaccurate and theologically simplistic.61  
Literary and Methodological Sources 
Humanism and scholasticism 
‘Humanism’ and ‘scholasticism’ are included here considering their 
significance for theological matters in the Reformed scholastic tradition. 
These terms are understood respectively as: (1) an intellectual movement 
within the Renaissance era determined to recover the value and meaning of 
the original text (ad fontes) through the development of sophisticated tools of 
literary analysis such as philology and textual criticism and (2) a method of 
academic investigation that intertwines concepts, distinctions, definitions, 
syllogisms, rhetoric, and disputational forms of argumentation.62  
                                                             
61 Carl Trueman, for example, points out to John Owen’s Bibliotheca Oweniana, 
which contains, apart from theological books, numerous volumes on music theory, 
mathematics, politics, philology, history, geography, philosophy, law, classical literature, and 
even gardening, social life, and magic. See Carl R. Trueman, John Owen: Reformed Catholic, 
Renaissance Man (Aldershot: Ashgate, 2007), 12-17. Charnock himself, in addition to his 
theological acumen, demonstrated a sophisticated knowledge in the medical sciences, and a 
clear interest in mathematics, classical literature, law, history, and philosophy. See Charnock, 
Works: 1:xiii, xxiv; cf. Bibliotheca Charnockiana. Moreover, a look at the curriculum at 
Cambridge while Charnock was at Emmanuel College (the so-called ‘Puritan bastion’ of the 
university) indicates that as an undergrad student Charnock was exposed to the study of logic, 
physics, mathematics, rhetoric, ethics, metaphysics, and cosmography. See William T. 
Costello, The Scholastic Curriculum at Early Seventeenth-Century Cambridge (Cambridge: 
Harvard University Press, 1958), 36.           
62  For more details consult, James Hankins, "Humanism, Scholasticism, and 
Renaissance Philosophy," in The Cambridge Companion to Renaissance Philosophy, ed. 
James Hankins (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2007), 30-32; Paul Oskar Kristeller, 
"Humanism," in The Cambridge History of Renaissance Philosophy, ed. Charles B. Schmitt, 
et al. (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1988); Anthony Vos, "Reformation and 
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In the last decades a significant number of scholars have reassessed the 
significance of the medieval period in shaping the theologies of the 
Reformation and post-Reformation era.63 Recent studies have determined that 
humanism and scholasticism coexisted in the work of many of the mainstream 
reformers and thereby the two methods of academic analysis should not to be 
seen as arriving at contradictory theologies (or philosophies).64 Renaissance 
humanism and scholasticism were used in tandem as the philological and 
pedagogical tools to elaborate the dogmatic systems of the seventeenth-
century.65  
The reassessment mentioned above accounts for the traces of both 
humanism and scholasticism in Charnock’s Discourses. Concerning 
humanistic impulses, Charnock engages the biblical text selected for each 
discourse showing a sophisticated knowledge of the original languages while 
applying philological tools for the proper understanding of the passage.66 
                                                             
Scholasticism," in Reformation and Scholasticism: An Ecumenical Enterprise, ed. Willem J. 
Van Asselt and Eef Dekker (Grand Rapids: Baker Academics, 2001), 106. 
63 Heiko Augustinus Oberman, The Dawn of the Reformation: Essays in Late 
Medieval and Early Reformation Thought (Edinburgh: T&T Clark, 1992); Steven E. Ozment, 
The Age of Reform, 1250-1550: An Intellectual and Religious History of Late Medieval and 
Reformation Europe (London: Yale University Press, 1980); Idem., "Humanism, 
Scholasticism, and the Intellectual Origins of the Reformation," in Continuity and 
Discontinuity in Church History, ed. George Huntston Williams, et al. (Leiden: Brill, 1979).   
64 The ground breaking work on this subject is Paul Oskar Kristeller, Renaissance 
Thought: The Classic, Scholastic, and Humanistic Strains (New York: Harper & Brothers, 
1961), 92-119. For the place of scholasticism in the thought of Luther and Calvin, consult 
D.V.N. Bagchi, "Sic Et Non: Luther and Scholasticism," in Protestant Scholasticism: Essays 
in Reassessment, ed. Carl R. Trueman and R. Scott Clark (Milton Keyes: Paternoster Press, 
2005), 3-15; David C. Steinmetz, "The Scholastic Calvin," ibid. 
65 Muller, After Calvin: 39. 
66 For the influence of humanism in Puritan exegesis, see Henry M. Knapp, 
"Revealing the Mind of God: Exegetical Method in the Seventeenth Century," in Church and 
School in Early Modern Protestantism: Studies in Honor of Richard A. Muller on the 
Maturation of a Theological Tradition, ed. Jordan J. Ballor, et al. (Leiden: Brill, 2013), 543-
548. 
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Regarding the influence of scholasticism, Charnock’s material exhibits an 
unapologetic appeal to logical reasoning, just as an appeal to propositional 
argumentation, definitions, and methods of disputation in his discussion of 
doctrinal matters.67  
In retrospect, Charnock’s style might be explained by the fact that the 
syllabus to which he was exposed during his time at the University of 
Cambridge had received after the Reformation a reinvigorated emphasis on 
certain areas of study such as grammar, rhetoric, and the study of the classics, 
precisely as a consequence of the influence brought Protestants shaped by 
humanistic instincts.68 Still, scholasticism, as a method of investigation, was 
also an integral part of Cambridge’s seventeenth-century curriculum, as it is 
attested by the way lectures and disputations were structured.69  
Philosophical Sources 
Aristotelianism  
Charnock’s theology manifests a noticeable awareness of Aristotelian 
philosophy, though Aristotle (384 BC-322 BC) himself is not cited as often as 
                                                             
67 Note, for instance, the use of humanistic and scholastic tools in Charnock’s sermon 
titled ‘The Necessity of Christ’s Death’, in Stephen Charnock, The Works of Stephen 
Charnock, 5 vols., vol. 5 (Edinburgh: James Nichol, 1866; repr., Banner of Truth Trust: 
Edinburgh, 2010), 3-48. Charnock begins by exegeting Luke 24:26, then he establishes three 
points of inquiry concerning Christ’s suffering: (1) its nature; (2) its necessity; and (3), its 
consequences. From these three general themes, Charnock infers/affirms two doctrines: (i) 
the necessity of Christ’s sufferings; and (ii) the necessity of Christ’s exaltation. Then, 
Charnock proceeds to tackle (i) by explaining what kind of necessity this is. This is done by 
demonstrating that it was necessary, and, finally, by indicating the practical use of the 
doctrine. Charnock then engages in a series of arguments—buttressed by biblical texts, 
tradition, propositions, and logical inferences—to accomplish his objective. 
68 Morgan and Brooke, A History of the University of Cambridge: 441. 
69 That is, in the form of propositions, definitions, syllogisms, questions, and articles. 
Costello, The Scholastic Curriculum: 11-12. 
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other philosophers in the Discourses.70 Charnock’s acquaintance with the 
philosophy of Aristotle is explained by being exposed, while at Cambridge, to 
Aristotle’s thought through primary and secondary literature including 
Thomas Aquinas’s Summa Theologiae and Bartholomäus Keckermann’s 
Systema Sacrosanctae Theologiae.71 It is not surprising, then, to observe 
philosophical principles derived from Aristotle in Charnock’s theological 
argumentation.  
In the realm of logical thinking, Charnock explicitly relies on key 
Aristotelian trends such as the law of non-contradiction (principium 
contradictionis).72 For Charnock, compliance with the law of non-
contradiction was an indispensable requirement for the coherence of any 
rational argument. In this sense, logic is reckoned foundational to theological 
discourse rather than being antithetical to it.73 Besides, Charnock draws from 
Aristotle the distinction between essential predications (things that are said to 
be per se) and accidental predications (things that are not necessary or 
essential) to affirm the ontological otherness of God in comparison with the 
creature. Creatures are subjected to change in regards to their ‘substance’ and 
‘accidents’, which is to say that they experience variations in their being 
                                                             
70 Aristotle is directly named (or referenced) five times in Charnock, Works: 3:116; 
5:303, 386, 399, 471. The Greek and Latin editions of Aristotelis opera are listed in the 
Bibliotheca Charnockiana, 9.  
71 Consult Costello, The Scholastic Curriculum: 9, 37, 45-46. Cf. Morgan and Brooke, 
A History of the University of Cambridge: 511-512. It is noteworthy that the entrance of 
Aristotelianism into the classrooms at Emmanuel was preceded by a critical accommodation 
of Aristotle’s own philosophy. Schaefer, "Protestant Scholasticism," 151.   
72 Charnock, Works, 1: 1:147. 
73 Cf.  Theo J. Pleizier and Maarten Wisse, "'As the Philosopher Says': Aristotle," in 
Introduction to Reformed Scholasticism, ed. Willem J. van Asselt, et al. (Grand Rapids: 
Reformation Heritage Books, 2011), 30-32. 
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whereas God’s being subsists without successions (i.e. variations of any 
kind).74 Furthermore, Charnock argues by mean of syllogisms—another 
feature of Aristotelian pedigree—to stress the cogency of an argument and to 
maximize the force thereof.75 Finally, Charnock alludes frequently—directly or 
by inference—to Aristotle’s fourfold model of causality: material, formal, final, 
and efficient.76   
None of the above makes Charnock’s theology ‘Aristotelian’, not if by 
the term one understands an uncritical acceptance of Aristotle’s ideas.77 In his 
account of the existence of the universe Aristotle assumes, for example, a 
metaphysical model wherein the unmoved mover (i.e., the ultimate cause of 
reality) is accountable for the existence of reality out of ingenerated, eternal, 
and infinite raw matter.78  On the contrary, while agreeing with the notion of 
causality to explain the existence of the universe, Charnock rejects that matter 
is eternal and infinite. Aristotle’s explanation of the universe as formed from 
                                                             
74 Charnock, Works, 1: 351-352. Cf. 1025a-1, and 1029b-4 in Aristotle, Metaphysics: 
Volume I (Book I-IX), Loeb Classical Library (Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press, 
1933), 289-291; 321. 
75 Stephen Charnock, The Works of Stephen Charnock, 5 vols., vol. 4 (Edinburgh: 
James Nichol, 1865; repr., Banner of Truth Trust: Edinburgh, 2010), 4:183. 
76 See for instance, Idem., Works: 1:15, 65, 165, 304; 2:232, 412, 490; 3:169, 281, 309; 
4:154, 221, 362; 5:47, 171, 417. 
77 Richard A. Muller, "Reformation, Orthodoxy, 'Christian Aristotelianism,' and the 
Eclecticism of Early Modern Philosophy," Nederlands archief voor kerkgeschiedenis 81, no. 3 
(2001): 313-314. 
78 Consult Aristotle, On the Heavens, ed. Jonathan Barnes, trans. J. L. Stocks, 2 vols., 
vol. 1, The Complete Works of Aristotle: The Bollingen Series (Princeton: Princeton University 
Press, 1984), 279b, 13 ff; 301b 31, 494. 
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existing matter is replaced by the Christian doctrine of creatio ex nihilo 
(creation out of nothing).79  
In sum, Charnock’s metaphysics should not be depicted as ‘Aristotelian’ 
in nature since they reflect a Christian revision of Aristotle’s ideas, one that 
was critically assessed by and, thus, compatible with confessional 
Christianity.80  
Ramism 
A brief explanation is due concerning the potential influence of the 
French logician and educator Petrus Ramus (1515-1572) on the theology of 
Stephen Charnock.81 Limitations of scope will not allow this investigation to 
determine the entire scope and impact that Ramus’ thought could have had in 
Britain’s academia during the seventeenth-century. In what matters this 
study, it may be said that Ramus sought to modify the style of doing academic 
investigation and to improve the study of all academic subjects by simplifying 
the syllabus of dialectic and rhetoric; additionally, he developed a highly-
organized method of inquiry based on charts and dichotomies (binary 
divisions) so that the apprentice could avoid the technical hitches ingrained 
into the traditional Aristotelian system of thought.82  
                                                             
79 See Charnock, Works: 2:129,184; 4:115. 
80 This modified form of Aristotelianism used by the Reformed orthodox may 
sometimes be better described as a ‘highly modified Thomism often with Scotistic or 
nominalistic accents.’ See Muller, "Reformation, Orthodoxy, 'Christian Aristotelianism,'" 323. 
81 Ramus’ legal name was Pierre de la Ramée. 
82 Other features of the Ramist method are: (1) it is fundamentally a ‘deductive’ 
system (contra ‘inductive’ system); (2) it divides subjects into parts logically connected; and 
(3), it reaches its conclusions without appealing to syllogisms. See Donald K. McKim, The 
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Usually, Ramus and Ramism are introduced as an antidote against the 
alleged rationalism of Aristotle and the stiffness of Aristotelian logic.83 
However, the real significance of Ramism has been the subject of a lively 
debate among scholars. While some historians have considered Ramus’ 
thought as a turning point in intellectual history, others have reckoned 
Ramus’ works as no more than intellectual exercises in shallowness and 
vulgarisation.84  
Before one makes a definite judgment concerning the real influence of 
Ramus’ thought on Charnock’s theological material, it is worth to ponder on 
recent scholarship on Ramus. On one side, Mordechai Feingold has noted that 
despite being foundational for building up Protestant curricula outside the 
higher educational establishment, the logical system proposed by Ramus was 
never elevated above the work of other logicians at the major universities—not 
even at Emmanuel College, presumably the puritan stronghold at 
                                                             
Oxford Encyclopedia of Reformation (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1996), s.v. "Ramus, 
Petrus." 
83 Ibid. Some have illustrated well this point by quoting Ramus himself, ‘“but (oh 
shame!) we have almost made this philosophy of Aristotle the foundation of the Christian 
religion… Theologians deliver Christianity from this pestilence.”’ Quoted in Keith L. Sprunger, 
"Ames, Ramus, and the Method of Puritan Theology," Harvard Theological Review 59, no. 2 
(1966): 138. Alister McGrath, following the ‘Calvin against the Calvinists’ narrative, has 
claimed, for instance, that the challenge posed by the French theologian Moïse Amyraldus 
(1596-1664) to the orthodox doctrine of predestination was precipitated by the latter’s use of 
Ramist logic in response to Theodore Beza’s ‘Aristotelian syllogistic logic’. In The Intellectual 
Origins of the European Reformation (Oxford: Basil Blackwell, 1987), 193-194. Cf. Jürgen 
Moltmann, "Zur Bedeutung Des Petrus Ramus Für Philosophie Und Theologie in 
Calvinismus," Zeitschrift für Kirchengeschichte 68, no. 3-4 (1957).       
84 For a succinct evaluation of these contradictory assessments of Ramus, consult 
James Veazie Skalnik, Ramus and Reform: University and Church at the End of the 
Renaissance (Kirksville, Mo: Truman State University Press, 2002), 3-5. A more nuanced 
assessment can be read in Mordechai Feingold, "English Ramism: A Reinterpretation," in The 
Influence of Petrus Ramus: Studies in Sixteenth and Seventeenth Century Philosophy and 
Sciences, ed. Mordechai Feingold, et al. (Basel: Schwabe & CO AG, 2001). Also Aza 
Goudriaan, "Theology and Philosophy," in A Companion to Reformed Orthodoxy, ed. 
Herman J. Selderhuis (Leiden: Brill, 2013). 
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Cambridge.85 Similarly, it is useful to observe the results of Feingold’s 
examination of the libraries belonging to the scholars who died while at 
Cambridge during the late sixteenth and earlier seventeenth centuries. 
Feingold concludes that quantitatively the material on the classics and 
theology took a place of ascendency over logic and philosophy, and within this 
latter set Ramist books were usually in the minority compared with other texts 
on logic and rhetoric.86 On the other side, there are those who unequivocally 
affirm that Ramus’ method and logic were rooted in the configuration of the 
theological material of the puritans.87  
In his monograph on Charnock and Perkins, Hansang Lee declares that 
the influence of Ramism is proven by the existence of divisions and 
subdivisions in Charnock’s material.88 In response, one may note that Lee’s 
research is circumscribed almost exclusively to Charnock’s discourses on the 
existence and attributes of God, leaving a significant portion of Charnock’s 
material without analysis. Furthermore, Lee assumes that the use of 
dichotomies and thematic subdivision (assuming that Charnock followed such 
structure in his works) was an exclusive trademark of Ramist methodology 
when in fact this was not the case.89 But even if it were, there is no indication 
                                                             
85 The direct relationship between Ramism and Puritanism is a common place for 
many contemporary historians. See for instance, Elizabethanne Boran, "Ramism in Trinity 
College: Dublin in the Early Seventeenth Century," in The Influence of Petrus Ramus: Studies 
in Sixteenth and Seventeenth Century Philosophy and Sciences, ed. Mordechai Feingold, et 
al. (Basel: Schwabe & CO AG, 2001), 199.  
86 Mordechai Feingold, "English Ramism: A Reinterpretation," ibid., 131-133. 
87 As in Donald K. McKim, Ramism in William Perkins' Theology (New York: Peter 
Lang, 1987); Sprunger, "Ames, Ramus, and the Method of Puritan Theology." 
88 See, "Theology and Piety," 49. 
89 Walter J. Ong, Ramus: Method and the Decay of Dialogue: From the Art of 
Discourse to the Art of Reason (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1958), 199. Ong goes 
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that Charnock had ever used Ramus’ system of charting and diagramming to 
convey any of his theological ideas. Moreover, the influence of Ramism was 
predominant during the Early Orthodoxy (1560-1620), a period that precedes 
Charnock’s time for almost a decade.90 Finally, though not a definitive 
argument per se, it is significant that neither Ramus’ name nor any of his texts 
are ever cited or hinted in the whole of Charnock’s Works.91  
However, this does not preclude the possibility that some of Ramus’ 
ideas could be spotted in Charnock’s theological sermons. For example, the 
consideration given to the elements of Christian obedience and practice in the 
process of learning sound teaching, just at the similarities between Ramus’ 
usus et exercitatio and Charnock’s ‘Uses’ of Christian doctrine are noteworthy, 
and although Charnock never explicitly answered the question ‘what is 
theology?’, it would not be hard to imagine him approving in principle to 
Ramus’ definition: Theologiae est doctrina bene vivendi [Theology is [the] 
doctrine of living rightly].92 In the end, this study concludes that the role of 
Ramus’ thought in shaping Charnock’s theology is tangential at best since no 
                                                             
further and says that there is, ‘little, if any, theoretical foundation’ for Ramist dichotomies. In 
ibid. 
90 Muller, PRRD: 1:62. 
91 In contrast, as we have pointed out before, Aristotle is referred several times 
(directly and indirectly) throughout the Works. See notes, 97, 101,102, and 103. Yet, Charnock 
cites the work of William Ames, presumably ‘one of the most consistent theological Ramist’. 
Sprunger, "Ames, Ramus, and the Method of Puritan Theology," 149. For Charnock’s 
references on Ames see, Works: 1: xiii; 3:90, 171.       
92 See Petrus Ramus, "Commentariorum De Religione Christiana, Libri Quatuor," 
(Frankfurt: Apud Andream Wechelum, 1577), 6. The closest Charnock comes to define 
theology is on his discourse on the Knowledge of God, and this only by making ‘knowledge of 
God’ in his ‘what kind of knowledge [of God] this is?’ as synonymous with ‘theology’, in 
Charnock, Works: 4: 15ff.  
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clear evidence have been found pointing in the direction of a significant 
incidence of Ramus’ logic and method in Charnock’s Discourses.93  
 
                                                             
93 Cf. M'Cosh, "Introduction," xii-xiii. Here, Ramus’s name is omitted amongst the 
most influential philosophies in Charnock’s theology.     
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CHAPTER II 
 
METHOD AND CONTENT: FUNDAMENTALS IN CHARNOCK'S DOCTRINE 
OF THE EXISTENCE AND ATTRIBUTES OF GOD 
Methodological Considerations  
This segment explores aspects related to Charnock’s theological 
methodology. The purpose is to identify the presuppositions and principles 
used by Charnock in his theological task and to analyse their importance in 
the discourses on the existence and attributes of God. More precisely, this unit 
investigates the role of divine revelation and hermeneutics in forming 
Charnock’s theology. In doing this, this chapter intentionally circumvents the 
discussion of themes such as the definition, the parts, the object, the nature, 
and the aim of theology, neither does it include a discussion concerning the 
relation between theology, reason, and philosophy. The justification for this 
self-imposed restriction rests upon the fact that there is no evidence that 
Charnock ever intended to codify the contents of Christian doctrine in a 
systematic way.94  
Here is the place to discuss Lee’s characterisation of the type of 
material illustrated in Charnock’s discourses on the existence and the 
attributes of God. Though Lee employs the term ‘theological prolegomena’ to 
depict the methodological and theological presuppositions found in 
                                                             
94 For original and further developed versions of theological prolegomena during the 
orthodox era, see respectively Franciscus Junius, De Theologia Vera (Lugduni Batavorum: 
Officina Plantiniana, 1594), 17-45; Francis Turretin, Institutes of Elenctic Theology, trans. 
George Musgrave Giger, 3 vols. (Phillipsburg: P&R Publishing, 1992), I/1, i-xiv; 1:1-54. Junius’ 
work has been translated into English as A Treatise on True Theology: With the Life of 
Franciscus Junius, trans. David C. Noe (Grand Rapids: Reformation Heritage, 2014). 
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Charnock’s material, the use of this nomenclature is incorrect considering that 
theological prolegomenon has its place in a theological genre known as 
systema theologiae (systems of theology), but not in the collection of a series 
of theological sermons such as in Charnock’s Discourses.95  
The main objection to Lee’s description of Charnock’s methodological 
assumptions is the imposition of a technical descriptor that does not apply for 
the literary genre of Charnock’s discourses.96 By ignoring the methodological 
differences between the theological system and the theological sermon, Lee 
incorrectly uses the category of the former to account for the methodological 
presuppositions of the latter, a shortcoming that is prompted by an effort to 
accommodate, rather artificially, Charnock’s material in an attempt to mimic 
the methodological structure of the seventeenth-century theological systems.97 
On the contrary, by acknowledging the differences in style and content 
between a system of theology and a theological sermon, this study seeks to 
interpret Charnock in consideration of the literary genre to which his 
theological discourses belong. Therefore, rather than proposing a synthetic 
theological prolegomenon for Charnock’s works, the following section 
analyses some aspects of the prolegomena found in the Reformed scholastic 
                                                             
95 Typically, the theological systems of the seventeenth-century were organised 
according to loci (topics) explained systematically as one interconnected unit. This is also the 
case for other material closely related to the systema, such as the loci communes theologiae 
(the universal topics of theology), the corpus (body), the compendia (compendium), and the 
medulla (marrow). Richard A. Muller, The Unaccommodated Calvin: Studies in the 
Foundation of a Theological Tradition (New York: Oxford University Press, 2000), 178. 
96 See, for example, Lee, "Theology and Piety," 7, 30-31, 39, 57, 74-75, 140, 189, 221.  
97 Perhaps symptomatic of a more fundamental problem is that at one point Lee 
attributes to Muller the description of Charnock’s works as a ‘discursive system’ and as a 
‘technical theological system’. However, a reading of Muller’s words in their original context 
proves that Lee’s assertion is baseless. See ibid., 39. Cf. Muller, PRRD: 1:73, 2:466. 
  34 
 
systems and extracts from them those features that concur with the 
presuppositions manifested in Charnock’s lectures on the existence and the 
attributes of God.  
Ontic and Epistemic Principles: 
Charnock and the principia theologiae 
Like those in the Reformed scholastic tradition, Charnock establishes 
God as the objective ground or the essential foundation (principium essendi) 
of theology whilst Scripture is acknowledged as the epistemic or cognitive 
foundation (principium cognoscendi) thereof.98 While Charnock implicitly 
assumes that both God and Scripture are the principia of the theological task, 
it is God—the principium essendi—which takes precedence in the order of 
religious acceptance, if not in the exposition of Christian theology: ‘The belief 
of a God must necessarily precede the belief of any revelation; the latter 
cannot take place without the former as the foundation… [t]he principal 
foundation of faith is not the word of God, but God himself, and God as 
considered in this perfection [goodness].’99 This in no way diminishes the 
significance of Scripture for the theological task for, in fact, Charnock 
acknowledges that written revelation is the ‘principle’ and the ‘medium’ 
whereby God communicates and makes known his grace to mankind.100  
In general, Charnock’s exposition on the existence and the attributes of 
God exhibits a theological method that recognises the significance of the 
                                                             
98 Charnock, Works, 4: 491, n. *. 
99 Idem., Works, 1: 180; ibid., 2: 383.  
100 Idem., Works, 4: 491. 
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principia theologiae without necessarily framing its content according to a 
particular ontological or epistemological order (ordo essendi or ordo 
cognoscendi); instead, the material is organised according to a pedagogical 
order (ordo docendi).101 However, it is important to note that the chief 
metaphysical assumption is that God (principia essendi) takes logical 
precedence in the task of formulating doctrine. This is to say that the 
principium essendi is for Charnock the assumptio sine qua non for the 
exposition of Christian theology given that no knowledge about the divine 
comes but through the mediation and self-disclosure of God himself.  
Divine Revelation: 
Natural and Supernatural Knowledge of God 
More explicit turns out to be the evidence for Charnock’s belief in the 
natural and the supernatural knowledge of God (i.e., theology), even though it 
must be noted that the discussion of these themes belong to a series of 
lectures included in volume four of the Complete Works and, thereby, a 
comprehensive analysis of such subjects fall outside the scope of this 
investigation.102 It suffices to note, however, that the natural/supernatural 
scheme is observed throughout the theology of the Discourses, including those 
on the existence and attributes of God.103  
                                                             
101 Somehow resembling the method that elicited the order in Calvin’s Institutes. For 
an explanation about the latter, consult Muller, Unaccommodated Calvin: 118-139. 
102 Charnock, Works, 4: 3-163. It is noteworthy that in the only comprehensive 
treatment concerning Charnock’s epistemology, the ‘supernatural’ knowledge of God seems to 
be treated exclusively under the theme of ‘special revelation’, Siekawitch, "Charnock's 
Doctrine of the Knowledge of God," 196-256. This provides an opportunity for further 
investigation on this matter.        
103 In his own style, Charnock follows the natural/supernatural distinction of theology 
used by several of his peers including Mastricht, John Owen (1616-1683), Thomas Barlow 
(1608-1691), Johannes Cocceius (1603-1669), Polanus, and Junius, among others. Rehnman, 
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Instead of rejecting altogether the possibility of acquiring true 
knowledge about God through the created order, Charnock limits the power of 
natural revelation by declaring it ineffective for human redemption. The 
power of natural knowledge in the soul may provide some intelligible 
information about the nature of God, but transmits nothing ultimately 
substantial about the redeeming work of Christ.104 Furthermore, natural 
revelation by itself does not reveal God’s hatred of sin and the benefits of 
divine grace.105 Ultimately, the finest of natural knowledge is outranked by the 
content of supernatural knowledge and thereby the former is inferior to the 
latter in delivering the best knowledge about God.106  
Having noted the limitations of natural knowledge of God, this 
knowledge, though theoretical, insufficient, and limited for contemplation, it 
is intrinsically valuable since by it God secures his people from the wickedness 
of the world whilst concurrently justifies his punitive actions towards worldly 
evils.107 What is more, natural revelation is still capable, though in a limited 
manner, of revealing God’s power, wisdom, goodness, immutability, eternity, 
omniscience, sovereignty, spirituality, aseity, and majesty.108 This knowledge 
                                                             
Divine Discourse: 73-74, n. 1. For natural and supernatural revelation in puritan thought 
(including Charnock), see Beeke and Jones, A Puritan Theology: 11-26. 
104 Charnock, Works, 4: 16. This claim correlates the Christological tone of the 
formulations that Charnock offers in this discourse: (1) ‘The knowledge of God, and Christ the 
mediator, is the necessary means to eternal life and happiness’; and (2), ‘The true and saving 
knowledge of God is only in and by Christ.’ In ibid., 15. 
105 Ibid., 129. 
106 Ibid., 71. 
107 Ibid., 16-17. Cf. Lee, "Theology and Piety," 41-42. 
108 Charnock, Works, 4: 115-116.  
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remains ‘dim in the discovery of his perfections’ and, thus, ‘it sees not light 
enough to raise it up to any close act of a fiducial dependence on him [God].’109 
Besides, natural knowledge serves as the necessary foundation for acquiring 
saving knowledge: one can have natural knowledge without special 
knowledge, but not the latter without the former.  110 In sum, Charnock’s 
acceptance of the legitimacy of natural revelation (as a medium for divine 
disclosure) and his assessment of the superlative status of supernatural 
revelation remain within the boundaries of his theological tradition.111 
In addition to natural knowledge, there is a knowledge that is 
supernatural in character. The primary objective of this sort of knowledge is 
the deliverance of saving knowledge, not simply contemplation (natural 
knowledge’s aim).112 Supernatural knowledge has its origin in God himself and 
it founds in Scriptures and in the person of Christ its means of 
communication.113 It is worth noting that for Charnock Christ is the 
embodiment and the source of all supernatural knowledge concerning the 
divine, in Christ resides all the knowledge that one can get about God, the 
                                                             
109 In ibid., 31. 
110 Ibid., 17. 
111 Westminster Confession of Faith (§XXI.1).   
112 Charnock’s treatment of the Knowledge of God and the Knowledge of God in Christ 
unequivocally illustrates this Christological emphasis, see Charnock, Works, 4: 3-163. It must 
be noted that Charnock frames the uniqueness of Christ’s work in the 
dispensation/acquisition of saving grace within the acknowledgment of the work of the Triune 
God as the efficient cause of regeneration. For Charnock’s treatment of the latter theme, see 
ibid., 3: 250-306.     
113 Junius, Treatise: 198; Beeke and Jones, A Puritan Theology: 18-21. Beeke rightly 
indicates that this supernatural knowledge is framed within a covenantal context. In ibid., 25.   
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supreme ‘medium’ of revelation for discovering God in creation.114 
Supernatural revelation provides the creature with a specific knowledge of 
God, one that exceeds the knowledge acquired through natural revelation.115  
Hermeneutics: 
Exegesis and Biblical Interpretation 
In the concluding remarks of an essay titled Puritan Hermeneutics and 
Exegesis, theologians Joel Beeke and Peter Jones argue that one would get an 
informed idea of the biblical literacy and interpretative sophistication of the 
puritans by reading, amongst other notable puritans, the material attributed 
to Charnock.116 Drawing from Beeke’s and Jones’s essay, this section seeks to 
provide an explanation of the most significant concepts considered by the 
Reformed puritans in interpreting the Bible. By understanding these features 
in the puritan tradition, Charnock’s hermeneutical and exegetical method 
becomes more predictive and easy to understand.     
In the first place, the authors note the covenantal framework from 
which puritan hermeneutics operated. Given that covenant theology was 
popular in Reformed circles during the middle of the 1700’s, it is not 
unexpected observing that the puritans read and interpreted Scripture under a 
covenantal framework. This way of reading Scripture considers the relation 
established by God with his creation as the interpretative key for rightly 
unfolding the drama of redemption as revealed in the Bible. Within this 
                                                             
114 Charnock, Works, 4: 126, 132, 413.  
115 Idem., Works, 5: 485.  
116 Beeke and Jones, A Puritan Theology: 40. 
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covenantal structure, there is the covenant of works and the covenant of grace: 
the former understood as the pre-lapsarian pact (foedus operum) between 
God and Adam, the federal representative of humanity, while the latter taken 
as the post-lapsarian agreement (foedus gratiae) between God and his people, 
wherein Christ is the federal head of the church.117 It is worth noting that 
references about the theological concept of the covenants are not scarce in 
Charnock’s Discourses, a notable example is illustrated in the lecture titled 
God the Author of Reconciliation, where Charnock writes in Christological 
terms about the intrinsic relation of the covenants.118 
Though familiar with the pattern of a twofold covenantal scheme, not 
every puritan followed it. Charnock himself operated within a threefold 
covenantal configuration which, in addition to the covenant of works and the 
covenant of grace, included a third pact: an intra-Trinitarian, pre-temporal 
covenant known as pactum salutis (covenant of redemption or covenant of 
peace).119 Though normally explained in terms of a Father-Son agreement, the 
pactum salutis is a Trinitarian act in which the Holy Spirit, while active as 
potentia Deitatis, does not participate as a legal partner, but as an 
“implementing subject”.120 Doctrinally, the covenant of redemption is an 
                                                             
117 Consult R. Scott Clark, "Christ and the Covenant: Federal Theology in Orthodoxy," 
in A Companion to Reformed Orthodoxy, ed. Herman J. Selderhuis (Leiden: Brill, 2013). For 
a comprehensive study on the first systematic presentation of covenantal theology, see Van 
Asselt, Federal Theology.  
118 Charnock, Works, 3: 375. 
119 For a standard definition of the covenant of redemption, see Louis Berkhof, 
Systematic Theology (London: Banner of Truth Trust, 1959), 298. See Van Asselt, Federal 
Theology: 235.  
120 This is clearly the case in the thought of Johannes Cocceius and Herman Witsius 
(1636-1708), among others. See Richard A. Muller, "Toward the Pactum Salutis: Locating the 
Origins of a Concept," Mid-America Journal of Theology 18 (2007): 15, 23. 
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internal work (ad intra) of the Triune God that functions as the foundation for 
the external work (ad extra) of redemption: ‘[T]he covenant of redemption is 
the foundation of the covenant of grace.’121  
Equally important is the emphasis given in puritan hermeneutics to 
Christ as the hermeneutical key to understand Scripture. Accordingly, 
Charnock asserts that the redemptive knowledge of God cannot be obtained 
apart from the revelation in and by Christ since Scripture reveals that he acts 
as the exclusive mediator and communicator of saving knowledge.  122 For 
Charnock, the foundational knowledge of God comes through an 
interpretation of the Bible wherein the reader (1) handles revelation 
responsibly, (2) considers the history of Christ (as revealed in the biblical 
text), and (3) discerns the Christological motif by means of  analogy, 
prophecy, and typology in the relation between Old and New Testaments.123  
Besides, the puritans assumed the principles of analogia fidei (analogy 
of faith) and analogia Scripturae (analogy of Scripture) in their 
hermeneutical and exegetical method. By presupposing the internal coherence 
of the Bible, the analogia fidei suggests a manner of interpreting the Bible 
whereby the reading of Scripture on any subject should be confirmed with a 
correlated reading elsewhere. Similarly, by presupposing the unity of the 
Bible, the analogia Scripturae states that the best way of interpreting a 
                                                             
121 Charnock, Works, 3: 376. Cf. Idem., Works, 2: 343. 
122 Idem., Works, 4: 120ff. Here, the use of typology is evident to explain that all 
things under the law are but shadows of the promises of redemption to be fulfilled in Christ. 
See Charnock’s discourse titled Christ our Passover, in ibid., 509ff.    
123 See ibid., 15.  
  41 
 
specific passage in Scriptures is by determining its significance in the whole of 
Scriptures.124  Charnock echoes this belief as he explains:  
As God is the author of his law and word, so he is the best interpreter of it; the 
Scripture having an impress of divine wisdom, holiness, and goodness, must be 
regarded according to that impress of divine wisdom, holiness, and goodness, 
must be regarded according to that impress, with a submission and meekness 
of spirit and reverence of God in it.125  
A further aspect in Charnock’s hermeneutics considers the method to 
make effective the transition from biblical exegesis to doctrinal formulae. 
Given that Scripture is the principium cognoscendi theologiae (the cognitive 
principle of theology), it should be the epistemic source from which dogmatics 
is built up.126 This signifies that neither reason alone nor ecclesiastical 
tradition should replace Scripture as the basis for theological truth or, to put it 
differently, the theologian should not relinquish the role of Scripture as her 
prime epistemic source for knowing God.127  
Another important subject in Charnock’s hermeneutics concerns the 
role of reason for interpreting the Bible. Reason is a cognitive ability that, 
under the direction of the Spirit, enables the interpreter to understand 
Scripture, to infer doctrinal matters from the text, and to find ways of 
application for the doctrine acquired.128 Some have argued that by making 
                                                             
124 See Knapp, "Revealing the Mind of God," 537-538. 
125 In Charnock, Works, 1: 222.    
126 See the discussion on Natural and Supernatural revelation in pp. 35-38 above.  
127 Charnock, Works, 2: 8. 
128 Deductive reasoning as an interpretative device is expressed in Reformed creeds 
such as in the Westminster Confession of Faith: ‘The whole counsel of God concerning all 
things necessary for his own glory, man’s salvation, faith and life, is either expressly set down 
in Scripture, or by good and necessary consequence may be deduced from Scripture…’ (§I.6. 
Emphasis mine). For a detailed account of the principle of ‘good and necessary consequence’ 
in the Westminster Confession, consult Ryan M. McGraw, By Good and Necessary 
Consequence, (Grand Rapids: Reformation Heritage Books, 2012); C. J. Williams, "Good and 
Necessary Consequences in the Westminster Confession," in The Faith Once Delivered: 
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‘logically exploitable arguments in a systematic discourse’ the Reformed 
orthodox have made the inferences equally authoritative as the text itself.129 
Briefly, in response to this reproach, one may note that neither the Reformed 
orthodox in their theological systems nor Charnock in his theological sermons 
assumed that every consequence was always good and necessary for their 
doctrinal formulations. In other words, the criterion whereby an inference is 
accepted or rejected relies on the compatibility between cogent rational 
thinking and the testimony of the Bible but never on bare logic.130  
Divine Essence and the Attributes of God  
Discussions on the divine essence in the Reformed systems of the 
seventeenth-century vary in scope and in metaphysical import.131 Since the 
Reformation, Reformed theologians have acknowledged the theological 
problems of ascribing ‘naturam’ (nature) or ‘essentia’ (essence) to God.132 The 
                                                             
Essays in Honor of Dr. Wayne Spear, ed. Anthony T. Selvaggio (Phillipsburg, N.J.: P&R, 
2007).  
129 Bert Loonstra, "Scholasticism and Hermeneutics," in Reformation and 
Scholasticism: An Ecumenical Enterprise, ed. Willem J. Van Asselt and Eef Dekker (Grand 
Rapids: Baker Book House, 2001), 298-299. Loonstra’s main concern has to do with an 
alleged dismissal of the historical context and scope of the text for the sake of rational 
deduction within a particular logical framework. Ibid., 299.  
130 McGraw, By Good and Necessary Consequence. 23. As far as this study concerns, 
no instances have been found in the Discourses where the biblical orientation of Charnock’s 
theological method is sacrificed for a rationalistic version of the Christian faith. In fact, 
Charnock notes: ‘Scripture is the source of divine knowledge; not the traditions of men, nor 
reason separate from Scripture.’ In Charnock, Works, 2: 8. Cf. Goudriaan, Reformed 
Orthodoxy and Philosophy: 36-65; Richard A. Muller, "Vera Philosophia Cum Sacra 
Theologia Nusquam Pugnat: Keckermann on Philosophy, Theology, and the Problem of 
Double Truth," The Sixteenth Century Journal 15, no. 3 (1984). 
131 See, for instance, Synopsis Purioris Theologiae: Synopsis of a Purer Theology, vol. 
1 (Leiden: Brill, 2015), 158-165; Wilhelmus à Brakel, The Christian's Reasonable Service, 
trans. Bartel Elshout, 4 vols. (Grand Rapids: Reformation Heritage Books, 1995), 1:88-89; 
Amandus Polanus, Syntagma Theologiae Christianae (Hanoviae: Johannis Aubrii, 1615), 
II/v; pp. 135-137. 
132 For instance, Musculus explores whether it is proper to affirm that God has a 
nature, see An Natura Locum Habeat in Deo in Wolfgang Musculus, Loci Communes in Usus 
Sacrae Theologiae (Basel: Sebastianum Henricpetri, 1599), XLIII/ii; p. 430. Ultimately, 
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older divines realised that any explanation concerning God’s nature would 
require a qualification indicating that the divine nature cannot be placed 
within any metaphysical classification since God transcends all known genus 
and differentia.133 The Reformed scholastics understood the essence of God as 
that which denotes his quidditatem (whatness), that is, that which makes God 
divine: ESSENTIA DEI est ipsa Deitas, qua Deus à se & per se absolute est & 
exsistit.134  
Generally, the Reformed systems of the orthodox era include a section 
wherein their authors offer an exegetical analysis of the names of God and the 
doctrinal corollaries derived from such study. While not in the same manner, 
Charnock’s Discourses evidence a similar approach: ‘It is not Jehovah, which 
name signifies the essence of God as the prime and supreme being, but 
Elohim, which name signifies the providence of God, God as rector and 
judge.’135 It is, then, the discussion of the names of God (not speculative 
metaphysics) the foundation that serves as the groundwork for the doctrine of 
the attributes of God in both the Reformed systems and in Charnock’s 
Discourses.136 In sum, the treatment of the names of God served as the means 
                                                             
Musculus predicates nature to God, though after presenting a detailed qualification of the 
meaning of the term. 
133 Daniel Chamier, Corpus Theologicum Seu Loci Communes Theologici (Geneva: 
Samuelis Chouet, 1653), III/v; p. 87. 
134 [The essence of God is deity itself, [that] by which God is and exists completely by 
and for himself.] In Polanus, Syntagma: II/v; p. 135.   
135 Charnock, Works, 1: 127. Cf. William Ames, The Marrow of Sacred Divinity 
(London: Henry Overton, 1642), IV/13-14; p. 11.: ‘This Essence of God is declared in his 
Name Jehova.’   
136 For example, from their analysis of the divine name Jehovah, theologians 
contended that God is eternal, independent, immutable, constant, and the most efficient 
cause. See Turretin, Institutes: III/4, v; 1:184-185; Polanus, Syntagma: II/vi; pp.137-141. Cf. 
  44 
 
by which one has access to the content concerning the quid sit Deus just as the 
epistemic basis for the locus de Deo.137      
The Reformed scholastics realised that a correct understanding of the 
divine attributes require of some qualifications: (1) that God’s act of existing 
(esse) is identical to the quiddity of his being (essentia) and, thereby, contrary 
to the ontology of the creature in whom esse and essentia are 
distinguishable,138 (2) that the divine attributes should be understood as 
necessary properties of the divine ontology, namely, propietates essentiales—
properties that are intrinsic to God’s being as to whatsoever subsists in God is 
tantamount to his essence,139 (3) that there are no distinctions between the 
divine attributes and the divine essence nor real distinctions among the 
attributes themselves,140 (4) that the divine attributes subsists as pure 
actuality, that is, they are in God at the fullest and devoid of any potentiality, 
and lastly, (5) that the attributes of God remain eternally immutable and, 
thereby, their operations does not depend on the act of creation.141   
                                                             
Charnock, Works, 1: 40, 360, 366; ibid., 2: 121, 126, 162, 432; Idem., Works, 3: 124-125, 251; 
ibid., 4: 237, 484, 570; Idem., Works, 5: 151, 280, 439. 
137 Dolf te Velde, "Eloquent Silence: The Doctrine of God in the Synopsis of Purer 
Theology," Church History and Religious Culture 92, no. 4 (2012): 583. 
138 St. Thomas Aquinas, ST, trans. Timothy McDermott, 61 vols., vol. 2 (Cambridge: 
Cambridge University Press, 1963), 1a. 3, 3; p. 29. Cf. Brakel, Christian's Reasonable Service: 
1:88. 
139 This is to say, negatively, that the divine attributes do not subsist in God as 
accidentia (accidents) since they are not contingent for the divine ontology. 
140 In this study, the doctrine divine simplicity is treated below, pp. 47-55. 
141 For primary references for the points above, consult Axiomata in Polanus, 
Syntagma: II/vii; p. 141. Also Ames, Marrow: I/iv, 20-30; pp. 12-13; Edward Leigh, A 
Treatise of Divinity (London: E. Griffin, 1646), 21-22. 
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Taxonomic Diversity of the Divine Perfections: 
Patterns of Classification  
Since this study argues for the significance of the scholastic method in 
Charnock’s theology and considering that nowhere he discusses the 
parameters for classifying the divine attributes, it is important to include a 
proper frame of reference to illustrate what it might be the underlying notion 
upon which Charnock would classify the perfections of God.  
Even though the communicable-incommunicable scheme was the most 
common pattern of classification during the era of Orthodoxy, this was by no 
means the only existing method.142 For instance, Franciscus Gomarus (1563-
1641) proposed a classification wherein the attributes were organised 
according to the manner creatures conceive the perfections of God; thus, the 
distinction between ‘negative’ and ‘positive’ attributes.143 Others arragements 
were done according to the degree of relationality established between the 
divine attributes and the creatures: ‘absolute’, then, stands for those 
perfections that explain God as he is in himself without any relation to the 
creature; alternatively, ‘relative’ denotes those attributes that depict God in 
relation to his creatures by means of his external acts.144 Interestingly, Johann 
Heidegger (1633-1698) adds the qualifiers ‘affirmantia’ and ‘negantia’ to the 
                                                             
142 Contra Muller (PRRD: 3:216.), who asserts that the communicable-
incommunicable scheme was not the prevailing method of classifying the divine attributes, 
note Turretin’s comments in Institutes: III/6, i; 1:189.    
143 Franciscus Gomarus, Disputationes Theologicas: Habitae in Variis Academiis, 
Opera Theologica Omnia (Amsterdam: Joannes Janssonii, 1644), III/xxvii; p. 8. 
144 Leigh, Treatise: 22. Probably Johannes Wollebius, "Compendium Theologiae 
Christianae," in Reformed Dogmatics: Seventeenth-Century Reformed Theology through the 
Writings of  Wollebius, Voetius and Turretin, edited and translated by John W. Beardslee III 
(New York: Oxford University Press, 1965), 37. 
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traditional communicable-incommunicable set.145 The communicabilia-
affirmantia configuration accounts for those attributes that relate to the 
creature analogically whilst the incommunicabilia-negantia scheme denies 
the existence of any imperfection in the being of God. Still, others appeal to 
the via triplex bearing in mind the via eminentiae and the via negativa. The 
way of eminence, then, is used to indicate the infinite nature of the attributes 
that resemble finite properties whilst the way of negation is used to negate 
that God owns any of the limitations that are inherent in finite beings.146 
Finally, the ‘communicable’ attributes correspond to those divine properties 
that are predicated of the creature by means of the analogy of attribution, this 
means that this predication must be taken always as analogical (not univocal 
or equivocal).147 The ‘communicable’ attributes highlight the participative 
aspect of the creature vis-à-vis her relationship with God. In this relation, the 
creature resembles the nature of God in a qualified (i.e. analogical) and 
subordinate (i.e. finite) form. On the other hand, the ‘incommunicable’ 
attributes are those perfections that are predicated of God in se and because of 
it have no similarity neither analogical resemblance in the creatures.148 The 
incommunicable attributes seek to emphasise the ontological uniqueness and 
the transcendence of God.  
                                                             
145 Johann Heinrich Heidegger, Medulla Theologiae Christianae (Zurich: Joh. 
Henrici Bodmeri, 1713), I/3, xvii; p. 46. 
146 As we have stated, the way of causality provides us with the knowledge derived 
from placing God as the cause for everything that exist. In this sense, the via causalitatis 
identifies those attributes proper to the relationship of divine causality and effect.   
147 Turretin, Institutes: IV/6; 1:189-191.  
148 In contrast with Turretin, Thysius believes that the incommunicable attributes may 
be partially reflected by the creature. Velde, Synopsis, 165.  
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Simplicitate Dei: The Fundamental Proposition 
The doctrine of divine simplicity is perhaps one of the most baffling, 
nonetheless fundamental, theological notions in the understanding of the 
divine nature. The inherent intricacy of the doctrine has led theologians and 
philosophers, primarily ever since the nineteenth-century, to voice serious 
objections against it.149  
In terms of its historicity, the pedigree of the doctrine of simplicity 
antecedes to its acceptability amongst the schoolmen of the medieval era.150 
Ever since the mid-second century until pre-modern times, the notion of 
divine simplicity did enjoy of a venerable place in the mainstream theology of 
the Christian tradition.151 Throughout the centuries, different aspects of the 
doctrine were emphasised in accordance with the theological function that it 
was expected to accomplish. Early patristic writers, for example, used the 
notion of simplicity to describe God considering different assertions in 
Scripture whereas pro-Nicene theologians employed it to provide the 
theological ground upon which they treated the doctrine of the Trinity.152 In 
                                                             
149 Though some have noted that there have been important reactions against the 
doctrine as early as the seventeenth-century. Duby, "Divine Simplicity," 36-37. Barth captures 
well the sentiment of the critic: ‘Starting from the generalised notion of God, the idea of the 
divine simplicity was necessarily exalted to the all-controlling principle, the idol, which, 
devouring everything concrete, stands behind all these formulae.’ In CD, ed. Thomas F. 
Torrance and Geoffrey William Bromiley (Edinburgh: T&T Clark, 1957), II/1, 329. 
150 Though the Thomistic account is perhaps the most recognised and discussed 
version. See Aquinas, ST, 2: 1a. 3; pp. 19-47.  
151 For an extensive bibliography on the doctrine of simplicity in the patristic and 
medieval eras, see Muller, PRRD: 3:39, n. 57-58. For a detailed study of the doctrinal 
development of divine simplicity, consult Duby, "Divine Simplicity," 13-71. Consult also Gavin 
Ortlund, "Divine Simplicity in Historical Perspective: Resourcing a Contemporary 
Discussion," International Journal of Systematic Theology 16, no. 4 (2014). 
152 See respectively Andrew Radde-Gallwitz, Basil of Caesarea, Gregory of Nyssa, 
and the Transformation of Divine Simplicity (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2009), 7; 
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continuity with their medieval and Reformation forerunners, the Reformed 
scholastics recognised the doctrine of divine simplicity as a fundamental 
axiom for the construal of the locus de Deo, particularly for the exposition of 
the doctrine of the divine attributes.   
Definition and Theological Import 
For the Reformed scholastics, an adequate definition of divine 
simplicity included, in its most austere version, a rejection of all sort of 
composition within the divine nature: ‘By Simplicity [we mean that] God is 
deprived of all composition, coalition, materiality, and diversity; he is 
perfectly (absolute) simple, one and undivided; just as whatever is thought in 
him, God is.’153 More developed explanations of divine simplicity also 
comprised: (1) a detailed description of the kind of composition to which 
divine simplicity is antithetical; (2) an assertion declaring that esse, essentia, 
and attributa are identical in God; and (3), a justification for the compatibility 
of simplicity with the doctrines of the incarnation and that of the Trinity. 
More precisely, the Reformed understanding of the doctrine of 
simplicity rejects that God can be composed logically, physically (naturally), or 
metaphysically (supernaturally).154 In the first place, God cannot be logically 
discriminated by genus et differentia (class and distinction) since his 
                                                             
Lewis Ayres, Nicaea and Its Legacy: An Approach to Fourth-Century Trinitarian Theology 
(Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2004), 286-287.    
153 Heidegger, Medulla: I/3, xix; p. 47. Cf. Polanus, Syntagma: II/iix; p. 141.    
154 Johann Heinrich Alsted, Metaphysica, Tribus Libris Tractata (Herborn: s.n., 
1616), I/14, ii; pp. 137-141; Polanus, Syntagma: II/iix; pp. 141-142; Leigh, Treatise: 26; Velde, 
Synopsis, 165.  
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exclusive nature transcends any human taxonomy.155 Second, the notion of 
simplicity denies that the divine essence is composed of quantitative parts: 
neither by substance and form nor by subjects and its incidentals. Simplicity 
predicated of God implies that the divine essence does not subsist by the 
compilation of different constitutive material elements, as in beings existing in 
corporeal forms. Likewise, to say that there is no physical composition in God 
is to affirm that there are no contingent properties in the divine being because 
everything in God is essential to his being—whatever is of God is God himself. 
Finally, simplicity rejects that God is metaphysically composed, which 
signifies: (1) that God’s actual esse (existence/being) is identical to his actual 
essentia (essence/nature), (2) that potentia (capacity to accomplish change) 
and actus (complete operation) are one in the divine essence, and lastly (3) 
that the essentia of God is indistinguishable from his subsistentia 
(individuality/personhood), that is, that the essence of God is his mode of 
subsisting.156    
The older divines responded to the objections posed by the incarnation 
and the doctrine of the Trinity by arguing that simplicity does not necessarily 
contradict such doctrines as far as the denial of composition is not tantamount 
to the dismissal of distinctions within the Godhead.157  
                                                             
155 Polanus, Syntagma: II/iix; p. 142; Wollebius, "Compendium," 39. 
156 Brakel, Christian's Reasonable Service: 1:96-99. 
157 In some cases, the Reformed orthodox depicted divine simplicity as being 
‘absolute’ or ‘omnimodus’; however, these descriptors were qualified to negate divine 
composition, not the possibility of distinctions in God. Muller, PRRD: 3:280-281.  
  50 
 
In accounting for the doctrine of simplicity vis-à-vis the incarnation, 
the Reformed orthodox noted that the coexistence of the human and the 
divine in the person of Christ does not lead to divine composition since the 
concurrence of the two natures in the theanthropic person does not produce 
additions, changes, or divisions in the divine essence.158 The incarnation is 
understood primarily as unio hypostatica (hypostatic union), this kind of 
union considers: (1) that the humanity of Christ is, by way of conception, 
supernaturally composed of the same substance as that of the virgin Mary, (2) 
that the human nature is, by way of sanctification, devoid of any moral flaw 
through the perfecting power of the Holy Spirit, and (3), that the eternal Son 
takes on, by way of assumption, a human nature into one hypostasis.159 To 
summarize, in the unio hypostatica neither the divine essence nor the 
humanity of the incarnate Word are subjected to change, confusion, or 
mixture, which is to say that in the person of Christ the divine does not 
become human (neither does humanity become divine), hence no composition 
is effected in God’s essence.  
In countering the claim that the doctrine of the Trinity is incompatible 
with divine simplicity, the older theologians noted that the plurality of persons 
indicate a distinctione modali (modal distinction), not composition, within 
                                                             
158 The theological assumption above concerns the person of Christ and the 
communicatio idiomatum in concreto (communication of properties in concrete). Amandus 
Polanus, The Substance of Christian Religion: Soundly Set Forth in Two Bookes, trans. 
Elijahu Wilcocks (London: R.F., 1595), 68. In contrast to the Lutheran’s view of 
communicatio idiomatum in abstracto (communication of attributes in abstracto), the 
Reformed argued that the communication does not take place between the divine and the 
human, but in Christo proprium (the actual person of Christ). Consult Guillaume Bucanus, 
Institutiones Theologicae (Geneva: Samuelis Chouet, 1648), II/xx; pp. 20-21.  
159 William Perkins, A Golden Chaine: Or, the Description of Theologie... (London: 
John Legatt, 1616), 25-26. 
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the divine essence.160 Furthermore, this modal distinction, while being other 
than essential (since the divine essence is indivisible), is also rational and 
nominal (since the divine persons really differ from one another). 
Consequently, some Reformed divines defined the modal distinction that 
discriminates the divine persons as a distinctio realis modalis (real-modal 
distinction).161   
Finally, concerning the multiplicity of the divine perfections, the 
Reformed dogmaticians asserted: (1) that certain distinctions among the 
divine attributes could be discerned rationally based upon the effects of the 
attributes, viz., God’s operations ad extra;162 (2) that the attributes could be 
discriminated by ratio ratiocinatae quae habet fundamentum in re 
(determined reason that has its basis in the thing) and not exclusively through 
a distinctio rationis rationans (distinction by reason reasoning), a rational 
distinction without extra-mental basis.163 In other words, though not realis 
                                                             
160 ‘Modal distinction…which is between being [ens], and rank or mode of being 
[modu entis].’ In Bartholomèaus Keckermann, Systema Sacrosanctae Theologiae (Hanouiae: 
Guilielmum Antonium, 1602), 1:59. Samuel Maresius (1599-1673), concludes that relationes 
personales, non arguant in Deo compositionem, sed distinctionem [the personal relations 
within the Godhead do not indicate composition, but only distinction]; furthermore, these 
relations, quippe quae non componunt, sed modificant [do not compose the divine essence, 
but modify it]. In Samuel Maresius, Collegium Theologicum (Groningae Frisiorum: Johannis 
Cöllen, 1659), II/xxi; p. 42. 
161 The divine persons are distinguished modaliter [modally] not essentialiter 
[essentially]. Turretin, Institutes: III/27, iii-xi; 1:278-280. Mastricht also favours the 
inclusion of ‘realiter modaliter’ as a qualifier to understand the modal distinction that 
distinguishes the divine persons within God. In Petrus van Mastricht, Theoretico-Practica 
Theologia (Utrecht: Thomae Appels, 1699), II/24, ix; p. 238. 
162 Brakel indicates that we may distinguish between the divine attributes by the way 
they are recognized by the creature and through the effects that the attributes bring upon their 
objects. In Christian's Reasonable Service: 1:89; ibid. 
163 Thus, Mastricht: Differre utique attributa Dei inter se; sed non tam a parte Dei, 
quam a parte nostri conceptus… ast non ratiocinante sola… sed ratiocinata, quae 
distinguendi rationes, accipiat ab ipso Deo. [Certainly, the attributes of God differ in 
themselves, not to such an extend as [the distinction] being part of God, but as being part of 
our conception… not merely upon reasoning alone… but also upon reason reasoned, which 
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(real) objectively, the distinctions between the divine attributes are more than 
nominal and subjective inasmuch as they are grounded in God’s objective 
reality.164    
Divine Simplicity in Charnock’s Doctrine of God  
The doctrine of simplicity is nowhere discussed separately in the 
Discourses upon the Existence and Attributes of God, yet it is foundational for 
Charnock’s understanding of the nature of God and hence for his 
comprehension of the divine perfections.165  
Charnock’s commitment to the notion of divine simplicity is explicitly 
rendered in the Discourses: 
God is the most simple being; for that which is first in nature, having nothing 
beyond it, cannot by any means be thought to be compounded; for whatsoever 
is so depends upon the parts whereof it is compounded, and so is not the first 
being. Now God being infinitely simple, hath nothing in himself which is not 
himself, and therefore cannot will any change in himself, he being his own 
essence and existence.166 
                                                             
learns its method of distinguishing from God himself.] In Idem., Theoretico-Practica: II/5, 
vii; p. 93.  
164 Turretin concludes (in Institutes: III/5, viii-ix; 1:188-189) that the distinction used 
to discriminate one divine attribute from another is neither real nor merely conceptual but 
primarily eminentem (eminent) in character. Instances in which the distinctions are 
understood simply nominally were observed in strong conceptualism (i.e., nominalism), as for 
instance in the work of medieval theologians such as William of Ockham (ca. 1288-1347) and 
Gabriel Biel (ca. 1420-1495). For Ockham’s position on divine simplicity and the divine 
attributes, consult the magisterial work of Marilyn McCord Adams, William Ockham, 2 vols. 
(Notre Dame, Ind.: University of Notre Dame Press, 1987), 2:941-952.  
165 Muller explains the absence of divine simplicity in Charnock’s material by noting 
the homiletical character of the Discourses. In Muller, PRRD: 3:275-276. 
166 Charnock, Works, 1: 394. 
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Yet, Charnock’s goal is never to present an explanation of the doctrine, 
but to use it as the theological background upon which he explains other 
aspects concerning the divine perfections.167 
Divine simplicity is directly linked to at least eight (spirituality, 
eternity, omnipresence, knowledge, wisdom, power, and holiness) of the 
eleven perfections that are treated in the Discourses.168 For Charnock, the 
attribute of spirituality is the fullest mode of subsistence and the purest form 
of simplicity. Thus, to subsist as a pure spirit is tantamount to be composed of 
no parts.169 Furthermore, to say that God is the purest spirit is to say that he is 
perfect since spirituality and simplicity are directly proportional to 
perfection.170   
In Charnock’s theology, omnipresence and divine simplicity are linked 
by a causal relation whereby the latter entails the former. The claim follows 
from confirming the essential presence of God in creation (i.e., omnipresence) 
by considering his continual operation in the world, in addition to divine 
infinity and the supreme perfection of God.171 Charnock reasons that since God 
                                                             
167 Simplicity, for example, prevents one to predicate change in God’s essence. If God 
is simple, he cannot be mutable as far as composition—essential or accidental—presupposes 
variability. Ibid., 393. Similarly, Polanus: ‘Deus esse immutabilem…Quia est actus 
simplicissimus, in quem nulla cadit composition, nulla passiva potentia.’ [God is 
immutable…Because he is the simplest act, in which neither composition nor passive power 
falls.] In Polanus, Syntagma: II/xiii; p. 151. 
168 Charnock, Works: 1:264-265, 273, 276, 278, 280, 322, 351, 361, 382-387, 393-394, 
429-437, 466, 497-498; 2:12-13, 110, 123-124, 136, 149, 185, 196, 256. Charnock alludes to the 
notion of divine simplicity also in his lectures on the doctrine of regeneration and that of the 
object of faith. See ibid., 3:264-265, 273, 276-280, 322; 5:154, 174. 
169 Idem., Works, 1: 263. 
170 Ibid., 264, 268. 
171 Ibid., 433-439. 
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is the one who creates and maintains the universe, he exercises his power over 
all of creation and thereby everything owes its existence and operation to him. 
This implies that the presence of God in the act of creation must be identical 
to his presence in the act of preservation given that the divine substance 
cannot be isolated from the divine power being as the two are identical in God: 
‘where the power of God is, his essence is, because they are inseparable; and 
so his omnipresence ariseth from the simplicity of the nature of God.’172     
Similarly, whilst treating the divine attribute of power, Charnock 
presupposes the notion of divine simplicity to say that the former cannot be 
abstracted from the divine essence as far as power subsists essentially (not 
accidentally) in God. In other words, given that God is pure simplicity, his 
power must be identical to his essence. What is more, the doctrine of divine 
simplicity serves as evidence of God’s omnipotence.173 Charnock presents a 
sequential argument wherein the notions of power, unity, and simplicity are 
logically linked: ‘Where there is the greatest simplicity, there is the greatest 
unity; and where there is the greatest unity, there is the greatest power.’174 This 
line of reasoning implies that perfect simplicity entails perfect unity, the latter 
                                                             
172 Ibid., 436-437. 
173 Ibid., 2: 121-125.It is worth noting that Charnock’s definition of omnipotence (i.e., 
‘the divine essence efficacious ad extra’) is also conceptually shaped by the metaphysical 
claims imbedded in the notion of divine simplicity. Ibid., 110.  
174 Ibid., 124. Interestingly, Charnock seems to invert the sequence elsewhere. In ibid., 
1: 265., he writes: ‘Where there is the greatest unity, there must be the greatest simplicity; but 
God is one.’ This paradox can be explained by noting the purpose of each statement and the 
context in which they are located. In the first instance, Charnock’s aim is to signal to a 
sequential chain of causality in order to show the interconnection between power and other 
divine perfections. Thus, he indicates a direct causal correlation between divine simplicity, 
divine unity, and divine power. The second statement takes place whilst Charnock is treating 
the spiritual nature of God. In it, Charnock seeks to explain that for God to be the most perfect 
unity he ‘must’ be (assumed as) the most simple being, for composition in the divine essence 
would imply that God is constituted by parts, either finite or infinite, and thus not one.            
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understood not only in terms of numerical oneness (unity of singularity) but 
in terms of inner oneness (unity of simplicity), and since the more spiritual a 
being is, the more powerful he is (for perfections are more united in simplicity 
than in composition), then God is the most powerful being.175  
The import of divine simplicity in Charnock’s doctrine of God is not 
limited to its ad hoc function in configuring the way whereby the divine 
attributes are to be grasped in relation to their individuality and their 
multiplicity vis-à-vis the divine essence. The notion of divine simplicity carries 
a more fundamental assumption for Charnock’s theology: to affirm that God is 
simple is to express his very divinity: ‘[I]f his [God’s] understanding and his 
essence were not one and the same, he were not simple, but compounded; if 
compounded, he would consist of parts; if he consisted of parts, he would not 
be an independent being, and so would not be God.’176  
                                                             
175 In the divine essence, the unity of its singularity is ontologically established by the 
unity of its simplicity. See Dolezal, God without Parts: 73-74. Charnock seems to be aware of 
this distinction considering that in some instances he links unity with numerical oneness 
whilst in other occasions he refers to divine unity in relation to inner oneness. See 
respectively, Charnock, Works, 2: 208; ibid., 1: 446.    
176 Idem., Works, 1: 385. 
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CHAPTER III 
 
AN SIT DEUS: CHARNOCK ON THE EXISTENCE OF GOD  
(THE ONTOLOGICAL PRINCIPLE) 
Introduction: Does God Exist?   
Discussions concerning the existence of God during the seventeenth-
century are better understood by considering the debates that took place 
during and after the Reformation era concerning the relation between nature 
and grace and its corollaries for the doctrine of revelation and the knowledge 
of God. During the Reformation, the debate was about the Roman Catholic 
stance on the continuity between nature and grace and about the adequacy of 
the former in the acquisition of true knowledge of God.177  Roman Catholic 
theology operated under the assumption of an ontological dualism between 
nature and grace, one in which nature is elevated (or perfected) by the aid of 
grace to achieve its orientation towards the supernatural. In this manner, 
grace is thought as donum superadditum (having been added) to nature. The 
reformers, on the other hand, rejected the Roman Catholic view by stating 
that nature needs no to be elevated beyond itself, but rather it requires to be 
liberated (from sin) to be itself. Furthermore, the reformers argued that the 
cognitive abilities of the creature became impaired after the Fall making 
                                                             
177 Platt, Reformed Thought: 4-5.     
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impossible for herself to acquire saving knowledge, though able to have 
natural knowledge of God.178 
Though scarce in comparison with the material found during the 
Middle Ages and throughout Post-Reformation times, Roman Catholics and 
Protestants alike discussed at length the existence of God during the 
Reformation period.179 In particular, the reformers gave attention to the 
theistic proofs for apologetical reasons; they sought to defend the 
foundational claims of religion against the sceptics of the time, mostly Deists 
and so-called practical atheists.180 In modern times, the debate has centred on 
the possibility and the legitimacy of developing a natural theology and, by 
derivation, in evaluating the nature and the place of the theistic proofs within 
Christian dogmatics.181  
In most cases, the Reformed orthodox estimated unnecessary to prove 
(i.e., a rigorous scientific demonstration) the existence of God. In their 
estimation, to know that ‘God is’ is self-evident given that, amid other things, 
                                                             
178 Michael Horton, The Christian Faith: A Systematic Theology for Pilgrims on the 
Way (Grand Rapids: Zondervan, 2011), 140-146. Cf. Platt, Reformed Thought: 4-5.     
179 Peter Anstey, "Early Modern Philosophy of Religion: An Introduction," in History 
of Western Philosophy of Religion: Early Modern Philosophy of Religion, ed. Graham Oppy 
and Nick Trakakis (Durham, UK: Acumen, 2012), 3.  
180 Here the ‘proofs’ do not refer exclusively to the traditional demonstrations for the 
existence of God, as in Aquinas’s quinque viae, but to a rhetorical argumentation combining 
elements of logic, philosophy, human nature, and history. See Platt, Reformed Thought: 18.  
181 Notably, Karl Barth and his polemics against Protestants such as Emil Brunner and 
Catholics represented by the theology affirmed in the First Vatican Council (1869-1870). In 
the debate, Barth strenuously rejected Brunner’s ‘point of contact’ and Rome’s ‘analogy of 
being’. For a detailed description of the position taken by Barth and his antagonists over 
natural theology, consult G. C. Berkouwer, General Revelation, Studies in Dogmatics (Grand 
Rapids: Eerdmans, 1955), 21-86. For an intramural debate among modern Protestants, see 
Emil Brunner and Karl Barth, Natural Theology: Comprising 'Nature and Grace' by Emil 
Brunner and the Reply 'No!' By Karl Barth, trans. Peter Fraenkel (London: Centenary Press, 
1946). 
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the idea of ‘God’ always entails existence as an indispensable property of 
being. Moreover, the recognition that God exists comes intuitively in the 
human mind, regardless of scientific proof, since rational creatures have been 
endowed from creation with a sensus divinatis (sense of the divine).182 
Nevertheless, the older divines acknowledged that belief in the existence of 
God was foundational for any coherent theological claim given that existence 
is that which logically precedes any other claim about the divine nature: ‘We 
cannot pay God a due and regular homage unless we understand him in his 
perfections, what he is; and we can pay him no homage at all unless we believe 
that he is.’183 
Exegetical Foundation 
Like his peers in the Reformed scholastic tradition, Charnock 
establishes the foundation of the discussion on the Existence of God in the 
testimony of Scripture. The classical locus ever since the Reformation and 
thus Charnock’s chosen text for treating the problem of unbelief (i.e. practical 
atheism) is Ps. (14:1): The fool hath said in his heart, There is no God. They 
                                                             
182 In contrast, Thomas concludes, while admitting that the proposition ‘God exists’ is 
‘per se nota est’ (evident in itself), that ‘because what it is to be God is not evident to us’, the 
proposition is then ‘non est nobis per se nota’ (not evident by itself for us). In Aquinas, ST, 2: 
1a. 2, 1; p. 7. See also Gilby’s editorial comments, in ibid., 6, n. c. Though the majority of the 
Reformed affirmed the self-evidential nature of the proposition ‘God is’, there were some, 
such as Thomas Barlow (1609-1691), who denied it. See Dolf te Velde, The Doctrine of God in 
Reformed Orthodoxy, Karl Barth, and the Utrecht School: A Study in Method and Content, 
ed. Eddy Van der Borght, Studies in Reformed Theology (Leiden: Brill, 2013), 127; Sebastian 
Rehnman, "The Doctrine of God in Reformed Orthodoxy," in A Companion to Reformed 
Orthodoxy, ed. Herman J. Selderhuis (Leiden: Brill, 2013), 368.     
183 In Charnock, Works, 1: 129. 
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are corrupt: they have done abominable works; there is none that doth 
good.184   
Charnock dismantles verse 1 in different clauses and offers a discursive 
analysis framed by familiarity with the original language and philological 
prowess. Charnock pays attention to the use of Ps. (14:1) elsewhere in 
Scripture and uses a variety of biblical passages to provide textual evidence for 
the exegetical points he tries to make, by doing so he evidences a commitment 
to the hermeneutical principle of analogia fidei. Charnock seeks support in 
the tradition as he interacts with biblical commentators such as Calvin, 
Hebraists like Siméon Marotte de Muis (1587-1644), and even by appealing to 
counter-Reformation figures such as Old Testament scholar Augustinus 
Steuchus Eugubinus (1496-1548).185    
The exegesis of Ps. (14:1) is preceded by a theological observation about 
the universal scope of sin and the moral corruption of humanity after the 
Fall.186 This is important because it provides the basis for a biblical 
anthropology wherein an emphasis on the absolute necessity of divine grace 
for salvation is required.187 Further theological claims flow out of Charnock’s 
                                                             
184 Ibid., 126. Cf. Andreas Hyperius, Methodi Theologiae, Siue Praecipuorum 
Christianae Religionis Locorvm Commvnivm Libri Tres (Basel: Ioannem Oporinum, 1567), I, 
p. 74; Musculus, Loci Communes: I/i, p. 1; Turretin, Institutes: III/2, ix; 1:179. 
185 Charnock, Works, 1: 127. The similitudes between Charnock and Calvin on the 
exegesis of Psalm (14:1) are worth noting. See Commentary on the Book of Psalms in John 
Calvin, Commentaries of John Calvin, 22 vols. (Edinburgh: Calvin's Translation Society, 
1844-1855; repr., Baker Books House: Grand Rapids, 1979), IV:188ff. 
186 Charnock, Works, 1: 126. 
187 In his discourse on ‘The Necessity of Regeneration’, Charnock observes that 
‘[n]atural men have no delight in anything but secular concerns, love nothing but their own 
advantage; admire not any true spiritual worth…’, Idem., Works, 3: 84. 
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exegesis of Psalm (14:1); for instance, the moral state of the ‘fool’ (i.e. the 
unbeliever) is that of pervasive corruption and albeit the faculties of the soul 
(i.e., will and intellect) remain active in him, these do not operate in 
accordance to the original imprint given by God in creation and thus he 
cannot have a ‘right notion of God and divine things.’188 Thereby, the plight of 
humanity is the result of an spiritual state that is manifested in lack of 
wisdom, rather than resulting from an intellectual impediment.189 The result 
of this spiritual condition is scepticism, one that is manifested in atheistic 
tendencies, unworthy practices, and the misuse of reason; this in turn results 
in the rejection of God’s existence and in an attempt to blot out the moral 
implications arising from acknowledging the sanctity of God.   
Interestingly for Charnock, what the psalmist describes in Ps. (14:1) is 
not the absolute denial of the existence of God (speculative atheism), but the 
denial of God’s governing power over creation: non potestas Domini.190 The 
incredulity of the ‘fool’ (nâvâl) in Psalm (14) is not a direct attack on the 
divine essence (understood as divine existence), but a repudiation of the 
providence of God.191 Yet, the denial of God’s participation in the sustenance of 
                                                             
188 Idem., Works, 1: 126. Charnock holds to the faculty psychology and thus he 
understands the faculties of the soul to be the intellectus (intellect: the reflective principle) 
and the voluntas (will: the active principle and the seat of all the affections). Idem., Works, 4: 
275. 
189 For Charnock, the ‘fool’ is ‘not one who wants reason, but [one who] abuses his 
reason’, in Idem., Works, 1: 126. Thus, Muller summarises that for Charnock ‘[t]he problem of 
atheism is not primarily philosophical but hamartiological.’, in Muller, PRRD: 3:180. 
190 Charnock, Works, 1: 127. 
191 Cf. Michael J. Buckley, At the Origins of Modern Atheism (New Haven: Yale 
University Press, 1987), 9-10.       
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creation suffices to reckon the ‘fool’ as an atheist.192 This is the case, Charnock 
explains, since the scepticism of the ‘fool’ ultimately leads to a rejection of the 
reality of God, ‘for [by denying the providence of God] they strip him [God] of 
that wisdom, goodness, tenderness, mercy, justice, righteousness, which are 
the glory of the Deity.’193  
Incidentally, the Reformed scholastics had identified three forms of 
unbelief: (1) an absolute form of atheism wherein the actuality of God is 
entirely rejected, this is atheism quoad existentiam, (2) a form of atheism that 
is manifested by the rejection of God’s caring and governing power over 
creation, this is atheism quoad providentiam, (3) a sort of atheism that rejects 
one or more of the essential attributes of God, this is atheism quoad 
naturam.194 In this discourse, Charnock does not aim at repelling atheism in 
its quoad existentiam (absolute or sceptical) form, but in rebutting the 
foundations of practical atheism, namely, those atheistic impulses manifested 
                                                             
192 Contrary to the post-Enlightenment significance of ‘atheism’ wherein the term was 
specifically understood as the denial of the existence of God. This form of atheism formally 
appeared until the mid-eighteenth-century in the work of French philosopher Denis Diderot 
(1713-1784). Ibid., 249-250. From late medieval period, all the way through up to the 
beginning of post-Reformation times, the word ‘atheism’ was used as a generic term for 
deviance or, in some cases, as a form of religious abuse; thus, to confess oneself as an atheus 
(atheist) is blasphemia (blasphemy) and implies also infidelitas (faithlessness), diffidentia 
(unbelief), incredentia (distrust), and incredulitas (incredulity). See Gavin Hyman, "Atheism 
in Modern History," in The Cambridge Companion to Atheism, ed. Michael Martin 
(Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2007). This is not to say, however, that Charnock’s 
use of the word ‘atheist’ is improper or that his charge of ‘atheism’ is unfounded insofar as he 
is appealing to the legit meaning of the word as established by its semantic range during the 
seventeenth-century. See Trueman, "Reason and Rhetoric," 33.    
193 Charnock, Works, 1: 127.        
194 Ibid. 
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in licentious living arising from creating a caricature of the divine to replace 
the biblical God.195   
Charnock concludes the exegetical part of this discourse by 
summarising the thrust of the text, a depiction of humanity’s moral condition 
after the Fall. In the end, atheism is a form of moral corruption that affects the 
faculties of the soul, a spiritual ailment caused by lack of spiritual life. This 
moral corruption is pervasive as it impedes wisdom (i.e. good judgement) to 
operate properly in the light of natural revelation, that is, it is a moral problem 
with cognitive repercussions affecting the intellect by impeding human reason 
to acknowledge the reality of a creator. Additionally, this moral state 
compromises also the will as it acts—by commission or by omission—in ways 
that defy God’s moral law.196 
Doctrinal Formulae 
Atheism is irrational 
Charnock renders his concluding judgement in a simple proposition: ‘It 
is a great folly to deny or doubt of the existence or being of God’.197 The folly of 
atheism is so evident that even those who reject the authority of Scripture as a 
legitimate source testifying about the reality of God are without excuse since 
                                                             
195 This is better understood within Charnock’s polemics against other theological 
trends and in response to his political opponents—Arminianism and Socinianism, on the one 
hand, and cavaliers and royalists, on the other. See Trueman, "Reason and Rhetoric," 33-34.    
196 Charnock, Works, 1: 128. 
197 Ibid. 
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reason itself points toward the existence of God.198 Yet again, one needs to 
keep in mind Charnock’s comments concerning the limitations of natural 
revelation for redemptive purposes: general revelation cannot inform one 
about the gravity of sin and the necessity of redeeming grace.199       
Charnock uses an assorted number of a posteriori arguments in his 
case for the existence of God. The arguments include aspects of method, style, 
and content, which in turn incorporate rhetorical points, metaphysical 
assertions, and the use of logical syllogisms.200 In what follows, this study 
analyses Charnock’s arguments for the existence of God by following four 
main reasons given to prove this claim:     
Reason (1): The Universal Sense of God 
For Charnock, the irrationality of the sceptic is manifested by his denial 
of what is common sense to universal reason; the fool is one who goes in 
opposition to the dictates of his own will and intellect. In his denial of God, the 
sceptic suppresses the truth by ignoring the testimony given by the natural 
order in creation. In the end, atheism—in its various presentations—entails a 
form of human deprivation, a kind of dehumanisation.201 
                                                             
198 Ibid., 130. Contra Socinians who deny the possibility of acquiring natural 
knowledge of God; they argued that the existence of God can only be established via special 
revelation. Ibid., 131. 
199 Ibid. 
200 For the role of reason in Puritan scholasticism, wherein philosophical categories, 
deductive reasoning, and syllogisms were part of the technical argumentation used in the 
exposition of the Christian faith, consult Knapp, "Revealing the Mind of God," 542-543. 
201 Works, 1: 128. 
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The foregoing assertion prompts serious questions concerning 
Charnock’s anthropology; for example, is Charnock arguing that the atheists 
have lost that which makes someone a human? What is the extent of the 
ontological ‘degradation’ that an atheist experiences by his atheism? Though it 
is not possible to offer a straightforward answer to such inquiries since 
Charnock neither expands on these points nor has he dealt with anthropology 
as an independent theological locus at any point in the Discourses, this study 
suggests a response that is inferred from Charnock’s own thought.  
In the first place, it is significant to note that this ‘dehumanisation’ is 
neither permanent nor an irreversible state. The moral corruption of the 
sceptic is transformed in imputed righteousness in the divine act of 
regeneration.202 Second, Charnock speaks of the atheist undressing ‘himself of 
humanity’ not of God dispossessing the sceptic from his human nature.203 This 
means that this ‘dehumanisation’ takes place when someone refuses to 
recognise the very source (i.e. God) from which his humanity is derived. In 
other words, it is a self-imposed ‘dehumanisation’, a refusal to use wisely 
(ethical impairment) the rational faculties (epistemological inability) that 
make someone a human.204 In the end, the ‘dehumanisation’ that Charnock 
attributes to the atheist has more to do more with a rhetorical emphasis on the 
moral and mental condition of the unbeliever than with an ontological 
                                                             
202 Volume III is dedicated in its entirety to the theme of regeneration and 
reconciliation. Charnock, Works, 3. 
203 Idem., Works, 1: 128, 142. 
204 Ibid., 132. 
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degradation. This seems to be a plausible explanation considering that it is 
unlikely that Charnock regards the sceptic as having a non-human ontology.  
The argument from the collective awareness of the reality of God must 
not be discarded by the fact that many believe in a multiplicity of deities 
(polytheism) or by those who make the created order indistinguishable from 
the creator (pantheism). On the contrary, this suggests that humans are 
naturally prone to look for something transcendental beyond themselves, even 
if in doing so they ended up worshipping an idol. The point is that the 
designation ‘god’ could not have been attributed to anything unless the 
concept of the divine had not been already assumed in the human mind.205 
This leads Charnock to indicate that absolute atheism was an exceptional 
occurrence before the seventeenth-century.206 By itself, this suggest an 
argumentum ad populum and hence not very compelling insofar as the truth 
value of a proposition cannot be confirmed or rejected exclusively upon the 
number who affirm it or reject it. In Charnock’s case, however, the appeal to 
the collective notion of God is just but one piece of a composite grand 
argument which includes others line of reasoning. For example, the notion 
that there is a God is buttressed by observing the constant presence of theism 
throughout human history. Charnock notes that the acknowledgement of the 
divine has been consistently present in every civilisation despite of all the 
changes that the world has experienced ever since its creation. Besides, if the 
                                                             
205 Charnock follows Pierre Gassendi (1592-1655), the Roman Catholic philosopher 
and mathematician. Ibid., 132-134. 
206 Cf. Jan N. Bremmer, "Atheism in Antiquity," in The Cambridge Companion to 
Atheism, ed. Michael Martin (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2007), 11-12; Gavin 
Hyman, "Atheism in Modern History," ibid., 29-33.   
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acknowledgement of God is just the by-product of human imagination, 
Charnock wonders, why man has not been able to root the notion of the divine 
out of his mind and with it be freed from the emotional angst caused by the 
belief in a perfectly holy and just deity?207 Additionally, Charnock adds 
another piece to the grand argument, namely, the sense for religious matters 
that has been fixed in every human being. The knowledge that God is belongs 
to those innate principles that have been sealed in the human soul ever since 
creation: ‘[to know that God exists] is as natural as anything we call a common 
principle.’208 What is more, since all people have been endowed with a law of 
nature that guides them to do commendable things, indistinctively of race or 
culture, the universal existence of this law presupposes the notion of a 
common lawgiver that transcends those to whom the law has been given.209 
For Charnock, the widespread notion of God cannot be explained by 
unbroken communication, neither by indoctrination, nor by psychological 
reasons. If someone attempts to account for the collective notion of God by 
saying that it is the result of constant communication ever since the first 
human generation, she would still have to explicate the innate sense of the 
divine in the first human being.210 If the idea of God is the result of a political 
scheme propagated by rulers and other authorities to keep the masses under 
                                                             
207 Charnock, Works, 1: 136. 
208 Ibid., 137.    
209 Ibid., 138. 
210 Ibid. Charnock underlines the inadequacy of presenting an infinite regress of 
causes as an explanatory principle for the existence of something. Some scholars have noted 
the similitude between Charnock’s objection and the arguments from mechanical causation. 
See Trueman, "Reason and Rhetoric," 34. 
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control, then it must be explained how this practice became universal and how 
is it that there is no record anywhere of a legislation prohibiting the belief in 
God. Finally, if one attempts to explain the existence of God by considering 
the fear of divine judgement, it must be argued that man was created with an 
inherent habit to sin and that the fear of judgement was contemplated even 
before the Fall, but this cannot be for the object of fear must be prior to the act 
of provoking fear. In other words, the fear of divine judgement presupposes 
the existence of a being who executes the sentence that is being feared.211        
Reason (2): The Testimony of the Natural Order 
It is worth noting that the primary piece of evidence to which Charnock 
appeals to justify the claim that general revelation points to the existence of 
God is special revelation. For Charnock, Rom. (1:19-20) reveals that God has 
made known his eternal power through the natural order in creation. The 
magnificent glory of God is seen in every perfection contained in the 
creaturely realm and since this is so evident, man is without excuse in his 
denial of the existence of God.212 This is significant for, if Trueman is correct in 
identifying Charnock’s account of universal manifestation of the divine as the 
‘metaphysical heart’ of the discourse on the existence of God, it would be 
                                                             
211 Charnock, Works, 1: 142. It is not that mere existence would excite affections such 
as love or fear, but it is the way those affections are related to us that makes God the object of 
those feelings.  
212 Ibid., 142-143. Charnock also appeals to Gen. (1:24), Psalms (8:1; 19:1-2; 54:2), and 
Job (31:25, 27). 
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responsible to affirm that Charnock’s metaphysics (at least in this case) are 
primarily driven by Scripture and not simply by philosophical reasoning.213   
Besides its epistemic foundation in special revelation, the study of the 
existence of God in Charnock’s theology falls under the physical and the 
metaphysical realms.214 For Charnock, the order in the universe testifies for 
the existence of God in at least four ways, namely, production, harmony, 
purpose, and preservation.215  
The appeal to production seeks to demonstrate that things came into 
existence (i.e. production) through divine fiat, that is, that God is the ultimate 
cause of the universe. Charnock accomplishes this by considering Aquinas’s 
quarta via, namely, the argument from the gradation of properties such as 
goodness and truth.216 The argument points to the necessity of an archetypal 
(primary) source of absolute perfection to explain the existence of ectypal 
(derivative) forms of perfection.217 Arguing a posteriori, the reasoning 
                                                             
213 Trueman, "Reason and Rhetoric," 35. 
214 Cf. Francisco Suárez, The Metaphysical Demonstration of the Existence of God: 
Metaphysical Disputations 28-29, edited and translated by John P. Doyle (South Bend, Ind.: 
St. Augustine's Press, 2004), XXIX.1.6, p. 55. 
215 Charnock, Works, 1: 145-171. 
216 Charnock does not use the Five Ways in the same order as Thomas presents them 
in the Summa, rather Charnock includes the Ways indiscriminately according to what the 
argumentation requires.    
217 In the context of theological prolegomena, theologia archetypa (archetypal 
theology) stands for the natural knowledge of God about himself, his decree, and his works in 
relation to his infinite wisdom whereas theologia ectypa (ectypal theology) is creature’s 
derivative wisdom concerning God, his providence, and his works. See Willem J. van Asselt, 
"The Fundamental Meaning of Theology: Archetypal and Ectypal Theology in Seventeenth-
Century Reformed Thought," Westminster Theological Journal 64, no. 2 (2002): 322. A more 
succinct formula is that of Junius: ‘Archetypal theology is the divine wisdom of divine 
matters’; conversely, ectypal theology is ‘the wisdom of divine matters, fashioned by God from 
the archetype of Himself, through the communication of grace for His own glory.’ In Junius, 
Treatise: 152, 158. 
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continues by indicating that all the effects in the universe (i.e. finite things) 
require of an explanation for their occurrence given that the ultimate cause for 
any effect cannot be explained by entertaining an infinite series of causes 
because a processus in infinitum is impossible.218 Infinite regressions are not 
possible to a series of causes of second order (i.e., dependent causes) for these 
exist accidentally (per accidens), namely, in subordination to a first cause.219  
Several arguments are presented in support of the claim that the reality 
of a First Cause accounts for the existence of the universe. Charnock anchors 
his theological reasoning on Gen. (1), Psalm (89:14-15), and Heb. (11:3) from 
which he indicates that the world and all the creatures in it are finite beings.220 
This, in turn, signifies that there was a time when the universe was not and as 
such its existence and causal origin must be attributed to the willing and 
creative power of God: ‘He gives being to them [the world and everything in it] 
now as the fountain of all being, though the several modes of being are from 
the several nature of second causes.’221 In addition to the claim that everything 
came into being through divine fiat, Charnock adds that God did not require 
                                                             
218 Charnock, Works, 1: 144. 
219 On the one hand, Charnock builds upon the metaphysical principle found in 
Aquinas’s prima via, the proof of the existence of a first unmoved mover based on 
motion/change: ‘Prima autem et manifestior via est quae sumitur ex parte motus.’ See 
Aquinas, ST, 2: 1a. 2, 3; p. 12. On the other hand, Charnock’s rejection of processus in 
infinitum resembles Suárez’s comments in §§ 25-40 of Disputation 29. See Suárez, 
Metaphysical Disputations: 68-79.      
220 Charnock, Works, 1: 144. 
221 Ibid. 
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of any pre-existent matter to bring into being the universe, therefore, creation 
is said to be ex nihilo (out of nothing).222  
Charnock shifts his line of reasoning; he transitions from the evidence 
provided by Scripture to the evidence derived from reason. Drawing from the 
principle of efficient causality, Charnock explains that given that the universe 
has a beginning and considering that nothing finite can exist without having a 
cause then everything must have a cause other than itself.223 That the universe 
is finite can be proven by noting the metaphysical impossibility of ascribing 
eternal existence to anything but God.224 This is the case given that infinite 
regressions are actually impossible, so to invoke a cause in an infinite series of 
causes as the causal explanation for the existence of the universe is to endorse 
a metaphysical cul-de-sac.225 What is more, matter cannot be eternal due to its 
mutability given that eternal things are immune to change.226  
                                                             
222 Ibid. 
223 This is a variation of the cosmological argument for the existence of God, more 
specifically the secunda via in Aquinas, ST, 2: 1a. 2, 3; p. 15.     
224 Charnock, Works, 1: 144-146. Elsewhere, Charnock explains that if creatures were 
eternal, their own existence would have hinged on eternal propagation rather than on a First 
Cause; however, this cannot be since time is finite and thus it is impossible to have an infinite 
sequence of propagation. Ibid., 145. 
225 Ibid. In modern times, some philosophers have objected to the cosmological 
argument arguing that it is possible to have infinite regressions; they have argued that 
infinites are present in complex theories of infinitesimal calculus, see Graham Oppy, 
Philosophical Perspectives on Infinity (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2006). 
Defenders of the cosmological argument have replied that the existence of potential infinite 
sets in mathematics do not prove the existence of actual infinites, consult William Lane Craig, 
"Graham Oppy on the Kalam Cosmological Argument," International Philosophical 
Quarterly 51, no. 3 (2011). 
226 Charnock, Works, 1: 145. Cf. Aquinas, ST, 2: 1a. 10, 1; pp. 134ff. Interestingly, 
Mastricht describes eternity as something of endless, indivisible, and independent duration, 
something ‘devoid of all imperfection and change.’ Quoted in Heinrich Heppe, Reformed 
Dogmatics: Set out and Illustrated from the Sources, trans. G. T. Thomson (London: Allen, & 
Unwin, 1950), 65.  
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Once it has been established that nothing in creation is eternal, 
Charnock introduces a series of six propositions wherein he attempts to 
demonstrate that the universe owes its existence to an external cause that 
transcends creation.227 The first three propositions form a logical syllogism 
that can be expressed as follows: 
P1= Self-creation is not possible 
P2= Creatures are not capable of creating the world 
P3= Therefore, there must be a creator that transcends creation 
P1 is supported by the testimony found in Psalm (100:3), The Lord he is 
God: he hath made us, and not we ourselves.228 This entails Charnock to 
affirm, on the one hand, that God is the ultimate cause of human existence 
and, on the other, that it is impossible for the creature to be his own cause. If 
special revelation identifies God as the almighty creator, human reasoning 
provides the rationale to claim that self-creation is impossible: since finite 
things (X) require a beginning, it may be inferred that there was a time when 
X was not, but if at one point in time X did not exist, how could X exist now 
given that something that once was no-thing could not have acted without 
being, much less it could have brought into existence its own being.229 
Therefore, no logical explanation can be provided to account for the self-
causality of finite things considering that there was a time when finite things 
were deprived of an objective ontology and, thus, could create nothing.230 
                                                             
227 Charnock, Works, 1: 146-172. 
228 Ibid., 146. 
229 Ibid., 146-147. 
230 This objection has retained its force throughout the ages as it is indicated in the 
work of contemporary philosophers and theologians: ‘It is absurd to suppose that something 
is explanatory prior to itself. (An obviously absurd case of something’s being explanatory 
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Charnock wants to stress the fact that it would be logically contradictory to 
assert that something can create itself because this would involve the 
affirmation of two antithetical claims, namely, that something is and is not at 
the same instant and in the same relation.231   
P2 is supported by a reasoning that conflates logical, metaphysical, and 
scriptural elements. Charnock notes that if a ‘creature’ has the power to create 
something ex nihilo, she in fact is not a creature but a higher being given that 
creatures are by definition deprived of omnipotence (the power required to 
create something out of nothing).232 Furthermore, if a creature made the 
world, she must own in her being all the perfections of the thing created; 
however, this is evidently not the case as no creature possesses all the 
perfections of the world at once.233   
P3 contains the logical conclusion of the syllogism, which is inferred 
from P1 and P2. Unless the creator is a supreme being in the order of nature, 
namely, God, the existence of the universe could not be satisfactorily 
explained. Competing accounts encounter the insolvable problem of 
explaining the origin of the so-called ‘creator’ by appealing to the notion of 
                                                             
prior to itself is something’s creating itself)’; ‘When pressed, the concept [self-causation] soon 
shows itself incoherent and dogmatically precarious.’ See respectively in Joshua Hoffman and 
Gary S. Rosenkrantz, The Divine Attributes, Exploring the Philosophy of Religion (Oxford: 
Blackwell, 2002), 91; John B. Webster, "Life in and of Himself: Reflections on God's Aseity," 
in Engaging the Doctrine of God: Contemporary Protestant Perspectives, ed. Bruce L. 
McCormack (Grand Rapids: Baker Academic, 2008), 117.  
231 Basically, the same objection is used to reject that man is self-created, note the 
explanation in Charnock, Works, 1: 147-149. 
232 Ibid., 149. 
233 Charnock reinforces P2 by noting that Scripture itself (Isa. 65:6-7; Deut. 4:35) 
testifies about the existence of an infinite, eternal, an independent being who is responsible 
for the existence of the universe. Ibid., 150. 
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self-creation and that of the world by invoking an infinite regress of causes, 
but these scenarios end up being logically incoherent or metaphysically 
impossible.234  
Those who deny the existence of God by saying that reality is just an 
illusion must believe that they exist, otherwise they would not be able to think, 
but they evidently think, so their existence must be ultimately explained by a 
first cause.235 Furthermore, this cause must exist necessarily because nothing 
can precede that which is the ultimate cause. To be the first cause is to be 
without beginning and, thus, it must exist in and from itself, it must eternally 
subsist à se.236 This is to say that divine existence does not require a causal 
explanation because God eternally and necessarily subsists by the power of his 
own being.237 Furthermore, this first cause must be infinitely perfect since the 
absence of total perfection in creation presupposes the existence of an 
archetypal perfection, i.e., God, of whom no greater perfection can be 
                                                             
234 Ibid. 
235 Charnock seems to operate under the same principle that prompted René 
Descartes (1596-1650) to write: ‘I am thinking therefore I exist, *was so secure and certain* 
that it could not be shaken by any of the most extravagant suppositions of the sceptics, I 
judged that I could accept it without scruple, as the first principle of the philosophy I was 
seeking.*’ In René Descartes, A Discourse on the Method of Correctly Conducting One's 
Reason and Seeking Truth in the Sciences, trans. Ian Maclean, Oxford World's Classics 
(Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2006), 4.32, p.28. 
236 Charnock, Works, 1: 151. It is significant to note the role of divine aseity (‘self-
existence’) in Charnock’s theology of the divine attributes. The aseity of God explains that he 
requires of nothing else than himself to be or, to put it differently, that God does not require of 
a cause to explain his own existence.  
237 A caveat is due: while God exists à se, he is not causa sui; to assert that God is his 
own cause is contrary to logic and repugnant to divine perfection. See Muller, PRRD: 3:238-
240; William G. T. Shedd, Dogmatic Theology, ed. Alan W. Gomes (Philipsburg: P&R 
Publishing, 2003), 276.  
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conceived.238 It is worth noting that Charnock here appeals to a variant of the 
classical a priori argument for the existence of God known as the ratio 
Anselmi. Anselm (1033-1109) stated, in what would be known as the 
ontological argument, that if God is something aliquid quo nihil maius 
cogitari possit [‘than which nothing greater can be thought’], then he cannot 
be a fixture of the mind but it must exist objectively.239  
Charnock also argues that the natural order testifies of God by 
appealing to the congruence of the universe, an argument based upon the 
harmony exhibited in the created order (effect) as evidence to know God 
(cause). For Charnock, atheistic explanations of the natural world fail to 
provide a satisfactory answer as to why the universe displays such order and 
beauty in its structure.240 The argument from harmony is buttressed by three 
major claims: the equilibrium of contrary qualities, the mutual subordination 
of created beings, and the stability of the order established (regularity, 
uniformity, and constancy).241  
In the first place, Charnock says that created things are made of 
properties (sometimes contrary in nature) which co-exist for the benefit of the 
                                                             
238 Charnock, Works, 1: 151. Trueman believes that the invocation of a divine 
archetype accounting for the notions of perfection residing in the human mind might be 
‘Platonic’ in its origins. Trueman, "Reason and Rhetoric," 35.  
239 See "Proslogion," in Anselm of Canterbury: The Major Works, ed. G. R. Evans and 
Brian Davies, Oxford World's Classics (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1998), 87-88. Cf. 
Augustine, Catholic and Manichaean Ways of Life, trans. Donald A. Gallagher and Idella J. 
Gallagher, vol. 56, Fathers of the Church (Baltimore: Catholic University of America Press, 
1966), II. 11. 24, p. 82.   
240 Charnock, Works, 1: 151. Charnock employs a variation of the teleological 
argument or argument from design. The quinta via in Aquinas’s Five Ways, Aquinas, ST, 2: 
1a. 2, 3; p. 17.   
241 Charnock, Works, 1: 152-158. 
  75 
 
thing composed. He adds that no harmonious composition could have taken 
place unless these elements had been ordered by a supreme, wise being. 
Instead of assigning creatures’ ultimate purpose and their suitability for 
reciprocal service to mindless occurrences in nature or to chance, Charnock 
asserts that these features must be explained by the existence of a 
transcendent intelligent cause. Furthermore, while everything in the natural 
order has a definite function for the communal benefit, there is a notable 
orientation in the structure of the universe to favour the human race given 
that it is the pinnacle of God’s works: creation is, thus, not ordered propter se 
(for itself) but propter aliud (for another).242 Finally, Charnock argues that the 
regularity, the uniformity, the constancy, and the variety of the composition 
displayed in creation lead to the postulation of two possible explanations to 
account for such characteristics of the universe: (1) a natural order that is 
intrinsically intelligent and, thereby, divine, or (2) the existence of a 
transcendental, intelligent, and all-powerful being.243 Ultimately, Charnock 
argues that the regularity, the uniformity, the constancy, and the variety of the 
composition displayed in creation lead to the postulation of two possible 
explanations to account for such characteristics of the universe: (1) a natural 
order that is intrinsically intelligent and, thereby, divine, or (2) the existence 
of a transcendental, intelligent, and all-powerful being.244  
Intended purpose is the following piece in the argument for the 
existence of God upon the natural order. The thesis here is teleological in 
                                                             
242 Ibid., 154. 
243 Ibid., 155-156. 
244 Ibid., 155-156. 
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nature, that is, that creation has an ultimate meaning, a goal to achieve, and 
since non-rational creatures are incapable of providing meaning into their 
own existence this purpose must come from an infinitely superior rational 
being equipped with a complete understanding of nature and, thereby, 
capable of providing existential meaning to creation. Though rational beings 
may pursue some end while ignoring the mechanics of the natural order to 
achieve their objectives, only God, a being with a transcendental nature and a 
superior understanding, must be the one determining creation’s ultimate 
telos.245   
From the notion of preservation, Charnock infers that nature’s 
sustenance depends on a self-subsisting and self-preserving first cause given 
that something that is unable to subsist by its own power is incapable of 
preserving itself. Moreover, just as a transcendental cause is required to 
account for the preservation of the created order, the universe’s order, 
goodness, and beauty entails the existence of a self-sufficient and wholly 
independent principle.246 In fact, had not the universe been preserved by the 
operation of the same power required for its creation, everything would have 
entered in a state of chaos, thus Charnock: ‘Though the matter of the world 
after creation cannot return to that nothing whence it was fetched, without the 
power of God that made it (because the same power is as requisite to reduce a 
                                                             
245 Ibid., 158-160. 
246 Ibid., 161. 
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thing to nothing as to raise a thing from nothing), yet without the actual 
exerting of a power that made the creatures they would fall into confusion.’247 
Reason (3): The Composition and Superiority of the Human Nature 
This line of reasoning involves a discussion of the architecture and 
excellence of humanity that leads Charnock to deduce the existence of God.248 
The structure of this section, therefore, focuses on a discussion involving the 
physical (body) and metaphysical (soul) constitution of man and the 
implications thereof for the existence of God.249  
Charnock affirms that human beings are the highest form of creation, 
the zenith of finite beings; this claim is justified by noting: (1) the cognitive 
ability of human beings to reason, and (2) the intrinsic ability of humanity to 
reflect many of the perfections that are found in nature: ‘Man is the epitome of 
the world, contains in himself the substance of all natures and the fullness of 
the whole universe, not only in regard of the universalness of his knowledge, 
whereby he comprehends the reasons of many things, but as all the 
perfections of the several natures of the world are gathered and united in man 
for the perfection of his own, in a smaller volume.’250  
                                                             
247 Ibid. 
248 Ibid., 162. 
249 This dual classification of the constitutive elements of man indicates that Charnock 
holds to what is called anthropological dichotomy, that is the notion that contends that man is 
constituted by body and soul. In contrast to the dichotomic view, other contend that man is 
composed not by two, but by three parts: body, soul, and spirit. It must be noted, however, 
that most theologians of the Reformed orthodox era rejected trichotomic anthropology in 
favour of a dichotomic approach. See Heppe, Reformed Dogmatics: 221. Cf. Velde, Synopsis, 
317-318; n. 5.        
250 Charnock, Works, 1: 162. The idea of man embodying a microcosm in himself is 
echoed by other divines, ‘to recapitulate all created things so speak in one man and to present 
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That God exists can be inferred from observing the composition of the 
human body and the nature of the soul: ‘He [God] shines in the capacity of our 
souls and the vigour of our members.’251 As God is the one who bestows 
humanity to mankind, to deny his existence is to strip men and women of the 
very fabric that makes them humans.252 To prove his point, Charnock notes the 
order, fitness, and usefulness of the body; he describes different parts of the 
human anatomy to illustrate the ‘signature and mark [and wisdom] of God’ in 
the biological organization of the body.253  
Charnock points out also to the nature of the soul, particularly he 
observes (following Cocceius) the operations and reflections of the human 
conscience as elements leading to the existence of God.254 The human soul is 
the centre of all cognitive operations, the link that connects the individual 
with the realm of things that are not perceived by the senses: ‘We know that 
we have an understanding in us: a substance we cannot see, but we know it by 
its operations, as thinking, reasoning, willing, remembering, and as operating 
                                                             
the sum of his vast universe in a stupendous work of art in such tiny compass and as a sort of 
’. In Mastricht, Theoretico-Practica: III/ ix, 4; p. 367. Translation taken from 
Heppe, Reformed Dogmatics: 220.    
251 Charnock, Works, 1: 162. 
252 Ibid. 
253 Ibid., 162-163. Charnock’s knowledge of the human anatomy and physiology is 
explicated by his attraction for the medical sciences, as indicated in some biographical 
accounts. See M'Cosh, "Introduction," xiii, xxiv. 
254 Charnock, Works, 1: 164-170. Cf. Johannes Cocceius, Summa Theologiae Ex 
Scripturis Repetita (Geneva: Samuelis Chouët, 1665), II/viii, 50-51; pp. 108. Significantly, 
when it comes to decide whether the soul originates by an act of divine creation ex nihilo (i.e., 
creationism) or by an act of human propagation ex traduce (i.e., traducianism), Charnock 
remains nonpartisan not without indicating that the excellencies of the soul cannot be ex 
traduce. See Charnock, Works, 1: 165; n. §. Most theologians in the Reformed orthodox 
tradition, however, favoured creationism whereas Lutherans preferred traducianism. Heppe, 
Reformed Dogmatics: 227-231.   
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about things that are invisible and remote from sense.’255 Therefore, the 
possession of an anima rationalis (rational soul) is an exclusive feature of 
humankind given that only humans have the ability of performing superior 
cognitive and volitional acts.256 In this sense, it can be assumed that the soul is 
understood as a personal substance.  
In terms of its uniqueness, Charnock notes concerning the human soul 
(mind and will): (1) its ability to retain vast amounts of information, (2) its 
capacity to move from one subject to another with incredible speediness, (3) 
its role in constituting a human being by its union with a human body, and (4) 
its ability to act consciously.257 Some of these features serve as the basis upon 
which the existence of God is deduced. For instance, thoughts move from one 
place to another almost instantaneously without considerations of space and 
this cannot be produced by any material cause since matter, by nature, is 
unable to transfer reason and will.258 Furthermore, nature alone could not 
produce an effect that surpasses its own nature, yet mind and will surpass 
nature’s excellency; therefore, Charnock infers, the cause of the soul must be a 
supreme, immaterial, intelligent being.259  
                                                             
255 Charnock, Works, 1: 164. The significance of the soul is that it incorporates to its 
nature a unique number of metaphysical features: ‘ The soul is a spiritual, incorporeal, 
invisible, intangible, and immortal personal entity adorned with intellect and will.’ Brakel, 
Christian's Reasonable Service: 1:310. 
256 In contrast to animals and plants, which have ‘souls’ though essentially different 
than the human soul. Animals, for instance, are endowed with anima sensitiva (sensitive 
soul) whereas plants possess anima vegetativa (vegetative soul). See Idem., Christian's 
Reasonable Service: 1:310-311. 
257 Charnock, Works, 1: 165-166. 
258 Ibid., 165. 
259 Ibid., 165-166. 
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Considering that some contemporary philosophers of atheistic 
persuasion have identified human consciousness as the biggest obstacle for 
holding a purely materialistic cosmology, it is important to explain in detail 
Charnock’s insights on the operations of the human conscience and its import 
in the discussion concerning the existence of God.260 In his line of reasoning, 
Charnock notes that the fear of punishment and the hope for future rewards 
are universal operations of the human conscience that presuppose the 
existence of an archetypal form of justice, whose origin cannot be accounted 
by any other being but God.261 As there is an innate law imbedded in the 
human conscience whereby a person becomes cognisant of the existence of 
objective good and evil, and since these moral absolutes cannot be explained 
by the individual (for he cannot guarantee objectivity but arbitrariness) nor by 
natural generation (for nature by itself does not establish objective morals), 
then a transcendental moral lawgiver must exist from whom absolute morality 
is derived.262  
A variation of the so-called ‘moral argument’ is that which supports the 
argument above. The rationale behind reveals that the objective value 
inherent in a moral action (X) requires of an objective moral lawgiver, 
otherwise the moral content of X would be entirely subjective, if not illusory.263 
                                                             
260 Thomas Nagel, Mind and Cosmos: Why the Materialist Neo-Darwinian 
Conception of Nature Is Almost Certainly False (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2012), 35-
70. Charnock, Works, 1: 166-170. 
261 Idem., Works, 1: 166. 
262 This indicates a limitation of the physical (material) world to communicate an 
immaterial property such as morality, much less one that is universal in scope and objective in 
its value. Ibid., 167. Cf. Gerald Bray, The Doctrine of God (Downers Grove: InterVarsity Press, 
1993), 71-74.   
263 Charnock’s moral argument is a modified form of Aquinas’s Fourth Way, though 
other variations of the moral argument can be observed in the thought of Plato, Aristotle, 
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Charnock assumes an archetypal form of absolute goodness whereby all other 
forms of goodness are measured and since this archetypal goodness cannot be 
simply hypothetical, a being in whose nature this supreme goodness resides 
must exist.264  
There is a logical (not ontological) correlation between the existence of 
God and the reality of consciousness: if there were no God, conscience would 
be redundant. The fact that man fears punishment when he breaks the natural 
law supposes the actuality of a sovereign judge, who as a perfect law-giver, 
must exercise his punitive justice when required, but if there is no such being, 
fear for transgressing the law becomes unfounded and, hence, conscience 
turns out to be of no use.265 Furthermore, if human conscience were not 
informed by a set of objective moral values, it would not be constant in 
experiencing fear in acting evil, particularly by acts done in secret.266  
In sum, Charnock believes that just as human existence is 
demonstrated by the ability of man to think (Descartes’ dictum: ego sum, ego 
                                                             
Augustine and Anselm. Consult Thomas Gilby’s ‘Appendix 9’ in Aquinas, ST, 2: 204, n. 1-4. Cf. 
Rik van  Nieuwenhove, An Introduction to Medieval Theology (Cambridge: Cambridge 
University Press, 2012), 179. 
264 Cf. Aquinas, ST, 2: 1a. 2, 3; p. 17. 
265 Charnock, Works, 1: 169. 
266 Similarly, Turretin notes: ‘For how comes it that the conscience is tormented after 
a crime committed (even in secret and with remote judges), where no danger threatened from 
men… unless it is affected by a most intimate sense of deity…?’ In Turretin, Institutes: III/1, 
xiv; 1:173. 
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existo), the existence of God is supported by the presence of a ‘natural 
principle’ (i.e. conscience) in every person.267  
Reason (4): Extraordinary Occurrences 
The last piece of evidence in Charnock’s cumulative case for the 
existence of God involves the occurrence of extraordinary events in the world, 
which, it is claimed, have no convincing explanation apart from divine 
providence.268  
In the first place, Charnock notes that the concatenation of actions 
leading to the proper punishment of heinous crimes cannot be 
unintentional.269 That the punishment of the transgressor arrives by the 
succession of unexpected circumstances presupposes the action of a righteous 
power capable of intending and delivering due justice for violations against 
the natural law, ‘…it is observable how often everything contributes to carry on 
a judgment intended, as if they rationally designed it. All those loudly 
proclaim a God in the world; if there were no God, there would be no sin; if no 
sin, there would be no punishment.’270  
Second, Charnock points out to of miracles, that is, the occurrence of 
nonconformities in nature. Charnock does not conceive miraculous 
                                                             
267 Charnock, Works, 1: 170. Interestingly, the operations of the conscience and man’s 
innate knowledge of objective moral values have been used as evidence for the existence of 
God by other Reformed scholastic divines. See Heppe, Reformed Dogmatics: 48-49.      
268 These events include the occurrence of special judgments, miracles, and the 
fulfilment of prophecies, in Charnock, Works, 1: 171-173.  
269 Ibid., 171. 
270 Ibid., 172. 
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occurrences as violations of the laws of nature; instead, he reckons miracles as 
acts wherein the natural order of the universe is guided out of its normal 
course by a power infinitely superior to nature itself, namely, by a 
supernatural cause.271 Since these extraordinary occurrences cannot be 
produced by natural causes, a transcendental cause must be invoked to 
account for these events.272 Similarly, the fulfilment of biblical prophecies can 
only be explained by the existence of ‘a mind infinitely intelligent’.273 The 
comprehensive and infallible knowledge of future events, which are purely 
contingent and unknown to the human mind, cannot be explicated apart from 
the activity of a providential power, an infinite intelligence that directs history 
and transcends the natural realm. 
                                                             
271 Ibid. During the eighteenth-century, the significance of miracles as reliable 
evidence for the existence of God was under heavy scrutiny. Contra Charnock, David Hume 
(1711-1776) explained that ‘[a] miracle is a violation of the laws of nature… [miracles] may be 
accurately defined, a transgression of a law of nature by a particular volition of the Deity, or 
by the interposition of some invisible agent.’ In David Hume, An Enquiry Concerning 
Human Understanding, Oxford World's Classics (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2008), 83, 
127. 
272 Charnock, Works, 1: 172. 
273 Ibid., 173. 
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CHAPTER IV 
 
QUID SIT DEUS: CHARNOCK ON THE ATTRIBUTES  
OF THE FIRST ORDER  
Introduction: Divine Perfections per essentiam Dei 
Given that the being of God is utterly transcendent and, thus, beyond 
the cognitive reach of the human mind, the Reformed divines concluded that a 
comprehensive explanation of what entails God essentially was impossible. 
Instead, they suggested that one may know what God is not.274 Based upon 
what God has revealed about himself in Scripture (theologia supernaturalis) 
and through his works (theologia naturalis), the older theologians aimed at 
describing the divine essence rather than explaining it.275  
Emulating his medieval predecessors and contemporaries in the 
scholastic tradition, Charnock recognises two ways of describing God: the way 
of affirmation (eminence) and the way of negation.276 The former takes place 
when one predicates of God that which is excellent in the creature whereas the 
latter comes from removing all imperfections that are found in the creature 
                                                             
274 Leigh, Treatise: 1-4; Mastricht, Theoretico-Practica: II/3, iii; p. 77; Turretin, 
Institutes: III/1, i; 1:169. 
275 The Reformed acknowledged, however, that natural theology was secondary to 
supernatural theology in soteriological matters. See Beeke and Jones, A Puritan Theology: 38. 
276 Charnock, Works, 1: 263. Interestingly, Charnock refers to Johann Gerhard (1582-
1637), whose work on the divine attributes is the first comprehensive discourse on the subject 
from a Lutheran perspective. Robert Preus, The Theology of Post-Reformation 
Lutheranism (Saint Louis: Concordia Publishing House, 1970), 2:54. The reference to 
Gerhard is noteworthy considering the significant differences between Lutheran and 
Reformed orthodox concerning the classification of the divine attributes. Muller, Dictionary: 
49-50.  
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when predicating something of God.277 For Charnock, the way of negation is 
the simplest of the two approaches when it comes to understand the nature of 
God considering that finite minds are better suited to comprehend what God 
is not than what God is, ‘as when we say God is infinite, immense, immutable, 
they are negatives; he hath no limits, is confined to no place, admits no 
change.’278 What is more, Charnock adds, the way of negation is the medium 
whereby most of the knowledge of God is communicated to the creature.279  
Scholars have recently noted that from its early uses in Christian 
theology negative theology has never represented a single set of beliefs. For 
instance, in its moderate version negative theology included positive 
affirmations about God, whereas in its stronger version it denied altogether 
the possibility of describing God by means of human categories.280 The use 
Charnock gives to the way of negation is in accord with the use given to it by 
those who consider that positive affirmations concerning the nature of God 
are possible but restricted by the limitations of human discourse in 
representing God adequately due to the ineffability of the divine essence. 
Nowhere in the Discourses there is an indication of the via negativa 
                                                             
277 Charnock, Works, 1: 263. Charnock’s omission of the way of causality in his 
explanation of the divine attributes may be explained by the fact that he appeals to the 
knowledge of God by via causalitatis when answering the An sit Deus question. Other 
orthodox divines, however, recur to the way of causality to infer the relative attributes. For 
instance, Turretin, Institutes: III/2, viii; 1:179.   
278 Charnock, Works, 1: 263. Cf. Augustine, On the Trinity: Books 8-15, trans. Stephen 
McKenna, Cambridge Texts in the History of Philosophy (Cambridge: Cambridge University 
Press, 2002), 8.2; p. 6. Also, Aquinas, ST, 2: 1a. 2; p. 19. 
279 Charnock, Works, 1: 263. 
280 Lewis Ayres and Andrew Radde‐Gallwitz, "Doctrine of God," in The Oxford 
Handbook of Early Christian Studies, ed. Susan Ashbrook Harvey and David G. Hunter 
(Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2008), 877. 
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functioning as the controlling principle to describe the divine essence in such 
way as to impede the ascription of notions such as ‘goodness’ or ‘being’ to 
God.281 The foregoing caveat prefaces the discussion of the attributes of first 
order, divine perfections that are exclusively predicated of God.  
Spirituality (De Spiritualitate Dei) 
The discourse on the spirituality of God begins with the exegesis of 
John (4.24), ‘God is a Spirit: and they that worship him must worship him in 
spirit and truth’. It is from the interpretation of this biblical passage whence 
Charnock lays out the foundation for the doctrinal content and practical 
application of the doctrine ahead.282  
Contrary to Remonstrant theologian Simon Episcopius (1583-1643), 
who rejected John (4.24) as biblical evidence for God’s spirituality indicating 
that it was God’s will, not his essence, that was the foundation of worship, 
Charnock affirms that the nature of God is the foundation of worship and his 
will the rule thereof.283 In this sense, the act of worship should not exclude the 
nature of the object that is being revered, which in the case of God is his 
spiritual nature: ‘God is a Spirit, therefore must have a spiritual worship.’284 To 
                                                             
281 For the origin of this insight, consult Lewis Ayres, Augustine and the Trinity 
(Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2010), 262, n. 26.  
282 Charnock, Works, 1: 248-282. The exegesis of John (4.24) follows the pattern 
established by puritan hermeneutics of the seventeenth-century in which in-depth exposition 
of the text interwoven with mastery of the biblical languages was common practice. For a 
focalized analysis on Reformed puritan exegesis, consult Knapp, "Revealing the Mind of God."   
283 Charnock’s preference for John (4.24) in dealing with the subject of divine 
spirituality echoes both the mainstream evangelical tradition preceding him (e.g., Calvin, 
Musculus) and the exegetical work of several of his contemporaries. See Neele, Van 
Mastricht: 222-227.      
284 Charnock, Works, 1: 260. 
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put it succinctly, Charnock moves from revelation: John (4.24), to exegesis: 
the nature of God and the duty of man, then into doctrinal formulae and 
practical use: God is a purely spiritual being and spiritual worship is required 
and expected from his creatures.   
The schematics above prefaces Charnock’s definition of the spirituality 
of God. Following Melanchthon, Charnock maintains that to ascribe God with 
spirituality means that ‘he hath nothing corporeal, no mixture of matter; not a 
visible substance, a bodily form. He is a Spirit, not a bare spiritual substance, 
but an understanding, willing Spirit; holy, wise, good, and just.’285 For 
Charnock, the proposition ‘God is a spirit’ is communicated to the human 
mind by way of negation, namely by asserting that ‘he [God] is not a body’.286 
To say that God is a spirit is to deny that the divine essence is constrained by 
the physical limitations existing in a material being.287 Most Christian 
theologians have claimed that God is devoid of a material body because 
corporeality is incompatible with absolute perfection and Charnock represents 
this conviction well: ‘God were not the most excellent substance if he were not 
a Spirit. Spiritual substances are more excellent than bodily’.288  
The usage of the adjective ‘spiritual’ to qualify the noun ‘substances’ in 
the quote above is significant in relation to the seventeenth-century’s debate 
                                                             
285 Ibid.  
286 Ibid., 263. 
287 Charnock states, ‘So God is called a Spirit, as being not a body, not having the 
greatness, figure, thickness or length of a body, wholly separate from anything of flesh and 
matter.’ In ibid. 
288 In ibid., 264.  
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over divine spirituality and invisibility.289 The spirituality of God indicates that 
the divine nature cannot be discerned through physical observation 
considering that there is no material composition in the divine essence. Or, to 
put it briefly: to uphold that God is spirit is to affirm, concomitantly, that the 
divine nature is one, invisible, and simple.290 Furthermore, the affirmation 
‘God is a pure spiritual being’ conveys much more than a blank metaphysical 
description of the divine essence and as such it should not be understood 
purely in abstract terms as if God were a spiritual substance voided of 
affections, cognitive faculties, and intrinsic goodness. On the contrary, God is 
a living spirit; one who is driven by the holiness, wisdom, justice, and 
goodness of his own mind and volition. Though Charnock explicitly 
acknowledges that the spirituality of God involves primarily the nature of the 
divine essence, there is a clear determination not to exclude Trinitarian 
considerations in the discussion of the divine attributes: ‘So that our Saviour 
would render a reason, not from any one person in the blessed Trinity, but 
from the divine nature, why we should worship in spirit; and therefore makes 
use of the word God, the being a spirit being common to the other persons 
with the Father.’291      
Charnock takes some time to explain what it means to say that God is 
invisible in relation to his spiritual nature. To assert the invisibility of God 
                                                             
289 For details about this debate, consult Amos Funkenstein, "The Body of God in 17th 
Century Theology and Science," in Millenarianism and Messianism in English Literature and 
Thought, 1650-1800, ed. Richard H. Popkin (Leiden: Brill, 1988). 
290 It is common to find in the Christian scholastic tradition that divine spirituality is 
included in the loci dedicated to the study of the doctrine of divine simplicity. E.g., Aquinas, 
ST, 2: 1a. 3, 1; Heidegger, Medulla: III/6, xxi-xxiii; p. 48.  
291 Charnock, Works, 1: 260. 
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requires further clarification since invisibility is not an exclusive predication 
of incorporeal realities.292 An earthly element like the air, whilst invisible to 
the human eye, is nevertheless a corporeal thing as far as it occupies a spatial 
place and, thereby, it is subject to mathematical quantification.293 The 
invisibility of God, then, should not be apprehended solely as a 
phenomenological description concerning the divine nature, but as an 
affirmation mediated by revelation and theological reflection about the 
ontology of the divine nature: ‘‘If he [God] be invisible, he is also spiritual’.294  
Though Charnock affirms God’s invisibility, he is cognisant of some 
exegetical and doctrinal problems. For example, the invisibility of God seems 
to contradict passages such as Dan. (7.9), Ps. (11.4, 34.15), Isa. (31.3, 51.9), 
Luke (24.39), and similar, where corporeal forms and human actions are 
ascribed to God. Charnock accounts for such cases by appealing to the notion 
of divine accommodation and by attending to the implications arising from it; 
thus: ‘We must not conceive of God [when revealed in Scripture in the form of 
a visible Deity] according to the letter, but the design of the metaphor.’295 
Similarly, Charnock tackles the problem posed by the incarnation of the Son 
and the spirituality of the divine essence. The metaphysical claims comprised 
in the proposition ‘God is a spirit’ (i.e., incorporeity and invisibility) demand 
                                                             
292 It is noteworthy that Charnock’s understanding of what entails for something to be 
spiritual is not primarily the outcome of speculative metaphysics or scholastic intricacies, but 
rather it comes as a result of a lexical survey concerning the usage of the term ‘Spirit’ in 
Scripture. See, ibid., 262-263.    
293 Ibid., 265-266.  
294 Ibid., 266.   
295 Ibid., 269, 276. For Charnock’s complete response, see pages 270-271 in ibid.   
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an explanation given some divergent features existing in the theanthropic 
person (i.e., corporeity and visibility). Though Charnock does not engage in an 
in-depth analysis of how the physicality of Christ can be reconciled with the 
spirituality of God, he asserts that the divine essence remains hidden even in 
the awareness of the physicality of the Son, the very Deus figuratus (God-
shaped).296 Charnock explains elsewhere that ‘[t]hough God hath manifested 
himself in a bodily shape, Gen. xviii. 1, and elsewhere Jehovah appeared to 
Abraham, yet the substance of God was not seen, no more than the substance 
of angels was seen in their apparitions to men.’297   
Noteworthy, Charnock claims that the doctrine of divine simplicity 
ascertains the uniqueness of the spiritual nature of God and that it supports 
the case for it.298 In this line of reasoning, the primacy of God as a spiritual 
being is established: (1) by acknowledging that God’s spiritual nature is 
infinitely superior to that of other incorporeal beings, and (2) by considering 
that the divine essence eternally subsists devoid of all composition.299  
Interestingly, Dolezal has stated in his study on divine simplicity that 
the terms ‘simple’ and ‘spiritual’ are interchangeable for Charnock ‘most 
likely’ indicating that the invisibility of God involves divine simplicity and by 
                                                             
296 Ibid., 271, 276.  
297 Ibid., 266. 
298 For Charnock, the structural character of simplicity is not contradictory to the 
theological importance of divine spirituality: ‘God’s spirituality is the root of his other 
perfections.’ In ibid., 282.   
299 Ibid., 263-264.  
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inference God’s incorporeity.300 On the one hand, Dolezal correctly notes the 
foundational role of divine simplicity for the recognition of God’s invisibility; 
on the other, however, it is not altogether clear that simplicity and spirituality 
are transposable concepts in Charnock’s doctrine of God.301 A detailed 
observation of the textual evidence would indicate that simplicity and 
spirituality are not all the time exchangeable predications in Charnock’s 
doctrine of the divine attributes, even though the terms appear to be 
synonymous in some instances. Though Charnock recognises that some 
created substances (e.g., angels, soul) have a spiritual nature, he forcefully 
declares that these substances are not metaphysically simple in their essence, 
and because of it they are ontologically inferior to God.302 This is an indication 
that spirituality is not necessarily an indicator of simplicity and, therefore, 
distinct from it. Moreover, in some cases Charnock tacitly assumes a 
distinction between spirituality and simplicity as when, in treating the 
perfection of the divine essence, he describes God as a ‘Spirit without parts’, or 
elsewhere when he states ‘the more spiritual and simple’ something is ‘the 
more perfect’ that particular thing is.303 This suggests that it would be more in 
tune with the textual evidence to say that, generally, Charnock thought of 
divine simplicity as another way to convey the notion of God’s absolute 
perfection and, thus, distinct from spirituality while in some instances he 
                                                             
300 Dolezal, God without Parts: 44, n. 48. 
301 Dolezal does not qualify his statement more precisely, so it is possible to interpret 
his words as if they intended to convey the idea that for Charnock ‘simple’ and ‘spiritual’ were 
always interchangeable terms; if so, the correction indicated above is due.     
302 Charnock, Works, 1: 264, 268. 
303 See respectively ibid., 279, 268.    
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establishes a direct relation between spirituality and simplicity wherein the 
two properties appear to be one and the same.  
Concerning the case for the spiritual nature of God, Charnock takes 
eight subjunctive conditionals wherein the antecedent (p), ‘if God were not a 
Spirit’, remains constant for every variation of the consequent (q) ‘he could 
not be… [creator, one, invisible, infinite, independent being, immutable and 
unchangeable, omnipresent, and most perfect being]’.304 It must be noted that 
the underlying assumption in almost every proposition is that God is simple. 
This is significant in the sense that indicates that the case for the doctrine of 
divine spirituality presupposes the notion of divine simplicity just as most of 
the divine predications named in the independent clauses of the conditionals 
would not be were God not the simplest being.305      
Eternity (De Aeternitas Dei) 
Before diving into Charnock’s exposition on divine eternity, it is 
important to indicate that even though Charnock does not treat the infinitas 
Dei (infinity of God) as a separate attribute in his theological sermons, the 
immeasurable nature of the divine essence is the doctrinal backdrop that runs 
behind the discussions on divine eternity and omnipresence: ‘An infinite 
power, an infinite wisdom, an infinite duration, must needs speak an infinite 
                                                             
304 Thus, the structure goes, if it were the case that p, then it would be the case that q. 
Or, in the idiom of propositional logic, conditionals connected by the relation p → q.  
305 Charnock, Works, 1: 265-269.  
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essence, since the infiniteness of his attributes is grounded upon the 
infiniteness of his essence.’306  
The text from which Charnock builds up the doctrinal formulae for the 
eternity of God is Ps. (90.2), ‘Before the mountains were brought forth, or 
ever thou hast formed the earth and the world, even from everlasting to 
everlasting, thou are God.’307 Two main inferences are provided from reading 
Ps. (90.2): (1) the greatness of God’s creative power, and (2) the 
boundlessness of God’s duration. Charnock expands on the latter point by 
noting that when it comes to time (i.e., that whereby the duration of a being 
can be measured) God infinitely transcends creation in the sense that the 
divine essence is beyond any categorisation dictated by successions or 
temporal limits, whereas everything else in creation is marked by 
temporality.308 Ps. (90.2) contains direct references to the eternity of God 
supported by noting that the text affirms the existential priority of the being of 
God and the infinite extension of God’s duration. Further propositions are 
inferred from the same text: (1) that the universe had a beginning, (2) that the 
world depends on God’s creative power for its existence, (3) that the being of 
God precedes creation, (4) that the being of God has existed from eternity, (5) 
that the being of God sustains eternity, and (6) that there is one eternal God.309 
The style of argumentation in support of these propositions follows a logical 
                                                             
306 Ibid., 434. 
307 In Charnock’s analysis, Psalm 90 is divided in two acts; one in which the psalmist 
complains about man’s frailty (ver. 3-6) and about the situation of the church (ver. 8-10); the 
other one in verse 12, a prayer elevated to God. Ibid., 345. 
308 Ibid., 346-347. 
309 Ibid., 347. 
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order and a subsequent consequence that reflects the influence of the 
scholastic way of argumentation wherein Charnock employs biblical exegesis 
and logic in the procurement of his doctrinal insights. In this line of 
reasoning, Charnock anchors his discourse primarily in the biblical text, which 
serves as the exegetical justification for his doctrinal exposition. This doctrinal 
formulation, in turn, includes inferences derived from syllogisms framed and 
tested by the laws of logic.310  
In addition to what it has been inferred from Ps. 90, Charnock argues 
that the self-identification of God as I am in Ex. (3:14) reveals God’s proper 
name and it justifies some ontological claims concerning the divine nature, 
being divine eternity one of them. Charnock explains:  
This description being in the present tense, shews that his essence knows no 
past nor future. If it were he was, it would intimate he were not now what he 
once was; if it were he will be, it would intimate he were not yet what he will be; 
but I am: I am the only being, the root of all beings; he is therefore at the 
greatest distance from not being, and that is eternal; so that is signifies his 
eternity, as well as his perfection and immutability.311  
Divine eternity is inferred from the divine name I am as it implies, 
among other things, that God is possessor of infinite, constant, and immutable 
life in himself: God semper est [always is].312  
Charnock is aware of the cognitive difficulties posed by the notion of 
eternity, but the complexity of the subject does not become an obstacle for its 
                                                             
310 The method of drawing ‘good and necessary consequences’ from the biblical text 
was a well-known and accepted interpretative tool in Reformed circles during the post-
Reformation era. For a representative defence of this exegetical device during the 
seventeenth-century, consult George Gillespie, A Treatise of Miscellany Questions: Wherein 
Many Usefull Questions and Cases of Conscience Are Discussed and Resolved. (Edinburgh: 
Patrik Gillespie, 1649), 238-245.  
311 Charnock, Works, 1: 355. 
312 Ibid., 349.  
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study. On the contrary, Charnock frames the discourse on divine eternity 
under the linguistic and conceptual categories of the via negativa: ‘So may I 
say of eternity; it is easy in the word pronounced, but hardly understood, and 
more hardly expressed; it is better expressed by negative than positive 
words.’313. In this sense, divine eternity entails the denial of all measures of 
time when attempting to determine the duration of the divine essence.314 At 
first sight, Charnock’s reliance on negative theology could be taken as a tacit 
permission for using all kinds of metaphysical abstractions to describe the 
nature of God. However, a more judicious assessment is possible if Charnock’s 
commitment to Scripture as the principium cognoscendi theologiae is 
considered.315  
It is worth noting that the concepts of time and eternity, though 
conceptually related, are contrapose to one another and, in some instances, 
even deemed quasi-antithetical in Charnock’s theology: ‘Eternity is contrary to 
time… We must consider eternity contrary to the notion of time… Eternity and 
time differ as the sea and rivers’.316 This distinction is not superfluous 
considering that Charnock argues that eternity is something that cannot be 
encompassed by any category of time and, consequently, divine eternity 
comprehends and infinitely excels all times and durations.317  
                                                             
313 Ibid., 348. 
314 Ibid., 349. 
315 See pp. 34-35 above in this study.   
316 Charnock, Works, 1: 348. In modern times, theologians of the significance of Karl 
Barth have also distinguished between time and eternity, see Barth, CD: II/1, 608.  
317 Charnock, Works, 1: 349. This mode of thinking explains why Charnock and most 
of the Reformed orthodox affirmed that eternity was a corollary of infinity and that divine 
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In any case, the Reformed portrayal of divine eternity should not be 
understood exclusively in terms of timelessness. This tendency is common 
amongst those who are conversant (and even sympathetic) with the work of 
the Reformed orthodox. Take for instance, philosopher Paul Helm, who in his 
monograph on divine eternity writes: ‘To say that God is eternal is thus to say 
that he is not in time.’318 While Helm’s depiction of the eternity of God is not at 
odds with the mainstream of Reformed scholasticism, Charnock would qualify 
Helm’s statement by saying that divine eternity also informs one about the 
perpetual duration of the divine essence. To be more precise, Charnock 
ascribes duration to God and his creatures, yet he explains that God’s duration 
is deprived of temporal succession whereas that of the creature is marked by 
successive events: ‘The being of creatures is successive, the being of God is 
permanent, and remains entire with all its perfections, unchanged in an 
infinite duration.’319 What is more, most of the Reformed orthodox argued that 
there was an exceptional relation between divine eternity and time wherein 
the divine essence remained immune to the mutations and detriments innate 
to non-eternal beings.320  
Ryan Mullins has depicted Charnock as if the price for espousing the 
classical notion of divine eternity were the rejection of Scripture as the 
                                                             
infinity was the basis upon which other attributes such as immensity and omnipresence were 
drawn up. See Velde, Synopsis, 167. Cf. Heppe, Reformed Dogmatics: 65-67. In like manner: 
‘As the nature of time consists in the succession of parts, so the nature of eternity in an 
infinite immutable duration.’ Charnock, Works, 1: 348. 
318 Paul Helm, Eternal God: A Study of God without Time, 2nd ed. (Oxford: Oxford 
University Press, 2010), 23.   
319 Charnock, Works, 1: 351. 
320 Velde, The Doctrine of God: 158. Cf. Muller, PRRD: 3:348. 
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epistemic foundation for theology or, in scholastic lingo, as if Charnock had 
abandoned Scripture as the principium cognoscendi theologiae to 
accommodate a concept of divine eternity wherein God is depicted as eternally 
infinite but also as without successions and thus eternally immutable.321 
Mullins proves his case by saying that Charnock himself ‘notes that the Bible 
does not teach that God exists without succession… but because of the 
weakness of our concepts the Holy Spirit describes eternity in the Bible simply 
as without beginning and without end.’322  
In principle, the noted problem in Charnock’s method and the negative 
implications thereof for the understanding of divine eternity seem to be valid;  
after all, Mullins’ assessment relies on what it is presented as Charnock’s 
incriminating admission of theologising without the warrant of Scripture. 
However, an examination of the theological method observed in Charnock’s 
theological sermons on the divine attributes indicates that far from arguing a 
priori that some metaphysical beliefs are to be favoured over the testimony of 
Scripture, Charnock is simply acknowledging that certain claims about the 
nature of God are deduced (not explicitly taken) from Scripture.323  
                                                             
321 R. T. Mullins, The End of the Timeless God (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 
2016), 85, 203. 
322 Ibid., 203.  
323 This is nothing else but the Reformed principle of ‘good and necessary 
consequence’ in practice, the basis for a theological reading of the Bible. See McGraw, By 
Good and Necessary Consequence.  
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Mullins points out to two references in Charnock’s discourse on divine 
eternity to support his claim.324 In the first allusion, Charnock speaks of the 
Spirit revealing the concept of divine eternity as in two stages to accommodate 
revelation to the cognitive limitations of the human mind.325 In the second, 
Charnock explains that the Spirit deigns in Scripture to fit creature’s capacity 
of understanding to communicate the notion of eternity in temporal terms. 
Yet, this divine temporality should be interpreted in similar manner as when 
some body parts are ascribed to God: just as anthropomorphisms do not imply 
a material body for God, temporal language to describe eternity do not imply 
that the divine essence is liable to succession or variation.326 It must be noted 
that Charnock nowhere says that the Bible does not teach that God subsists 
without succession just that the notion of divine eternity (without succession) 
is accommodated to suit the capability of the human mind. Charnock infers 
from Ps. (90.2) that since God remains the same being eternally, he must 
never experience variation, change, or succession.327 Therefore, rather than an 
admission about the lack of biblical justification for the claim ‘there is no 
successions in God’, Charnock is recognising that this theological assertion, 
                                                             
324 In Timeless God: 210, n. 26, Mullins refers to pages 181 and 186 from the 1682’s 
edition of Several Discourses…. In this study, the foregoing pages correspond to Charnock, 
Works, 1: 347-348, 353-354.   
325 Charnock reiterates that the notion of divine eternity is complex and hence 
difficult to explain; yet, rational creatures are at the least capable to understand that God is 
eternal. Idem., Works, 1: 348.   
326 Ibid., 347. 
327 Ibid., 351. It is worth noticing how Charnock deduces that just as there is no 
succession in the being of God, there is no succession in his knowledge or in his decrees. See 
ibid., 351-352. 
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while not explicitly rendered in Scripture, is a necessary inference from 
Scripture and hence one that is biblically justified.     
The first major doctrinal claim based upon the exegesis of Ps. (90.2) is 
that the being of God is of eternal duration.328 This assertion carries with it 
implications involving God both in relation to himself (i.e., his subsistence ad 
intra) and in relation to everything other than himself (i.e., his subsistence ad 
extra).329 Following Calvin, Charnock affirms that divine eternity has a direct 
repercussion for the covenantal relationship between God and humanity given 
that the ‘covenant can have no foundation but in his duration before and after 
the world.’330 This is to say that the certainty of what has been established in 
the covenant finds its perfect assurance in God’s everlasting and immutable 
duration. This concurs with the claims of other prominent federal theologians 
of the Orthodox era who affirmed that eternity and covenant were concepts 
mutually interconnected.331 
In Charnock’s theology, eternity is classified under the non-
communicable attributes. This is explained by noting that to ascribe eternity 
to something is to say that it has no beginning, no end, and no temporal 
                                                             
328 Ibid., 347ff. 
329 Interestingly, some modern theologians have emphasised a similar relation 
between the divine attributes and the ad intra/ad extra operations. For example, John 
Webster explains in an essay concerning divine aseity: ‘But God is from himself not only in his 
inner life but also in the external works which correspond to his inner life.’ In Webster, "Life 
in and of Himself," 119. 
330 Charnock, Works, 1: 347. 
331 For example, Willem van Asselt notes that in the theology of Cocceius the notion of 
the covenant incorporates the movements of history and the concept of eternity. Van Asselt, 
Federal Theology: 297. For Asselt’s explanation on the relation between covenant and 
eternity in Cocceius’ theology, see ibid., 299-300. 
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succession, and since no other being has perpetually existed by itself, eternity 
must be an exclusive predication of God.332  
Furthermore, it is worth noting how the notion of eternity shapes 
Charnock’s understanding of the divine attributes. That God is eternal 
signifies that every perfection in the divine essence is also eternal; in fact, 
Charnock argues, if any of the divine attributes were not eternal God himself 
could not be eternal.333 What is more, eternity is a necessary condition for 
affirming other divine perfections.334 For example, to ascribe God the attribute 
of immutability requires of him to be eternal considering that, if finite, God 
must have a beginning, but if God began to exists he has experienced the 
greatest mutation, namely, the transition from non-being into being, but this 
cannot be for God could not be who he is if there were either beginning, 
ending, or succession in him.335  
While infinity is the implicit backdrop out of which divine eternity 
logically follows, divine aseity explicitly testifies of it: ‘He that hath life in 
himself, and is from himself, cannot but be’, to which Charnock later adds, 
‘[s]ince he [God] had life in himself, and that there was no cause of his 
existence, he can have no cause of his limitation, and can no more be 
                                                             
332 Charnock, Works, 1: 360. 
333 Ibid., 354. 
334 Charnock explains by using a series of conditional clauses that God could not be 
immutable, perfect, omnipotent, the first cause, if he were not eternal. In ibid., 357-358. 
335 Ibid., 357. Charnock follows Calvin’s exegesis on Mal. (3.6) and Job (37.23) 
wherein the Reformer distinguishes between God’s unchangeable nature from his immutable 
purpose. Thus Charnock, ‘Had he not been eternal, there had been the greatest change, from 
nothing to something. A change of the essence is greater than a change of purpose.’ In ibid.   
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determined to a time than he can to a place.’336 For Charnock, then, God 
subsists a se (from himself) and in se (in himself), which in metaphysical 
idiom is to say that the existence of God is constitutive of his essence—God is 
actus purus, i.e., his being has full and unrestricted actuality. Consequently, 
since life is an essential—not a derivative—property in the divine ontology, 
God must be a necessary and, therefore, an eternal being: ‘God is life; it is in 
him originally, radically, therefore eternally. He is pure act, nothing but vigour 
and act.’337 
The constancy of the being of God is contrasted with the successive 
nature of his creatures: while God remains everlastingly unaltered with all his 
perfections, humanity subsists temporarily and in constant change.338 Echoing 
Jean Daillé (1594–1670) and his Melange de Sermons, Charnock expounds: 
‘God possesses a firm and absolute being, always constant to himself; he sees 
all things sliding under him in a continual variation; he beholds the 
revolutions in the world without any change of his most glorious and 
immoveable nature.’339 
In the end, Charnock’s ideas might be arranged in such a way as to 
compose a definition of divine eternity highlighting both the rejection to 
                                                             
336 Ibid., 356. 
337 Ibid. 
338 Here the noun ‘constancy’ is not used as a substitute for ‘immutability’ as it is 
found in modern dogmatics, such as in Barth, CD: II/1, 490 ff. Scholars have recognised that 
the differences between modern accounts on divine constancy and the orthodox view of divine 
immutability transcends the realm of semantics. See Robert B. Price, Letters of the Divine 
Word: The Perfections of God in Karl Barth's Church Dogmatics, Studies in Systematic 
Theology (London: T & T Clark, 2011), 129-130.     
339 Charnock, Works, 1: 352. 
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ascriptions to God of any temporal limitation and the perpetual plenitude of 
his mode of subsistence. Consequently, divine eternity is, negatively, that 
aspect of the divine nature whereby God is said not to experience temporal 
succession and, therefore, that which rejects any temporal categorisation in 
accounting for the duration of the divine essence. Positively, divine eternity 
means that God subsists in an enduring and immutable state of perfect 
possession of life.340   
Immutability (De Immutabilitas Dei) 
From the very early stages of the development of Christian theology 
until the doctrinal codification observed in the dogmatic systems of the 
seventeenth century, divine immutability enjoyed almost universal 
acceptation. After the advent of German Idealism (1780s-1840s), however, 
immutability began to lose its doctrinal status and became a concept of 
problematic implications for systematic theology.341 In the history of the 
doctrine of immutability, Charnock represents those pre-Kantian theologies 
that affirmed that ‘[t]he essence of God, with all the perfections of his nature, 
are pronounced the same, without any variation from eternity to eternity.’342  
                                                             
340 It is worth noting the striking resemblance between Charnock’s ‘positive’ view of 
eternity with the definition provided by Boëthius, who writes: ‘Eternity, then, is the whole, 
simultaneous and perfect possession of boundless life, which becomes clearer by comparison 
with temporal things.’ In Boethius, The Consolation of Philosophy, ed. Jeffrey Henderson, 
trans. S. J. Tester, Loeb Classical Library (Harvard: Harvard University Press, 1973), V/vi; p. 
423.  
341 Isaak Dorner (1809-1884) arguably penned the most important work on divine 
immutability during the nineteenth-century. For an English translation of Dorner’s two-parts 
essay, consult I. A. Dorner and Robert R. Williams, Divine Immutability: A Critical 
Reconsideration, trans. Robert R. Williams and Claude Welch (Minneapolis: Fortress Press, 
1994).    
342 Charnock, Works, 1: 379. 
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Charnock begins this discourse by providing a summary of the most 
substantial elements of the text under consideration.343 This allows him to 
follow the conceptual flow of Ps. (102) in preparation for the doctrinal, 
metaphysical, and practical inferences derived from verses 26-27, particularly 
to the declaration: ‘but thou art the same, and thy years shall have no end.’344  
Once more, Charnock refers to the significance of the divine name I am 
in the exegesis of Ps. 102. The allusion to the proper name of God by the 
psalmist seeks to emphasize the unchangeable nature and the ontological 
supremacy of the divine being: ‘His wisdom and power, his knowledge and 
will, are always the same. His essence can receive no alteration, neither by 
itself nor by any external cause.’345 Charnock returns to Ex. 3:14 in search of 
textual ammunition for the defence of divine immutability, there he argues 
that ‘[t]he very name Jehovah bears, according to the grammatical order, a 
mark of God’s unchangeableness… I am, that is, I receive from no other what I 
am in myself. He depends upon no other in his essence, knowledge, purpose, 
and therefore hath no changing power over him.’346 The theological use that 
Charnock gives to the divine name is in accord with the way the Reformed 
tradition has understood the proper name of God.347 In fact, it was customary 
amongst the Reformed theologians of the sixteenth and seventeenth centuries 
                                                             
343 Ibid., 374-379. 
344 Ibid., 374. 
345 Ibid., 380.  
346 Ibid., 391-392.  
347 Muller has traced back the inference of divine immutability from Ex. (3.14) to the 
theology of Augustine. See Muller, PRRD: 3:308.  
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to make doctrinal inferences from the name Jehovah in support for their 
metaphysical claims about the divine nature.348 Parenthetically, one must take 
notice of a renewed interest amongst some contemporary dogmaticians to 
embrace a reading of Scripture wherein the biblical text provides the 
epistemic foundation to formulate metaphysical claims about God.349  
That God does not change with respect to his essence, his nature, and 
his perfections is presented as the major doctrinal claim in Charnock’s 
discourse on divine immutability.350 Divine immutability is almost axiomatic 
given the perfect nature of the divine essence: God must be immune to change 
for his subsistence requires of nothing but himself:  ‘He [God] wants nothing, 
he loses nothing, but doth uniformly exist by himself, without any new nature, 
new thought, new will, new purpose, or new place.’351  
It is worth noting here that the doctrine of simplicity is invoked to 
affirm the immutability of God by arguing that change and simplicity are 
antithetical: ‘[God] is an absolutely simple Spirit, not having the least particle 
                                                             
348 Pictet represents well the whole tradition when he writes, ‘This name [Jehovah] is 
frequently found in the sacred record… and [it] properly signifies these three things:—1. An 
eternal Being, who is self-existent and independent; hence he is simply called he that is. 2. A 
Being, from whom everything else has its being. 3. A Being unchangeable, and faithful to his 
promises.’ In Bènèdict Pictet, Christian Theology, trans. Frederick Reyroux (Philadelphia: 
Presbyterian Board of Publications), II/ii; p. 72.  
349 For instance, John B. Webster, "One Who Is Son," in God without Measure: 
Working Papers in Christian Theology. Volume I: God and the Works of God (London: T&T 
Clark, 2016). In this essay, the author makes substantial claims about the nature of God the 
Son based upon the exordium found in Heb. 1.  This is not to say, however, that Scripture 
must be taken as the raw material from which the theologian obtains a doctrinal by-product 
exclusively by means of human reasoning. Instead, sacred scripture and doctrinal formulation 
must be understood as organically related in a way wherein doctrines elucidate, in theological 
categories, what the Spirit has already revealed in biblical idiom.        
350 Charnock, Works, 1: 380. 
351 Ibid. 
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of composition, [then] he is not capable of those changes which may be in 
created spirits’.352 Or in more unequivocal terms: ‘Mutability is absolutely 
inconsistent with simplicity, whether the change come from an internal or 
external principle.’353 A change to the essence of God would imply that he is 
not God given that change suggests the enhancement or the lessening of 
something accidental or essential, but nothing can be added to or subtracted 
from the divine nature because God is the simplest being.  
Charnock supports divine immutability by noting the close correlation 
between the attributes of eternity and that of immutability. These perfections 
are said to be so interlocked in the divine nature that one is tantamount to the 
other: ‘true eternity is true immutability’.354 It is important to note that 
immutability and eternity, while one and the same in the being of God (as per 
divine simplicity), differ conceptually in the human mind: the former refers to 
God’s mode of existence whereas the latter explains the extent of such mode of 
being.355 In scholastic idiom, the conceptual difference is one of ratio 
ratiocinatae, though one cum fundamentum in re: a distinction determined 
by reason but with a foundation in reality. To say that God is eternal is, then, 
to affirm that he is immutable since no eternal being, i.e., one who enjoys the 
‘possession of an immutable life’, can experience change over time.356 
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353 Ibid., 393. 
354 Ibid., 380.  
355 Ibid. 
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The case for divine immutability continues as Charnock argues that 
God is essentially immutable by virtue of the constitution of his own being: 
‘God is the first being, an independent being; he was not produced of himself, 
or of any other, but by nature always hath been, and therefore cannot by 
himself, or by any other, be changed from what he is in his own nature’.357 In 
other words, the ontological primacy of God, in addition to the absolute self-
sufficiency of his being and the fact that he subsists in se and a se, prevents 
God from enduring an essential change brought either by internal or external 
causes.    
Interestingly, Charnock explains that immutability is not a perfection 
by itself, that is, not in isolation from other divine virtues.358 Divine 
immutability is understood as a perfection only when it operates in relation to 
the other attributes that reside essentially within the divine being. What is 
more, immutability secures the constancy of the divine operations as far as 
‘[it] is the centre wherein they [the attributes] all unite… [it is] a thread that 
runs through the whole web, it is the enamel of all the rest; none of them will 
appear so glorious without this beam, the sun of immutability, which renders 
then highly excellent without the least shadow of imperfection.’359  
                                                             
357 Ibid., 382. 
358 Ibid., 381. Charnock illustrates his point by indicating the immutable wickedness 
of the devil and the fallen angels. In ibid. Charnock does not mention it but the illustration 
remains valid only if one assumes that in the examples offered ‘immutability’ is not 
understood in absolute but in derivative terms. For neither the devil nor the demons are 
immutable (or eternal) by nature but became so after they rebelled against God.     
359 Ibid. 
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That the immutability of God encompasses his knowledge signifies that 
God knows from eternity everything possible for him to know and also that 
the nature of the divine knowledge is not susceptible to transitions from 
ignorance to understanding for that would be contrary to the perfection of the 
divine essence and particularly inconsistent with divine wisdom and 
omniscience.360 God immutably owns perfect knowledge of himself and of 
everything else given that the operative faculty of his knowledge is his own 
essence: the knowledge of God is no other than Deus intelligens [God 
understanding].361 Consequently, Charnock positively infers ‘[i]f his 
understanding then be his essence, his knowledge is as necessary, as 
unchangeable, as his essence’ and, negatively concludes, ‘[i]f his 
understanding and his essence were not one and the same, he were not 
simple, but compounded; if compounded, he would consist of parts: if he 
consisted of parts, he would not be an independent being, and so would not be 
God.’362 Furthermore, as the being of God is not susceptible to temporal 
successions, the operation of knowing in the divine mind is instantiated by a 
single instinctive act meaning that changes according to past and future 
information have no effect in the way God perfectly knows all possible 
things.363 
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Just as the knowledge of God is immutable, his will and purposes are 
also immune to change.364 This is the case, since there is no distinction 
between the divine essence and the divine will in the being of God, that is to 
say that there is no difference between the will of God and the act of God 
willing: voluntas Dei est Deus volens.365 In the same way, as God wills all 
things to be by one eternal act of volition, he knows everything by a single and 
eternal act of his mind: ‘Again, as God knows all things by one simple vision of 
his understanding, so he wills all things by one act of volition… He wills 
nothing to be in time, but what he willed and nilled from eternity.’366 Finally, 
Charnock asserts that there is no place in God for volitional changes since the 
perfect nature of the divine being prevents those mutations to take place. 
Contrary to the will in non-perfect creatures, the will of God is not susceptible 
to alterations prompted by lack of knowledge of future events, inherent 
volitional unsteadiness, or the desire of accruing personal power.367  
Two provisos need to be mentioned to understand the way that 
Charnock conceives the relation between immutability and the divine will. In 
the first place, Charnock explains that though the will of God is immutable, 
the object thereof remains susceptible to change: ‘As a decree from eternity 
doth not make the thing decreed to be eternal, so neither doth the 
                                                             
364 Although Charnock speaks of ‘will’ and ‘purpose’ as two distinct features, in most 
cases he uses the terms interchangeably if not synonymously.  
365 Charnock, Works, 1: 387. The Augustinian trend is worth noting: ‘For the essence 
of God, whereby He is, has nothing changeable, neither in eternity, nor in truth nor in will’. In 
Augustine, The Trinity, trans. Stephen McKenna, Fathers of the Church (Washington, D.C.: 
Catholic University of America Press), IV; p.130. 
366 Charnock, Works, 1: 388. 
367 Ibid., 388-389. 
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immutability of the decree render the thing so decreed to be immutable.’368 
Charnock explains that alterations of things divinely willed (e.g., the duration 
of the Mosaic rites and Christ’s sufferings) are not caused by a subsequent 
decree wherein the antecedent pronouncement is overruled for that would 
entail a volitional change in God; instead, these changes are part of the eternal 
decree itself.369 In second place, though the will of God is eternally immutable, 
the volitional act that brings about the divine purpose remains always free and 
independent: ‘The liberty of God’s will consists with the necessity of 
continuing his purpose.’370 It must be noted that the language of ‘necessity’ 
here is not assumed de facto to be in conflict with the notion of divine 
freedom: ‘God is necessarily good, immutably good; yet he is freely so, and 
would not be otherwise than what he is.’371 This allows Charnock to affirm both 
the necessity of God to act in accord with the divine nature and the self-
government of the divine will. In other words, God is absolutely free in willing 
what he wills, yet he necessarily wills that which remains consistent with the 
moral mandates arising from a morally perfect being.372  
For God to be immutable in his essence, he must be also unchangeable 
in relation to space, namely, God cannot experience change brought by 
                                                             
368 Ibid., 390. 
369 Ibid., 389-390. 
370 Ibid., 390. 
371 Ibid. 
372 Charnock’s position on this matter echoes the position of other scholastics in the 
Reformed tradition: ‘Will in God, is that whereby God freely and unchangeably willeth his 
owne glory, as the end, and all other things as the meanes unto this end, this will… is the first 
and supreme cause of things, comprehending with all other causes in itself, and subordaining 
them to that first cause.’ In Lucas Trelcatius, A Briefe Institution of the Common Places of 
Sacred Divinitie, trans. John Gawen (London: Francis Burton, 1610), 71.  
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transitions from one spatial location to another.373 To account for the 
foregoing claim, the notions of immensity, ubiquity, and omnipresence are 
being considered. Since God is ubiquitous, it is impossible for him to occupy a 
place now that he has not occupied before given that his presence eternally 
fills—in the fullest of his being—all possible places at all times: ‘[God] is 
substantially in all space, real and imaginary; there is no part of the world that 
he doth not fill… he was always in himself by his own eternal ubi.’374  
That God is immutable is proven by responding to several propositions 
contrary to the notion of divine immutability.375 The first objection asserts that 
by creating the universe, God must have experienced a change considerable 
enough to impair his immutability and, thus, the objection goes, absolute 
immutability cannot be ascribed to the divine nature.376 In response, Charnock 
acknowledges that though creation entails a real alteration, this change affects 
subjectively only the creature not the creator. Creation brings a massive 
transformation for temporal beings (not for infinite beings) given that only 
finite beings began to be what they were not before.377 Furthermore, though 
creation is enacted in time, the temporal execution of the decree does not 
necessarily bring change in the subject decreeing, but only in the object 
                                                             
373 Charnock, Works, 1: 390-391. 
374 Ibid. Like the doctrine of divine simplicity, the ubiquity of God (ubiquitas Dei) is 
accepted, though not treated separately, throughout Charnock's discourses on the divine 
attributes. See ibid., 269.     
375 Ibid., 397-406. Though not mentioned by name, Johannes Crellius (1590-1633), 
minister of the Racovian church, Conradus Vorstius (1569-1622), Beza’s former student in 
Geneva, and the Socinians, were probably the theologies Charnock opposes here. Cf. Turretin, 
Institutes: 1:205. 
376 Charnock, Works, 1: 397. 
377 Ibid. 
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decreed.378 Therefore, since creation is not the consequence of a subsequent 
act of the will with respect to the eternal decree, God is said to be immutable 
with respect to the temporal actualisation of creation given that the will 
remains always eternal while enacting the act of creation.379  
Similarly, it is argued that the command to bring the universe into 
existence does not require the use of new power in God and, thus, no change is 
entailed in the divine nature. The underlying argument is the notion of the 
eternal state of God as actus purus, that is, everlastingly devoid of 
potentiality: ‘So when God is the author of a new work, he is not changed, 
because he works it by an eternal will and an eternal power.’380 Finally, 
Charnock argues that creation does not impair the immutability of God given 
that the existence of the universe brings no new relationship to him: ‘God 
gained no new relation of Lord or Creator by the creation; for though he hath 
created nothing to rule over, yet he had the power to create and rule though he 
did not create and rule.’381 It is pivotal to understand this assertion that 
Charnock is not rejecting altogether the idea of divine relationality. Charnock 
discards the idea of a new relation to God inaugurated by creation, yet without 
excluding the reality of an eternal way of relationality that is independent of 
the act of creation itself. Charnock explains:  
[T]he name Creator and Lord belongs to God from eternity, because he could 
create and rule though he did not create and rule. But howsoever, if there were 
                                                             
378 Ibid. In fact, a separate volitional act to actualize creation would have entailed a 
moral change in God wherein he wills one thing he did not will before. Ibid., 398.   
379 Ibid. 
380 Ibid., 398-399. By ‘new power’, Charnock means an additional faculty disposed for 
the act of creation that was absent in God before the conception of the universe. Ibid., 398. 
381 Ibid., 399. 
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any such change of relation, that God may be call Creator and Lord after the 
creation and not before, it is not a change in essence, nor in knowledge, nor in 
will; God gains no perfection nor diminution by it, his knowledge is not 
increased by it; he is no more by it than be was and will be if all those things 
ceased.382   
The second objection to divine immutability is grounded on the 
incarnation of the Son.383 Critics argue that by assuming a human nature, the 
eternal Son suffers an essential change for he becomes something he was not 
before. In Chalcedonian terms, Charnock replies to this objection by 
explaining that the incarnation is not about the transformation of the divine 
nature becoming human nor the human nature becoming divine, but about 
the union of two distinct natures in one (theanthropic) person wherein the 
divine and the human natures remained distinguishable and in possession of 
their own properties.384 Charnock elucidates that the hypostatic union does 
not entail variation in God for he has own from eternity all the excellencies of 
the human nature ‘eminently in a nobler manner than they are in themselves, 
and therefore could not be changed by a real union.’385 In other words, 
Charnock argues that since the incarnation is not brought by a change in the 
                                                             
382 Ibid.  
383 Similar objections to divine immutability are frequently found in modern 
theological movements such as in Open Theism and Process Theology. Contemporary unease 
for the doctrine of immutability is explained primarily by an increasing sensibility to human 
suffering and by the acceptance of the idea of divine passibility wherein God is depicted as 
experiencing pain in loving solidarity with his creation. See for instance Jürgen Moltmann, 
The Crucified God: The Cross of Christ as Foundation and Criticism of Christian Theology 
(London: SCM, 1974); Paul S. Fiddes, The Creative Suffering of God (Oxford: Clarendon 
Press, 1988).   
384 Charnock, Works, 1: 399. Cf. Thomas Watson, A Body of Divinity: Contained in 
Sermons Upon the Westminster Assembly's Catechism (London: Banner of Trust, 1692; repr., 
1965), 67. 
385 Charnock, Works, 1: 401. 
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ontology of the eternal Logos, but rather by the assumptio carnis [adoption of 
flesh], divine immutability stands as a divine predication.  
It is timely to analyse here what appears to be a deviation from 
confessional Reformed theology. After maintaining that the incarnation does 
not bring change in the divine nature, Charnock explains that ‘[t]he humanity 
[of Christ] was changed by a communication of excellent gifts from the divine 
nature, not by being brought into an equality with it; for that was impossible 
that a creature should become equal to the Creator.’386 At first sight, this can 
be taken as if Charnock were in contradiction with the Reformed stance on the 
communicatio idiomatum [communication of attributes]387 However, a more 
detailed analysis indicates that Charnock is not advocating for a view wherein 
the human nature of the incarnated Son is said to receive properties 
exclusively belonging to the divine nature, but he is considering a particular 
effect of the unio personalis (personal union) wherein the human nature is 
endowed with gifts of eminence.388 Generally, the Reformed scholastics spoke 
of a threefold effectus (outcome) resulting from the union between the human 
and divine natures in the one theanthropic person: the communicatio 
                                                             
386 Ibid., 399.      
387 Historically, Reformed theology has fundamentally maintained that the 
communication of attributes brought by the unio personalis (personal union) takes place 
from each nature into the theanthropic person whereas Lutheran theology has favoured a 
view of the communicatio wherein the attributes are said to be transmitted between the 
human and the divine natures reciprocally and between the two natures and the person of 
Christ. For the Reformed and Lutheran views during the seventeenth-century, see respectively 
Heppe, Reformed Dogmatics: 439-447; Heinrich Schmid, The Doctrinal Theology of the 
Evangelical Lutheran Church, trans. Charles A. Hay and Henry E. Jacobs, 3 ed. (Eugene, OR: 
Wipf and Stock, 2008), 305-317.  
388 Known also as unio hypostatica, namely, the communication of the Son’s 
hypostasis to the human nature and the union thereof with the divine nature in one 
theanthropic person. Cf. Charnock, Works, 2: 58-62. 
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idiomatum, gratiarum et operationum [communication of attributes, graces 
and operations].389 The communicatio idiomatum accounts for the 
concurrence of properties from each nature (human and divine) in the person 
of Christ, the communicatio gratiarum speaks of the excellencies (habits, 
graces, honours, and gifts) with which Christ’s human nature is adorned from 
the moment it began to exist, and the communicatio operationum denotes the 
operational consonance between the two natures in accomplishing the 
redemptive work of Christ.390 Consequently, it would be better to interpret the 
statement ‘communication of gifts from the divine nature [to the human 
nature]’ as the endowment of eminent charismata not as the transmission of 
divine attributes.391   
Charnock also addresses those who reject divine immutability under 
the conviction that Scripture contradicts it when God is said to repent and 
when other variable affections are ascribed to him.392 The objection is tackled 
by contrasting the perfection of the divine nature against the implications of 
an actual act of repentance: if God repents, then he could not be perfect given 
                                                             
389 Johannes Wollebius, The Abridgment of Christian Divinitie, trans. Alexander Ross 
(London: T. Mabb for Joseph Nevill 1660), 121-122; Brakel, Christian's Reasonable Service: 
1:506; Johannes à Marck, Compendium Theologiae Christianae Didactico-Elencticum 
(Amsterdam: Douci & Paddenburg, 1749), XIX/xxii, pp. 382-383, who speaks of a fourfold 
(quadruplex), instead of a threefold, effect from the hypostatic union. 
390 The Reformed orthodox believed that the excellencies of Christ’s human nature 
were exceedingly greater than that of humans and angels, but not infinite given the conviction 
that finitum non capax infiniti [the finite is not able to (contain) the infinite].  
391 In response to Quod est effectum unionis illius Personalis? [What is the effect of 
this personal union?], Bucanus (d. 1603) answers that the effectum consists in a donorum 
collatio (combination of gifts) including wisdom, goodness, holiness, power, majesty, and 
glory. This effect, Bucanus adds, is what the church fathers called carnis deificationis 
(divinization of the flesh) while the schoolmen refer to it as gratiam habitualem (habitual 
grace). In Bucanus, Institutiones Theologicae: II/xxiii; 21.  
392 Charnock, Works, 1: 400. 
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that true repentance necessarily implies an imperfection, in this case, 
demonstrated by insufficient knowledge or by lacking good judgement at a 
particular instance.393 Charnock, therefore, interprets Scripture’s depictions of 
divine repentance as a form of divine accommodation whereby God ‘frames 
his language to our dullness, not to his own state, and inform us, by our own 
phrases, what he would have us learn of his nature, as nurses talk broken 
language to young children.’394 Furthermore, Charnock adds to his response 
the necessity of discriminating between the external operations of God and the 
operations within the Godhead. Biblical accounts of divine repentance 
indicate a change in God extra se (outside himself), that is, an alteration 
according to God’s perfect knowledge of future events and his immutable 
decree in the way he deals with creation, but not a transformation within the 
divine being: ‘He changes the way of his providential proceeding according to 
the carriage of the creature, without changing his will, which is the rule of 
providence.’395 Similarly, Charnock rejects those who ascribe changeability to 
God based upon unfulfilled predictions in Scripture, as in the stories narrated 
in 2 Kings (20) or Jonah (3). In the first place, it is noted that the nature of 
promises and threats that are included in the covenantal relation between God 
and humanity differ one from the other. God is primarily responsible for 
enacting his promises while the creature is right in demanding the fulfilment 
                                                             
393 Ibid., 400-401. 
394 Ibid., 401. This strategy in defence of divine immutability suggests Aquinas’s use of 
analogical language as a category of predication and, manifestly, Calvin’s notion of divine 
accommodation. See St. Thomas Aquinas, ST edited and translated by Thomas Gilby, 61 vols., 
vol. 8 (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1967), Ia, 13; John Calvin, Institutes of the 
Christian Religion, trans. John T. McNeill, 2 vols., Library of Christian Classics (Philadelphia: 
The Westminster Press, 1977), I. 13. 1; pp. 1:120-121.  
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of what has been assured upon satisfying the conditions of the pact. In the 
case of the threats, the obligation lies with the creature while God holds the 
right to punish offences against his sanctity.396 In this manner, Charnock 
asserts that unfulfilled promises in Scripture are to be assumed as 
interlocutory verdicts, an idea brought from civil law signifying an interim 
rule given during an ongoing legal action, ‘so the promises of God are to be 
understood with the condition of perseverance in well-doing, and threatenings 
with a clause of revocation annexed to them, provided that men repent.’397 In 
similar manner, divine immutability suffers no alteration when God expresses 
emotions of opposite nature to his creatures, this is so because the changes 
taking place are not actual in the divine being but in the object of his 
affections. The variation is due to a new stance of the creature in relation to 
God in the understanding that ‘an innocent creature is the object of his 
[God’s] kindness, an offending creature is the object of his anger.’398 Besides, 
God ensues no change when Scripture speaks of the abrogation of certain 
ordinances during the old covenant neither after the instatement of other 
principles in the new covenant because these modifications are not alterations 
in the divine will but different ways wherein God executes his will in time.399    
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Omnipresence (De Omnipraesentia Dei) 
Divine omnipresence is a derivative from the notion of divine infinity: 
just as divine eternity denotes the infinity of God with respect to time, 
omnipresence signifies the boundlessness of the divine essence spatially 
considered. Charnock explains: ‘As eternity is the perfection whereby he hath 
neither beginning nor end, immutability is the perfection whereby he hath 
neither increase nor diminution, so immensity or omnipresence is that 
whereby he hath neither bounds nor limitation.’400 In addition to the relation 
between the concept of infinity, eternity, and omnipresence, Charnock 
suggests that the mental acknowledgement of omnipresence comes to the 
creature through the mediation of the via negativa given that omnipresence 
primarily denies that God is constrained by  any spatial limitation: ‘As the 
infiniteness of God is a denial of limitation of being, so immensity, or 
omnipresence, is a denial of limitation of place.’401   
The text to expound the doctrine of omnipresence is Jer. (23.24), ‘Can 
any hide himself in secret places that I shall not see him? saith the Lord: do 
not I fill heaven and earth? saith the Lord.’ From the text context of the text, 
Charnock explicates that omnipresence is greater than those acts of divine 
understanding and divine will, and more transcendental than the 
                                                             
400 Ibid., 423. In addition to ‘omnipresence’, other terms like ‘ubiquity’ and 
‘immensity’ were used by Reformed orthodox theologians to describe the same divine 
property. Heppe, Reformed Dogmatics: 65-66; Beeke and Jones, A Puritan Theology: 66. In 
modern times, confessional Reformed theologians, while agreeing with the orthodox in the 
equivalence between ‘immensity’ and ‘omnipresence’, have noted a distinction wherein, 
properly speaking, ‘immensity’ indicates the absolute freedom of the divine essence whereas 
‘omnipresence’ emphasizes the universal presence of God in the entirety of his being, thus 
‘[t]he former emphasizes the transcendence, and the latter, the immanence of God.’ In 
Berkhof, Systematic Theology: 65. Cf. Charles Hodge, Systematic Theology, 3 vols. (London: 
Thomas Nelson, 1871), 1:383-384. 
401 Charnock, Works, 1: 425. 
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acknowledgement of God’s authority and power in the world.402 Though it is 
possible for a being to be present ‘by knowledge’, by itself knowledge lacks of 
the ontological nature to encompass a place and, thus, it cannot ‘constitute a 
presence.’403 The gist in Charnock’s argument lies in the distinction between 
the constitutive properties of the knower and the knowledge he might have 
vis-à-vis his own spatial capabilities. In other words, Charnock grants that a 
knower is capable of being ‘present’ by means of his knowledge, yet he denies 
that knowledge alone is metaphysically able to fill a spatial location.404 To 
conclude this point, Charnock sustains that the presence of God is always 
substantial, that is, it encompasses the entirety of the divine being. This 
pervasive presence of God is observed in the activity of his power, in the 
testimony of his operations, and in the infinitude of his knowledge, though 
always involving the reality of the divine essence.405  
The wording in Jer. (23.24) does not preclude Charnock from reading 
the text in a way where the divine presence is not understood as strictly 
confined to the ‘heavens and earth’; instead, God’s presence transcends every 
place considering that ‘his [God’s] essence is not straitened in the limits of any 
                                                             
402 Ibid., 422. Contra Socinians, who limited God’s presence to his dominion, power, 
wisdom, and providence. See The Racovian Catechism, trans. Thomas Rees (London: 
Longman, Hurst, Rees, Orme and Brown, 1818), 32.  
403 Charnock, Works, 1: 422. 
404 In response to Vorstius’ teaching on omnipresence wherein God is said to be 
universally present by means of the divine virtue (virtute) and power (potentia), but not by 
means of the divine essence. See Watson, Body of Divinity: 51. 
405 This insight is recognised even amongst pagans; thus, Seneca’s De Beneficiis, from 
which Charnock quotes, ‘Ipse opus suum implet’ (He [Mercurium] himself fills his own 
works). In Charnock, Works, 1: 423. Cf. Lucius Annaeus Seneca, Moral Essays: Volume III, 
trans. John W. Basore, Loeb Classical Library (Cambridge, Mass: Harvard University Press, 
1928), IV/viii; pp. 218-219. 
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created work, he is not contained in the heavens, i.e., in the manner that he is 
there; but he is there in his essence, and therefore cannot be contained there 
in his essence.’406 Charnock justifies such metaphysical claim by noting, on the 
one hand, that references in Scripture pointing to God’s spatial location are 
anthropomorphic in nature and the consequence of divine accommodation 
and, on the other hand, he takes into account the self-subsistence of God, 
which in turn hints of divine eternity, entailing divine immensity, and from 
there leading to omnipresence. 407 Therefore, omnipresence is an predication 
restricted only to God given that ‘no creature can be eternal and immutable, so 
no creature can be immense, because it cannot be infinite; nothing can be of 
an infinite nature, and therefore nothing of an immense presence but God.’408  
Following the scholastics, Charnock asserts that the presence of God in 
the universe must be always repletivè, filling all places, rather than 
circumscriptivè, limited to one spatial location or definitivè, limited to one 
non-spatial point.409 To prove that the repletivè presence of God is real, 
Charnock argues from the constitutive nature of the divine essence. In this 
manner, divine infinity becomes the foundation for affirming the universal 
presence of God whilst divine simplicity accounts for the assertion that God is 
everywhere in the entirety of his being: ‘for in regards of his infinite he has no 
                                                             
406 Charnock, Works, 1: 431-432. 
407 Ibid., 432. Following Denis Pétau (1583-1652), the French Jesuit theologian, 
Charnock asserts, ‘Innumerable worlds cannot be a sufficient place to contain God; he can 
only be a sufficient place to himself’. In ibid. 
408 Ibid., 433. 
409 Ibid., 422, 424. Charnock adds that a repletivè presence is an exclusive property of 
God while a circumscriptivè and a definitivè presence belongs to material bodies and finite 
spirits, respectively. In ibid., 424. 
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bounds; in regards of his simplicity, he has no parts’.410 Furthermore, given 
that God is essentially infinite, his presence must be also infinite in nature 
since ‘the infiniteness of his attributes is grounded upon the infiniteness of his 
essence’ and, by virtue of divine simplicity, ‘his perfections are his essence’.411 
In fact, to think of a divine being who is concurrently infinite in its essence 
and finite in its attributes is clearly contradictory inasmuch as such 
metaphysical disproportionality would lead to irrational notions of the God.412  
Another piece of evidence supporting the omnipresence of God is 
observed in the continuous operations of the works of God. The argument is 
simple: given that God preserves everything, he must be, therefore, in 
everything.413 Since the presence of God in the universe is repletivè, his work 
of preservation cannot be accomplished simply by the diffusion of divine 
virtues throughout the created order, but through the influence of God’s 
essential presence in the world: ‘As his [God’s] presence was actual with what 
he created, so his presence is actual with what he preserves, since creation and 
preservation do so little differ; if God creates things by his essential presence, 
by the same he supports them.’414 In other words, God’s essential presence in 
                                                             
410 Ibid., 433. 
411 Ibid., 434, 435. 
412 Ibid., 434. 
413 Ibid., 436. 
414 Ibid. 
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the act of creation (creatio) remains alike in the act of preservation 
(continuata creatio) since the latter is an extension of the former.415  
Omnipresence is also proven by the inferences drawing from other 
attributes such as perfection, immutability, and omnipotence. First, since a 
perfect being is not bound by external restrictions of any kind, God’s presence 
cannot be confined to one place because such spatial restriction would entail 
an ontological imperfection.416 Second, God’s presence must be universal for 
otherwise a motion would be required for God to be in more than one 
location, but to move from one location to another is to experience a spatial 
change, something that God cannot undergo for he is immutable.417 Lastly, a 
correlation between the power of God to act and his presence is established 
upon the basis of the notions of infinity and immensity: given that the divine 
essence is not less than his power and his power is not an extension of his 
essence, Charnock states that: ‘God is wheresoever he hath a power to act, but 
he hath a power to act everywhere in the world, everywhere out of the world; 
he is therefore everywhere in the world, everywhere out of the world.’418 It is 
worth noting the import of divine simplicity as a theological concept in 
Charnock’s theology of the divine attributes, which in this particular case 
allows Charnock to claim that the divine presence is universally extensive 
since, by virtue of God’s infinity and immensity, there is no place wherein the 
divine power is inactive: ‘Where his essence is, his perfections are, because 
                                                             
415 Cf. A Discourse of Divine Providence in ibid., 9. 
416 Ibid., 437-438. 
417 Ibid., 438. 
418 Ibid., 439. 
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they are one with his essence; yea, they are his essence, though they have their 
several degrees of manifestation.’419  
Significantly, Charnock does not make divine power contingent on 
creation and preservation. Clearly, for Charnock, the reality of the divine life 
ad intra (i.e., God’s power) is independent from the actuality of the divine 
operations ad extra (i.e., God’s economy).420 This is important for at least two 
reasons: (1) it rejects that God’s infinite power, and by derivation God’s 
infinite presence, is bounded by the finitude of creation, and (2) it preserves 
divine aseity by acknowledging the absolute freedom of God with respect to 
creation.       
Though the term ‘pantheism’ was coined after Charnock’s death (1680), 
some embryonic forms of it existed during the seventeenth-century.421 
Charnock’s doctrine of omnipresence responds to the challenge posed by such 
nascent forms of pantheism by describing how his repletivè presence 
permeates the universe:: ‘So is the essence of God in the whole world, not by 
diffusion as air or light, not mixed with any creature, but remaining distinct 
from the essence of any created being.’422 Thus, while the presence of God fills 
everything substantially, it does not do so by dispersing or dividing the divine 
essence nor by the concoction between the creator and his creation. 
                                                             
419 Ibid., 453. 
420 Ibid., 439. 
421 It is believed that John Toland (1670-1722) formally introduced the term 
‘pantheism’ for the first time in his 1720’s Pantheisticon: or The Form of Celebrating the 
Socratic Society. Pantheistic ideas, however, antecedes Tolland. See Michael P. Levine, 
Pantheism: A Non-Theistic Concept of Deity (London: Routledge, 1994), 1-22.  
422 Charnock, Works, 1: 425. 
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Explanations about omnipresence that appeal to diffusion and mixture are 
inadequate. If God’s present is accounted by the diffusion of his being, the 
divine essence is said to be divided, an impossibility due to God’s simplicity 
and his spiritual nature. If God’s presence is accounted by conflating the 
divine being with creation, there would be no meaningful distinction between 
God and creation; thus, Charnock: ‘God is so in his essence as a Creator 
different from the creature, preserving their nature, not communicating his 
own. His essence touches all, is in conjunction with none. Finite and infinite 
cannot be joined.’423 Neither omnipresence can be satisfactorily explained by 
the multiplication of the divine essence given that God is infinite and therefore 
undividable.424  
Interestingly, Charnock devotes some time to ponder about the 
significance of the doctrine of omnipresence in some Christological themes. 
For example, there is a concern involving the way whereby omnipresence is 
communicated to Christ. While affirming the unio personalis and the full 
divinity of the incarnated Son, Charnock rejects that the ubiquity of Christ 
results from having the omnipresence of the deity communicated to the 
humanity of Christ.425 For Charnock, the communication of attributes from the 
divine to the human is unattainable given the unsurmountable ontological 
difference between divinity and humanity: ‘It is as impossible that the 
meanness of the humanity can receive the impressions of the Deity, so as to be 
changed into it; and a creature be metamorphosed into the Creator, and 
                                                             
423 Ibid., 442. 
424 Ibid., 430. 
425 Ibid., 433. 
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temporary flesh become eternal, and finite mount up into infinity.’426 In other 
words, one should not speak of communication of attributes between the two 
natures of the theanthropic person but to discriminate between concrete 
claims describing the person and abstract claims describing each nature in the 
person.427  
Charnock indicates that the presence of God in creation is active as his 
providential acts of power and wisdom testify: ‘He is present with all things by 
his authority, because all things are subject to him; by his power, because all 
things are sustained by him; by his knowledge, because all things are naked 
before him… [He is] providentially present with all, since his care extends to 
the meanest of his creatures. His power reacheth all, and his knowledge 
pierceth all.’428 The omnipresence of God is, then, not limited to a passive 
observance of creation’s affairs, but, on the contrary, it is operative, and 
morally discernible, in the acts of sustenance, providence, and judgement. In 
this sense, Charnock links the doctrines of omnipresence, creation, and 
providence by noting the actual presence of God in all creatures, as the 
foundation for their ontological constitution, attest for the influence of God’s 
power and goodness: ‘As everything in the world was created by God, so 
everything in the world is preserved by God; and since preservation is not 
wholly distinct from creation, it is necessary God should be present with 
everything while he preserves it, as well as present with it when he created 
                                                             
426 Ibid., 2: 59. 
427 Ibid., 1: 433. Similarly, Wollebius concludes: ‘Therefore I say rightly, “God is man,” 
and “Man is God,” but not “Deity is humanity,” or “humanity is Deity.” In Wollebius, 
"Compendium," 92. 
428 Charnock, Works, 1: 425. 
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it’.429 Paradoxically, Charnock restricts the revelation of the presence of God to 
those creatures that are ‘capacitated for it’.430 This conundrum (i.e., God is 
everywhere but not with everyone) is explicated by alluding to God’s special 
presence whereby he providentially assists specific individuals for specific 
tasks. While God is present with all creatures by means of his divinity, the 
divine presence as ‘gracious efficacy’ is reserved exclusively for his people.431 
In sum, God’s essential presence, though universal, it is manifested in 
different manners; for example, the divine glory is an expression of his 
presence in heaven just as the divine wrath it is so in hell. Charnock adds to 
this point, ‘… in heaven he is a God spreading his beam of light; in hell, a God 
distributing his strokes of justice; by the one he fills heaven, by the other he 
fills hell; by his providence and essence he fills both heaven and earth.’432 
Pars Practica: Practical Application of the Doctrine 
Charnock ends his treatment of the spiritual nature of God by 
presenting ten inferences in the form of antecedent/consequent clauses 
wherein each consequent seeks to highlight a practical element of the doctrine 
of divine spirituality.433 These factual conditionals are clustered according to 
their homiletical objective into two major categories: (1) 
exhortation/sanctification, and (2) reassurance. 
                                                             
429 Ibid. 
430 Ibid. 
431 Ibid., 426. 
432 Ibid. 
433 Ibid., 271-282. 
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To acknowledge the spirituality of God is a recognition that the human 
spirit finds no real comfort but in the Father of spirits. It is an admonishment 
against idolatry because it is abhorrent to fashion the divine essence in earthly 
or heavenly forms. It is an encouragement to trust in God when one seeks for 
spiritual blessings.434 In sum, one may say that to understand that God is spirit 
is an exhortation to offer the proper worship that is due to him (i.e., spiritual 
worship).435 These inferences are rich in theological substance for pedagogical 
instruction whilst remaining homiletical in character: to know God as a pure 
spiritual being is: (1) to assume he is that ‘which nothing can be imagined 
more perfect, more pure, more spiritual’, (2) to affirm that God is permanently 
active and communicative, and (3) to say that ‘he is indefatigable in acting.’ 436 
Knowing about the doctrine of divine eternity accomplishes three tasks 
for the personal edification of the saints: (1) it provides crucial information for 
strengthening one’s faith, (2) brings comfort to one’s soul, and (3) incites 
exhortation for the sake of personal sanctification.437 Consequently, eternity 
informs the church about Christ’s divine status inasmuch as the Son is 
                                                             
434 Ibid., 272, 279-280. 
435 Worship is a spiritual act that requires the engagement of one’s cognitive and 
volitional faculties. Charnock explains (in ibid., 298.) that ‘[w]orship is an act of the 
understanding, applying itself to the knowledge of the excellency of God, and actual thoughts 
of his majesty, recognizing him as the supreme Lord and governor of the world, which is 
natural knowledge; beholding the glory of his attributes in the Redeemer, which is evangelical 
knowledge, this is the sole act of the spirit of man.’ The emphasis that Charnock makes on the 
spiritual aspect of worship should not be understood as a rejection of the bodily element that 
is involved in the adoration of God. See ibid., 296-298. For the particulars qualifying spiritual 
worship, see ibid., 299-305. 
436 Ibid., 275, 280.    
437 Ibid., 360-373. 
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ascribed with eternity, an exclusive predication of God.438 Acknowledging 
divine eternity brings comfort to one’s soul for it immutably secures God’s 
ultimate promises of redemption in the face of trials, persecution, and 
distress.439 Finally, divine eternity exhorts the faithful to meditate on the false 
expectations of worldly pleasures. Eternity is also a reason for the creature’s 
devotion: ‘He [God] is more worthy of our affections because he is eternal 
God, than because he is our Creator; because he is more excellent in his nature 
than in his transient actions.’440          
It is worth noting that a significant number of ‘uses’ for the attributes of 
the second order are directly related to one another. For instance, Charnock 
believes that divine spirituality can be inferred from omnipresence: God is 
said to be essentially present everywhere thus he must subsist not in bodily 
form but as a spirit considering that it is impossible for a corporeal entity to be 
in the plenitude of his being in more than one place at the same time.441 
Similarly, omniscience is directly related to omnipresence insofar as the 
universal presence of an infinitely intelligent being (God) entails an infinite 
knowledge of everything external to him just as much as of a boundless 
knowledge of its own being for in God the knowledge of the world cannot be 
                                                             
438 Charnock appeals to the testimony of the New Testament in passages such as John 
16.28, 17.5; Col. 1.16; Heb. 7.3, 13.8; and Rev. 1.8. In ibid., 360-361. 
439 Ibid., 365. 
440 Ibid., 373. 
441 Ibid., 446. 
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greater than the knowledge of himself.442 Particularly, omnipresence 
highlights the unsurpassable gap between God and creation: 
[H]e [God] is in the world, yet not confined to it; he is out of the world, yet not 
debarred from it; he is above the world, yet not elevated by it; he is below the 
world, yet not depressed by it; he is above all, equalled by none; he is in all, not 
because he needs them, but they stand in need of him; this, as well as eternity, 
makes a vast disproportion between God and the creature.443 
To know that God is immutable enlightens one about the status of 
Christ’s divinity because immutability, as a divine prerogative, is equally 
predicated of the Son (Heb. 1.11) as it is of the Father (Ps. 102.26-27). Also, 
divine immutability brings comfort to the believer since by it constancy rests 
secure for God’s actions of deliverance and redemption. What is more, 
immutability comforts the mind and soul by the recognition that salvation 
reposes in the unchangeable character of the principles that compose the 
eternal decree, viz., election and the covenant of grace.444 Finally, to know that 
God is immutable urges the church: (1) to grow in the virtue of patience 
knowing that the providence of God is a reflection of his immutable will; (2) to 
imitate God by aiming at a state of permanent goodness; and (3), to reach out 
for God’s deliverance in moments of spiritual darkness for the creator is able, 
by virtue of being the one who always remains the same, to provide the 
stability the unstable creature requires.445      
                                                             
442 Ibid., 447. 
443 Ibid., 448. 
444 Ibid., 412-413. 
445 Ibid., 418-419. 
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CHAPTER V 
  
QUID SIT DEUS: CHARNOCK ON THE ATTRIBUTES  
OF THE SECOND ORDER (I) 
Introduction: Divine Perfections per intelligentia Dei  
The present and the subsequent chapter describe Charnock’s theology 
of the so-called communicable attributes. The decision to split the exposition 
of Charnock’s lectures on the attributes of the second order in two chapters is 
not arbitrary; on the contrary, it obeys to considerations of method seeking to 
consider a taxonomy founded in the scholastic distinction between attributes 
according to the divine intellect (knowledge and wisdom) and attributes 
according to the divine will (power, holiness, goodness, dominion, and 
patience). In what follows, this study discusses the attributes of the second 
order that reveal an aspect of the intellect of God: per intelligentia Dei.  
As the attributes of the first order are characterised by the rejection of 
any limitation in the divine nature (via negativa), the attributes predicated of 
God in the following two chapters are ascribed to him in the most excellent 
manner (via eminentiae). Contrary to the ones discussed in the previous 
chapter, the properties inferred from the way of eminence are said to be 
communicated to the creature analogically, that is, by resembling something 
real of the divine essence in the creature, though only by participation.    
Knowledge (De Scientia Dei) 
Though in most cases the Reformed systems included de scientia Dei as 
part of the so-called ‘communicable attributes’, Charnock classifies it 
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differently in his theological sermons. To understand this variance, one may 
note that the Reformed scholastics understood the term scientia as an actus 
simplicissimus (simplest act), that is, an act wherein nothing precedes or 
follows the divine act of knowing.446 This is to say that God eternally knows all 
that it is possible to know in one single instant given that the divine essence 
requires of no potentiality for the acquisition of new knowledge since God is 
actus purus: ‘God is all act in the knowledge of himself, and his knowledge of 
other things.’447 In contrast, scientia when predicated of the creature implies a 
gradual process, a disposition, a faculty, or a habitus of the mind in the 
acquisition of understanding. By underscoring the immeasurable gap between 
divine knowledge and the knowledge of the creature, Charnock indicates that 
the former is always superordinate over the latter and hence 
incommunicable.448 Though Charnock does not use this language, ectypal 
forms of knowledge are eclipsed by considerations about the one archetypal 
knowledge residing in God.449 It is worth noting that the quality of 
‘incommunicable’ is not limited to descriptions of divine omniscience alone; in 
fact, Charnock asserts that the whole knowledge of God is ‘incommunicable’ as 
                                                             
446 See Muller, Post-Reformation: 3:398. Also ‘scientia’ in Idem., Dictionary of Latin 
and Greek: 274.    
447 Charnock, Works, 1: 466. Cf. Cocceius, Summa: III.x.8; p. 144, where he notes: 
Intelligentia in Deo non habet se ut potentia, sive ut facultas… sed ut actus [In God there is 
no intelligence itself as potency… but as an act]. 
448 Incommunicable in the sense that knowledge resides in the creature only by 
participation not essentially.  
449 While Charnock does not address the archetypal-ectypal classification per name, 
all indicates that he was cognisant of it. Charnock was aware of the systems that included the 
distinction in their theological prolegomena: Polanus’ Syntagma, Gerhard’s Loci Theologici 
(by inference Junius’s De vera theologia), and Turretin’s Institutio. What is more, the terms 
were used by some of Charnock’s fellow puritans in England. See Trueman, The Claims of 
Truth: John Owen's Trinitarian Theology: 54-64.  
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far as it indicates the possession of an exclusive perfection of the divine 
essence.450  
Ps. (147.5), ‘For great is the Lord, and of great power; his 
understanding is infinite’, is the text that accounts for the transition from 
biblical exegesis to the doctrinal formulae in this discourse.451  The text 
provides the biblical foundation to make claims concerning the essence, the 
power, and the knowledge of God. Charnock orders these claims sequentially 
to say that ‘as God is almighty, so he is omniscient; and as there is no end of 
his power, so no account can exactly be given of his understanding. 
The discussion begins by noting that divine knowledge is identified 
differently according to its objects. For instance, in reference to God’s 
understanding of past, present, and future things, divine knowledge is 
respectively known as ‘remembrance’, ‘knowledge’, and ‘foreknowledge’ or 
‘prescience’. Concerning the simple understanding of things, Scripture 
identifies divine knowledge merely as ‘knowledge’; yet, when this knowledge 
involves the universality of objects it is called ‘omniscience’. Finally, when 
divine knowledge considers the way wherein God acts, it is recognised as 
‘wisdom’ or ‘prudence’.452  
                                                             
450 Charnock, Works, 1: 461. He treats the doctrine of omniscience as an essential 
aspect of divine knowledge, see ibid., 457-536. 
451 Charnock makes some preliminary claims concerning the ontology of God based 
upon the assertion of the psalmist: God is immense, his power and wisdom are infinite. See 
ibid., 459. 
452 Ibid., 461. 
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Though in one sense it is impossible for the human mind to grasp the 
knowledge of God, it is possible to know something about it by way of analogy, 
that is, by means of the via negativa and the via eminentiae. According to 
Charnock, one may grasp (though not exhaustively) what divine knowledge is 
by removing from it (negative way) all the imperfections prevailing in 
creaturely knowledge, while ascribing the most excellent way of 
understanding to God (eminent way). This manner of making the 
incomprehensible accessible to the human mind is a gift from God whereby he 
reveals the greatness of his nature in a way that meets the limitations of the 
creature’s cognitive faculties.453  
In harmony with the Reformed scholastic tradition and with the history 
of the doctrine, Charnock follows the classification of the modes of divine 
knowing according to their objects. These ways of knowing are clustered in 
pairs: (1) scientia visionis et simplicis intelligentiae (knowledge of vision and 
simple intelligence and knowledge of simple intelligence).454 In this account, 
the knowledge of vision stands for God’s knowledge of himself and the 
knowledge of all things yet to come.455 This way of knowing derives ultimately 
from a free act of the divine will that logically (not temporarily) precedes and 
enables the decree to be effected: ‘If we could suppose any first or second in 
                                                             
453 Ibid. 
454 Cf. Andreas J. Beck, "Gisbertus Voetius (1589-1676)," in Reformation and 
Scholasticism: An Ecumenical Enterprise, ed. Willem J. van Asselt and Eef Dekker (Grand 
Rapids: Baker, 2001), 222, n. 50. The two distinct ways of knowing noted in the set above 
indicated are equivalent to the scientia libera sive voluntaria and the scientia necessaria sive 
naturalis respectively. The use of one set of terms over the other is explained by either the 
voluntaristic impulse found in Scotism or the intellectualistic tendency prevailing in some 
forms of Thomism. See Muller, PRRD: 3:407.  
455 Charnock, Works, 1: 461-462.  
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God's decree, we might say God knew them as possible before he decreed 
them; he knew them as future because be decreed them.’456 In this account, 
then, a denial of scientia visionis entails a rejection of God’s sovereign control 
over his creation given that ignorance of the things created is inconsistent 
with God’s absolute dominion over creation.457  
Surprisingly, Charnock includes God’s understanding of himself as an 
object of the scientia visionis Dei.458 This seems incorrect given that the 
knowledge of vision is logically consequent to the divine will: if God knows 
himself by a determination of his will, his existence would be contingent not 
necessary. It seems more consistent, then, to assert that God’s knowledge of 
himself entails a necessary/natural mode of divine knowing, this on the basis 
that God is a necessary being and as such his existence does not depend on 
any act of his will.459 Furthermore, since God necessarily knows himself by his 
essence, that is, through the awareness of his own eternal existence, this 
knowledge must (logically) precede the divine will.460 Thereby, this 
investigation reckons more sensible to affirm that God primarily knows his 
own being by means of a mode of knowing that is necessary and natural not 
                                                             
456 Ibid., 462.  
457 Ibid., 463. 
458 Ibid., 461. More intriguing is that elsewhere Charnock takes side with those who 
affirmed that God’s knowledge of himself belongs to scientia speculativa. In ibid., 463. 
459 Paradoxically, Charnock himself is aware that God’s knowledge of himself comes 
by God’s own essence and therefore not by an act of the divine will. In ibid., 465-466. 
460 Cf. Gisbertus Voetius, Disputationes Selectae Theologicae: Pars. I-V (Utrecht: 
s.n., 1648-1669), 1:246. Quoted in Antonie Vos, "Reformed Orthodoxy in the Netherlands," in 
A Companion to Reformed Orthodoxy, ed. Herman J. Selderhuis (Leiden: Brill, 2013), 148. 
Voetius’ claim is something that Charnock indirectly acknowledges: ‘The knowledge of vision 
follows the act of God’s will, and supposeth an act of God’s will before, decreeing things to be.’ 
In Charnock, Works, 1: 462. 
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one that is free and voluntary as Charnock appears to affirm. In the end, it is 
difficult to suggest a definite explanation as to why Charnock believes that 
God knows himself by means of his scientia visionis. On one side, it seems 
that he favours those who locate God’s knowledge of himself as an object of 
scientia speculativa; on the other side, it is possible that Charnock conflates 
or confuses the objects of knowledge contained in two different modes of 
divine knowing.461  
The scientia simplicis intelligentiae or knowledge of simple intelligence 
denotes God’s knowledge of things that are within the realm of logical 
possibilities but that never will be actual.462 This mode of knowing 
presupposes a necessary knowledge (scientia necessaria) in God whereby he 
necessarily knows the objects of his understanding. This must be the case 
since the knowledge of possible things imply the consciousness of the objects 
that, if decreed, would be actual. In contrast to the knowledge of vision, the 
knowledge of simple intelligence is not directly linked to the divine will; 
instead, it is derivative of God’s sentience of his power. In other words, God 
knows possible things by means of the power to create them for whatever 
possible for him to create, he necessarily knows it.463 Since God necessarily 
                                                             
461 Idem., Works, 1: 462. 
462 Ibid. 
463 In the case of knowledge of vision, though God knows things primarily as an act of 
his will he also knows them through his power for he is able to make the object of his 
knowledge real. Ibid. 
  135 
 
knows his own power, a denial of this mode of knowing would be a dismissal 
of God’s very being and thus a rejection of his deity.464 
(2) The second set in the classification of the modes of divine 
knowledge is composed by the scientia speculativa (speculative knowledge) 
and the scientia practica (practical knowledge).465 The former, also known as 
scientia theoretica (theoretical knowledge), is the knowledge one has of 
something irrespective of its means of operation or production, which in the 
case of God refers to the knowledge of all things possible (i.e., scientia 
visionis).466 More precisely, divine speculative knowledge is the knowledge of 
possible things considered consequent to the divine decree. The latter is the 
divine understanding of everything that has been eternally decreed and things 
directed towards creation, that is, God’s all-encompassing knowledge (in 
concurrence with the divine decree) of everything that is under his 
governance.467 In can be argued that practical knowledge must be predicated 
of God given that it determines the existential status of the creature 
considering that his actualisation depends on the divine decree, not as causa 
sui [its own cause] but in the sense that ‘we are the fruits of his discretion 
                                                             
464 Ibid., 463. 
465 Ibid., 462. This parallel set of modes of divine knowing is a further classification of 
the scientia visionis in relation to the divine decree. Accordingly, God’s speculative knowledge 
concurs with the eternal decree whereas practical knowledge is consequent with it. See 
Muller, PRRD: 3:408.   
466 In Charnock, Works, 1: 462, Charnock notes that for some God’s knowledge of 
himself is only speculative. Thomas concurs: ‘Accordingly, we must say that God’s knowledge 
of himself is speculative only: he himself cannot be produced [ipse enim operabilis non est] ... 
Thus in his speculative knowledge of himself he has knowledge both speculative and practical 
of all other things.’ In St. Thomas Aquinas, ST, trans. Thomas Gornall, 61 vols., vol. 4 
(Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1964), 1a. 14, 16; pp. 59, 61. 
467 Charnock, Works, 1: 463. 
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discovered in creation.’468 Finally, Charnock adds that the scope of practical 
knowledge extends, not only to things that are or will be actual according to 
the divine decree, but to those possible things that God might actualize though 
never will.469 This is why God’s scientia practica is also known as scientia 
libera sive voluntaria (free or voluntary knowledge), because it ultimately 
rests on the free determinations of the divine will.  
(3) The final set of terms used to explain the divine knowing includes 
the scientia approbationis (knowledge of approbation) and the scientia 
reprobationis (knowledge of apprehension).470 Charnock explains that the 
nature of the knowledge of approbation is often represented in Scripture by 
‘acts of affection’.471 Scientia approbationis is directly linked to the divine will, 
though it fundamentally remains in the divine understanding as an affection 
that presupposes the knowledge of the thing already approved by the mind.472 
This manner of knowing concerns God’s positive knowledge of things in their 
inherent goodness, or as Barth puts it, the knowledge of things ‘in their 
genuine being’.473 In contrast, God is said to have knowledge of apprehension 
(reprobation) in the absence of positive knowledge. The knowledge of 
apprehension, then, may be understood as the negative knowledge of evil, not 
                                                             
468 Ibid. 
469 Ibid. 
470 Ibid., 463-464. Though the content of the two seems to be virtually the same, 
Charnock prefers the term ‘apprehension’ over the more literal ‘reprobation’.  
471 Ibid., 463. 
472 Ibid. 
473 Barth, CD: II/1, 567. 
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in the sense of divine ignorance, but as the refusal to acknowledge evil as an 
object of divine affection.474    
It is worth pausing for a moment to evaluate what others have said 
concerning the absence of the language of ‘free’ and ‘voluntary’ in relation to 
the ways of divine knowing in Charnock’s material. Significantly, Lee has 
asserted that this is indicative of the ‘intellectualistic character of his 
[Charnock’s] scholasticism.’475 In response, this study argues that while 
Charnock’s linguistic preference for scientia visionis over scientia libera sive 
voluntaria may be an indicator of the intellectualism prevailing in the 
Thomistic tradition of seventeenth-century’s Protestantism, it is simply not 
the case that the language, much less the concepts, of freedom and volition are 
absent from Charnock’s discourse on the knowledge of God. In fact, Charnock 
directly relates the divine will—and by inference the divine freedom—with 
scientia visionis in several instances.476 Unless one believes that the acts of the 
divine will are not free by nature, it must be recognised that the knowledge of 
vision necessarily imply a free act on God’s part. It is also worth noting that in 
recent times scholars have expressed their scepticism against the rather loose 
use of categories such as intellectualism and voluntarism to categorise the 
                                                             
474 While commenting on Matthew (7.23; 25.12), Charnock explains: ‘[F]or while he 
[Jesus] saith he never knew them, he testifies that he did know them, in rendering the reason 
of his disapproving them, because he knows all their works.’ In Charnock, Works, 1: 463. 
475 Lee, "Theology and Piety," 147. 
476 For example, consider the following statement: ‘The knowledge of vision follows 
the act of God’s will and supposeth an act of God’s will before decreeing things to be.’ In 
Charnock, Works, 1: 462. 
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entire view of an author. 477 Lee’s claim, therefore, is ultimately an unjustified 
conjecture considering that the argument does not reflect the data derived 
from the textual evidence contained in Charnock’s own material. For this 
reason, this study concludes that Charnock seeks to maintain a delicate 
balance between the divine will and the divine freedom in his formulation of 
the doctrine of the divine perfections precisely with the intention of evading 
hard forms of voluntarism and intellectualism.  
Following the explanation on the different manners whereby God 
knows things, Charnock adds that the knowledge of God must be universal in 
its scope. This is to say that scientia Dei encompasses the knowledge of 
himself and the knowledge of everything real and possible, including the 
knowledge of all things that will be or could be. God must have knowledge of 
himself as it is essential for the divine life itself and for the enacting of the 
divine operations. Without perfect knowledge of himself God could not be said 
to be perfect since ignorance of his own being would contradict his perfect 
nature considering that ‘ignorance of one’s self is a greater imperfection than 
ignorance of things without.’478 Moreover, had God been ignorant of himself, 
he could not have created the universe because he would be ignorant of the 
power residing in his own being. Ignorance of his own righteous nature, as 
expressed in his holiness and justice, would make God unable to discriminate 
good from evil and, thus, he would not be able to dictate laws of governance: 
                                                             
477 See, for instance, Tobias Hoffman, "Intellectualism and Voluntarism," in The 
Cambridge History of Medieval Philosophy, ed. Robert Pasnau and Christina van Dike 
(Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2010), 414.  
478 Charnock, Works, 1: 465. 
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‘If he did not know himself, he did not know what to punish, because he could 
not know what was contrary to himself.’479  
   The second part of the discourse on the knowledge of God is 
dedicated to the object and the scope of the divine knowledge.480 In the first 
place, Charnock reiterates that the most distinctive feature of divine 
knowledge, one whereby all creaturely knowledge is exceled, is God’s unique 
understanding of his own being.481 For Charnock, the infinite nature of divine 
knowledge is not the result of maintaining an absolute comprehension of 
everything (actual or possible) apart from the knowledge God has of himself, 
but the corollary of possessing unqualified knowledge of the divine 
perfections. Having the notion of divine simplicity in the background, 
Charnock concludes that since God is essentially infinite, his knowledge must 
be infinite also.482   
Since the knowledge of his own being is essential for the life of God and 
for the governance of the created order, Charnock infers that God’s knowledge 
of himself takes precedence over the knowledge of all other things, ‘He [God] 
is the first truth and therefore the first object of his own understanding.’483 Yet, 
this order must be understood logically, from the creature’s conception, 
considering that in the strictest terms God knows the divine being and 
                                                             
479 Ibid. 
480 Ibid., 464-496. 
481 Ibid., 465, 483. 
482 Ibid., 466. 
483 Ibid., 465. 
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everything else in one single act of knowing.484 Moreover, God does not know 
himself from the effects of his power since his knowledge is from eternity; nor 
does this knowledge depend on any external cause to God since he is a 
necessary being and thus his existence requires no causal explanation, nor 
does this knowledge arise from a separate faculty in God implying 
composition in the divine being. God knows himself naturally and necessarily 
by and from his own essence.485 As God’s knowledge involves the knowledge of 
himself, whose nature is infinite, the same knowledge must include a 
comprehensive understanding of every finite thing. In other words, God 
knows everything else besides his own being precisely because he knows 
himself.486  
That God knows all possibilities is justified by the nature of the divine 
being: God is infinite in essence and hence infinite in power on the basis that 
there is no real distinction between essence and being in the divine being. This 
is to say that since God can do everything possible he must know everything 
he is able to do because ‘[i]f he knows not all things possible, he could not 
know the extent of his own power, and so would not know himself as a cause 
sufficient for more things than he hath created.’487 Accordingly, the knowledge 
God has of all possible things is a derivative from the infinite nature of the 
divine power or more specifically from the relation between divine power and 
its objects. In causal idiom, God knows in himself all possible things (those 
                                                             
484 Ibid. 
485 Ibid., 465-466. 
486 Ibid., 466-467. 
487 Ibid., 468. 
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that never will be) only as their sufficient cause, i.e., he knows them as having 
in himself the creative power for bringing possible things into existence 
whereas things that are to be actual according to the divine decree, God knows 
them in himself as their efficient cause and in their immediate instrumental 
causes.488 In other words, God’s comprehensive knowledge of possible things 
depends on knowing all potentialities as contained in God’s creative power, 
not in the determination of God’s will: ‘[H]e [God] understands them 
[possible things] as able to produce them [sufficient cause], not as willing to 
effect them [efficient cause].’489   
Though Charnock asserts that God knows everything essentially by one 
single act of intuition that is independent, distinct, infallible, immutable, and 
perpetual, he still discriminates amongst divine knowledge of past, present, 
and future events.490 That God owns a comprehensive knowledge of past and 
present occurrences has been hardly contested; however, significant disputes 
erupted over God’s foreknowledge and its implications for human freedom.491 
To understand better the position of the Reformed orthodox divines 
(Charnock’s in particular) on divine foreknowledge and human freedom it is 
necessary to preface the discussion by some introductory remarks on the 
                                                             
488 Ibid., 469. 
489 Ibid. Cf. Ames, Marrow: I/vii, 27; pp. 29-30. 
490 Charnock, Works, 1: 469-486, 496-505. 
491 For a detailed history of the debate until the sixteenth century, see William Lane 
Craig, The Problem of Divine Foreknowledge and Future Contingents from Aristotle to 
Suarez, Brill's Studies in Intellectual History (Leiden: E.J. Brill, 1988).  
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context that prompted the discussion over the so-called middle knowledge 
during Reformation and post-Reformation times.492  
After the Reformation, several disputes took place at the inside of 
Protestant and Catholic churches over the relation between divine sovereignty 
and human free will. On one side of the debate, the Dominicans led by 
Domingo Báñez (1528-1604) defended the Thomistic view that upheld God’s 
infallible knowledge of future contingents whereas, on the other side, the 
Jesuits, headed by the Spaniard Luis de Molina (1535-1600), introduced the 
notion of scientia media (middle knowledge), a theory later adapted by 
Remonstrants and Socinians during the seventeenth-century.493 Molina’s 
writings became the epicentre of the debate and thus the moniker of 
‘molinism’ ever since to identify those theologies aligned with Molina’s notion 
of middle knowledge, although in many cases Molina’s followers departed 
from his ideas.494  
                                                             
492 For literature treating middle knowledge’s medieval background, including 
Ockham, Scotus, and Thomas, refer to Eef Dekker, Middle Knowledge, Studies in 
Philosophical Theology (Leuven: Peeters, 2000), 4, n. 14. 
493 Domingo Báñez, Scholastica Commentaria in Primam Partem Summae 
Theologicae S. Thomae Aquinatis (Tomus Primus), 4 vols. (Douai: Petri Borremans, 1614), 
206-217. Luis de Molina, Liberi Arbitrii Cum Gratia Donis, Divina Praescientia, Providentia, 
Praedestinatione Et Reprobatione Concordia, ed. Johannes Rabeneck (Oña: Societates Iesu, 
1953). For a translation of disputations 47-53 in Molina’s Concordia, consult Luis de Molina 
and Alfred J. Freddoso, On Divine Foreknowledge (Part IV of the Concordia), trans. Alfred J. 
Freddoso (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 1988). Báñez’s direct response to Molina’s 
Concordia is a joint work with two fellow Dominicans, Pedro Herrera and Diego Alvarez, 
Apologetica Fratrum Praedicatorum in Provincia Hispaniae Sacrae Theologiae 
Professorum, Adversus Novas Quandam Assertiones Cujusdam Doctoris Ludovici Molinae 
Nuncupati (Madrid: s.n., 1595). Cf. Turretin, Institutes: III/12, vii; 1:208.   
494 Francesco Piro, "The Philosophical Impact of Molinism in the 17th Century," in A 
Companion to Luis De Molina, ed. Matthias Kaufmann and Alexander Aichele (Leiden: Brill, 
2014), 367. In modern times, molinism has resurfaced in some philosophical circles primarily 
as a foundational concept for the defence of libertarian free will vis-à-vis divine sovereignty 
and the problem of evil, as in Alvin Plantinga, The Nature of Necessity (Oxford: Clarendon 
Press, 1974). In other instances, molinism has been motivated by a rejection of Reformed 
theology and its purported ‘theological fatalism’, this is the case of William Lane Craig, The 
  143 
 
Basically, molinism introduces a third way of divine knowing (next to 
that of necessary and free knowledge) named scientia media (middle 
knowledge) to reconcile the concept of divine efficacious grace with future 
contingents involving the motions of the human will. This middle knowledge 
is located prior to the divine will, that is, in between the knowledge containing 
all possibilities (scientia simplicis intelligentiae sive necessaria) and the 
knowledge comprising all realities (scientia visionis sive scientia voluntaria). 
Molinists assert that neither the knowledge of simple understanding nor the 
knowledge of vision are suitable ways to explain God’s knowledge of future 
contingents inasmuch as the object of this knowledge, which comprises both 
all possibilities and all actualities, neither determines nor grasps them in the 
indeterminacy that is implied in future conditional contingencies.495 In other 
words, the notion of middle knowledge seeks to do justice to future 
conditionals not exclusively in consideration of the divine decree but upon the 
free (independent) act of the creature.496  
The Reformed orthodox responded to this variety of molinism through 
their polemic writings against Jesuits, Remonstrants, and Socinians.497 
                                                             
Only Wise God: The Compatibility of Divine Foreknowledge and Human Freedom (Grand 
Rapids: Baker Book House, 1987). For a glance as to where the current debate stands, 
including a useful bibliography (mostly philosophical) on the subject, see Kenneth J. Perszyk, 
ed. Molinism: The Contemporary Debate (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2011).  
495 Eef Dekker, "Was Arminius a Molinist?," The Sixteenth Century Journal 27, no. 2 
(1996): 338-340. Elsewhere, Dekker refers to this indeterminacy when he stresses that 
contingent knowledge, at least in Molina’s account, implies that what God knows as a fact 
might have been otherwise. In Idem., Middle Knowledge: 6. 
496 Craig, Divine Foreknowledge: 175-177.    
497 Turretin, Institutes: III/13, iv; 1:213. For the most part, the Reformed orthodox 
rejected scientia media in its different versions (Velde, The Doctrine of God: 184.) 
Nevertheless, there were some Reformed divines (e.g., Alsted, Gomarus, Heidegger, and 
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Interestingly, these rejoinders reflected the same Augustinian-Thomistic tone 
deployed by Domingo Báñez in his response to Molina’s views.498 The 
Reformed opposed the notion of scientia media by rejecting the 
Remonstrants’ doctrine of predestination and by repudiating the Socinians’ 
understanding of God’s knowledge of future contingencies. Contra the former, 
the Reformed objected that the so-called middle knowledge of God had taken 
the place of the divine will as the foundation for the doctrine of election. 
Against the latter, the Reformed argued that molinism led to the conclusion 
that divine foreknowledge was limited by the indeterminacy of the creature’s 
volitional acts. The arguments posed by the Reformed orthodox against 
molinism varied in form but generally zeroed on: (1) the superfluous character 
of scientia media as a category of divine knowing, (2) the problem of locating 
scientia media logically prior to the dive decree, and (3) the implications of 
scientia media for the understanding of the divine being.499  
Though Charnock does not tackle middle knowledge by name, his 
understanding of divine knowledge leaves no space for a way of divine 
knowing that is fixed in something different than God’s perfect understanding 
of himself, particularly in the knowledge of his power and the determination 
                                                             
Walaeus) who adapted some notion of middle knowledge in their own theologies. Heppe, 
Reformed Dogmatics: 79.   
498 Christopher Cleveland, Thomism in John Owen (London: Routledge, 2016), 41. 
One may mention, for instance, the conceptual likeness of Báñez’ notion of physical 
premotion and the Reformed concept of divine concurrence. See Charnock, Works, 2: 234-
235. Cf. Robert Joseph Matava, Divine Causality and Human Free Choice: Domingo Báñez, 
Physical Premotion, and the Controversy De Auxiliis Revisited (Leiden: Brill, 2016), 37-72. 
Also worth noting is Charnock’s explanation of the relation between human will and divine 
sovereignty in the efficacy of regeneration, in Charnock, Works, 3: 284-289.   
499 Turretin, Institutes: III/13, ix-xvi; 1:214-216; Maresius, Collegium: II/xli-xliv; pp. 
54-56; Voetius, Disputationes. 
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of his will: ‘Certainly, if God knows all things possible, which he will not do, he 
must know all things future, which he is not only able, but resolved to do, or 
resolved to permit. God’s perfect knowledge of himself, that is, of his own 
infinite power and concluding will, necessarily includes a foreknowledge of 
what he is able to do, and what he will do.’500 This means that everything God 
knows is contained within the categories of possible and (actual) future 
things.501 More to the point, Charnock asserts that divine omniscience is the 
biblical name for the knowledge of God in regards to the universality of 
objects to be known; so, God knows in himself whatsoever is knowable either 
through his knowledge of simple understanding, which is necessary and 
indefinite, or by means of his knowledge of vision, which is voluntary and 
definite.502 Consequently, one may infer from Charnock that since nothing 
escapes the realms of possibility or actuality, it would be redundant to come 
up with a new way of divine knowing (scientia media) to account for God’s 
knowledge of conditioned future events.503  
                                                             
500 Charnock, Works, 1: 478. Other concur with the contention made in this study 
about Charnock’s (implicit) rejection of scientia media. See for instance, Hoek, "Charnock on 
Divine Attributes," 3; Beeke and Jones, A Puritan Theology: 70-71. 
501 Charnock, Works, 1: 461. This universality includes the comprehension of all 
objects known via speculative knowledge, knowledge of simple intelligence, practical 
knowledge, and knowledge of vision. Ibid., 463.   
502 Ibid., 461-462. Cf. Turretin, Institutes: III/13, 1; 1:212-213.  
503 Charnock infers, from Heb. (4.13), that all things are accessible to the knowledge 
of God, and since contingent events are included amongst the nature of things, then all 
contingencies are disclosed to God. Charnock, Works, 1: 485. Cf. Turretin, Institutes: III/13, 
ix; 1:214. Voetius also argues that since the division of divine knowledge into scientia simplicis 
intelligentiae and scientia visionis exhausts all nature of knowable objects (exhaurit totam 
natura objecti scibilis), there is no need to ascribe a third way of knowing (i.e. scientia media) 
to God. In Voetius, Disputationes: I: 309.  
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An objection concerning the ontological status of conditional 
contingencies is also inferred from Charnock’s account of divine knowledge. 
As conditional future events are assumed to be more than possibilities but less 
than absolute actualities, it is disputed how these conditionals are known by 
God considering that propositions prior to the divine decree are deprived of 
truth-value, contrary to what molinists have argued. Besides, if the outcome of 
conditional future contingencies ultimately rests upon creature’s free will, 
rather than upon the determination of the divine will (which is established by 
the divine decree), how is it possible for God to know these contingencies in 
actuality, being that these are assumed to be ontologically indeterminate? 
Moreover, how these conditionals become actual given that contingent 
propositions are void of metaphysical constitution and as such are incapable 
of transitioning from a quasi-actual modus enti (mode of being) into an 
absolute actuality.504 Leonard van Rijssen (1636-1700?), Charnock’s 
contemporary, encapsulates well the substance of the objection: Quae vera 
non sunt, non possunt praesciri ut vera; at futura conditionata non sunt 
vera, seclusâ voluntatis divinae determinatione, quia nullus effectus potest 
intelligi futurus absque Dei Decreto. [Anything that is not true cannot be 
known earlier as true; but yet conditional future is not true, having been 
excluded by the determination of the divine will because it is understood that 
the future is capable of no effect apart from the divine decree.]505 Charnock 
would concur with this rationale in the understanding that Rijssen asserts that 
                                                             
504 Turretin, Institutes: III/13, ix; 1:214; William Twisse, A Discovery of D. Jackson's 
Vanity (Amsterdam: s.n., 1631), 334-336. 
505 In Leonard van Rijssen, Compendium Theologiae Didactico-Elencticae 
(Amsterdam: Apud Georgium Gallet, 1695), III/xxiv, argumenta 2; p. 30. 
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everything included as an object of God’s knowledge of vision has been at one 
instance future and, thus, has been known eternally to God through his will 
and power.506 Furthermore, Charnock would add that God can know future 
contingencies apart from scientia media since all things are ‘present’ to him 
by virtue of the eternal subsistence of the divine essence.507 This is to say that 
divine eternity suggests that God knows by a perpetual act of the divine 
knowing.508 As divine eternity encompasses the possession of perfect life 
without temporal succession, all things must be known to God in an instant, 
that is, in one, eternal, indivisible motion of divine intellect.509 Or, in its 
briefest form, foreknowledge is the scientia nunquam deficientis instantiae 
[knowledge of a never fading present].510 
Things are said to be always ‘present’ in the knowledge of God not as if 
the objects of divine knowledge were eternally endowed with an actual 
ontology for this would mean that things would be coeternal with the divine 
essence. Moreover, had the objects of divine knowledge been eternal, they 
could have never been future since futurity presupposes the transition from 
non-actuality into actuality: ‘Thus all things are present to God's knowledge, 
though in their own nature they may be past or future, not in esse realis [in 
                                                             
506 Charnock, Works, 1: 478. 
507 Ibid., 484. 
508 It is hard to ignore the import of the doctrines of divine simplicity and divine 
aseity in Charnock’s theology of the divine attributes, something that is implicit in the 
argument above. 
509 Charnock, Works, 1: 505.   
510 In ibid., 484. Here, Charnock approvingly cites Boëthius’ words as found in 
Philosophiae Consolationes: V/6.  
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real existence], but in esse intelligibili [in being realised], objectively, not 
actually present’.511  
Ironically, by placing the knowledge of conditional future contingents 
prior to the determination of the divine decree, seventeenth-century defenders 
of middle knowledge tumbled into theological fatalism, the very inference they 
wanted to eradicate from the Reformed view of divine foreknowledge.512 In the 
theory of middle knowledge, divine causality (God’s decree) is replaced with 
natural necessity (free will) as the ultimate cause for events that involve 
conditional contingencies. Since molinists believe that it is God’s ultimate 
prerogative to decide which set of circumstances are to be actualised, the 
events preceding the actualisation of future conditional contingents become 
causally necessary and, thereby, by the same logic, it would leave the door 
open to another form of fatalistic determinism.513 On the contrary, by securing 
divine knowledge of actual things in the divine decree and the divine 
knowledge of possible things in God’s creative power, Charnock does not 
require to invoke middle knowledge to explain God’s understanding of 
contingent occurrences.514 This suggests that the transition from the realm of 
possibility into the state of actuality requires a prior determination of the 
divine will as far as ‘[n]othing can pass out the rank of things merely possible 
                                                             
511 Ibid. See also the explanation in ibid., 353. 
512 Mastricht, Theoretico-Practica: III/ii, 17; p. 275. 
513 Velde, The Doctrine of God: 184, n. 34. Cf. Barth, CD: II/1, 574. It is important to 
consider that the concept of free will in the molinist’s theory is understood in terms of 
freedom of indifference, a view rejected by most Reformed theologians during the sixteenth 
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into the order of things future, before some act of God’s will hath passed for its 
futurition.’515 More to the point, Charnock argues (following Cocceius) that 
God’s foreknowledge ultimately comes directly from what has been eternally 
established by the divine decree, ‘his [God’s] declaration of things to come is 
founded upon his appointment of things to come.’516   
For Charnock, to say that something is contingent is to imply a form of 
‘accidental’ causality, that is, to affirm that something is the effect of an 
unintended action.517 These contingencies are said to be mixed and absolute 
wherein the former takes place when the contingency is composed by 
necessity and chance and the latter occurs when the contingency is 
independent of a necessary cause—or is not obtained by logical necessity—as 
in the free actions of a moral agent.518 This explanation prefaces an important 
theological point in Charnock’s account of divine knowledge, namely, that 
contingencies while accidental concerning their secondary causes are infallible 
concerning their first cause.519 This ultimately means that there is no possible 
state of affairs—including absolute contingencies—that can escape God’s 
foreknowledge. For this reason, the logical conundrum arising from affirming 
two seemingly irreconcilable assertions, namely, God’s infallible knowledge of 
                                                             
515 Ibid., 481. 
516 Ibid.  
517 Ibid., 486. 
518 It is the second kind of contingency that becomes relevant in Charnock’s discussion 
of divine foreknowledge and human free choices. Some speak of diachronic and synchronic 
contingencies: the former is the kind of contingency that becomes fixed at the moment of its 
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future contingents and creature’s free choices, is not ultimately an 
unsurpassable difficulty in Charnock’s doctrine of divine knowledge simply 
because there is no contradiction in upholding both propositions.520 On the 
one hand, God understands from eternity all contingencies, both mixed and 
absolute, since his knowledge of the future is infallible not simply 
hypothetical.521 Moreover, had God been ignorant of contingent occurrences, 
he could not have been able to exercise absolute dominion over creation. In 
such scenario, God would be forced to govern according to the determinations 
of the human will rather than by virtue of the dictates of his own being, which 
would result in ‘an unworthy conceit of the infinite majesty of heaven’.522 On 
the other hand, Charnock is persuaded that human freedom is not infringed 
by God’s foreknowledge of conditional future contingents.523 Reformed 
theologians distinguished between the potency of simultaneities [potentia 
simultatis], an active and subjective notion of indifference in the operation of 
the will, and a simultaneity of potencies [simultas potentiae], a passive and 
objective concept of indifference in the will itself. 524 The Reformed rejected the 
indifference of the will understood as potentia simultatis but accepted it as 
suggesting simultas potentiae; in contrast, opponents of Reformed theology 
                                                             
520 Ibid., 485-486, 488ff.  
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522 Ibid., 488.  
523 At this point, it is worth remarking that, while Charnock neither expounds on all 
the theological and philosophical technicalities comprising the concept of ‘free will’ nor does 
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determined that freedom of (absolute) indifference speaks of one’s ability to 
will two contradictory objects simultaneously. This implies, then, that the 
freedom of the will is maintained when, given all the circumstances for a 
volitional motion to occur (i.e., God’s concurrence, rational judgement, divine 
decree, etc.), the will remains ‘indifferent’ to act or not to act. One immediate 
problem with this interpretation of free will involves the impossibility of any 
moral agent (earthly or heavenly) to will two contradictory objects 
simultaneously at the instance when all the conditions for the will to act are 
given.525 Charnock seems to object to this notion of indifference when he states 
that ‘the liberty of the will doth not stand in indifference to this or that thing, 
for then the will would lose its liberty every time it hath determined itself to 
any one thing, because after the determination it would be no longer 
indifferent to the other.’526  
In particular, Charnock believes, in harmony with most of his 
Reformed colleagues, that every moral creature has been endowed with free 
will from the moment of creation, that is, Adam and Eve were originally 
created in a state of holiness and with the moral ability not to disobey the 
divine command or, to put it in positive terms, they were created with the 
freedom to obey God.527 After the Fall, Adam and Eve retained their free will as 
part of their essential constitution as human beings but lost their freedom 
                                                             
525 For an insightful analysis of Turretin’s view on free choice, including Turretin’s 
rejection of free will as freedom of absolute indifference, consult Eef Dekker et al., "Beyond 
Indifference: An Elenctic Locus on Free Choice by Francesco Turretini (1623-1687) " in 
Reformed Thought on Freedom: The Concept of Free Choice in Early Modern Reformed 
Theology, ed. Willem J. van Asselt, et al. (Grand Rapids: Baker Academic, 2010). 
526 Charnock, Works, 3: 287. 
527 Ibid., 171-172, 211-212. 
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(ability) to choose what pleases God.528 In this sense, a post-lapsarian moral 
agent is understood to have free will not in the sense of having freedom of 
indifference but in the understanding that her volitional acts are free from 
both necessity of compulsion and from physical necessity.529  
Briefly put it, Charnock argues that God is not violating the creature’s 
freedom of choice in foreknowing her voluntary actions because God does not 
necessitate the concurrence of the creature’s will. This claim is explained and 
defended by using six interrelated propositions wherein concepts such as 
necessity, coercion, causality, and inscrutability coalesce.530 The initial 
proposition asserts that not all necessity opposes freedom.531 Charnock 
justifies this claim by discriminating between what the scholastics called 
necessitas coactionis (compulsive necessity), that is, the necessity derived 
from imposition or coercion against the will from an external cause, and 
necessitas infallibilitatis (necessity of infallibility), namely, the necessity of 
supposition based upon God’s absolute foreknowledge.532 The former is 
incompatible with the agent’s freedom whereas the latter, by imposing no 
absolute or physical (coercive) necessity, preserves creaturely freedom. 
Conceptually, Charnock’s argument rests on a more foundational distinction 
                                                             
528 Ibid., 211. 
529 Charnock affirms that the events foretold by Isaiah concerning Cyrus and the 
capture of Babylon, though infallibly foreknown by God, were brought by ‘a free inclination 
and resolve of his [Cyrus’] own will’. In Idem., Works, 1: 488. Significantly, freedom of the will 
is essential for the constitution of humanity, without it human nature simply cannot be. 
Likewise, liberty of choice is thought to be essential for the constitution of the human will, 
without it the will is effaced. Ibid., 2: 118; Idem., Works, 3: 211. 
530 Idem., Works, 1: 492-496. 
531 Ibid., 492. 
532 Ibid. Cf. Turretin, Institutes: X/2, vi; pp. 662-663. 
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found in scholastic theology, one that distinguishes between necessitas 
consequentis (necessity of the consequent) and necessitas consequentiae 
(necessity of the consequence).533 In this scheme, the necessitas consequentis 
explains the relation between two states of affairs in which the consequent 
(conditional) is necessary or, in other words, that the consequent cannot be 
other than what it is. In contrast, the necessitas consequentiae defines the 
necessary relation between two states of affairs wherein the necessity is not 
absolute but logical (hypothetical) since it arises out of contingent causes.  
The second proposition argues that no compulsion can be claimed 
when one is acting voluntarily.534 For Charnock, the correspondence reason-
choice explains the correlation action-intention for every free act. Freedom of 
choice involves the concurrence between the intellect, freely consenting to do 
something, and the will, freely choosing one thing over another according to 
its strongest inclination.535 As the will is a rational faculty, every human action 
must involve the intellect as much as the will; consequently, a free choice 
would result from the judgement of reason and the subsequent volitional 
motion with respect to a logically antecedent intent, so ‘[n]o man acts 
anything but he can give an account of the motives of his actions; he cannot 
father it upon a blind necessity; the will cannot be compelled, for then it would 
                                                             
533 See ‘necessitas consequentiae’ and ‘necessitas consequentis’ in Muller, Dictionary: 
200. Cf. Willem J. Van Asselt et al., "Introduction," in Reformed Thought on Freedom: The 
Concept of Free Choice in Early Modern Reformed Theology, ed. Willem J. van Asselt, et al. 
(Grand Rapids: Baker Academics, 2010), 35-37. 
534 Charnock, Works, 1: 492. 
535 Ibid., 493; ibid., 2: 201. 
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cease to be will.’536 This does not mean that the will succumbs to the 
judgements of reason during the process of choosing for that would entail 
another form of determinism; instead, it means that reason recognises and 
evaluates the instruments employed when reaching a determined goal and 
then the will freely moves according to its own inclination.537  
The third proposition denies that God’s foreknowledge has causative 
effects.538 Contrary to Thomas, who asserts that God’s knowledge is the cause 
of things, Charnock argues that divine knowledge by itself is deprived of 
creative power.539 Instead of being the cause of things, divine foreknowledge is 
the ‘directive of the actions’ that are logically consequent from the divine 
will.540 Knowledge apprehends things by means of the divine decree but it is 
not the principle of things, hence, divine foreknowledge carries no ontological 
necessity to the things pending for their actualisation. In relation to sin, for 
example, it is the will of the offender, not the foreknowledge of the offense, 
that causes sin.541 The sort of cause attributed to human sin is not causa 
efficiens (efficient cause) but causa instrumentalis (instrumental or secondary 
                                                             
536 Idem., Works, 1: 493. In speaking about the compatibility between the divine 
initiative and the freedom of the will in the act of regeneration, Charnock writes ‘God 
changeth the inclination of the will, but doth not force it against its inclination; the will, being 
a rational faculty, cannot be wrought upon but rationally.’ In Idem., Works, 3: 287.  
537 That the will determines itself in the act of free choice is certainly affirmed by 
Charnock, more explicitly when it comes to explain God’s foreknowledge of sin and the liberty 
of the will. Idem., Works, 3: 190-191.  
538 Idem., Works, 1: 493. 
539 See Aquinas, ST, 4: 1a. 14, 8; pp. 29-35. It can be noted in passing that this may 
well be one of those instances wherein the Reformed scholastics welcome the beliefs of their 
medieval sources with a critical mind rather than simply accepting their teachings as 
theological axioms. 
540 Charnock, Works, 1: 493.  
541 Ibid., 495.  
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cause): ‘God hath no manner of immediate efficiency in producing sin… but 
only ceased to act, and therefore could not be the efficient cause of man's 
sin.’542  
In fourth place, Charnock argues that the proposition ‘God foreknows 
things because they will come to pass’ is not biconditional, that is, it is 
unidirectional in meaning and thus its order cannot be reversed. In other 
words, to say that God’s foreknowledge has its object in the things to come 
does not validate the inverse inference, viz., that the things to come are 
because God knows them. Charnock’s argument rests on a principle founded 
in Aristotelian logic called ‘affirming the antecedent’ and on the rejection of an 
invalid logical inference from it known as ‘affirming the consequent’.543 To 
observe this, one may convert this proposition into a conditional if-then 
phrase: (1): ‘if God foreknows things, then they will come to pass’. From (1), 
the antecedent clause (if) cannot be commutable with the consequent clause 
(then), for otherwise one would be affirming the consequent, which is a logical 
fallacy. Besides, Charnock explains that God’s foreknowledge of the events 
brought by free will concatenates three elements: (1) the determinations of the 
divine will (permissive or definite), (2) the concurrence of primary and 
secondary causes, and (3) the conjunction of (1) and (2) for the purpose of 
exalting God’s perfect nature in everything he does.544  
                                                             
542 Ibid., 28; ibid., 2: 225. 
543 William T. Parry and Edward A. Hacker, Aristotelian Logic (Albany: State 
University of New York Press, 1991), 373-382. 
544 Charnock, Works, 1: 495. Clearly, there is a methodological pattern in the 
theological argumentation that Charnock offers, one wherein God is the principle to which 
everything else is subordinated and whose exaltation is the aim of every discourse. 
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In proposition five, Charnock asserts that the scope of divine 
knowledge is not restricted exclusively to the understanding of the creature’s 
future actions, but it encompasses also the freedom whereby these actions 
take place.545 What is more, given that divine foreknowledge does not change 
the nature of things, God knows the objects of his knowledge in accordance to 
their own nature, that is, God understands possible things as possibilities, 
contingent things as contingencies, and free agents as acting freely, ‘so that’, 
Charnock concludes, ‘liberty is rather established by this foreknowledge than 
removed.’546  
In the final proposition, Charnock acknowledges the limitations arising 
from a finite mind in its attempt to comprehend fully the relation between 
divine foreknowledge and free will.547 By acknowledging one’s cognitive 
boundaries when discoursing about the divine nature, Charnock is aware of 
the possibility of facing an indissoluble mystery, yet this recognition is not 
done at the expense of God’s absolute foreknowledge neither by denying the 
creature’s freedom of choice. Albeit there is an awareness that a flawless 
explanation concerning the relation between divine foreknowledge and 
human freedom is beyond human competence, Charnock sees no justifiable 
reason to purge any of these principles from the doctrine of God’s knowledge. 
In fact, a rejection, either of God’s knowledge of conditional future 
contingents or of man’s freedom of choice, would tarnish the perfection of the 
                                                             
545 Ibid. 
546 Ibid. 
547 Ibid.  
 
  157 
 
divine nature: if the former, God is made less than perfect by making him 
ignorant of the things to come, if the latter, God becomes immoral by 
convicting those whose deeds are the result of irremediable necessity.548        
Wisdom (De Sapientia Dei)  
In many cases, the Reformed orthodox treated the sapientia Dei as an 
appendix to the knowledge of God or as equivalent to it.549 In other instances, 
wisdom was placed under the so-called intellectual attributes of God 
regulating the operation of the divine attributes including the knowledge of 
God.550 In Charnock’s material, divine wisdom is discussed separately from the 
divine knowledge, yet without ignoring the conceptual proximity between the 
two concepts: ‘He [God] must have knowledge, otherwise he could not be 
wise; wisdom is the flower of knowledge, and knowledge is the root of 
wisdom.’551  
Charnock understood divine wisdom as the knowledge of God viewed 
from an operational or practical perspective: as the infinite knowledge is 
called omniscience and the simple knowledge is called universal knowledge, 
the divine knowledge in regards of acting is called wisdom or prudence.552 The 
                                                             
548 Ibid., 496. 
549 Perkins, Golden Chaine: 13; Wollebius, "Compendium," 38-39; Velde, Synopsis, 
170-173. Like in Charnock’s discourses on the divine attributes, wisdom and knowledge are 
discriminated in Leigh, Treatise: 60-65.  
550 Sapientia Dei essentialis complectitur intelligentiam, scientiam, artem & 
prudentiam [The wisdom of God embraces the essential properties of intellect, knowledge, 
arts, and prudence], in Synopsis Libri II of Polanus, Syntagma. 
551 Charnock, Works, 1: 461. Cf. Leigh, Treatise: 60-65; Watson, Body of Divinity: 40-
43. 
552 Charnock, Works, 1: 461.    
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decision to treat divine wisdom as an independent subject within the divine 
attributes has to do with the conviction that knowledge and wisdom differ 
conceptually from the perspective of the creature.553 Furthermore, these set of 
divine perfections may be discriminated by considering the logical correlation 
between the two attributes; in this sense, divine wisdom is said to be erected 
upon the content of divine knowledge given that the act of knowing logically 
antecedes the act of being wise or prudent: ‘Knowledge is the foundation of 
wisdom, and antecedent to it; wisdom, the superstructure upon knowledge.’554  
Charnock seeks first to establish the biblical and exegetical support for 
the definition of divine wisdom, the establishment of the doctrinal frame, and 
the practical uses of the doctrine. The chosen text is found in Paul’s epistle to 
the Romans (16.27), ‘To God only wise, be glory through Jesus Christ for 
ever. Amen.’555 Charnock demonstrates his acquaintance with the biblical 
material and with the biblical scholarship of the time as he exhibits dexterity 
in the application of the methods of biblical interpretation commonly 
employed in Reformed Puritanism, particularly on how tradition understood 
the interconnection between the Old and New Testaments.556 It is worth 
noting that Charnock’s exegesis of Rom. (16.27) is framed by a kerygmatic 
tone wherein Jesus Christ is presented as the divine vehicle by which God 
discloses himself, as such Christ is presented as the proper ground for divine 
                                                             
553 Ibid., 2: 10. 
554 Ibid., 12. 
555 Ibid., 3. 
556 Ibid., 4. 
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adoration.557 Furthermore, by appealing to a more literal rendering of the 
Greek text, Charnock argues that it is through Christ that God has revealed his 
wisdom to the world, yet Christ is more than just God’s chosen mode of 
revelation, he is the wisdom of God in and by himself and consequently he is 
worthy of the same glory that it is ascribed to God.558 This christological 
emphasis resonates with what Charnock says elsewhere in the Discourses 
about the divine attributes and their theological import for asserting the 
divinity of Christ.559  
During the exegesis of the text, Charnock makes an important remark 
about the interconnectedness between the attributes of power and wisdom: 
‘Power is no ground to expect stability, without wisdom interesting the agent 
in it, and finding out and applying the means for it. Wisdom is naked without 
power to act, and power is useless without wisdom to direct.’560 This is 
important for it indicates an understanding of the perfections of God whereby 
each divine attribute operates in synchronic harmony with one another in 
                                                             
557 Ibid., 10. 
558 Ibid. 
559 The point above might be observed clearly in Charnock’s discourse on The 
Knowledge of God in Christ wherein he sustains that all the perfections of God are 
harmonically comprised in the person of Christ. In Idem., Works, 4: 138-154. For Charnock 
on the divinity of Christ as derivative from the divine perfections, including eternity, 
immutability, omnipresence, knowledge, wisdom, power, and holiness, see respectively Idem., 
Works, 1: 360, 406, 445, 508; ibid., 2: 74, 164, 255. This list does not include other instances 
wherein the divinity of Christ is affirmed regardless of the inferences resulting from the 
doctrine of the divine attributes, being  perhaps the comments on the hypostatic union 
throughout the Discourses a solid case in point.  
560 Idem., Works, 2: 5. This trend is observed also in the manner Charnock 
understands the role of power and wisdom in conversion. See In ibid., 46. 
  160 
 
God’s being. An absence of this congruous coexistence between the attributes 
would result in an imbalance in the divine ontology.  
The key point Charnock wants to communicate on the subject of divine 
wisdom is the uniqueness of it when predicated of God. Thereby, one may 
theologically interpret this discourse as asserting that the archetypal wisdom 
of God surpasses in quality any ectypal form of wisdom as to ‘wisdom is a 
transcendent excellency of the divine nature.’561 For Charnock, wisdom 
comprises three major aspects: (1) it is to act for a right end, (2) it is to observe 
all circumstances for action, and (3) it is to will and act according to the right 
reason, according to a right judgement of things.562 In this construction, 
wisdom is related to the power of the intellect and to the motions of the will in 
acting thoughtfully and ethically for an intended end. Concerning God, 
wisdom is conceived, then, not as a static property residing in the divine 
intellect but as a dynamic quality that guides the motions of the divine will for 
the actualisation of a righteous action.  
Charnock discriminates between the essential and the personal wisdom 
of God by noting that the former relates to the divine nature itself whereas the 
latter is associated with the Son of God.563 The purpose here is to narrow down 
the study of the subject to wisdom as a property of the divine essence leaving 
aside the Christological aspect of wisdom for another treaty. Charnock 
explains the intrinsic character of wisdom vis-à-vis the divine being by 
                                                             
561 Ibid., 10. 
562 Ibid., 11-12. 
563 Ibid. 
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presupposing the notion of simplicity. Consequently, it is argued that wisdom 
is not a disposition appended to the being of God considering (per divine 
simplicity) that there is no real distinction between the wisdom and the 
essence of God.  
That wisdom is said to be (in the sense referred above) an exclusive 
predication of God does not mean that it is not present in the creatures, but 
rather that divine wisdom—as being the archetypal in nature—excels any 
ectypal manifestation of creaturely wisdom: ‘By his wisdom, as much as by 
anything, he infinitely differs from all his creatures, as by wisdom man differs 
from a brute.’564 This unique aspect of divine wisdom allows Charnock to 
expand on a series of essential distinctions between creator and creature. For 
example, since no other being but God is wise necessarily (for his wisdom is 
his essence), divine wisdom is thought as the pristine form of wisdom from 
which all the remaining wisdom emerges. Accordingly, it must be that only 
God is perfectly, integrally, eternally, and incomprehensively wise.565   
That God is wise is plainly indicated in Scripture, from which Charnock 
understands divine wisdom as the virtue that clothes all the remaining 
perfections. In this sense, wisdom is the guiding principle by which all the 
divine operations are regulated, yet without violating the sovereignty of the 
divine will: ‘Though he [God] acts all things sovereignly by his will, yet he acts 
all things wisely by his understanding; and there is not a decree of his will, but 
                                                             
564 Ibid., 17. 
565 Ibid., 13-17. 
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he can render a satisfactory reason for in the face of men and angels.’566 
Charnock goes further by claiming that the perfection of God necessitates 
wisdom as the latter is reckoned the most eminent of virtues and a perfection 
greater than power. Furthermore, divine wisdom is necessary for the 
government of creation because apart from it providence is reduced to a 
chaotic set of actions without an intelligent foundation.567  This signifies that 
wisdom functions as the regulative principle within the divine being that 
guarantees the approval of what is good and the actualisation of what is 
always right.  
Divine wisdom is illustrated by observing the outward operations of 
God [opera Dei ad extra], that is, by beholding the acts of creation, 
government, and redemption.568 The fact that everything in creation has been 
endowed with particular gifts seeking a specific end testify of God’s wisdom 
for ‘God could never have had a satisfaction in the review of his works, and 
pronounced them good or comely, as he did, Gen. i. 31, had they not been 
agreeable to that eternal original copy in his own mind.’569 In sum, Charnock 
develops an argument in which the origin, the nature, the order, and the telos 
of the universe are understood as indicators of the existence of a rational 
principle (wisdom) whereby God governs creation according to the 
stipulations dictated by the eternal decree.570  
                                                             
566 Ibid., 17. 
567 Ibid., 18-19. 
568 Ibid., 21-74.   
569 Ibid., 21. See also the explanation in ibid., 22-27. 
570 Ibid., 27-51. The analysis of the relation between providence and wisdom is limited 
for methodological reasons to the governance of man as a rational, sinful, and restored 
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In similar manner, Charnock asserts that the reality of the moral law 
manifests the wisdom of God since the comprehension of it falls within the 
faculties of the human soul. In other words, divine wisdom is observable in the 
fact that God designed a creature cognitively able to understand the content of 
the divine commands while able to choose freely between good and evil; so, 
Charnock expounds: ‘It had not been agreeable to the wisdom of God to 
propose any moral law to them [non-rational, amoral creatures], who had 
neither understanding to discern, nor will to choose’ because ‘[t]he wisdom of 
God commanded nothing, but what was very easy to be observed by him 
[Adam], and inferior to his natural ability.’571  
Divine wisdom is manifested also in the manner whereby God governs 
fallen creatures and sinful actions.572 Charnock engages this theme by 
specifically defining the competence of divine wisdom in the government of 
sin. While divine sovereignty, by consenting the existence of sin, and divine 
justice, by penalising it, are involved in the governing of sin, divine wisdom 
participates in it by ordering sin for a greater good and for a righteous end.  
Sin in itself is a disorder, and therefore God doth not permit sin for itself; for in 
its own nature it hath nothing of amiableness, but he wills it for some righteous 
end, which belongs to the manifestation of his glory, which is his aim in all the 
acts of his will; he wills it not as sin, but as his wisdom can order it to some 
greater good than was before in the world, and make it contribute to the beauty 
of the order he intends.573 
                                                             
creature. For a comprehensive discussion on providence including the significance of wisdom 
for the proper government of creation, refer to ibid., 1: 6-120.     
571 Idem., Works, 2: 27-28. 
572 For a more detailed treatment of the problem of evil in Charnock’s theology, see 
the discussion on divine holiness below in this study (pp. 199-225).  
573 Charnock, Works, 2: 33. 
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Specifically, the activity of wisdom is manifested in the restrictions that 
God imposes on sin considering that evil cannot displayed its wickedness in 
full because the activity of sin in the world is restricted by God’s wise ordering 
of affairs. Paradoxically, it is divine wisdom the principle that makes sin a 
suitable instrument for the exaltation of God’s glory in the plan of redemption, 
as the incarnation and the sufferings of the Son indicate.574 What is more, by 
ordering the entrance of sin into the world, wisdom engineers the disclosure 
(not the genesis) of attributes such as justice, mercy, and even some aspects of 
wisdom itself which otherwise would have remained unknown to 
humankind.575 At this juncture, it is worth pondering whether Charnock’s line 
of reasoning on this matter is driven by a variation of the medieval argument 
of the felix culpa.576 In this view, the Fall is thought of as an event that is 
logically necessary for the displaying of divine mercy. The felix culpa clause 
also implies that humankind would have been deprived of the blessedness of 
redemption had the Fall never occurred.577 While in most cases those who 
adhere to the doctrine of the felix culpa have favoured supralapsarianism 
                                                             
574 Ibid., 34-35. 
575 Ibid., 34-38. Cf. Idem., Works, 5: 23. Cf. Idem., Works, 1: 22.  
576 The concept of the felix culpa is taken from the lyrics of the Exultet, a fourth-
century hymn which was sung during the Easter Vigil of the Roman liturgy. See Victor 
Yelverton Haines, A Dictionary of Biblical Tradition in English Literature,  s.v. "Felix Culpa." 
The Exultet reads at one stanza, O certe necessarium Adae peccatum, quod Christi morte 
deletum est! O felix culpa, quae talem ac tantum meruit habere Redemptorem! [O certainly 
necessary sin of Adam, which has been crushed by the death of Christ! O happy fault, which 
have gained for us so excellent and so great Redeemer!]  
577 Paul Helm, The Providence of God, ed. Bray Gerald, Contours of Christian 
Theology (Leicester, UK: InterVarsity Press, 1993), 213-215. For a philosophical application of 
the felix culpa clause in relation to the problem of evil, see Alvin Plantinga, 
"Supralapsarianism, or 'O Felix Culpa'," in Christian Faith and the Problem of Evil, ed. Peter 
Van Inwagen (Grand Rapids: Eerdmans, 2004), 11-12. For a critique of this form of theodicy, 
consult Marilyn McCord Adams, "Plantinga on “Felix Culpa”," Faith and Philosophy 25, no. 2 
(2008).   
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(over infralapsarianism) to explain the logical sequence of the ordo 
decretorum Dei [order of the divine decrees], it is not altogether clear whether 
Charnock himself was a supralapsarian.578 The difficulty in identifying 
Charnock’s final stance on the debate over the logical order of the divine 
decrees lies in the fact that he remains silent on this matter and that the 
evidence gathered is conjectural and inconclusive. There are statements in the 
Discourses that may be interpreted as if election were logically subsequent to 
creation and thus infralapsarian in nature, yet in other instances Charnock 
may be read as espousing supralapsarianism as for example when he asserts 
that creation’s chief meaning is the actualisation of the decree of election.579 
Furthermore, considering that Charnock repeatedly refers to Amyraut’s de 
praedestinatione in matters concerning the doctrine of election, it is worth 
asking to what extent, if any, Amyraut’s theology of election influences 
Charnock’s understanding of the ordo decretorum.580 In any case, it is 
advisable not to press too much on Charnock’s doctrine of the divine decree in 
the quest for a highly developed ‘order of salvation’ considering that the 
                                                             
578 In defending the doctrine of predestination against Armimius’ claims, the 
Reformed proposed two views (infra & supra lapsarianism) to explain the logical order within 
the one eternal decree of God. Briefly stated, supralapsarianism affirms that the decree of 
election (and that of reprobation) logically antecedes the decree of creation and the decree to 
permit the Fall respectively whereas infralapsarianism believes that the logical sequence begin 
with the decree of creation which is followed by the decree to permit the Fall and the decree of 
election. For a detailed description of the infra/supra lapsarian views, consult Berkhof, 
Systematic Theology: 128-135.       
579 Charnock, Works, 3: 359.     
580 While the analysis required to assess this inquiry transcends the scope of this 
study, the subject invites to further engagement on this matter. For a complete description of 
the Amyraldian position on the order of the divine decree, consult Turretin, Institutes: 
XVIII/18, xiii-xx; 1:422-428. Cf. Muller, Calvin and the Reformed Tradition: 150-160. Muller 
offers a description of Amyraldus’ view from the perspective of Pierre du Moulin (1568-1658), 
Amyraldus’ opponent.       
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technical use of the ordo salutis emerged in the early eighteenth-century, 
years after Charnock’s death in 1680.581  
Ultimately, wisdom is revealed in the manner God brings goodness out 
of evil: ‘Even the sins of the world his will permits them, his power assists in 
the act, and his wisdom orders the sinfulness of the act for holy ends... Thus, 
divine wisdom doth both sharpen and brighten us by the dust of sin, and ripen 
and mellow the fruits of grace by the dung of corruption’582 While divine 
wisdom emerges as the guiding principle in the works of creation and 
providence, it is in the work of redemption where wisdom shines the most. 
Christology becomes the motif from which Charnock explains the operations 
of wisdom in the work of redemption.583 Consequently, themes like the nature, 
the manner, and the end of the hypostatic union are explained in covenantal 
terms evidencing the operation of divine wisdom in the work of redemption: 
‘Thus the wisdom of God is apparent in annexing such a condition to the 
covenant, whereby man is restored, as answers the end of God for his glory, 
the state, conscience, and necessity of man, and had the greatest congruity to 
his recovery.’584  
 A pause on the descriptive analysis of the material concerning this 
investigation is expedient here to address Colin Gunton’s assessment about 
                                                             
581 For more on the origin of the ordo salutis in Protestant Orthodoxy, consult Muller, 
Calvin and the Reformed Tradition: 163-167.    
582 Charnock, Works, 2: 43. 
583 Ibid., 57. 
584 Ibid., 70. 
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the method and content found in Charnock’s discourse on divine wisdom.585 
While Gunton acknowledges ‘Charnock’s biblical orientation’ in the treatment 
of attributes such holiness, he expresses serious doubts about the claims 
involving divine wisdom.586 Basically, Gunton complains that the scholastic 
leanings exhibited in Charnock’s lecture on divine wisdom have allowed the 
method of presentation to define the theological content of the discourse.587 
Specifically, the claim is that Charnock’s material reflects a flaw proper of the 
post-Reformation theological systems, namely, the appeal to negative theology 
and the return to a so-called form of ‘Aristotelian conceptualism’.588 To 
eliminate this problem, Gunton proposes a solution that consists in recovering 
the significance of the economic Trinity for shaping of the doctrine of God in 
Christian Dogmatics. This is accomplished, says Gunton, by favouring the 
biblical narrative that depicts the Triune God in act over the abstractions 
derived from negative theology.589 For Gunton, the structural shortcomings in 
Charnock’s exposition are fundamentally caused by embracing the 
methodological approach taken by Johannes Wollebius (1586-1629), who 
contrasted the absolute properties of the divine essence with the relative 
properties of the divine persons to distinguish the divine perfections.590 This 
                                                             
585 Gunton, Act and Being: 89-93.  
586 Ibid., 90. Interestingly, similar protestations against Charnock are noted in the 
introductory remarks of the 1864’s edition of the Complete Works. See M'Cosh, 
"Introduction," xxvii. 
587 Gunton, Act and Being: 91. 
588 Ibid., 76-87. 
589 Ibid., 94-104. 
590 Ibid., 88-89. In the course of doing this study, only one reference to Wollebius’ 
Compendium was found throughout Charnock’s Discourses; interestingly, it is not located in 
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manner of distinguishing the divine attributes assumes that the being of God 
is effectively dislocated from his modes of subsistence and hence it produces a 
theology proper wherein the divine essence is thought of as an inaccessible 
impersonal abstraction.591 In the final analysis, Charnock is criticised for 
ignoring that the biblical narrative portrays Jesus as ‘the wisdom of God in 
action’; moreover, the destabilising influence of negative theology is proven by 
the virtual absence of Christological and pneumatological participation in the 
exposition of divine wisdom.592  
Gunton’s critique may be understood as a broader concern that 
involves the doctrinal claims derived from the scholastic method in the 
theological material of the Protestant orthodox.593 While inventive in their own 
manner, the reservations noted by Gunton about the theology of the Reformed 
scholastics reflects the influence of Karl Barth, who expressed similar 
reservations about the theological role of the doctrine of the Trinity in the 
doctrinal systems of the Protestant scholastic tradition.594 In addition, Barth 
                                                             
the volumes dedicated to the examination of the divine attributes but elsewhere. See 
Charnock, Works, 4: 40; n. †. 
591 Gunton, Act and Being: 92. 
592 Ibid., 91-92. 
593 For a historico-theological response to those who associate scholasticism with a 
specific content rather than with a particular method of dissertation, consult Muller, Calvin 
and the Reformed Tradition: 24-34.     
594 Barth is unambiguous on the matter: ‘We stand here before the fundamental error 
which dominated the doctrine of God of the older theology and which influenced Protestant 
orthodoxy at almost every point.’ In Barth, CD: II/1, 261. Cf. Ibid., II/1, 288. For a critical 
assessment of Barth on Polanus, the Leiden theologians, and Cocceius, as representatives of 
Reformed Orthodoxy, consult Rinse H. Reeling Brouwer, Karl Barth and Post-Reformation 
Orthodoxy, Barth Studies (Farnham, Surrey: Ashgate, 2015), 35-147. Cf. Colin Gunton, 
Becoming and Being: The Doctrine of God in Charles Hartshorne and Karl Barth (London: 
SCM, 2001). In his Concluding Scientific Postscript, Gunton summarizes in one phrase his 
findings on Barth’s doctrine of God, ‘The greatness of Barth is first all to be found in the 
content of his dogmatics, an above all in what he had to write about God.’ In ibid., 244. 
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holds that the doctrine of the divine attributes must be grounded in the reality 
of God as it is revealed in his works of creation, reconciliation, and 
redemption.595 Though Barth moderates his concerns about the appeals to 
negative theology, he remains apprehensive of using the via negativa as a 
means of classification for the perfections of God.596  
Given that Barth and Gunton fundamentally share the same ground in 
their objection towards the scholastics, Gunton’s critique may be assessed by 
considering the rejoinders given to Barth on matters equally agreed by both 
theologians. For instance, it has been noted recently that the alleged absence 
of the doctrine of the Trinity for determining the content of the doctrine of 
God is an unwarranted generalisation considering that in most cases the older 
dogmaticians established their dissertations on God by emphasising his 
Trinitarian nature.597 Furthermore, Barth’s explanation as to the 
methodological reasons prompting some of the Protestant orthodox to place 
the doctrine of the Trinity after the doctrine of the divine attributes within the 
locus de Deo has been questioned.598 Contra Barth, it has been said that in 
locating the Trinity after the discussions over the nature and attributes of God, 
the Reformed scholastics were following the order dictated by central claim 
                                                             
595 Barth, CD: II/1, 259-260. Barth skilfully argues this point while avoiding, on the 
one hand, the disjunction between God in se and God extra se allegedly present in the 
Reformed scholastic tradition and, on the other hand, without succumbing to modern 
impulses wherein the being of God becomes dependent on his works in creation.           
596 Ibid., II/1, 347-348. 
597 Velde, The Doctrine of God: 356, n. 54. 
598 Reeling Brouwer, Karl Barth and Post-Reformation Orthodoxy: 46-47. According 
to Muller, Barth’s negative reading of the older theologians is explained by the fact that the 
argument offered on this particular issue seeks more the validation of Barth’s interpretation of 
the scholastics than their true affirmations. See Muller, PRRD: 3:155.      
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concerning the divine nature, namely, that God is one divine being subsisting 
in three distinct persons.599 The foregoing assertion is not grounded, however, 
upon an a priori assumption but rather it is inferred from the biblical 
testimony vis-à-vis the gradual disclosure of the oneness and the threeness of 
God in Scripture.600 What is more, the treatment of the doctrine of the divine 
attributes preceding the doctrine of the Trinity does not necessarily entails a 
disjunction between essence and persons in God as far as the Reformed 
orthodox did not considered the divine attributes in isolation from God’s 
modes of subsistence. On the contrary, the relatedness of the different themes 
within the orthodox doctrine of God indicates that the theme of the divine 
attributes and that of the Trinity were two indissoluble subjects under the 
locus de Deo.601  
                                                             
599 Rehnman, "Doctrine of God," 386. The formulation of the claim above is in tune 
with the mode of inquiry determined by the quaestio.  
600 Muller, PRRD: 3:158-159. It must be noted, however, that Muller’s impressive 
response to the critics of the Reformed scholastic tradition has not been immune to criticism 
either. See, for example, Gijsbert van den  Brink, "Reformed Scholasticism and the Trinitarian 
Renaissance," in Scholasticism Reformed: Essays in Honour of Willem J. Van Asselt, ed. 
Marcel Sarot Marteen Wisse, Willemein Otten (Boston: Brill, 2010), 335-339. While this is 
not the place for testing the forcefulness of Van den Brink’s comments, it is important to 
indicate that many of the contributions made by the members of the Utrecht School for the 
reappraisal of the doctrine of God in Reformed Orthodoxy include elements of continuity and 
discontinuity with the confessional creeds and theological systems of the Reformed tradition 
during the seventeenth-century. In some cases, these discontinuities are explained by an 
emphasis on philosophical methodologies whereby rationality plays a pivotal role in assessing 
doctrine. For the normative features required for ‘responsible theological discourse’ according 
to representatives of the Utrecht School, consult Gijsbert van den Brink and Marcel Sarot, 
"Contemporary Philosophical Theology," in Understanding the Attributes of God, ed. Gijsbert 
van den Brink and Marcel Sarot, Contributions to Philosophical Theology (Frankfurt: Peter 
Lang, 1999), 18-28. In turn, for an in-depth study on the doctrine of God in the Utrecht 
School, consult Velde, The Doctrine of God: 481-692; esp. 655-692.  
601 Beck, "Voetius," 213. Beck finds support for his thesis in the work of Gisbertus 
Voetius, a former delegate of the Synod of Dort (1618-1619), whose thoughts on De Utilitate & 
praxi[s] hujus dogmatis [Concerning the Usefulness and Practice of this Doctrine] are 
significant for the discussion above. Under the foregoing heading, Voetius concludes Iam vero 
solum dogma de Trinitate tradit, quis sit verus Deus [In reality, only the doctrine of the 
Trinity recounts who is the true God]. In Disputationes: I:478. Voetius is not the only 
Reformed theologian of the seventeenth-century displaying this Trinitarian awareness while 
discussing the doctrine of God. See, for example, Wollebius, "Compendium," 37, 40-45.  
  171 
 
Ultimately, this investigation rejects Barth’s—and by derivation 
Gunton’s—protestation against the older divines regarding their alleged 
indifference towards the doctrine of the Trinity in determining the content of 
the doctrine of God. This study justifies the foregoing assessment in 
consideration of the evidence introduced by modern reappraisals on 
Reformed scholasticism and in light of the conclusions reached by an 
independent research on the doctrine of God in the Reformed scholastic 
tradition.  
It must be noted that further analysis is required for addressing 
appropriately Gunton’s critique against Charnock, even if one concurs in 
rejecting Barth’s evaluation of the Reformed scholastic tradition on the basis 
foregoing explained. Gunton believes that it is precisely because of the 
influence of the absolute-relative scheme over Charnock’s theology that the 
Discourses on the divine attributes exhibit, in many instances, a structural 
deterioration whereby the essence of God is dislocated from the persons of the 
Trinity.602 While it is true that in some occasions throughout the Discourses 
Charnock alludes to what it seems to be an absolute-relative distinction within 
the divine attributes, a detailed examination of Charnock’s theology 
contradicts the substance of Gunton’s criticism. Contra Gunton, this study 
argues that neither the ways of knowing the perfections of God by means of 
the triplex via nor the recognition of the absolute-relative method for 
classifying the divine attributes imply necessarily an actual severance of the 
divine essence from the divine persons. Though Charnock never provides a 
                                                             
602 Gunton, Act and Being: 92. 
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detailed explanation on the precise meaning of the terms ‘absolute’ and 
‘relative’ in reference to the divine attributes, the evidence available indicates 
that he would have echoed his Reformed peers on this matter and thus he 
would have defined the absolute attributes as those properties that described 
God as he is in se, apart from any relation to other beings and the relative 
attributes as those qualities depicting God as he is in his relation to his works 
ad extra.603 If this assumption is correct, the result of accepting the absolute-
relative scheme is not necessarily that of splitting the divine essence from the 
divine persons, but to discriminate the divine perfections according to the 
object to which God refers: himself and creation.  
Serious problems could arise from adopting the absolute-relative mode 
of categorising the divine attributes, as when, in what constitutes the basis of  
Gunton’s concern, the knowledge of God’s essence (absolute attributes) is 
thought of as if it were accessible in complete isolation from God’s works in 
creation (relative attributes).604 However, there are reasons to believe that this 
is not the epistemic assumption from which Charnock develops his doctrine of 
the divine attributes. Facing the problem of divine predication, while treating 
the divine perfections, Charnock indicates that there are two ways of 
describing God, that is, the way of affirmation and the way of negation: ‘the 
                                                             
603 Charnock, Works, 2: 380, 412. 
604 The remedy for this problem is, according to Gunton, to take up ‘the biblical 
teaching according to which Jesus is the wisdom of God in action’, see his explanation in 
Gunton, Act and Being: 92, 94-96. To put it differently, Gunton advocates for a 
methodological approach whereby the divine attributes are described through a resolute 
emphasis on the biblical narrative depicting the Triune God in action and not by an a priori 
appeal to metaphysical categories as Wollebius et al. Reformed orthodox do. A critical 
evaluation of this so-called ‘narrative Trinitarianism’ is found in Francesca Aran Murphy, God 
Is Not a Story: Realism Revisited (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2007). According to 
Murphy, ‘God is [actually reduced to] a story’ as a consequence of ‘the driving force of 
narrative theology’ inherent in this method. In ibid., 1.      
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first ascribe to him [God] whatsoever is excellent [via eminentiae], the other 
separates from him whatsoever is imperfect’, to which Charnock adds, ‘[t]his 
way of negation is more easy; we better understand what God is not, than 
what he is, and most of our knowledge of God is by this way.’605 What is crucial 
to note here is that both of these ways of knowing God presuppose an 
understanding of the divine being that is grounded in an ectypal form of 
theology, that is, in an understanding of God ‘fashioned by God from the 
archetype of Himself, through the communication of grace for His own 
glory.’606 This signifies that the different ways of knowing God presuppose the 
existence of an pedagogical relation whereby the God freely chooses to 
communicate knowledge of himself to the creature. Furthermore, Charnock 
explicitly expresses that the knowledge of God in se does not reside in the 
human mind as if it were in direct relation to the divine essence, but instead it 
is mediated by the works of God ad extra.607 This is not to say, however, that in 
having a comprehensive understanding of the divine works one procures also 
an inclusive knowledge of God in se, given that it is through the knowledge of 
God, mediated by the Son not by the divine operations ad extra, that the 
excellences of God are principally revealed.608 Furthermore, the mediation of 
special revelation and the renewal of the mind are the sine qua non for 
                                                             
605 Charnock, Works, 1: 263.  
606 Junius, Treatise: 151. While Charnock nowhere discusses, at least not 
systematically, the epistemic and metaphysical foundations of his theology, he is certainly 
committed to a particular set of beliefs on these matters.    
607 Charnock, Works, 4: 38. 
608 Idem., Works, 1: 509; Idem., Works, 4: 112-113. 
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acquiring knowledge of things divine, including the knowledge of God.609 
Thereby, the existence of an epistemological foundation for knowing God, 
prompted by christological motives, in addition to the import of supernatural 
revelation and the necessity of a regenerated intelligence, indicate that for 
Charnock the knowledge of God is not thought as something abstracted from 
the divine operations but as something communicated to the creature’s mind 
through the revelation of God in the life of the Son; thus: ‘We do not only 
know in Christ what we know by creation, but more that can possibly be 
known of God by the works of his hands.’610 
Gunton zeroes on Charnock’s doctrine of divine wisdom as, it is argued, 
it depicts a contradistinction between the absolute and relative attributes in 
God. This leads to a bifurcation of the eternal wisdom of God (i.e., the divine 
essence) with respect to the personal wisdom of God (i.e., the person of the 
Son).611 Gunton’s apprehension would have been well founded, had Charnock 
thought of the essential wisdom of God as a metaphysical abstraction 
subsisting in isolation from the personal wisdom of God (i.e., the Son). 
However, this construal is inaccurate as Charnock asserts throughout the 
Discourses that the Son is not just the personal but the actual manifestation of 
the divine attributes. In the first place, Charnock states that the Son 
participates, in relation to his divinity, of the same divine essence of that of the 
                                                             
609 Idem., Works, 4: 155. Cf. Webster, "Omnia… Pertractantur in Sacra Doctrina Sub 
Ratione Dei: On the Matter of Christian Theology," 3-7.   
610 Charnock, Works, 4: 137. For bolder claims about the role of christology in framing 
Charnock’s epistemology, consult Jae-Eun Park, "Stephen Charnock's Christological 
Knowledge of God in a Discourse of the Knowledge of God in Christ," The Confessional 
Presbyterian 10 (2014).     
611 Gunton, Act and Being: 91.   
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Father, ‘Christ is “the image of the invisible God,” Col. i. 15… [he] is like God 
the Father; he hath the same essence, the same attributes, the same 
operations.’612 Second, Charnock ascribes to Christ infinite wisdom, an 
essential predication of the divine nature: ‘If wisdom be an excellency of the 
divine nature, then, Christ’s deity may hence be asserted’, and since ‘[a]ll his 
attributes are alike essential to him’ then the Son partakes on the eternal 
wisdom of God.613  
Pars Practica: Practical Application of the Doctrine 
The concluding part of the knowledge of God is a lengthy section 
discussing the practical application of the doctrine.614 Normally, this segment 
is divided into three major headings covering the different uses of the 
doctrine, namely, the use of information or instruction, comfort, and 
exhortation. In the case of the doctrine of divine knowledge, however, 
Charnock adds an extra category by which the believer is urged to humble 
herself before God considering that no wicked action will go unnoticed to 
God.615  
Significantly, the doctrine of God’s knowledge functions as a 
pedagogical device to instruct the church about the divinity of Christ. The 
argument begins with the proposition, ‘if God hath all knowledge, then Jesus 
Christ is not a mere creature’, then it moves into an explanation of the features 
                                                             
612 Charnock, Works, 4: 126. 
613 Idem., Works, 2: 74; Idem., Works, 5: 210. 
614 Idem., Works, 1: 508-536. 
615 Ibid., 530-533. 
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that support the validity of the previous assertion, finally it ends with the 
confirmation of Christ’s divine nature based upon an exact replication of the 
knowledge of God residing in the person of Christ.616 However, for some 
reason, Charnock circumscribes the previous application only to the 
instruction about the divinity of Christ, notwithstanding the same type of 
application could have been used to make an instructive case about the 
divinity of the Holy Spirit.617  
The chief point under the practical uses of the doctrine of the divine 
wisdom emphasises the fact that sin of any sort is detrimental towards the 
wisdom of God for it disfigures the imago Dei, which in turn means that by 
ruining humankind’s original concreated perfection ‘all reproaches of God 
must imply either a weakness or unrighteousness in God. If unrighteousness, 
his holiness is denied; if weakness, his wisdom is blemished.’618 Besides, sin 
attacks the wisdom of God by rejecting the content of the divine command. 
The derision of the divine law implies a disregard for divine wisdom as far as 
the commands of God, who is summa ratio [highest reasoning], springs forth 
divine intelligentia, the principle whereby the content of the moral law is 
established.619 In particular, sin defaces divine wisdom by inserting modes of 
worship that have not been instituted by God. By enforcing non-sanctioned 
modes of adoration, the creature is assigning to himself a prerogative that 
                                                             
616 See ibid., 508-512. 
617 Whatever the explanation for this omission could be, it is not the result of a 
heterodox view of the Godhead. An investigation at Charnock’s theology will easily indicate a 
commitment to classical Trinitarian theology. 
618 Charnock, Works, 2: 79. 
619 Ibid. 
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belongs exclusively to God and by doing so he is neglecting the divine wisdom 
that frames the forms of worship authorised in Scripture.620 Similarly, the 
neglect of the means instituted by God for the sake of the church entails a 
denial of divine wisdom characterised by the improper administration of the 
sacraments, by the omission of prayer, and by the censuring of God’s 
revelation and providence (including the prescription of modes of acting to 
God).621 Finally, murmuring against God’s designs, pride of spirit for the 
offices God has given to the believer, and distrust in the divine promises 
confabulate a serious affront to the wise acting of God in the government of 
his creation.622     
                                                             
620 Ibid., 82-83. 
621 Ibid., 83-85. 
622 Ibid., 85. 
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CHAPTER VI 
 
QUID SIT DEUS: CHARNOCK ON THE ATTRIBUTES  
OF THE SECOND ORDER (II) 
Introduction: Divine Perfections per voluntas Dei  
This chapter contains a description of the attributes of the second order 
that are related to manifestations of the divine will. In addition to the 
attributes treated in the previous chapter, the divine perfection per voluntas 
Dei account for a faculty psychology that is broadly covered by the so-called 
attributes of the divine life.623 It is worth nothing that the order of exposition 
found in the published collections of Charnock’s theological sermons on the 
divine attributes is determined by the same pattern of classification found in 
many of the scholastic material discussed in this monograph.  
Power (De Potentia Dei) 
Episcopal theologian Katherine Sonderegger has noted, in what may be 
considered an oddity in contemporary theological circles, the importance of 
using scholastic distinctions for achieving a better understanding of the 
doctrine of divine omnipotence.624 While Sonderegger’s remarks refer to the 
work of the medieval schoolmen, particularly to that of Thomas Aquinas’ 
                                                             
623 Muller, PRRD: 3:219-220. 
624 Katherine Sonderegger, Systematic Theology: Volume 1, the Doctrine of God 
(Minneapolis: Fortress Press, 2015), 175.  
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Summa Theologiae, her assessment would have equally stood had she chosen 
any representative of the Reformed orthodox tradition.625  
Although Sonderegger finds some of the distinctions made by the 
medieval schoolmen necessary and useful, her overall estimation of scholastic 
theology is rather negative. Sonderegger complains that the notion of divine 
power in scholastic theology ends up being ‘highly abstract and all too tame’.626 
It is worth noting that in Charnock’s discourse on divine power, the 
shortcomings brought by the highly speculative nature that prevailed in 
certain late medieval theologies are counterbalanced by a careful qualification 
of the terms involved in the most controversial scholastic distinctions; in 
addition, Charnock deliberately emphasises the usus practicus, namely, the 
practical use of the doctrine, whose subjective application served as a buffer 
against the objectivistic idiom proper of the scholastic tradition.627        
Charnock grounds the doctrinal exposition of his discourse on the 
power of God in the book of Job (26.14): Lo, these are parts of his ways: but 
how little a portion is heard of him? but the thunder of his power who can 
understand?628 In Charnock’s reading of the text, Job defends the 
                                                             
625 An investigation of the primary sources indicates that the Reformed scholastics 
were as adept as their medieval forerunners in applying the scholastic method for theological 
purposes. Like their predecessors, the Reformed divines were prone to define and distinguish 
different concepts in their systems while exhibiting a resolution for arranging the doctrinal 
exposition of the Christian faith in different loci. See Van Asselt and Rouwendal, 
"Distinguishing and Teaching." 
626 Sonderegger, The Doctrine of God: 174.    
627 Cf. Muller, PRRD: 3:524-525.  
628 Charnock, Works, 2: 99. The exegesis of the text includes a contextual analysis of 
the verses immediately preceding verse 24. As Bildad’s remarks in chapter 25 are insufficient 
for expounding the power of God, Job seizes the opportunity to correct his opponent by 
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magnificence and pervasiveness of the power of God by an argument in 
crescendo that begins by observing the activity of divine power in the lower 
parts of the earth (i.e. hell) and by acknowledging the works of God in 
creation, including his acts of sustenance and providence.629 Charnock 
identifies three main features from the text: (1) that the power of God is 
evidenced by the works of creation and providence, (2) that creation and 
providence do not exhaust divine power, which in scholastic idiom is to say 
that the potentia Dei extends beyond what is observable in the opera Dei ad 
extra. This is so, since the power residing in God is, per divine simplicity, as 
infinite as the divine essence and, (3) that the power of God transcends human 
understanding.630 
    In developing the doctrinal formulae for this particular discourse, 
Charnock asserts initially that power is a necessary property of the divine 
nature: ‘[I]t is a certain and undoubted truth, that power is essential to the 
divine nature’, so essential that ‘no acts of mercy, or justice, or wisdom can be 
exercised by him [God] without power.’631 Charnock claims that there is such 
relation of reciprocity and indissolubility between God and his power 
() that the latter might be taken as a designation of God.632 This is 
significant for a rejection of the power of God would simultaneously entail a 
                                                             
offering a more comprehensive explanation (verses 5-13). Ibid., 99-103. Though Charnock 
makes one ancillary reference to Bildad’s discourse in Job (25). Ibid. 
629 Ibid., 100-102. 
630 Ibid., 103. 
631 Ibid., 104. 
632 Ibid. 
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denial of God’s very existence: ‘If we imagine him restrained in his power, we 
imagine him limited in his essence.’633   
Charnock unfolds the content regarding the nature of divine power by 
indicating the importance of discriminating between power in terms of 
‘strength’ and ‘authority’.634 The point here is to make a case for the theological 
suitability of the notion that stresses divine strength when one ascribes power 
to God. While strength is intrinsically necessary in any display of power, it is 
possible to exercise power without authority, as in tyrannical forms of 
government, just as to have authority while being void of power, as in the case 
of an exiled king.635 Consequently, Charnock defines divine power as ‘that 
ability and strength whereby he [God] can bring to pass whatsoever he please, 
whatsoever his infinite wisdom can direct, and whatsoever the infinite purity 
of his will can resolve.’636  
Elsewhere, Charnock offers a succinct definition of divine omnipotence 
that is demarcated by the doctrinal content of divine simplicity as it correlates 
the power of God, the divine essence, and the divine operations out of the 
Godhead: ‘[O]mnipotence is nothing but the divine essence efficacious ad 
extra.’637 Other scholars have correctly noted that simplicity functions, not 
                                                             
633 Ibid.  
634 Ibid., 105. 
635 Ibid. 
636 Ibid., 106. 
637 Ibid., 110. Mastricht concurs: Ex dictus tandem, potentia Dei est: 1. ipsa 
eius essentia, seu deitas potens; in Deo enim, non est res & res [From [what] has been said at 
lenght, the power of God is: 1. God’s very essence, or mighty deity; for in God there is not 
thing and thing.] In Mastricht, Theoretico-Practica: II/20, xiv; p.211.  
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only as a key to explain the relation amongst the divine attributes and the 
attributes in relation to the divine essence, but as a conceptual tool to 
demonstrate divine omnipotence.638 Consequently, Charnock expounds on a 
theological axiom wherein simplicity, unity, and power are integrated to say: 
‘Where there is the greatest simplicity, there is the greatest unity; and where 
there is the greatest unity, there is the greatest power.’639  
By identifying divine simplicity as the foundational principle for 
understanding the divine attributes, Charnock can make other significant 
theological and metaphysical claims. For instance, he asserts that the power of 
God must be of an infinite nature considering that the divine being is 
essentially infinite: ‘Therefore, since the essence of God is unquestionably 
infinite, his power of acting must be so also. His power… is one and the same 
with his essence.’640 It is worth noting that the foregoing assertion follows 
from the metaphysical dictum operationes sequuntur essentiam, an 
explanation of being affirming that acts are anteceded by being, from which 
Charnock concludes, following Aquinas, that just as every ontological 
limitation (essence) would result in a limitation of power (act), an infinite 
ontology would imply a boundless power to act.641 Charnock clarifies that the 
basis upon one can argue for the infinitude of divine power must not be the 
objects of God’s power since they are finite; instead, the argument should rely 
                                                             
638 Lee, "Theology and Piety," 170-171. 
639 Charnock, Works, 2: 124. 
640 Ibid., 111.  
641 Ibid. Cf. St. Thomas Aquinas, ST, edited and translated by Thomas Gilby, 61 vols., 
vol. 5 (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1964), 1a. 25, 2; p. 156-161.  
  183 
 
upon God’s ability to produce an infinite number of individual and distinct 
effects.642  
The aforenoted definition comprises some significant qualifications 
aiming at presenting a view of divine power that is both biblically responsible 
and theologically sound.643 Charnock wants to avoid a philosophical 
overemphasis on the understanding of divine power whereby the content of 
the doctrine is primarily dictated by metaphysical concerns rather than by 
what Scripture reveals, this while presenting a definition that is internally 
coherent and doctrinally persuasive. For Charnock, though to act is to be 
powerful, divine power is not primarily an act but the capacity to bring a thing 
into act since ‘[p]ower notes the principle of the action, and therefore is 
greater than the act itself.’644 In other words, the case for divine power does 
not require of the act of creation to be proven considering that God’s power 
(i.e., his strength) is eternal in duration and hence it must precede the 
existence and the motions of everything but God.  
Charnock also links the notion of divine freedom and that of divine 
infinity to say that the operations of God are executed in complete 
independence from external necessity.645 To avoid the problems derived from 
extreme forms of medieval voluntarism, Charnock qualifies the primacy of 
                                                             
642 Charnock, Works, 2: 111-112. 
643 For a succinct summary of the conceptual problems involved in defining divine 
power (i.e., omnipotence), consult Gijsbert van den Brink, "Capable of Anything? The 
Omnipotence of God," in Understanding the Attributes of God, ed. Gijsbert van den Brink 
and Marcel Sarot (Frankfurt: Peter Lang, 1999), 148-158.   
644 Charnock, Works, 2: 106. 
645 Ibid., 1113-114. 
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God’s will in the operations of divine power. In this context, the freedom of 
God is not to be conceived as if the divine will arbitrarily decides to actualise A 
instead of -A, but rather it signifies that God freely resolves to execute his will 
to determine A instead of -A in concurrence with the perfection of his entire 
nature: ‘His power is not the rule of his will, but the will is the disposer of his 
power, according to the light of his infinite wisdom, and other attributes that 
direct his will’.646  
Charnock argues that the power of God is infinite in regard of action, 
signifying with it that God could have created an infinite number of objects in 
addition to those he has created. This claim seeks to underscore two aspects 
concerning divine power: (1) that God owns the ability to create a numberless 
set of objects and, more importantly, (2) that God does not operate at the level 
of exhausting his power completely.647 Incidentally, this means that the power 
of God does not require of any instrumental (secondary) cause to be effective 
in the execution of his will. The assigning of different levels of excellency to 
creation suggests a distinction between infinite power as extensivè, that is, 
power in relation to the number of objects that can be created, and infinite 
power as intensivè, namely, power in regards to the mode of operation.648 
Besides, divine power is said to be (per divine simplicity) infinite in regards to 
duration since power must fit the eternal existence of the divine essence; thus, 
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God’s power must have no beginning, no end, and cannot be liable to 
change.649 The foregoing account of divine power is better comprehended by 
considering Charnock’s use of the scholastic distinction between the potentia 
absoluta Dei (absolute power of God) and the potentia ordinata Dei (ordained 
power of God).650  
From the early stages of the Middle Age, theologians were compelled to 
reassess previous accounts concerning the nature of divine power as they were 
not satisfied with defining omnipotence exclusively in light of the divine will, 
that is, to describe omnipotence as God’s ability to do what he wills.651 This 
hesitation to accept such limitations in the concept of divine power paved the 
way for inquiries on whether omnipotence should be understood as 
surpassing the divine will or as being limited by it.652 In addressing this 
problem, medieval theologians came up with a conceptual distinction within 
the single power of God; on the one hand, they introduced the notion of 
potentia dei absoluta to denote the ability to effect whatsoever God chooses to 
do or, more succinctly, to describe divine power regardless of the divine 
choice; on the other hand, they identified the potentia dei ordinata to signify 
the power bound to the act of creation and sustenance of the universe vis-à-vis 
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the dictates of the divine will.653 There were some extreme cases during the 
late medieval period in which theologians such as Gabriel Biel pressed the 
notion of potentia absoluta to claim that God could have done things contrary 
to his nature had he willed to do so based on his omnipotence.654 These radical 
views prompted the negative reaction of the magisterial reformers. Calvin 
adamantly disdained the notion of potentia absoluta since he considered it a 
‘profane’ speculation that turns God in an arbitrary lawgiver.655 In exegeting 
Calvin’s theology on this matter, scholars have debated whether the reformer 
must be interpreted as dismissing the concept of potentia absoluta in its 
entirety or whether he must be understood as rejecting, not the potentia 
distinction per se, but the fanciful speculations arising from it.656 Regardless of 
which interpretation is correct, it is worth noting that Charnock welcomed the 
potentia distinction not without carefully qualifying the meaning of the terms 
seeking to circumvent the abuses noted during the late medieval era, 
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particularly those promoted by some forms of nominalism. Equally significant 
is the reappraisal of the potentia distinction during the Post-Reformation era, 
which led some systems (Maccovius’ Loci communes) to conclude that the 
assessment of Calvin on this matter was incorrect.657  
Firstly, Charnock describes the potentia absoluta as the ‘power 
whereby God is able to do that which he will not do, but is possible to be 
done’.658 This definition is tempered by saying that the object of such power 
includes all things possible, that is, things that do not entail a contradiction, 
not only a logical level, but also things that are congruent with the nature and 
the perfections of God.659 What is significant to note is that these qualifications 
sought to prevent the abuses concerning omnipotence previously indicated: 
Charnock explains: ‘Some things are repugnant to the nature and perfections 
of God, as it is impossible for his nature to die and perish, impossible for him, 
in regard of truth, to lie and deceive’.660 While the use of the term ‘impossible’ 
denotes a restriction in the things God can do, these impossibilities do not 
entail a limitation of the divine nature, precisely because by not being able to 
do things that are repugnant to his own nature God is said to be omnipotent.661 
Charnock presents a final qualification whereby he explains that the things 
that are possible for God to do are possible in nature signifying with it that 
their transition from possibility to reality does not depend on an intrinsic 
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strength residing on the thing itself but on the power of God given that 
possibilities lack of ontological substance prior to their actualisation and thus, 
as mere possibilities, they are void of any intrinsic strength.662  
Secondly, Charnock defines the potentia ordinata as ‘the power 
whereby God doth that which he hath decreed to do, that is, which he hath 
ordained or appointed to be exercised.’663 Correspondingly, Charnock adds to 
the prior definition that the object of such power consists of all things that 
have been divinely ordained to be, that is, things that are or will be actualised 
according to the eternal determination of God’s decree and since the divine 
decree is immutable in what it has determined to accomplish, the nature of 
the things that belong to the decree are by definition necessary rather than 
merely possible.664 While Charnock adheres to the absolute-ordained 
distinction, he rejects the conclusion that it implies a form of composition 
within the power of God: ‘[Absolute and ordinate] are not distinct powers, but 
one and the same power: his ordinate power is a part of his absolute’.665 It is 
noteworthy that Charnock believes that the potentia distinction is directly 
supported by Scripture’s testimony from which he interprets Matt. (26.53-54) 
as containing a clear reference to the absolute (v. 53) and the ordained (v. 54) 
power of God.666 So, it can be said that Charnock does not restrict the 
discussion to the theoretical; instead, he seeks to explain the relation between 
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the absolute and the ordinate power of God by using some aspects of the 
incarnation as a biblical motif  in an effort to make the topic accessible to his 
audience: ‘The absolute power of God could have prepared a body for Christ as 
glorious as that he had after his resurrection, but that bad not been agreeable 
to the end designed in his humiliation; and therefore God acted most perfectly 
by his ordinate power in giving him a body that wore the livery of our 
infirmities.’667   
In the end, Charnock ends up framing his understanding of the 
potentia distinction in concomitance with other features of the divine nature, 
viz., freedom, will, and wisdom.668 This is to say that the potentia dei absoluta, 
by being essential for the divine nature, is necessary for God whereas the 
potentia dei ordinata, by depending on the divine will, depends on God’s 
freedom for its execution. Contrary to the claims made by late medieval 
nominalists and also in contradistinction with seventeenth-century 
Cartesianism, whose understanding of divine omnipotence based upon the 
potentia absoluta was of an undefeatable power only restrained by the divine 
will in isolation from the remaining divine attributes, Charnock offers a more 
stable view of divine power whereby omnipotence and freedom are preserved 
under the control of the guiding principle of divine knowledge: ‘So that the 
power of God is a perfection (as it were) subordinate to his understanding and 
will, to execute the results of his wisdom and the orders of his will; to his 
wisdom, as directing, because he works skilfully; to his will, as moving and 
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applying, because he works voluntarily and freely.’669 Thereby, divine 
omnipotence know of no restrictions besides those imposed by the divine 
wisdom and the divine will, that is, in ordering and guiding the execution of 
the opera Dei.      
Charnock is cognisant of the problems that arise from taken the power 
of God in isolation from the remaining perfections of the divine being, that is, 
simply as a pure force. Thus, Charnock offers several reflections seeking to 
explain the manners wherein omnipotence, though infinite and boundless in 
se and per se, is exercised in concurrence with God’s wisdom and God’s will.670 
Significantly, Charnock does not see these considerations as an essential 
restriction to the power of God, but as necessary qualifiers to avoid 
imputations of weakness to the divine nature. These limitations are better 
understood as impossibilities in the things themselves rather than deficiencies 
in God.671 For example, God cannot make a contradiction true for this would 
falsify God himself or, in other words, divine omnipotence cannot make A and 
-A simultaneously true. Given that a contradiction is a logical impossibility 
(i.e., a nonentity), it cannot be the object of God’s power for it has only 
possible things (i.e., entities) as its objects. These contradictions extend 
beyond the realm of logic and include things that entail a detriment to the 
being and the perfections of God. Following Augustine, Charnock states that 
God is not susceptible to death for ‘God is almighty in doing what he will, not 
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in suffering what he will not’, to which he later adds, ‘He cannot will any 
unrighteous thing, and therefore cannot do any unrighteous thing.’672  
As it has been noted, Charnock describes God in scholastic terms as ‘a 
pure act, nothing but vigour and act’, which is equivalent to say that God is full 
and unrestrictive actuality—actus purissimus.673 By being pure act, God is said 
to have no potentia passiva (passive potency), which is to say that no 
unrealised power resides in the divine being or that God is not subject to be 
acted upon by an outward potency. Instead, potentia is said to be always 
activa (active) in God, a potency that is perpetually in act. Accordingly, God’s 
acts of power demands no effort for his power is his ability to act, but since 
God is actus purus he is in perfect completion of himself and therefore it is 
concluded that, ‘[a]s he [God] can do all things possible in regard of the object, 
he can do all things easily in regard of the manner of acting.’674  
Predictably, Charnock understands divine power to be archetypal and 
an essential property of the divine being. This is to say, on the one hand, that 
divine power is derived from nothing but God himself and, alternatively, that 
the power of God is identical to the divine essence. In view of these exclusive 
features of the potentia Dei, Charnock stresses the distinction between divine 
and creaturely power: creatures can exercise power in great measure, yet their 
power is always ectypal and derivative whereas divine power is archetypal and 
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intrinsic to the being of God. Charnock acknowledges the massive power 
contained in nature and in secondary causes, yet he also notes that this form 
of power is unable to account for the act of creation. A thing can be multiplied 
or transformed by the forces of nature but its existence can only be attributed 
to the power of God. To prove this point, Charnock notes that the word 
translated as ‘creation’ in Gen. (1.1) is never ascribed to secondary causes but 
to God alone.675 In this context, divine power, as omnipotence, is a said to be a 
non-communicable property given that ‘[t]o be omnipotent is to be essentially 
God.’676 The Christological implications of the foregoing claim serve Charnock 
to reject the Lutheran view of the communicatio idiomatum. Had the 
communication of the divine attributes been directly transmitted from the 
divine nature to the humanity of Christ, the latter would not be human but 
divine as the communication of the divine attributes implies the 
communication of the divine essence.677  
That God is omnipotent is proven by appealing to the existence of 
creaturely power, the perfection and the simplicity of God, and by the reality 
of miracles.678 Interestingly, Charnock begins his case by pointing out to the 
testimony of Scripture as a preface for his case on divine omnipotence.679 First, 
omnipotence is observable in creation. Since divine power cannot be other 
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than archetypal and essential, all creaturely power needs to be ectypal and 
derived, which is to say that it is finite and endowed by a source of infinite and 
eternal power. Thus, Charnock:  
The power of the Creator must far surmount the power of the creature, and 
must needs be infinite; for if it be limited, it is limited by himself or by some 
other; if by some other, he is no longer a Creator, but a creature; for that which 
limits him in his nature did communicate that nature to him; not by himself, 
for he would not deny himself any necessary perfection.680     
Second, omnipotence is drawn from the perfection and the simplicity of 
God.681 Since God is actus purus, he is fully actualised in himself and, thus, 
ontologically supreme; therefore, God must lack of nothing but himself to act 
for otherwise he would be essentially wanting, but this cannot be since such 
ontological weakness is antithetical to God’s perfect nature.682 Lastly, God’s 
providential acts in the form of miracles are another reason to believe that 
God is omnipotent. In Charnock’s theology of providence, a miracle entails an 
action that does not rely on natural means for its causation suggesting with it 
that miracles are not natural but supernatural occurrences that presuppose 
the operation of a power capable of transcending the physical laws established 
for the natural order.683 Furthermore, while arguing that Christ’s ability to 
perform miracles is due to the power endowed by his divine nature, Charnock 
points out that creation in general and humanity in particular is incapable to 
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do the supernatural since ‘God “alone doth wonders,” Ps. cxxxvi. 4, excluding 
every other cause from producing such things.’684    
Charnock endeavours to explains how the divine attributes are 
manifested in God’s works ad extra.685 Biblically, the textual evidence 
supporting the manifestation of divine power in the act of creation is 
indisputable. Doctrinally, Charnock reasons that just as the framing of the 
world takes precedence over its sustenance and governance, then divine 
power precedes wisdom and kindness in the order of creation: ‘It was by this 
name of Power and Almighty that be was known in the first ages of the world, 
not by his name Jehovah: Exod. vi. 3, “And I appeared unto Abraham, Isaac, 
and Jacob, by the name of God Almighty; but by my name Jehovah was I not 
known to them.”’686 The fact that God created the universe ex nihil [out of 
nothing] demonstrates that a power greater than the power required for the 
sustenance the universe exists.687 This does not mean, however, that as greater 
the power demanded to accomplish an action, greater is the effort required for 
God to actualise it. On the contrary, God does not require of secondary or 
instrumental causes to execute his will in creating the universe, rather he 
creates the universe out of nothing without any exertion: ‘He does not hereby 
put his omnipotence to any stress… But in creation there is nothing necessary 
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to God's bringing forth a world but a simple act of his will, which is both the 
principal cause and instrumental.’688  
Just as the providence of God in governing creation necessitates the 
guiding principle of divine wisdom and the determinative participation of the 
divine will, providence also requires the influence of his power for its 
execution. The power of God is manifested by different acts of divine 
providence that comprise the modes of natural, moral, and gracious (judicial) 
government.689 The point in describing these modes of divine government is to 
indicate that the governance of creation would not be possible apart from the 
assistance of divine power. Charnock notes, for instance, that creation lacks 
the ability, in and by itself, of self-preservation as far as created things came 
into being through the agency of an external act of power (i.e., divine fiat).690 
Similarly, had not been for the intervention of God, manifested through the 
execution of his will, the physical and moral impact of evil, in any of its 
manifestations, would be worse than it is. Though a detailed discussion about 
the problem of evil in Charnock’s theology of the divine attributes takes place 
elsewhere, it suffices to note here that the restrictions God imposes on evil are 
not explained by a passive determination of the divine will. This signifies that 
in permitting and limiting the effects of sin, God exercises his Lordship—via 
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divine power—over creation, yet without causing harm to his own holiness: 
‘The holiness of God could never intend sin as sin. But the wisdom of God 
foreseeing it, and decreeing to permit it [executing his will], intended the 
making it subservient to his own honour.’ 691  Furthermore, just as divine 
power is responsible for restraining the devastating power of evil, power is 
also the strength that enables the moral faculties of a rational agent to do what 
it is righteous before God, thus: ‘The restraint of the destructive qualities of 
the creatures argues as great a power as the change of their nature, yea, and a 
greater.’692  
Redemption is the last item manifesting the activity of divine power in 
God’s works ad extra. For Charnock, redemption is God’s ‘most admirable 
work’ considering that it requires both the ability to recreate and, unlike 
creation, the strength to defeat the stratagems of the devil and the opposing 
forces of sin and death.693 More significantly, redemption demands the 
offering of a perfect sacrifice for the satisfaction of God’s justice, so this 
section begins with a point that it is decidedly Christological in content: Christ 
is identified as the power of God (1 Cor. 1.24).694 Accordingly, Charnock 
explains that the power of God makes itself evident in the supernatural 
conception of the Son, the agent of redemption (Luke 1.35). It is through the 
infinite power of God the Holy Spirit that the humanity of Christ is framed 
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and united to the divinity of the eternal Word.695 That redemption is an act of 
which only God should be thought as its efficient cause is highlighted by 
defining Mary’s role in the conception of Christ as instrumental. Her 
participation is passive in disposition not active in power: ‘The matter [the 
conception of Christ] was natural, but the manner of conceiving was in 
supernatural way, above the methods of nature.’696 The second act of power in 
the person redeeming is the union between the human and the divine natures 
in the person of Christ. While divine wisdom is responsible for the design of 
the incarnation, it is through the agency of divine power that such union 
becomes possible; so, in this manner, it is correct to say that the incarnation is 
indeed an act of divine power.697  
Additionally, the power of God is also evident in the publication, the 
propagation, and the application of the doctrine of redemption.698 The fact 
that the Christian kerygma, whose content is contrary to common reason and 
goes against the habits of the world, is capable of overcoming the sinfulness of 
the human heart points to something preternatural to explain the sinner’s 
acceptance of the gospel: ‘How impossible was it that a crucified Lord and a 
crucifying doctrine should be received in the world, without the mighty 
operation of a divine power upon the hearts of men!’699 Finally, the 
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manifestation of divine power in the application of redemption is explained by 
discussing three features resulting from redemption: the planting of grace, the 
forgiveness of sin, and the preservation of the gift of grace.700 Charnock 
recognises the presence of divine power in the proclamation of the good news 
and while the gospel is explained as the instrumental cause that brings a 
sinner into a state of saving grace, it is the ‘almightiness of God’ that which is 
ultimately singled out as the efficient principle in prompting the sinner to 
recognise his moral decadence.701  
For Charnock, divine power is conspicuous in God’s prerogative to 
forgive the creature’s sins. In this case, the power of God excels other 
instances since it is exercised primarily to control the execution of judgement 
demanded by the violation of God’s moral law: ‘God was to exercise a power 
over himself, to answer his justice and pardon the sinner, as well as a power 
over the creature to reduce the runaway rebel.’702 Finally, Charnock argues 
that just as the power of God is manifested in the sustenance of creation, 
divine power is equally established in the sustenance of the repented sinner. 
The former understood as an act of power for the preservation of creation 
whereas the latter thought as an act of power for the preservation of saving 
grace.703   
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Holiness (De Sanctitate Dei) 
Charnock’s in-depth treatment of the holiness of God is significant in at 
least two correlated ways. On the one hand, it indicates that the Reformed 
scholastics were concerned with more than the so-called metaphysical 
attributes of God (i.e., simplicity, eternity, immutability, omniscience, etc.).704 
Alternatively, it illustrates the centrality of the notion of divine holiness in 
Charnock’s understanding of the divine nature.705    
Exodus (15.11) is the biblical text supporting Charnock’s discourse on 
the holiness of God, Who is like unto thee, O Lord, among the gods? who is 
like thee, glorious in holiness, fearful in praises, doing wonders. Charnock 
submits two doctrinal points prefacing the analysis ahead: (1) the mercies and 
the judgements of God are equally worth of praise, and (2) divine holiness is a 
glorious perfection of God, a name given in Scripture that denotes the 
essential purity of the being of God.706  Though (1) may be connected to (2) in 
relation to the holiness of God, it is the latter proposition that gets Charnock’s 
attention. That Scripture depicts holiness as one of the names by which God is 
known, that is, the ‘Holy One’, indicates that this name is more than a majestic 
title, it denotes that God is naturally ‘pure and unmixed light, free from all 
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blemish in his essence, nature, and operations.’707 In other words, God is said 
to be holy, not simply because the doctrine of divine holiness can be properly 
inferred from Scripture, but precisely because God names himself holy. This 
emphasis on God’s self-revelatory name as the basis for speaking theologically 
about the divine attributes has been explicitly advocated in some 
contemporary dogmatic discussions on the holiness of God, significantly in an 
effort for confessing God rather than for categorising what sort of being he 
is.708 
While Charnock affirms that all the divine perfections belong to God 
essentially, that is, God is what he is in himself, by himself and of himself, yet 
in this discourse one sees an impulse to communicate this point emphatically. 
Holiness is so intrinsic to God’s nature that it would be less detrimental to 
deny his existence than to make of him an immoral deity by denying the purity 
of his nature.709 The significance of this attribute is further highlighted by 
qualifying holiness as ‘superior’ in relation to the other divine perfections.710 
The proposal of any hierarchical taxonomy within the divine attributes may 
suggest the idea of composition in the divine being, one manifested by a 
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metaphysical disparity amid the perfections of God.711 However, Charnock 
frames his statement in the conditional form suggesting a hypothetical 
scenario limited by the clause (‘If any’). Therefore, it would be better to read 
Charnock’s sentence rhetorically, that is, as seeking to emphasise the unique 
ability of divine holiness to function as the ethical principle by which the other 
perfections of God operate. In support of this reading, one may point to 
Charnock’s own words explaining the significance of holiness for the life of 
God: ‘Without it [holiness] his patience would be an indulgence to sin, his 
mercy a fondness, his wrath a madness, his power a tyranny, his wisdom an 
unworthy subtilty… [Holiness is] the crown of all his attributes, the life of all 
his decrees, the brightness of all his actions.’712   
Holiness is understood in two ways: (1) negatively, holiness is the 
attribute by which God is completely free from all evil, (2) positively, holiness 
is that which denotes the perfect integrity of the divine nature.713 This 
negative-positive explanation of holiness draws from the via negativa and 
from the via positiva sive eminentiae. Negatively defined, Charnock 
emphasises on the concept of God’s freedom to explain the notion of divine 
holiness; in this sense, holiness has to do with God’s ability to remain morally 
perfect or, as Charnock puts it, ‘estranged from all shadow of evil, all 
                                                             
711 This interpretation is irreconcilable with Charnock’s commitment to the doctrine of 
divine simplicity, which is illustrated repeatedly throughout the Discourses on the attributes 
of God.   
712 Charnock, Works, 2: 193. 
713 Ibid., 194. Though the 1864 edition of the Discourses reads, ‘negatively [holiness] 
is a perfect and polluted freedom of all evil’ (Ibid.), context and logic warrant the replacement 
of the word ‘polluted’ with any of its semantic antonyms.   
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imaginable contagion.’714 Positively understood, Charnock conceives the 
holiness of God as the concurrence between the sanctity of the divine being 
and the determinations of the divine will.  
Conceptually, divine holiness is distinguished from divine 
righteousness: ‘Holiness is a perfection absolutely considered in the nature of 
God; righteousness, a perfection as referred to others, in his actions towards 
them and upon them.’715 In this sense, divine righteousness is seen as an 
expression of divine holiness, a form of holiness primarily directed to the 
rational creature.716 Additionally, holiness is understood as the perfection 
whereby God acts according to the moral excellency of his being, the attribute 
from which God expresses satisfaction and detestation for those acts he 
willingly approves or rejects.717 While voluntaristic in tone, this emphasis on 
the divine will is tempered by noting the problems resulting from severing the 
divine essence from the divine will:  
His holiness is not solely an act of his will, for then he might be unholy as well 
as holy, he might love iniquity and hate righteousness, he might then command 
that which is good, and afterwards command that which is bad and unworthy; 
for what is only an act of his will, and not belonging to his nature, is indifferent 
to him… But what is moral and good in its own nature is necessarily willed by 
God, and cannot be changed by him, because of the transcendence eminency of 
his nature and righteousness of his will.718     
                                                             
714 Ibid., 194. 
715 Ibid. This is not the case for all the Reformed orthodox, however. Some conceived 
divine holiness and divine justice (righteousness) functionally the same perfection: ‘Iustitia & 
sanctitas Dei est, qua Deus sine ulla iniquitate est omne quod est.’ [It is the justice and the 
holiness of God, whereby God is all that he is without any iniquity] In Rijssen, Compendium: 
III/xxxviii; p. 33. 
716  This conviction is reiterated by Charnock in his discourse on the goodness of God, 
‘The holiness of God is manifest in his rational creatures... his holiness beams most in his law’. 
In Charnock, Works, 2: 283.  
717 Ibid., 194. 
718 Ibid., 195. 
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That God is essentially holy is more than to assert that he is the holiest 
amongst others; holiness is not simply a steady representation of a moral 
quality, but ‘the essential glory of his[God’s] nature… the peculiar glory of his 
nature.’719 God is essentially holy aside from creation, that is to say that God is 
necessarily holy as he does not require an object other than himself to be 
morally perfect, ‘the acts of those ad intra, or those within himself are 
necessary… Being infinitely holy, an act of holiness in infinitely loving himself 
must necessarily flow from this perfection.’720 Two significant points are to be 
highlighted here: (1) that divine holiness is just as necessary in God’s acts ad 
extra as it is in the operations ad intra, and (2) that holiness is necessary, not 
by simple inevitability, as the natural effect of a particular cause, but by a free 
inclination of the divine will.721  
From these considerations, it is concluded that God alone must be 
essentially holy considering that all creatures reflect some derived form of 
holiness. This means that holiness is accidental, not an essential property, in 
the human constitution implying that the being of the creature does not 
depend on being holy in contradistinction of God in whom holiness cannot be 
but an intrinsic property of the divine nature. Since holiness impedes God to 
approve evil in any of its forms (Hab. 1.13), it is also the basis upon which God 
freely decides to hate that which is sinful.722 It would be an irremediable 
                                                             
719 Ibid., 194, 195. Cf. John B. Webster, "The Holiness and Love of God," in Confessing 
God: Essays in Christian Dogmatics II (London: T&T Clark, 2005), 116-117. 
720 Charnock, Works, 2: 195. 
721 Ibid. 
722 Ibid., 197-200. 
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contradiction to assert that a God loves evil for that would be tantamount to 
affirm that God hates himself as to the ‘love of holiness cannot be without a 
hatred of everything that is contrary to it.’723 In this manner, the love of God 
for his own holiness becomes the basis upon which God loves the holiness 
residing in the creature (Psalm 11.7). This expression of love does not assume 
a divine obligation towards the creature but God’s natural affection directed at 
all that represent his image in creation for ‘He cannot but be delighted with a 
copy of himself; he would not have a holy nature, if he did not love holiness in 
every nature’.724 Finally, though Charnock holds to a robust notion of divine 
providence whereby God is said to order all things (including sinful actions) 
according to the eternal counsel of his will, God is not the cause of sin 
efficaciter, as if ordering it through an act of efficient causality, but 
permissivè, as ordering it through an act of active permission.725  
By being holy, God is said to be unable to do at least three things with 
respect to human sin: (1) to demand unrighteousness from his creatures since 
that would be to command hate of himself, (2) to infuse evil directly into the 
creature’s heart for that would entail a moral contradiction in God, one in 
which he would simultaneously delight in his own holiness while inspire 
impurity in others, and (3) to compel man to transgress his moral code for the 
                                                             
723 Ibid., 197. 
724 Ibid., 200. 
725 In ibid., 1: 26. For a more detailed discussion of the problem of evil in Charnock’s 
theology, see ibid., 25-37. In accord with Charnock’s explanation, the Reformed orthodox 
generally distinguished between God’s government by actio Dei (mediata & immediata) and 
by permissio divina: the former in reference to God’s effectual act of ordering the good 
through direct mediation or by means of secondary causes while the latter in relation to God’s 
sovereign decision in allowing the creature to sin. Cf. Polanus, Syntagma: VI/vii; p. 346.  
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act of sinning involves a voluntary act, either by a direct act of the will or by 
the natural inclination of it.726 These limitations, instead of being defects of the 
divine nature, are indicators of possessing the most excellent power, the most 
comprehensive wisdom, and of being clad by the most perfect holiness.727      
As a preface to the second division in this discourse, Charnock states 
that the blessedness of God (i.e., the possession of an eternal, infinite, self-
sufficient, and imperturbable state of absolute delight and contentment) is 
that without which the holiness of God cannot be affirmed inasmuch as these 
facets—perfect blessedness and absolute holiness—are inseparable and 
necessary for the divine life.728 God would not be blessed forever were he not 
be absolutely holy, for a moral imperfection would render him miserable, but 
to say that God might be disturbed psychologically is to say that he is not 
entirely and relentlessly blessed.729  
The scriptural references about the holiness of God are abundant and 
definite; God is called the Holy One repetitively in both the Old and the New 
Testaments. Accordingly, Charnock proposes three lines of reasoning in 
support for his case: (1) the concreated holiness of man, (2) the reality of an 
                                                             
726 Charnock, Works, 2: 200-203. 
727 Ibid., 203-204. 
728 Ibid., 204, 309. Interestingly, Muller notes that contrary to their predecessors in 
the Middle Ages, the reformers did not discuss the blessedness of God (beatitudo Dei) as an 
independent attribute within the doctrinal exposition of the divine perfections, though they 
treated it exegetically. Meanwhile, the Reformed scholastics included the theme in their 
highly elaborated seventeenth-century doctrinal systems (systema), though they left it away 
from their less comprehensive pieces, such as the compendia and the medullae or, as in 
Charnock’s case, the theological sermon (sermo). See Muller, PRRD: 3:371-372, 381-385, 541.   
729 Charnock, Works, 2: 204. 
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objective moral code, and (3) the judgement of creation.730 Since God cannot 
act in ways that are contrary to his own nature, he could not have created 
something that is intrinsically evil for that would be repulsive to his infinite 
goodness, that is, positively, that God only creates things that are inherently 
good.731 This does not mean, however, that God created man necessary holy as 
if he had been indebted to act in this way towards the creature. Instead, God’s 
decision to include holiness as part of the human constitution is the result of a 
sovereign act rooted in ‘the excellency and diffusiveness of his own nature, 
and his own glory, the end for which he formed it, which would have been 
obscure, yea, nothing, without some degrees of his bounty.’732 In this sense, the 
attribute of holiness is observable in man’s moral constitution in his pre-
lapsarian state as humankind bears the imago Dei. This is to say that man is 
originally holy (not naturally but by derivation) as creatures are endowed with 
holiness at the moment of creation.733    
The holiness of God is also observable in the disclosure of the natural 
law.734 The existence of an objective and universal law to which all moral 
                                                             
730 Ibid., 203-215.  
731 Ibid., 196, 289. Though God creates man necessary holy, this is not based upon an 
obligation with the creature, but upon God’s sovereign act rooted in ‘the excellency and 
diffusiveness of his own nature, and his own glory, the end for which he formed it, which 
would have been obscure, yea, nothing, without some degrees of his bounty.’ 
732 Ibid., 289. 
733 Ibid., 192. After the Fall, holiness is restored in the creature to its original form 
once she has experienced the efficacious work of regeneration, see Idem., Works, 3: 87-88. 
Interestingly, while speaking about regeneration and the restoration of the imago Dei, 
Charnock singles out in the attribute of holiness by saying, ‘This likeness to God consists 
principally in a likeness to him in holiness.’ In ibid., 128.    
734 Charnock includes as part of his argument the ceremonial law. In this case, he 
explains, the law reveals the necessity of continual sacrifices for the atonement of sin and thus 
evidence the holiness of God. Idem., Works, 2: 208. 
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agents are accountable reveals the holiness of God insofar as the dictates of 
the divine law indicates God’s complete abhorrence of sin, which is to say that 
the moral law forbids all forms of evil while concurrently prescribes all that is 
good.735 Besides, divine holiness is manifested in the eternal nature of the 
moral law given that the law does not rely on a temporal and mutable set of 
ethical demands, but on the eternal goodness of its precepts as they flow from 
the eternal will of God: ‘Can he [God] ever abrogate the command of love to 
himself, without showing some contempt of his own excellency and very 
being?’736 In recompensing the righteous and penalising the evil doer, 
Charnock presupposes a notion of divine justice whereby God determines 
which deeds are to be rewarded or castigated according to the dictates of the 
moral law. In turn, the infallible execution of God’s judicial ruling evidences 
the holiness of God as sovereign judge and ruler.737 
Charnock’s theology on divine punishment requires some particular 
attention considering the debate that took place during the High Orthodox era 
over what has been described as ‘the necessity of God’s judicial activity’.738 
Briefly stated, the genesis of the dispute can be traced back to the theology 
                                                             
735 Ibid., 205. 
736 Ibid., 208. 
737 Ibid., 210-211. 
738 Heppe, Reformed Dogmatics: 96. There were some Reformed orthodox divines 
such as William Twisse (1578-1646) and Samuel Rutherford (1600-1661) who argued, from 
the concept of potentia absoluta, that God’s vindictive justice was contradictory to divine 
freedom. William Twisse, Vindiciae Gratiae, Potestatis, Ac Providentiae Dei... (Amsterdam: 
Ioannem Ianssonium, 1632), I/ii, 25 (Digr. 8); pp. 198-207; Samuel Rutherford, Disputatio 
Scholastica De Divina Providentia (Edinburgh: Georgii Andersoni, 1649). For a detailed 
response to Twisse and Rutherford from a fellow Reformed theologian, consult John Owen, 
The Works of Jown Owen, 24 vols. (Edinburgh: T&T Clark, 1850-1855), 10:583-618. For a 
historical-theological account involved in the debate, consult Muller, PRRD: 3:490-496; 
Velde, The Doctrine of God: 219-230. 
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theologian Faustus Socinus (1539-1604), whose views on the doctrine of 
Christ’s satisfaction included a rejection of God’s avenging justice, a tenet that 
was later promoted and defended by his followers during the seventeenth-
century.739 The Socinians argued that God’s feats of justitia vindicatrix 
(vindictive or vindicatory justice), rather than essential to the nature of God, 
were temporal determinations of the divine will, that is, they were voluntary 
(not necessary) acts.740 In response, the Reformed orthodox claimed that 
God’s judicial acts were intrinsic to divine justice (in its relational connection 
to the creature); thus, they conceive that punitive justice is: (1) essential to the 
nature of God and, (2) necessary for the satisfaction of creature’s moral 
transgressions.741 The necessity to punish evil is not the result of an external 
cause urging on God an irrevocable moral obligation. Instead, punitive justice 
emerges from God himself and it is performed freely and instinctively.742  
Though Charnock does not address the affairs of the dispute directly, 
everything indicates that he would side with those who appraise Twisse’s and 
Rutherford’s views to be mistaken. By affirming that vindicatory justice is 
                                                             
739 For Socinus’ arguments against justice as essential to God’s nature, see Faustus 
Socinus, De Iesu Christo Servatore, Fausti Socini Senensis Opera Omnia in Duos Tomos 
Distincta (Amsterdam: s.n., 1656), I/i, III/iii-vi; pp. 121-124, 195-206.  
740 Ibid., I/i, III/i; pp. 121-125, 186-188. Turretin summarizes Socinus’s view by citing 
the latter in his Praelectionis theologicae, ‘Nor is there any justice in God obliging him to 
punish sin altogether, from which he cannot abstain… That which is commonly called justice 
as opposed to mercy is not a quality of God, but only the effect of his will’. Quoted in Turretin, 
Institutes: III/19, viii; 236. 
741 Cocceius, Summa: III/x, 55-56, pp. 151; Leigh, Treatise: 92; Owen, Works: 10:499-
500; Turretin, Institutes: III/19, 1:234-241; Watson, Body of Divinity: 87-93.  
742 Turretin explains that God’s freedom in acting punitively is not freedom of 
indifference as if God were apathetic as to whether sin should be punished or not. In Turretin, 
Institutes: III/19, v-vi , 1:236. Cf. Owen, Works: 10:509-510. After proposing a series of 
arguments (in chapter II of Dissertation on Divine Justice), Owen believes he has proven his 
thesis, namely, that ‘punitive justice is natural to God, and necessary to its egresses 
respecting sin.’ In ibid., 10:512. (Italics in the original) 
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essential to God’s nature, Charnock notes that the punishment of evil is 
necessary in compensating God’s honour.743 Interestingly, Charnock clusters 
the notions of divine justice, satisfaction, punitive necessity, and redemption 
under one christological leitmotif, the necessity of Christ’s death: ‘That 
he[Christ] might suffer, justice was to impute our sins to him; that his 
sufferings might be advantageous, mercy and justice were to impute his 
sufferings to us.’744 What is more, by asserting that ‘Divine holiness is the root 
of divine justice, and divine justice is the triumph of divine holiness’, 
Charnock suggests that God’s judicial actions are inescapable corollaries 
derived from the holiness and the justice of God.745 This is to say that holiness 
necessarily demands the execution of divine judgement when confronted with 
the wicked deeds of the creature: ‘When men will not own the holiness of God 
in a way of duty, God will vindicate it in a way of [vindictive] justice and 
punishment.’746 Additionally, one may add that the evidence (here and 
elsewhere) indicates that Charnock avoids leaning towards a voluntarist 
understanding of God just as he takes some distance with the late medieval 
nominalism that remained influential in some post-Reformation theologies. 
                                                             
743 Charnock, Works, 5: 47. 
744 Ibid., 17. The significance of connecting the justice of God and the expiatory work 
of Christ is that it indicates that God’s punitive acts are never in isolation from his mercy. See 
Idem., Works, 4: 151. 
745 Idem., Works, 2: 209.  
746 Ibid. In this context, ‘vindictive’ (vindicativa or vindicatrix) should not be 
understood as rancorous or spiteful but as vindication, satisfaction, and punishment for the 
transgression of the law. John Owen, cognisant of this problem, explains in his Dissertation 
on Divine Justice, ‘By “vindicatory justice,” then, we are to understand that perfection of the 
Deity which disposes him to vindicate his right by punishing its violators.’ In Owen, Works: 
10:495, n. 2. 
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The restoration of the unbeliever is the last illustration manifesting the 
holiness of God. No other judicial action but the Son being the object of divine 
wrath demonstrates better God’s detestation of sin.747 The death of Christ as 
satisfaction for the creature’s sin is the pinnacle of the operations of divine 
justice and hence of the holiness of God, ‘In this his purity did sparkle, and his 
irreversible justice manifested that all those that commit sin are worthy of 
death; this was the perfect index of his righteousness, Rom. iii. 29, that is, of 
his holiness and truth.’748  
As noted before, Charnock includes a section specifically dedicated to 
defend the holiness of God in view of the existence sin and the reality of evil. 
The argumentation exhibits a notable degree of sophistication and an in-depth 
knowledge of the Reformed theological tradition and of other schools of 
thought of the time.749 The makeup of this unit includes eight individual 
propositions confronting a variety of objections against the holiness of God. 
All of these claims are countered by a combination of biblical, theological, 
logical, and philosophical arguments.750 It is worth noting that Charnock’s 
apologia is prefaced by a recognition of the perils when, out of curiosity, one 
conjectures about the relation between the providence of God and the 
                                                             
747 Charnock underscores this point by noting the dignity of the person redeeming and 
the value of his holiness to make the sacrifice effective, the relation of the redeemer to the 
Father, and God’s estimation of his own holiness in the punishment of sin. In Charnock, 
Works, 2: 212-214.   
748 Ibid., 211-212. Charnock argues that the manifestation of divine holiness in God’s 
detestation of sin is also apparent in the regeneration, the justification, and the glorification of 
the one redeemed. In ibid., 214-215.   
749 See ‘Literary Sources’ in Chapter II above in this study.   
750 Charnock, Works, 2: 215-242. 
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existence of sin in the world.751 This admonition acknowledges the limitations 
of the human intellect and the inscrutability of the mind of God, yet it does so 
without precluding the intellectual aspiration of theology, viz., the 
procurement of ‘wisdom concerning divine matters’.752 
One common claim surfaces in all of Charnock’s propositions, namely, 
that divine holiness is irreproachable. The reliability of this master assertion is 
tested by presuming a contradiction between the latter and a series of 
doctrinal principles: (1) the mutable nature of humanity, (2) the impossibility 
of fulfilling law, (3) the decree of reprobation, (4) the will of God and the 
entering of sin into the world, (5) divine concurrence in the material aspect of 
a sinful act, (6) God-given instruments exploited for unrighteous ends, (7) the 
withdrawal of grace, and (8) the divine command of things apparently 
contrary to nature. These objections are analysed according to their 
theological loci; consequently, the arguments found in (1-2) are treated under 
the leitmotif of theological anthropology, the claims made concerning (3-5) 
are understood to be generally related to the divine decree, whereas (6-8) are 
thought to fall under the locus of theology proper.753 
                                                             
751 Ibid., 215-216. Interestingly, Charnock uses the term ‘curiosity’ to denote a 
disorder, not a virtue, of the intellect. For more on this approach, see Augustine, Confessions: 
Volume II (Books 9-13), edited and translated by Carolyn J. B. Hammond, Loeb Classical 
Library (Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press, 2016), X/v, 54-58; pp. 160-169. Cf. 
John B. Webster, "Curiosity," in The Domain of the Word: Scripture and Theological Reason 
(London: T&T Clark, 2012).   
752 Junius, Treatise: 143.  
753 Though it would be possible to organize the propositions under a different 
theological pattern, this would not ultimately affect the outcome of this study as the chief 
advantage for the categorization above is methodological not analytical.  
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In what concerns the claims made in propositions (1-2), Charnock 
emphasises that man’s concreated righteousness should not be taken as if he 
had been created essentially immutable. This is the case since immutability 
does not belong to the essential nature of the creature but that of the creator. 
On the contrary, moral agents were originally created susceptible to change 
and thus able to sin as they were endowed with liberty of choice, ‘Man had an 
ability to stand, as well as a capacity to fall; he was created with a principle of 
acting freely, whereby he was capable of loving God as his chief good’.754 This 
means that, in his pre-lapsarian state, Adam was able to obey God law by 
means of the righteousness conferred to him during creation.755 However, 
Adam lost the ability to do what is good before God as a result of an ill motion 
of his will: Adam willed to sin.756 This original transgression brought with it, 
among other things, an impairment of the faculties of the human soul ever 
since, so now, in his unregenerate state, man does not know God nor he does 
want to know him.757  
                                                             
754 Charnock, Works, 2: 217. Cf. ‘Man by creation had a freedom of will to choose that 
which was really good, yet had a mutability, and could choose evil’, in Idem., Works, 3: 211. 
Charnock’s line of reasoning here resonates with Augustine’s theological anthropology 
concerning Adam’s moral state of innocence; in this condition, Augustine explains, the 
creature is posse peccare, posse non peccare (able to sin, able not to sin). Augustine, "On 
Reprimand and Grace," in On the Free Choice of the Will, on Grace and Free Choice, and 
Other Writings, edited and translated by Peter King (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 
2010), 12.33 ; pp. 213-214. Following this Augustinian notion, similar accounts on Adam’s 
moral pre-lapsarian state are common in the Reformed orthodox tradition. See, for instance 
Turretin, Institutes: VIII/1, i-vii ; 1:569-570; Wollebius, "Compendium," 65; Watson, Body of 
Divinity: 137. 
755 Charnock, Works, 3: 223-224. 
756 This is important for Charnock’s apologia of divine holiness as he argues that man 
alone is responsible for losing his original righteousness, that is, his moral ability to keep the 
law. See ibid., 224-225. Cf. Idem., Works, 2: 219-220.  
757 Idem., Works, 3: 233; Idem., Works, 5: 465. 
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The gain of such theological anthropology is that it allows Charnock to 
maintain the holiness of God, even though it is objected that man’s original 
mutability and his moral inability (after the Fall) to obey the law entail a 
contradiction. Charnock’s response is grounded in the conviction that man 
was created good and free to choose, though not immutably, that which is 
righteous.758 In the first place, Charnock argues that man could not have been 
created evil since God, being good per essentiam, could not have created but 
that which is essentially good.759 Second, he asserts that freedom is intrinsic to 
the will just as the will is essential to being human: ‘Liberty is of the essence of 
the will, and cannot be taken away without extinction of the nature of man’.760 
What is more, man must act freely in all his operations if he is to be held 
responsible for his wrongdoings. If moral transgressions are not voluntary 
actions, but the effect of coercion or physical necessity, these would not be 
imputable to the person who acted them since these would be the result of a 
cause external to the transgressor.761 Therefore, Charnock concludes, the 
holiness of God is not tarnished by the sins of a changeable creature neither by 
the creature’s inability to keep the law or by the fact that God knew about this 
in advance. Still in possession of his original righteousness, man voluntarily 
neglected his ability not to sin; Adam disobeyed God not because the law was 
beyond his strength but because ‘he neglected the dictates and resolves of his 
                                                             
758 Idem., Works, 2: 217. Cf. Idem., Works, 3: 211. 
759 Idem., Works, 2: 288-289. 
760 Idem., Works, 3: 211. See also p. 227 above in this study.  
761 See ibid., 214. 
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own understanding.’762 In his corrupted state, the creature no longer holds the 
ability not to sin; instead, he is not able not to sin; notwithstanding he still 
retains the essential freedom of the will. Charnock notes that ‘though man 
hath lost this liberty to good, he retains his freedom to the commission of sin, 
under the necessity of sinning’.763 This means that ever since the Fall the 
creature determines the will to sin, yet he does so freely given that a moral 
necessity does not impose a necessity that is inconsistent with the agent’s 
freedom.764 Neither does God’s foreknowledge of man’s failure in keeping the 
law presents a challenge to the holiness of God. The foregoing assertion is 
supported by two principles: (1) that divine foreknowledge is not the cause of 
the creature’s weakness, and (2) that divine foreknowledge does not coerce the 
will to act one way or another. In the first place, Charlock argues, the 
foreknowledge of God infallibly secures the occurrence of sin, but it does so 
without being the effective cause of it since ‘[n]othing is because God knows it, 
but because God wills it, either positively or permissively.’765 Second, God’s 
foreknowledge of Adam’s sin did not necessitate his will; instead, Adam 
voluntarily sinned according to the determination of his own will, ‘God's 
foreknowledge did not make Adam guilty or innocent; whether God had 
                                                             
762 Idem., Works, 2: 219. Like Turretin, Charnock’s understanding of freedom of the 
will comprises two features: choice and willingness. The former refers to acting upon the 
judgment of reason (‘practical judgement’) while the latter implies acting voluntarily. See 
Idem., Works, 3: 287. Cf. Turretin, Institutes: X/1, v; 1:662. 
763 Charnock, Works, 3: 212. 
764 Cf. Turretin, Institutes: X/2, viii; 1:663.  
765 Charnock, Works, 1: 493. For Charnock on the permissive will of God with respect 
to sin, refer to the following discussion concerning proposition 4 below.  
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foreknown it or no, he was guilty by a free choice, and a willing neglect of his 
own duty.’766   
Propositions (3-5) point out to the problems for the doctrine of God 
that arise from affirming the doctrine of divine providence vis-à-vis the 
existence of sin. Particularly, the integrity of divine holiness is questioned 
when thought in allusion to sin and the latter’s relation to the decree of 
reprobation, the will of God, and divine concurrence.767 The first protestation 
refers to an apparent injustice on God’s part in his dealings with the 
reprobate, how a just God can irredeemably condemn someone from eternity? 
In the second place, Charnock faces the problem posed by the recognition of 
the existence of sin, on the one hand, and the sovereign will of God, on the 
other. More precisely, the dilemma lies in explaining how the holiness of God 
remains unstained given that sin could not have been without the resolve of 
the divine will. Finally, since Christian theology asserts that there is a 
concurrence between God (first cause) and the creature (secondary cause) 
with respect to sinful acts, God is imputed with being the provenance of sin.  
Charnock’s response begins in scholastic style, that is, by providing a 
precise definition of the meaning of reprobation. Thus, in its first sense, he 
explains, reprobation might be taken as an act of passing over or ‘preterition’, 
that is, an act by which God determines to restrain the dispensation grace 
indiscriminately. Second, it might also signify an ordination to punishment, a 
decree directed, not towards the commission of the offence, but towards the 
                                                             
766 Ibid., 2: 220.  
767 Ibid., 221-235. 
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condemnation thereof.768 Charnock’s explanation is crucial, as the first notion 
indicates that the decree of reprobation is not symmetrical with the decree of 
redemption; in the latter, God directly intervenes in dispensing saving grace 
for the justification of the elect whereas in the former God refrains himself 
from doing the same for the reprobate. In other words, while redemption 
implies a divine action, a positive motion of God, reprobation refers to a 
divine inaction, a negative motion of God, ‘God acts nothing, but withholds his 
power; he doth not enlighten their minds, nor incline their wills so powerfully 
as to expel their darkness, and root out those evil habits which possess them 
by nature.’769 The second aspect of the definition is equally significant for it 
denotes that the decree of reprobation operates in consideration of the 
reprobate’s sin. This is to say that it is the sin of the reprobate ensuing from 
his own corrupted nature the effective cause of his condemnation as opposed 
to God’s preterition.770  
In countering the second objection, Charnock appeals to the scholastic 
distinctions used by the Reformed orthodox in their discussions on the 
voluntas Dei (will of God) wherein a division between the will of God in 
reference to himself (ad intra) and in relation to his works (ad extra) is 
considered.771 In this manner, sin is not willed by God according to his 
preceptive will (voluntas praecipiens), nor by his approving will (voluntas 
                                                             
768 Ibid., 221. 
769 Ibid., 222. 
770 Ibid. This may be interpreted as Charnock leaning towards an infralapsarian view 
of the ordo salutis.   
771 Muller, PRRD: 3:453-473; Heppe, Reformed Dogmatics: 85-92. 
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approbans), but by a determination of his hidden will (voluntas arcana) 
whereby God wills to suffer the entrance of sin into the world.772 This signifies 
at least two things: (1) God does not command sin to be by a positive motion 
of the divine will, as in the creation of the world, and (2) neither does God will 
sin as if it were an object of divine approval since sin is abhorrent to the divine 
nature. What is more, God does not will sin as an end in itself (amabile 
propter se) for to do so would be repugnant to his being; instead, God permits 
sin to be by reason of a higher goal (honestatur ex fine).773 Therefore, God 
allows sin to be through a permissive resolve of his will (voluntas permissiva), 
one in which the will of God does not act directly to bring sin into existence, 
but one in which God positively wills to permit sin to be.774 Significantly, this 
permission does not carry with it a moral validation, that is, it does not 
legalise sin neither exonerates those who act at will on it.775 Neither does God 
resolve evil by his efficient will (voluntas efficiens) since the determination to 
permit evil is a ‘privative decree’ by which God acts nothing and thus no 
efficient causality can be established between the divine will and sin.776 This 
permission of God in reference to sin, however, is better understood as a 
suspension of God’s influence, a cessation of God’s sustaining grace.  In this 
manner, the privative decree that permits sin does not imply a passive motion 
                                                             
772 Charnock, Works, 2: 222. 
773 Ibid., 1: 17. Cf. Ibid., 2: 223. Particularly, Charnock explains that God permits sin 
for the exaltation of his own glory and for the majus bonum (the greater good). See for 
instance ibid., 1: 29-30; ibid., 2: 35-43, 228-229. 
774 Idem., Works, 2: 223-224. 
775 Ibid., 224-225. 
776 Ibid., 223, 225. Cf. Ibid., 1: 28. Besides, as sin is the absence of a something good, a 
negative rather than a positive thing, then its cause cannot be efficient (causa efficiens) but 
deficient (causa deficiens). See ibid., 2: 239.  
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of the divine will; in fact, the voluntas permissiva, in this context, comprises 
an active and positive resolve to tolerate the entrance of sin into the world, 
‘[f]or as God acts nothing in time, but what he decreed from eternity, so he 
permits nothing in time, but what he decreed from eternity to permit.’777  
The last objection concerns the doctrine of divine concurrence, 
specifically in its relation to sin. In his discourse on divine providence, 
Charnock asserts that no motion transpires in isolation from the prescriptive 
or permissive will of God.778 This commitment to an absolute notion of divine 
providence inexorably begs the question, does divine concurrence includes the 
sinful actions of the creature? Charnock answers is unequivocal: ‘Even the sins 
of the world his will permits them, his power assists in the act, and his wisdom 
orders the sinfulness of the act for holy ends.’779 The theological claim stated in 
the second clause of the foregoing sentence contains the opening elements for 
Charnock’s idea of divine concurrence (concursus divinus), which is the 
theme to which the following analysis refers.  
Charnock believes, under a notion of divine providence wherein sin 
itself cannot be outside of divine control, that God must sustain, somehow, the 
creature in the act of sinning. Though in the outlook the claim is theologically 
counterintuitive, Charnock decisively maintains it while acknowledging that 
further explanation is required:  
Some, to free God from having any hand in sin, deny his concurrence to the 
actions of the creature; because, if he concurs to a sinful action, he concurs to 
the sin also: not understanding how there can be a distinction between the act 
                                                             
777 Idem., Works, 2: 224. 
778 See ibid., 1: 6-93. 
779 Ibid., 12. 
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and the sinfulness or viciousness of it, and how God can concur to a natural 
action, without being stained by that moral evil which cleaves to it.780  
Nowhere, in Charnock’s Complete Works, one finds a theological 
definition of concurrence (concursus divinus), not at least one in explicit 
terms. However, the concept is clearly assumed when the topics of providence, 
divine causality, and human agency are intermingled in one way or another 
with the problems posed by the existence of sin and evil.781 Based upon those 
instances, one might well depict Charnock’s understanding of the concursus 
divinus as God’s particular and immediate acts in correlation with all the 
motions of the creature and, simultaneously, as the enabling power that 
makes possible all of the creature’s motions.782 Drawing from Suárez’s 
metaphysics, Charnock speaks about the causal relation between the acts of 
divine providence and the creature.783 Both Charnock and Suárez assert that 
the providence of God is that which endows the creature with being and with 
the ability to act, for ‘[a]ll created things depend upon God as agents, as well 
as beings, and are subordinate to him in a way of action, as well as in a way of 
                                                             
780 Ibid., 2: 229. Contemporarily to Charnock, several of the Continental Reformed 
divines fervently defended the notion of divine concurrence and secondary causality in their 
polemics against Socinians, Arminians, Jesuits, and Cartesians concerning divine 
foreknowledge and man’s free will. Consult, J. A. van  Ruler, "New Philosophy to Old 
Standards: Voetius' Vindication of Divine Concurrence and Secondary Causality," Nederlands 
Archief voor Kerkgeschiedenis 71, no. 1 (1991).    
781 In addition to the references listed in this section, Charnock refers to divine 
concurrence, in relation to providence, in plenty of instances. Charnock, Works: 1:12, 28, 214; 
2:137, 139; 3:88, 190, 291, 294, 529; 4:229.    
782 At one point, Charnock writes: ‘Our being we owe to his power, our well-being to 
his care, our motion and exerting of every faculty to his merciful providence and concurrence; 
“in him we live, and move, and have our being,” Acts xvii. 28. He frames our being, preserves 
our life, concurs with our motion.’ In Idem., Works, 1: 12. 
783 Cf. Disputation 22, section 1 in Francisco Suárez, On Creation, Conservation, & 
Concurrence: Metaphysical Disputations 20-22, trans. Alfred J. Freddoso (South Bend, Ind.: 
St. Augustine's Press, 2002), 149.    
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existing.’784 This underscores the fact that the act creation and that of 
concurrence are the condicio sine qua non for, respectively, the creature’s 
existence and motion.785 By discriminating between the act of sinning and the 
wickedness of the act in itself, Charnock vindicates the sanctity of God 
inasmuch as  the concursus between God and the act of sin is not said to be 
moral in nature, but natural or physical.786 In other words, God enables and 
sustains the faculties of the creature in the act of sin, yet he does so without 
concurring with the immorality of the sinful action itself, Charnock explains: 
‘God assists in that action of a man wherein sin is placed, but not in that which 
is the formal reason of sin, which is a privation of some perfection the action 
ought morally to have.’787 This means that divine concurrence should not be 
blamed for the creature’s sin for at least two reasons: (1) it is the creature’s 
corrupt nature which effectively causes sin to be not the divine concurrence in 
enabling the understanding, the willing, and the execution of a sinful act.788 
Since one action may have two different causes, the cause moving one to act 
sin is said to be righteous (divine concurrence), while the cause of the inherent 
evil in sinning is unrighteous (creature’s corruption),789 and (2) divine 
                                                             
784 Charnock, Works, 2: 230, also n.*.  
785 In causal lingo, this emphasises the idea that secondary causes never act 
exclusively by their own power, but they do so by the power of a first cause: ‘Nothing can act 
without the almighty influx of God, no more than it can exist without the creative word of 
God.’ In ibid., 137. This was an accepted conviction amongst the Reformed orthodox; for 
example, Brakel, Christian's Reasonable Service: 1:336.   
786 Charnock, Works, 2: 229, 231-233. Cf. Turretin, Institutes: VI/5, ii; 1:505. 
787 Charnock, Works, 2: 232. 
788 Ibid., 1: 27-28. 
789 ‘In second causes, one and the same action, proceeding from divers causes, in 
respect of one cause, may be sinful; in respect of the other, righteous.’ In ibid., 26. Cf. Ibid., 2: 
232-233, 239-240. 
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concurrence does not necessitate the human will to sin since the creature 
always sins freely: ‘Indeed, sin cannot be committed by force; there is no sin 
but is in some sort voluntary; voluntary in root, or voluntary in the branch; 
voluntary by an immediate act of the will, or voluntary by a general or natural 
inclination of the will.’790 In concurring with the faculties of the creature, God 
providentially moves everything according to the nature of the creature, thus 
‘we owe our creation to God, our corruption to ourselves.’791 Finally, Charnock 
notes that the concurrence of God and the sinful action of the creature have 
two different ends; the former is directed always towards the ultimate good 
whereas the latter aims at evil.792 The theological and practical import of 
noting this double objective is that it corroborates the comprehensive scope of 
divine providence and underscores the immeasurable nature of God’s wisdom 
while pointing towards the renewal of the believer’s faith by knowing that 
divine providence is that which would immutably secure the well-being of the 
church.  
In the final section of Charnock’s apologia, the sovereignty of God 
surfaces as the common denominator in the background of each one of the 
objections listed in propositions (6-8).793 In the first instance, the integrity of 
divine holiness is questioned by God’s sovereign decision of presenting an 
object to the creature that would be used for evil purposes. In the first 
instance, the integrity of divine holiness is questioned when God presents an 
                                                             
790 Idem., Works, 2: 201. 
791 Ibid., 1: 27. Cf. Idem., Works, 3: 190-191. 
792 Idem., Works, 2: 234-235. 
793 Ibid., 235-242. 
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object to the creature which is used for evil purposes. Hypothetically, the 
argument implies that God could have prevented sin to occur had he not 
presented the object that the creature would make use to sin. Charnock offers 
a threefold response: (1) Given that God presents objects to every person for 
their use, this act by itself cannot violate the liberty of the creature since, 
otherwise, no creature could have acted freely ever, (2) objects in themselves 
are good, they do not necessitate the creature to sin; instead, they become 
corrupted once the creature, out of his corrupt nature, uses them to sin, and 
(3) God can bring good in allowing the creature to misuse the object presented 
to him.794 Therefore, Charnock concludes that in no instance the holiness of 
God should be blemished for God’s sovereign decision of presenting objects 
that would be used for unrighteous purposes when in fact ‘[i]t is not from the 
nature of the object that men do good or evil, but from the disposition of the 
person; what is good in itself is made bad by our corruption.’795  
Neither does God's sovereign determination of removing the benefits of 
common grace from a sinful creature diminish his holiness, nor it does it when 
God commands things that seem in the outset contrary to nature or against 
the divine law.796 In the first place, Charnock argues that the withdrawal of 
grace is a negative act, this is to say that the hardening of the sinner’s heart is 
not the result of God working new evil in the creature, but instead it is an act 
in which the creature is left to act according to his own desires, which in the 
case of the unregenerate are always evil: ‘If hardness follows upon God's 
                                                             
794 Ibid., 235-238. 
795 Ibid., 236. 
796 Here are included the objections found in propositions 7-8.  
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withholding his softening grace, it is not from any positive act of God, but 
from the natural hardness of man.’797 Noteworthy, Charnock brings into the 
discussion the distinction between efficient (efficiens) and deficient (deficiens) 
causality to declare that God’s abstraction of his grace is not a positive act but 
rather an act of cessation and, as such, the result of a non efficient cause 
(causa deficiens).798 This is the case considering that sin possesses no 
metaphysical substance and thus it is better defined by what it lacks not but 
what it is: ‘Sin is the privation [privatio] of the rectitude due to an act’.799 
Then, conceived as a privatio, sin is a negative thing in terms of its ontology 
and hence it ‘cannot have an efficient, but a deficient cause’.800 Alongside, 
Charnock indicates that sin has two causal explanations with respect to the 
Fall; on the one hand, during the pre-lapsarian era, sin is explained by 
Adams’s free will whereas, on the other hand, after the Fall,  sin is said to be 
caused by the inherent corruption of man’s nature. This is significant for by 
locating sin’s efficient cause in the Fallen nature of the creature rather than in 
God’s withdrawal of his grace, Charnock is able to maintain the holiness of 
                                                             
797 Charnock, Works, 2: 238. 
798 Ibid., 216, 222, 238-239. This distinction can be traced back to Charnock’s 
discourse on divine providence wherein he explains that God has no efficient participation 
(causa efficiens) in producing sin. See ibid., 1: 27-28. 
799 Idem., Works, 1: 476. In identifying the cause of an evil will, Augustine explains 
that it cannot be of an effective nature ‘for the cause is not one of efficiency but of deficiency 
[non enim est efficiens sed deficiens] even as the evil will itself is not an effect but a defect.’ In 
Augustine, City of God: Volume IV (Books 12-15), trans. Philip Levine, Loeb Classical Library 
(London: Heinemann, 1966), 12.7; 32-33. Thomas discriminates between ‘absence’ taken as 
privation, and ‘absence’ as in the sense of negation; he argues, evil is always the result of the 
former but not of the latter. In Aquinas, ST, 8: 1a. 48. 1, 3; p. 109. 
800 Charnock, Works, 3: 190. In modern times, there has been some apprehension to 
defining sin exclusively as privation, and to ascribing deficient causality to God. G. C. 
Berkouwer, Sin, Studies in Dogmatics (Grand Rapids: Eerdmans, 1971), 61-65. 
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God.801 Second, Charnock addresses a potential objection against the holiness 
of God proceeding from the divine command of things seemingly contrary to 
nature or hindering other divine precepts.802 This is illustrated, for example, in 
the command involving the killing of Isaac as described in Gen (22.2); 
Charnock indicates that, despite the severity of the command, there is nothing 
unjust or immoral in it as far as ‘God hath a sovereign dominion over the lives 
and beings of his creatures, whereby as he creates one day he might annihilate 
the next’.803 In defending his argument on the matter here discussed, 
Charnock asserts that God ‘hath the power to dispense with his own law’ as 
universal lawgiver, which indicates God’s ability and authority to command 
things that apparently would do away with previous provisos of the divine 
law.804 Charnock’s argument may be seen as the returning of certain forms of 
medieval voluntarism wherein the divine will, in establishing the moral law, 
considers that the power of God is not limited by anything but logic in 
imposing changes upon the divine law.805 Though critics have noted that this 
view would make the divine law ultimately subjected to change and hence 
arbitrary, Charnock’s line of reasoning should be assessed considering a 
caveat to his initial claim wherein he says that while there is nothing unholy in 
                                                             
801 Charnock, Works, 2: 239-240. Additionally, Charnock notes two additional points: 
(1) God never removes his grace before the creature deserts him first either by ignoring or by 
abusing God’s common grace, and (2) there is no moral obligation on God’s part to dispense 
his grace. In ibid., 240-241.           
802 In contemporary terms, this problem may reflect in some aspects the objection 
posed against what is called the divine command theory of ethics.  
803 Charnock, Works, 2: 240. 
804 Ibid., 242. 
805 Heiko Augustinus Oberman, The Harvest of Medieval Theology: Gabriel Biel and 
Late Medieval Nominalism (Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press, 1963), 92-93, 96. 
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God by ‘disposing of the lives and goods of his creatures’, God cannot 
command that which is inherently evil.806 This qualification is significant for it 
indicates two coexisting aspects in the divine life: (1) that God is ontologically 
independent and hence always acts free from any limitation external to his 
own being, and (2) that God is self-restrained to act according to his own 
nature. In the end, however, one wonders whether Charnock’s theology {or 
‘God’} here is losing some of its stability by emphasising too much on the 
power and the sovereignty of God at the peril of minimising the immutable 
nature of the decree.807  
Goodness (De Bonitate Dei) 
While it is true that the Discourses are not explicitly concerned with 
presenting the divine attributes according to a specific pattern of 
classification, it would not be without sensible justification to assert that 
goodness is a perfection better understood by Charnock as an expression of 
the divine will.808  
Charnock finds in Mark (10:18), ‘And Jesus said unto him, Why callest 
thou me good? There is none good but one, that is, God’, the locus classicus 
for his exposition of the doctrine of divine goodness.809 The exegesis of this 
text indicates Charnock’s familiarity with various trends in biblical 
                                                             
806 Charnock, Works, 2: 242.  
807 Paradoxically, Charnock abandons any voluntaristic impulse when, while lecturing 
on the goodness of God, deals with the metaphysics of moral goodness.  
808 Cf. Turretin, Institutes: III/20, i-iv; 1:241; Wollebius, "Compendium," 40; 
Polanus, Syntagma: II/xx; p. 162. 
809 Charnock, Works, 2: 275. 
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scholarship; he refers, for instance, to the interpretation given by those like 
Augustine, Erasmus of Rotterdam (1466-1536), Calvin, Juan Maldonado 
(1533-1583), and John Lightfoot (1602-1675).810 Ultimately, Charnock follows 
the interpretation provided by the German scholar David Paraeus (1548-
1622), who synthetises Lightfoot’s explanation with that of Calvin.811   
Goodness is considered vis-à-vis the attributes of the first order such as 
simplicity, aseity, immutability, infinity, and perfection. First, God alone is 
originally good of himself, this is to say that God’s goodness comes from 
nothing external to him: he is good in se and a se. Second, as everything is 
good by participation, only God is infinitely good. Third, from the infinity of 
divine goodness, Charnock deducts that only God is perfectly good: ‘As in him 
is the whole nature of entity, so in him is the whole nature of excellency.’812 
Finally, Charnock declares that God alone is immutably good: the argument 
assumes that there is no distinction between the divine essence and the divine 
attributes and since God is essentially immutable, then he must be immutably 
good.  
The doctrinal thesis in this discourse underlines two chief aspects of 
divine goodness. On the one hand, it emphasises God’s royal prerogative to be 
the sole possessor of pure and perfect goodness; on the other hand, it notes 
                                                             
810 Ibid., 275-276. 
811 Lightfoot argued that the line of questioning in Mark (10:28) sought to underscore 
Christ’s divine status whereas Calvin believed that Christ wanted to affirm his divine mission 
from God. In ibid. 
812 Ibid., 277. 
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that goodness is a prime characteristic of the divine being.813 The former 
establishes a distinction between the essential goodness of God and the 
derivative goodness of the creature: God is good per essentiam, the creature is 
good per participationem. 814 Goodness, then, must be predicated of God since 
‘[h]e is good, he is goodness, good in himself, good in his essence, good in the 
highest degree, possessing whatsoever is comely, excellent, desirable; the 
highest good, because the first good; whatsoever is perfect goodness is God, 
whatsoever is truly goodness in any creature is a resemblance of God.’815 
Charnock seeks to communicate that goodness is more than a quality of the 
divine being; in fact, goodness is God’s very essence: ‘God is good as he is God, 
and therefore good by himself, and from himself, not by participation from 
another.’816 Furthermore, to say that God is the first good is to affirm that he is 
the highest good, the summum bonum, the origin, substance, and end of all 
good.817 In identifying God as the summum bonum, Charnock makes an 
indispensable assertion about the divine nature, namely, that God is goodness 
itself.818 Consequently, it is safe to conclude that there are metaphysical and 
teleological reasons, in addition to the fact that God always acts for the sake of 
                                                             
813 Ibid., 280. 
814 Ibid., 285. 
815 Ibid., 280. 
816 Ibid., 285. 
817 Cf. Aquinas, ST, 2: 1a. 6. 2; pp. 84-87; Leigh, Treatise: 78-79.  
818 Charnock, Works, 2: 281. 
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his people and for the manifestation of his glory, to characterise God as the 
highest good.819  
In defining the attribute of goodness, Charnock discriminates between 
the goodness of being (bonitate), which refers to the inherent perfection of a 
thing, the goodness of will (benevolentia), namely, the moral excellency of a 
being, and the goodness of the hand (beneficentia), the acts of liberality for 
the benefit of others.820 The purpose of the discourse is to elaborate on the 
goodness of God as bonitas Dei, that is to say goodness in reference to the 
divine essence.821  
By arguing that all good convenes in the divine nature, Charnock 
follows a theological axiom existing in patristic, medieval, and Reformation 
theologies. In it, God is characterised as the fons omnium bonorum [fountain 
of all good things].822 This suggests that divine goodness comprises all the 
                                                             
819 Ibid., 284. Leigh gives details of five characteristics which make God alone the 
highest good: (1) summum bonum est tantum bonum, that there is no mixture of evil in God; 
(2) summum bonum est bonum universale, that God contains all good in himself; (3) 
summum bonum est bonum proprium, that God is goodness itself; (4) summum bonum est 
bonum incommutabile, that God’s goodness is eternal and unchangeable; and finally, (5) 
summum bonum est appetitus quietativum, that God is the object of an all-satisfying desire. 
In Edward Leigh, A Systeme or Body of Divinity (London: A.M. for William Lee, 1654), II/xv; 
p. 203. 
820 Charnock, Works, 2: 282. Some have asserted that Charnock’s threefold division 
above draws, at least implicitly, from another threefold distinction in scholastic theology 
wherein the divines classify the voluntary love of God (amor voluntario) in three groups: (1) 
love of benevolence (amor benevolentiae), (2) love of beneficence (amor beneficientae), and 
(3) love of complacency or friendship (amor complacentiae sive amicitiae). In Beeke and 
Jones, A Puritan Theology: 78. Though it is not altogether clear that love and goodness were 
the same in Charnock’s theology, The foregoing assertion gains some justification by noting 
that, at least in some cases, the Reformed orthodox identified the love of beneficence as divine 
goodness; for example, in Pictet, Christian Theology: II/v; p. 85.      
821 Although, as it would be clear below, Charnock includes the notions of benevolence 
and beneficence while expounding goodness.  
822 Cf. Charnock, Works, 2: 286. The fons omnium bonorum principle is also 
observed in various of the doctrinal systems, sermons, and ecclesiastical confessions of the 
Protestant orthodox era. See, for instance, Confessio Belgica, art. I in Philip Schaff, The 
  229 
 
divine perfections: ‘All the acts of God are nothing else but the effluxes of his 
goodness, distinguished by several names, according to the objects it exercised 
about.’823 In making this claim, Charnock expresses that goodness is a cardinal 
property of both the acts of God ad intra and of the operations of God ad 
extra.824 In other words, goodness is a perfection that, while essentially owned 
by God alone, flows from him upon the whole of creation.825  
Specifically, Charnock contrasts divine goodness (bonitas) with other 
attributes that are commonly treated under the category of the divine will such 
as holiness (sanctitas) and, also, with attributes involving the divine affections 
such as mercy (misericordia).826  Divine goodness is defined as ‘the efflux of 
[God’s] will’, not the ‘rectitude of the divine nature’, which properly describes 
the holiness of God.827 Additionally, divine goodness differs in scope from 
divine holiness: the extent of the former is universal whereas that of divine 
holiness is limited to the rational creature.828 Neither divine goodness should 
be confused with divine mercy for, although the second is a natural corollary 
                                                             
Creeds of Christendom, 3 vols., vol. 3, The Creeds of the Evangelical Protestant Churches 
(New York: Harper & Brothers, 1877), 383; Leigh, Treatise: 83.  
823 Charnock, Works, 2: 284. 
824 This coincides with more explicit assertions on the matter in the Reformed 
orthodox tradition. For example, ‘[c]ommunicat Deus bonitatem suam duobus modis: (1) ad 
intra (2) ad extra.’ [God communicates his own goodness in two manners: (1) ad intra and 
(2) ad extra] In Marcus Friedrich Wendelin, Christianae Theologiae Libri II (Amsterdam: 
Ioannem Ianssonium, 1650), I/i, x (ii); p. 102. 
825 Charnock, Works, 2: 282. 
826 Cf. Thomas Ridgley, A Body of Divinity, 2 vols., vol. 1 (New York: Robert Carter & 
Brothers, 1855), 109. Charnock’s concern for presenting precise definitions of the subject 
under analysis is a common feature shared by other theological works influenced by scholastic 
methodology. See Muller, PRRD: 1:34.     
827 Charnock, Works, 2: 283. 
828 Ibid. 
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of the first, the two differ in scope and may vary in their manner of 
manifestation. In regards to scope, goodness extends to all of God’s works ad 
extra whereas the object of mercy are those things or beings that lack true 
blessedness.829 Concerning their mode of manifestation, the act of creation 
and that of the incarnation became the chosen means to illustrate the 
differences between the goodness and the mercy of God. For instance, creation 
is the result of an act of divine goodness, not of divine mercy, since goodness 
is that which prompts God to bring something into existence out of nothing 
whereas mercy already presumes the existence of something, though in a state 
of misery, and in need of succour.830 In the end, drawing from the definitions 
of other theologians, Charnock understands goodness to be that perfection of 
the divine essence whereby God is incline to act for the sake of his creatures, 
an inclination of his will for his own glory by which being is communicated to 
something else besides himself.831  
Being cognisant of the created goodness residing in everything that 
exists, Charnock is lead to conclude that all moral creatures enjoy of a 
concreated goodness;  Satan himself, whose being is divested from any moral 
goodness, still retains some form of goodness as a creature of God: ‘When he 
                                                             
829 Ibid. Since the operations of divine mercy presupposes a state of misery caused by 
sin wherein God acts in favour of the sinner by granting her saving grace, one may say that 
ultimately mercy has the elect as its chief object. See ibid., 108-109, 229. Cf. Polanus, 
Substance: 3.   
830 Charnock, Works, 2: 283, 306. Cf. Cocceius, Summa: VI/xv, 40; p. 215.: ‘Bonitas 
igitur Dei est [proegumena] causa creationis.’ [Goodness is, therefore, the [intercedent] 
cause of creation.] For Charnock, the argument remains the same when speaking of the 
incarnation: ‘Some think Christ had been incarnate, had not man fallen; had it been so, there 
had been a manifestation of goodness to our nature, but not of mercy, because sin had not 
made our nature miserable’, in Charnock, Works, 2: 283. 
831 Idem., Works, 2: 284. Cf. Cocceius, Summa: III/ix, 40; p. 148; Perkins, Golden 
Chaine: 12.  
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[the devil] fell from God, he retained his natural goodness as a creature, 
because he did not cease to be, he was not reduced to that nothing from 
whence he was drawn; but he ceased to be morally good, being stripped of his 
righteousness by his apostasy.’832 
The nature of divine goodness is explained by arguing in favour of the 
following assertions: (1) God is good by his own essence, (2) God is the most 
excellent manifestation of goodness, (3) the goodness of God is 
communicative, (4) God is necessarily good, (5) God is freely good, (6) God 
takes great delight in the communication of goodness, and (7) the 
manifestation of goodness is the basis of creation and the aim of providence.833   
Since all the propositions listed above had already been hinted, in one 
way or another in the material covered up to this point, the following analysis 
primarily focuses on commenting and complementing on information yet not 
considered.834 In proposition (1), Charnock reiterates the claim that God is 
good per essentiam, signifying that he is not good by participating from any 
source of goodness but his own nature. God is pure goodness itself: ‘He [God] 
is not first God, and then afterwards good; but he is good as he is God, his 
essence being one and the same, is formally and equally God and good.’835 It is 
                                                             
832 Charnock, Works, 2: 282. Interestingly, Velde has noted a couple of instances 
wherein other Reformed divines have called the devil ‘good’ (bonum) under the assumption 
that he is ‘a created being and ornated with various gifts.’ See Velde, The Doctrine of God: 
206. Cf. Jerome Zanchi, De Natura Dei (Heidelberg: Jacob Mylius, 1577), IV/I; p. 295.   
833 Charnock, Works, 2: 285-293. 
834 It is worth noting that Charnock’s definition of divine goodness suggests many of 
the features included in the propositions just listed. Cf. Ibid., 280.  
835 Ibid., 285-286.  
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worth underscoring the doctrinal import of the notion of divine simplicity for 
the formulation of divine goodness: God is not good as if goodness were 
something added to the divine being; instead, God is goodness itself since in 
the divine nature there is no real distinction (distinctio realis) between 
attributes and essence.836 The fact that God is simple and independent warrant 
the assertion that he is essentially good, which in turn justifies a derivative 
claim, namely, that God is infinitely and eternally good.837    
The argument in proposition (2) reflects an underlying conviction 
wherein God is conceived as being ontologically superior and sovereign over 
creation.838 As God is thought to be the prime and chief existence, one whose 
nature is but esse tantum (pure being/existence), he must be also the supreme 
and highest goodness, one whose essence is but summum bonum (highest 
good): ‘He [God] is only good without capacity of increase; he is all good, an 
unmixed good—none good but God’. 839 
                                                             
836 For a detailed information on the significance of divine simplicity in Charnock’s 
doctrine of God, see pp. 148-153 above in this study. 
837 Charnock, Works, 2: 286. 
838 Not in the sense of comparing one amongst many, but in the sense of exalting one 
above all.  
839 Charnock, Works, 2: 286. Cf. Responsio in Aquinas, ST, 2: 1a. 6, 2; pp. 84-87. 
Charnock, Works, 2: 123. ‘Pure being’ does not refer to being in the sense of existing beyond 
the physical universe, neither does it mean to convey an abstract notion of being; instead, it 
refers to complete actuality, viz., perfection of being. For a detailed description of the different 
ways wherein ‘pure being’ vis-à-vis God may be interpreted in Aristotelian thinking, consult 
Christopher Stead, Divine Substance (Clarendon Press, 1977), 103-109. Some modern 
defenders of the traditional system of Thomistic metaphysics have argued that the notion of 
esse tantum leads, not necessarily to an abstract notion of the divine but to a concrete and 
individual concept of God. See the argument, including objections and rejoinders, in Gaven 
Kerr, Aquinas's Way to God: The Proof in De Ente Et Essentia (New York: Oxford University 
Press, 2015), 150-172.       
  233 
 
Propositions (3) and (6) speaks about the diffusive character of the 
goodness of God and of God’s delight in communicating it to his creation.840 In 
Charnock’s theology, the conveying of goodness is something God does 
necessarily, not in the sense of dependence or as a result of external coercion, 
but precisely because he is pure goodness.841 In other words, since God is 
good, that is, he creates and acts for the benefit of the object made, and since 
goodness is a quality, not a defect, for it comprises personal holiness and 
righteousness, then God, as the summum bonum, cannot but impart his 
goodness to others.842 That goodness is imparted with the greatest pleasure is 
a natural corollary of the explanation provided in proposition (3). Charnock 
summarises the argument in one sentence, ‘[s]ince he [God] doth not delight 
in the unhappiness of any of his creatures, he certainly delights in what may 
conduce unto their felicity’, viz., the communication of his own goodness.843      
At first, proposition 4 and 5 seem to contradict each other: on the one 
hand, proposition (4) affirms that God is good necessarily while, on the other 
hand, proposition (5) maintains the freedom of God.844 Charnock reiterates 
that goodness is an essential attribute of the divine being, ‘… goodness is not a 
quality in him, but a nature, not a habit added to his essence, but his essence 
itself’, which is to say that God cannot but be good since goodness constitutes 
                                                             
840 Charnock, Works, 2: 287, 291. 
841 Ibid., 287-288. Later, Charnock explains that ‘God is not necessarily 
communicative of his goodness’ indiscriminately, this is to say that God freely chooses the 
objects to which he would impart his goodness. See ibid., 290.  
842 Ibid., 288. 
843 Ibid., 292. 
844 Ibid., 288, 290. 
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the divine ontology.845 Therefore, God is necessarily good (as he is necessarily 
holy, eternal, immutable, almighty, etc.) in the sense that goodness is inherent 
to what he is essentially.846 That God is necessarily good does not mean that he 
is not good freely considering that there are different kinds of necessity, some 
of which are not antithetical to freedom.847 Since God is said to be necessarily 
good by necessitas naturae (necessity of nature), viz., a necessity that arises 
from that which is intrinsic to the essence of the divine nature, God’s freedom 
to act according to the nature of his being, viz., his libertas naturae (liberty of 
nature), does not get abolished.848 Furthermore, Charnock differentiates 
between God’s matter of acting and his manner of acting.849 The former 
prompts no necessity in God, as it refers to his consideration to act or not to 
act, whereas the latter is concurrently necessary and free, as it denotes God’s 
desire to benefit others than himself; thereby: ‘He created the world and man 
freely, because he might choose whether he would create it; but he created 
them good necessarily, because he was first necessarily good in his nature, 
before he was freely a creator.’850 In the end, God is said to be necessarily good 
                                                             
845 Ibid., 285.  
846 The concept of necessity, understood in the sense above noted, is included in 
almost every theological sermon dealing with the different attributes of God in Charnock’s 
Discourses. 
847 Van Asselt et al., "Introduction," 38-39. 
848 Muller, Dictionary: 176, 200. 
849 Charnock, Works, 2: 290. 
850 Ibid. 
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in relation to his essence, though freely good in relation to the diffusion of his 
goodness towards its objects.851  
Finally, proposition (7) suggests that goodness (or more exactly the 
display of it) is the causative means and the ultimate telos from which and 
whereby God actualises his works ad extra. Charnock explains that as the acts 
of God cannot be isolated from the divine nature, the end that prompted 
creation has to be of equal distinction as God himself.852 What is more, since 
there was nothing before creation but God, ‘nothing can be the ultimate end of 
God but himself and his own goodness.’853 Therefore, as wisdom and power 
are, respectively, the rule and the principle upon which God acts, goodness is 
identified as the intended motive whereby wisdom and power are aroused to 
act.854 This means that goodness takes precedence in the motions involving the 
divine will, at least in that which concerns the act of creation. The precedence 
of divine goodness in the act of creation is logical, not ontological, given that 
goodness is identical with the essence of God and hence identical with the 
remaining perfections.855 Finally, Charnock explains that God gains nothing in 
bringing creation into existence for by being sufficient in himself he is, 
therefore, in need of nothing else than his own being to be fully blessed: 
                                                             
851 In the context above, Charnock qualifies the manner of necessity as affectivè (i.e., 
the natural disposition of a thing) and that of freedom as effectivè (i.e., making or bringing 
something into effect). Ibid. Cf. Adam Littleton, Linguae Latina Liber Dictionarius 
Quadripartitus,  s.v. "Affectatio", "Effectio."  
852 Charnock, Works, 2: 292. 
853 Ibid. 
854 Ibid. 
855 For the Reformed scholastics on the multiplicity of the divine attributes and the 
doctrine of divine simplicity, refer to pp. 51-52 above in this study. 
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In this regard, God is good above all creatures, because he intends only to 
communicate his goodness in creation, not to acquire any goodness or 
excellency from them, as men do in their framing of things. God is all, and is 
destitute of nothing, and therefore nothing accrues to him by the creation, but 
the acknowledgment of his goodness. This goodness, therefore, must be the 
motive and end of all his works.856 
 ‘God is good’ is the leitmotif that concerns the third section in 
Charnock’s discourse on the goodness of God.857 The aim of this unit is 
twofold: on the one hand, it aims to expound on the reasons supporting the 
claim that God is good; alternatively, it answers to potential objection that 
might be elevated against the goodness of God.858  
In support of the claim that God is by nature pure goodness, two major 
propositions are presented: (1) there is a direct proportionality between being 
excellent and goodness of being, and (2) God is the causal explanation of all 
created goodness and, hence, the highest manifestation of goodness.859 The 
former claim emphasises reason and rationality as the determinative principle 
for excellence, so the argument notes that rational creatures are able to 
manifest a greater inherence of goodness, compared with other non-rational 
creatures, since the former are endowed with a more excellent being than that 
of the latter. Therefore, God, whose being is the most excellent in nature, 
cannot but be the supreme manifestation of goodness.860 The latter assertion 
assumes that no other being but God is good by nature; he is the archetypal 
                                                             
856 Charnock, Works, 2: 293. 
857 Ibid., 293-306. 
858 It must be noted, however, that in this segment Charnock’s main interest is to 
defend divine goodness, rather than to explain the reasons thereof, as it is seen by the much 
longer analysis dedicated to respond to the objections against the goodness of God. 
859 Charnock, Works, 2: 293. 
860 Ibid. 
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form of pure goodness. This means that since all creatures are good by 
participation, the goodness of God ‘must be infinitely supreme and super-
eminent’ in relation to the goodness of creation.861   
Common objections against divine goodness during Charnock’s time 
included the entrance of sin in the world, the inequality in the distribution of 
goodness over creation, the punishment of the transgressor of the divine 
command, and the afflictions of the faithful. Charnock responds to these 
protestations by indicating, in the first place, that Adam’s misery after his 
original disobedience exhibits, rather than negates, the goodness of God as far 
as it denotes that Adam was created with an ability to experience happiness 
under the condition of obedience to God. Charnock adds: ‘God’s goodness 
furnished Adam with a power to stand; was it contrary to his goodness to leave 
Adam to a free use of use of that power?’862 Incidentally, in allowing the 
entrance of sin into the world, God also determines the way of redemption, 
which is the greatest manifestation of divine goodness.863  
As the goodness of God is not broken by the permission of sin, neither 
does the unequal distribution of goodness is contrary to the claim that God is 
good. This is to say that one should not expect God’s liberality to be expressed 
in an equal distribution of goodness amongst all the objects of creation.864 In 
fact, that God does not distribute goodness in equal measure may be better 
                                                             
861 Ibid. 
862 Ibid., 294. 
863 Ibid., 295. Once again, Charnock suggests that the Fall is the means whereby the 
manifestation of God’s goodness, mercy, and grace takes place.  
864 Ibid., 296. 
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understood as a sign of divine freedom given that ‘[h]ad he [God] been alike 
good to all, it would have looked like a necessary, not a free act; but by the 
inequality, it is manifest that he doth not do it by a natural necessity, as the 
sun shines, but by a voluntary liberty’.865     
Divine goodness is not injured by the punishment of the offender 
neither by the sufferings of the righteous. The suggestion is that vindictive 
justice and goodness are not incompatible but complementary properties 
within the Godhead; in fact, the execution of divine punishment is a property 
of divine goodness since for God to be good he has to be just and, thus, to act 
justly.866 Furthermore, punitive actions do not necessarily entail a moral evil in 
the agent that execute them (God), though they do entail a natural evil in the 
agent that endures them (sinners).867 Conversely, were God apathetic to 
vindicating of his justice by ignoring the transgressions against his law, divine 
goodness would be seriously injured given that God could not be good to 
himself if he would not care for vindicating his honour.868 By being infinitely 
good, God necessarily acts in accordance to that which is always righteous, 
hence, his vindictive or avenging justice, i.e., the punishment over the 
evildoer, must be always a virtuous act since ‘[t]he goodness of God could 
never have permitted justice to exercise itself upon an innocent creature, that 
                                                             
865 Ibid., 297. 
866 Ibid., 298. Cf. Pictet, Christian Theology: II/vi; p. 90. 
867 Charnock, Works, 2: 298. In Charnock’s usage above, ‘natural evil’ refers to the 
dreadful consequences brought upon the transgressor by breaking the divine command. This 
is to say that natural evils of this kind are always preceded by falling into some form of moral 
evil. Cf. Ibid., 1: 212., ‘[a]s grace is the union of the will of God and the will of the creature, so 
sin is the opposition of the will of self to the will of God. “Leaning to our own understanding” 
is opposed as a natural evil to “trusting in the Lord,” a supernatural grace, Prov. iii. 5.’        
868 Idem., Works, 2: 301. 
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was not guilty either personally or by imputation: Ps. xi. 7’.869 Interestingly, 
Charnock argues that the primary intention in establishing the rules of moral 
conduct and the admonitions against the law-breakers is not punishment, but 
the encouragement of creaturely goodness.870 This is the case for the goodness 
of God extends over the sinner as far as he still is the object of common grace. 
Negatively put it, divine hate does not extend to the sinner himself, but only to 
the transgression perpetrated against God’s honour, yet by executing the 
transgression the sinner becomes the object of God’s wrath.871       
Finally, the sufferings of God’s people do not contradict the operations 
of divine goodness as far as personal afflictions, which are divinely appointed, 
ultimately aim at temporal or eternal goodness for the church.872 In many 
cases, these afflictions are pedagogical in nature seeking to promote a holy 
living at individual and communal level. In fact, chastisement based upon 
divine goodness is part of the provisos established in the covenantal relation 
between God and his creation.873   
The penultimate segment of this discourse is a lengthy section 
dedicated to explain the manifestation of divine goodness in the works of 
creation, redemption, and providence.874 In what follows, this study focuses on 
                                                             
869 Ibid., 34. 
870 Ibid., 302. 
871 Ibid. Charnock draws from Francisco Suárez, Prima Pars Summa Theologiae De 
Deo Uno & Trino (Lugduni: Horatij Cardon, 1617), I/iii, 7; p. 156. 
872 Charnock, Works, 2: 305. 
873 Ibid. 
874 Ibid., 306-364. 
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the most significant aspects of this section, particularly on those elements that 
are new to what has been already discussed. Beginning with the act of 
creation, Charnock argues that to bring something out of nothing (creatio ex 
nihilo) is the result of an act of divine goodness. Since creaturely being is by 
participation, more precisely by the efflux of divine goodness as the 
interceding cause of creation, nothing could have been created good were God 
not perfectly good, as ‘nothing but goodness could have communicated to 
things an excellency, which before they wanted. Being is more excellent than 
nothing.’875 This implies that goodness, not the communication of being, is the 
chief end of creation. In support of this claim, Charnock considers the creation 
account in Gen. 1 from which he indicates that God rests of his work of 
creation after things were declared to be good, not simply after he conferred 
them being.876 In fact, creation is the first manifestation of the goodness of 
God extra se, beyond himself. Creation, however, does not add anything to the 
divine ontology since God perfectly subsists by and for himself and thus he did 
not require of creation to achieve a full state of blessedness for ‘[h]e was 
                                                             
875 Ibid., 306. God is most desirable precisely because all things desirable get their 
goodness by participating of divine goodness, see ibid., 392.  
876 Ibid., 306. In other words, divine goodness mediates the creation of beings that are 
endowed with a form of concreated goodness, not simply with a bare ontology. Some have 
offered two related approaches to explain creaturely goodness in the Christian tradition. On 
the one hand, the participation view wherein creaturely goodness is accounted by the 
participation into that which is the summum bonum, namely, God. On the other hand, the 
nature view wherein things are said to be good based upon the purpose determined for the 
nature of things, that is, by the actualisation into that which is intrinsic to the essence of a 
thing. For more on the metaphysics of goodness, consult Scott MacDonald, "Introduction: The 
Relation between Being and Goodness," in Being and Goodness: The Concept of the Good in 
Metaphysics and Philosophical Theology (Ithaca, N.Y.: Cornell University Press, 1991). 
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[before creation] incomprehensibly rich in the possession of an unstained 
felicity.’877  
The material and spiritual constitution of a human being is another 
way whereby the goodness of God is manifested in creation. This includes the 
human body and the ability of it to accomplish a great variety of tasks, it also 
encompasses the soul as it reflects understanding and freedom of the will. 
More importantly for evidencing the goodness of God in the creation of man is 
that both male and female are unique amongst the created order as far as they 
were created in the image of God and as such reflect in a mediated way the 
nature of God.878 Similarly, divine goodness manifests itself in the fact that 
creation was made for the sake of humankind, including not only the 
ornaments for the nourishment, shelter, and care of the human body, but also 
in the establishment of the divine law for the satisfaction of the human soul.879 
As the divine laws are the most rational for they are the device of divine 
wisdom—as wisdom cannot but order those things in agreement with divine 
goodness—so the laws of God are the most excellent for they are the device of 
divine goodness. Hence, the laws of God are not simply ‘the acts of his 
sovereign authority, but the effluxes of his loving-kindness, and the 
conductors of man to an enjoyment of a greater bounty.’880  
                                                             
877 Charnock, Works, 2: 306-307, 309. The quote above follows the editor’s correction 
of what it seems to be a misspelling in the original text. See ibid., 307, n. *.      
878 Ibid., 309. 
879 Ibid., 310-313. 
880 Ibid., 313. 
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Like creation, the act of redemption also displays the goodness of God; 
in fact, the goodness manifested in redemption is claimed to surpass that of 
creation. This is the case as redemption suggests a higher difficulty to effect, a 
higher cost to pay than that required for creation. In creating ex nihilo, 
nothing is subjugated whereas in redeeming the sinner, God had to overcome 
man’s hostility; moreover, in creating the universe God does not give up 
anything whereas in redemption he surrenders his only-begotten Son as 
sacrifice for the sins of his church.881 The goodness of God is also seen, not 
only in the act of redemption, but in the effects thereof. These effects include 
the relieve of the sinner’s spiritual and moral needs, the restoration of his 
dignity, the rescue of his understanding from ignorance, the deliverance of his 
will from his evil inclinations, and the assurance of eternal life.882   
Furthermore, since God was not under any compulsion to redeem 
humanity, redemption must result from the pure goodness of God considering 
that creation does not impose any moral obligation on God to restore the 
effects of the Fall. Thus, Charnock: ‘It had not been unbecoming the divine 
goodness or wisdom to have let man perpetually wallow in that sink wherein 
he had plunged himself, since he was criminal by his own will, and therefore 
miserable by his own fault; nothing could necessitate this reparation.’883  
Significantly, Charnock notes that redemption is an act of divine 
goodness involving the Trinity. He explains that there is a functional 
                                                             
881 Ibid., 319-323. 
882 Ibid., 319. 
883 Ibid., 318. 
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distinction within the divine persons according to the work each mode of 
being accomplishes in the restoration of a sinner. 884 Along these lines, the 
Father is said to be initiator of redemption by an act of grace, the Son merits it 
through his perfect obedience, while the Spirit effects it by means of his 
regenerative power. In covenantal terms, the Father promises redemption, the 
Son seals it by his death, and the Spirit applies it by his influence. Finally, the 
Father adopts the sinner into his family, the Son cleanses him to be a child of 
God, and the Spirit renews him to dwell on it.885 By noting this distinction, 
Charnock is adopting two axioms of classical Nicene trinitarian theology: the 
doctrine of inseparable operation and the doctrine of appropriation. The 
former dictates that all the external works of the Trinity are indivisible [omnia 
opera trinitatis ad extra indivisa sunt] whereas the latter attributes to one of 
the divine persons an operation (or an attribute) that is common to all the 
divine persons.886 Thus, Charnock argues that the goodness manifested in 
redemption is unique in the sense that, though redemption is the single work 
of the Triune God, it is also the particular work of the Father, Son, and Holy 
Spirit individually. In this trinitarian account, the distinction of the operations 
ad extra of the Trinity points back to the order of being of the Trinity ad intra 
whilst also insists on affirming a functional distinction in the works of the 
Godhead without denying their essential unity.887  
                                                             
884 Ibid., 319. 
885 Ibid.  
886 Ayres, Nicaea and Its Legacy: 296-297.     
887 Some of the Reformed scholastics expounds on the unity and diversity in the 
operations of God ad extra ‘For although the external works are undivided and equally 
common to the single persons (both on the part of the principle and on the part of the 
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Interestingly, Charnock ties the manifestation of divine goodness and 
the covenant of grace.888 The point argued here is that the goodness of God is 
seen in the abrogation of the strict terms of the covenant of works and of by 
the replacement of such conditions by a more gracious means of keeping a 
covenantal relationship with God.889 Following Turretin, Charnock indicates 
that ‘[t]he language of one [covenant] was, Die if thou sin; that of the other, 
Live if thou believest.’890 Goodness is that which freely prompted God to 
establish the covenant of works in the first place and that which freely moved 
him to replace it with the covenant of grace.891 What is more, the goodness of 
God clearly emerges in the covenant of grace by noting the mediatorial role of 
Christ and the condition of the covenant, which is, faith. Nothing else but pure 
goodness could have been the motive behind God’s decision to offer himself, 
through the vicarious sacrifice of the Son, to seal and confirm the covenant of 
grace.892 Instead of demanding perfect obedience (as in the covenant of 
                                                             
accomplishment), yet they are distinguished by order and by terms. For the order of operating 
follows the order of subsisting.’ In Turretin, Institutes: III/27, xx; 1:281.  
888 Charnock, Works, 2: 331-335. 
889 Though Charnock does not use the term ‘abrogation’ in this context, the notion of 
it is not alien to him. In Idem., Works, 4: 565. It is important to note that abrogation is used 
here to speak about the provisos stipulated in the covenant of works, not about rejecting the 
moral law or the righteousness required for the fulfilment of the promises of the covenant of 
grace. Cf. Brakel, Christian's Reasonable Service: 1:375-376.  
890 Charnock, Works, 2: 332. Interestingly, at one point Charnock compares God’s 
methods of dealing with humankind under the Christian notion of the covenant of grace with 
that exhibited in Islam: ‘[God] carrieth not on the gospel by force of arms; he doth not solely 
menace men into it, as worldly conquerors have done; he doth not, as Mahomet, plunder 
men’s estates, and wound their bodies to imprint a religion on their souls…’, in ibid., 339.     
891 Ibid., 331-332. 
892 Ibid., 333-335. 
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works), the condition of the covenant of grace rests upon an act of assertive 
trust in the promises of God, namely, faith.893  
Divine goodness is particularly linked to the Lord’s Supper as part of 
the sacramental stipulations established in the covenant of grace.894 The 
inclusion of the Lord’s Supper in the covenant of grace manifests the goodness 
of God in that the provision given to the redeemed also includes the 
permanent nourishment of his soul by participating of the elements of the 
sacrament. In the context of the manifestation of divine goodness in 
redemption, Charnock specifies the benefits of the Lord’s Supper in what 
evidently denotes an influence of covenant theology,  
The covenant itself was confirmed by the death of Christ, Heb. ix. 15, and 
thereby made unchangeable both in the benefits to us and the condition 
required of us; but he seals it to our sense in a sacrament to give us strong 
consolation; or rather the articles of the covenant of redemption between the 
Father and the Son, agreed on from eternity, were accomplished on Christ's 
part by his death, on the Father's part by his resurrection… The covenant of 
grace, founded upon this covenant of redemption, is sealed in the sacrament; 
God owns his standing to the terms of it, as sealed by the blood of the Mediator, 
by presenting him to us under those signs, and gives us a right upon faith to the 
enjoyment of the fruits of it… whereby he gives us assurance of his reality, and a 
strong support to our confidence in him.895 
Finally, God is said to display his goodness in the manner he governs 
the universe.896 Providence is a corollary of the goodness of God as far as 
creation testifies of the preservation of all things (Ps. 36.6), animals and 
mankind alike.897 The underlying argument is that to do good to an evil person 
                                                             
893 Ibid. 
894 Ibid., 341-345. 
895 Ibid., 343. 
896 Ibid., 349-364. 
897 Ibid., 349-353. 
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exhibits a greater goodness than having an innocent as the object of divine 
goodness.898 Furthermore, the goodness of God is observed in the preservation 
of human society, particularly in the prescription of rules for communal living, 
in the appointment of magistrates to maintain civil order, and in the effects of 
common grace, both by setting boundaries for the passions of men and by 
encouraging moral goodness in the world.899 Charnock adds the provision of 
Scripture—as the rule of conduct for all people—to the list of features that 
demonstrates the goodness of God in providence.900 Divine goodness explains 
why God decreed to reveal something about himself rather than nothing after 
the Fall; it provides a justification for God’s actions in preserving through ages 
his written revelation.901 Similarly, divine goodness is manifested in the 
response to intercessory prayers by considering that their efficacy does not 
rest in the nature of the request, neither in the character of the one who prays, 
but in God alone.902 Evidently, divine goodness shines in the patience of God 
while dealing with people’s infirmities and their imperfect obedience: ‘His 
omniscience knows their sins, but his goodness doth not reject their 
persons.’903 Finally, the gains brought by afflictions, persecutions, and 
temptations reveal the goodness of God for through them the believer is 
instructed in the faith, grows in character, and becomes better equipped to 
prevail against evil passions and thus to serve Christ’s church: ‘By afflictions 
                                                             
898 Ibid., 352. 
899 Ibid., 353-356. 
900 Ibid., 356. 
901 Ibid., 357. 
902 Ibid., 359. 
903 Ibid., 360. 
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he often snaps asunder those chains which fettered us, and quells those 
passions which ravaged us. He sharpens our faith, and quickens our 
prayers.’904     
Dominion (De Dominium Dei)  
In the concluding remarks of his massive volume on the doctrine of 
God, Velde informs his readers of three theological concepts (viz., simplicity, 
sovereignty, and perfection) that shaped the method of structuring the locus 
de Deo for Reformed scholastics.905 If Velde is correct, one may ask whether 
this fact concurs with Charnock’s thoughts on the dominion of God.906 In 
preparation for the following analysis, it must be noted that some Reformed 
divines have understood the dominion of God—and those features closely 
related to it such as majesty or sovereignty—not as a divine attribute per se, 
but as God’s rightful entitlement derived from the Lordship and Kingship of 
God.907 In this sense, Charnock speaks of the dominion of God as a ‘relative 
attribute’, that is, one which God exercises in his works ad extra.908 
                                                             
904 Ibid., 361, 364. 
905 Velde, The Doctrine of God: 716. For Velde’s conclusive thoughts on methodology 
and on the relation between method and content in the theological systems of the Reformed 
orthodox tradition, consult ibid., 104-106, 242-243, 253-255. 
906 Some have located Charnock’s doctrine of divine dominion under the theme of 
divine sovereignty. Drayson, "Divine Sovereignty in the Thought of Stephen Charnock ". 
907 Leigh, Treatise: 52. In other cases, the notion of dominion is included under the 
locus of divine power, as in Watson, Body of Divinity: 77; Brakel, Christian's Reasonable 
Service: 1:130. Cf. Hodge, Systematic Theology: 1:440; Herman Bavinck, Reformed 
Dogmatics, trans. John Vriend, 4 vols. (Grand Rapids: Baker Academics, 2004), 2:228. 
908 Charnock, Works, 2: 412. See also pp. 288-289 above in this study.  
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Charnock begins his explanation with the exegesis of Psalm (103.19): 
The Lord hath prepared his throne in the heavens; and his kingdom ruleth 
over all.909 In his style, by now customary, Charnock introduces the focal text 
after locating it within its immediate context from which he specifies some 
biblical and theological observations concluding with an exhortation to obey 
God and with an admonition to recognise his kingship.910 For Charnock, the 
psalm transitions from divine mercy to divine dominion by reflecting on the 
greatness of God and on divine providence.  
Ps. (103.19) is exegeted according to three clauses following the 
syntactical structure of verse 19: (1) the Lord hath prepared, (2) his throne in 
the heavens, and (3) his kingdom ruleth over all.911 Interestingly, Charnock’s 
exegesis serves as the foundation for an interpretation that is decisively 
theological in character. Take for instance (1), from which Charnock highlights 
the notion conveyed by the word ‘prepared’ or ‘established’ to speak about the 
distinctive nature of God’s authority, viz., that it is essential to the divine 
essence and hence infinite, immutable. Or from (2), which Charnock reckons 
as a metaphor for divine authority, wherein he notes the glory and the 
peculiarity of God’s dominion, the supremacy and the vastness of his empire, 
and the duration of his government.912   
                                                             
909 Ibid., 400. 
910 Ibid., 400-403. 
911 Ibid., 403-407. 
912 Ibid., 403-406. 
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The consideration of Psalm (103.19) in its immediate context, 
complemented by a theological interpretation of the text based upon an 
exegetical analysis, become the substrata from which Charnock elaborates the 
doctrinal formula that frames the discourse on God's dominion: ‘God is 
sovereign Lord and King, and exerciseth a dominion over the whole world, 
both heaven and earth.’913 This doctrinal claim suggests that the titles of Lord 
and King necessitate the sovereignty of God, which in turn is the basis for 
God’s right of governing all and everywhere. The dominion of God can be 
distinguished in three modes of operation according to its object and 
regarding to its foundation. There is, in the first place, a natural dominion 
whereby God exercises absolute command over creation, this is founded upon 
God as creator. In second place, God oversees his church by means of his 
spiritual or gracious dominion, which is based upon the covenant of grace. 
Finally, there is a kingdom dominion whereby God exercises authority over 
both his saints, through his grace, and over the demons and unredeemed 
humanity, through his justice.914  
In regards to general propositions, Charnock indicates the differences 
between divine power and divine sovereignty (expressed by its theological 
cognates of authority and dominion).915 While divine power refers to the 
strength whereby God effects his purposes, divine authority denotes God’s 
                                                             
913 Ibid., 406. Cf. Turretin, Institutes: III/22, ii; 1:250. 
914 Charnock, Works, 2: 407. 
915 Ibid., 407-408. The power of God is not to be understood of his authority and 
dominion, but his strength to act’. In ibid., 105.  
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legal ius (right) to do as he pleases.916 More particularly, omnipotence 
describes the physical power of God in accomplishing what he wills whereas 
divine dominion denotes God’s moral ability to do what it is legitimate for him 
to do.917 For Charnock, then, the notion of divine dominion is framed by a 
condition of ethics and legitimacy, that is, dominion is understood as God’s 
moral ability sanctioning the execution of the divine decree: ‘This dominion is 
a right of making what he pleases, of possessing what be made, of disposing of 
what he doth possess.’918 
The notion of dominion is a referent about which all the divine 
attributes testify. For example, divine goodness safeguards the moral exercise 
of God’s sovereignty while divine wisdom secures the correct use of his right to 
rule and divine power actualises what has been sovereignly prescribed by the 
divine will.919 Consequently, Charnock infers that sovereignty and divinity are 
equally essential for the notion of God: ‘He cannot be conceived as God, but he 
must be considered as the highest authority in the world. It is as possible for 
him not to be God, as not to be supreme.’920 Dominion is such an intrinsic 
feature of the deity that God cannot renounce to his prerogative of exerting 
absolute sovereignty over all of creation, including Christ’s life.921 This should 
not be taken, however, as detrimental towards the divine status of the 
                                                             
916 Ibid., 407. Cf. Ibid., 1: 228, 519. 
917 Idem., Works, 2: 407. Cf. Leigh, Treatise: 52; Turretin, Institutes: III/22, ii; 1:250-
251. 
918 Charnock, Works, 2: 407-408. 
919 Ibid., 408. 
920 Ibid. 
921 Ibid., 409, 457. 
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incarnate Son, but rather as a distinction in the economy of the Triune God 
vis-à-vis the divine missions wherein it is asserted that the Father takes 
precedence in the divine operations ad extra on the basis that he is identified 
as the fundamentum or fons [foundation or source] of the Godhead and of the 
divine persons.922 This is consistent with the Reformed understanding of the 
trinitarian ordo personarum sive relationum [order of persons and relations] 
whereby the order of the divine persons ad intra reflect the order in the 
operations ad extra.923 Thus, Charnock explains, ‘as the order of the works, so 
the order of the persons is preserved in their several operations… According to 
the order of these works [creation, redemption, and governance] is the order 
of the operations of the three persons.’924 What is more, while asserting that 
Christ’s dominion is a corollary from his mediatorial role, Charnock equally 
affirms that this dominion is an essential property of Christ and hence 
absolutely free in its dispensation and necessary for his existence.925 It is in 
this manner, as connatural and absolute, that dominion cannot be 
communicated to other creatures, even though Charnock acknowledges that to 
some extend mankind manifest analogically and by participation in the imago 
Dei some form of dominion over other creatures.926  
                                                             
922 Heppe, Reformed Dogmatics: 115-116.  
923 Beeke and Jones, A Puritan Theology: 91-93.  
924 Charnock, Works, 2: 56, 57. Cf. Velde, Synopsis, 204-205; Gomarus, 
Disputationes: VII/xiv-xv; p. 25. 
925 Charnock, Works, 3: 440-442.     
926 Idem., Works, 2: 409-410. Cf. Ibid., 1: 272; ibid., 2: 130, 205. 
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The second unit in this discourse treats the elements upon which divine 
dominion is established. Dominion is founded upon the excellency of God’s 
nature, the act of creation, the fact that God is the ultimate end of all, and the 
preservation of things. 927 The natural order dictates that the more excellent 
should rule over the less excellent and since God retains a plethora of 
intellectual and moral abilities infinitely superior to that of any creature, then 
God has in himself the primary foundation of dominion: ‘His incomparable 
and unparalleled excellency, as well as the greatness of his works, attracts the 
voluntary worship of him as a sovereign Lord.’928 Sovereignty and creation are 
indivisible insofar as creation results from the free motion of the divine will 
whereby, by means of divine omnipotence, God decrees to bring into existence 
something out of nothing and to endow it with life and motion.929 In other 
words, creation is completely dependent on the sovereign determination of 
the divine will and the execution of divine power. By being the ultimate and 
principal end of that exists, God is said to be the rightful sovereign of creation. 
The argument is that dominion comes by the fact that all things have their 
ultimate end and origin in God as he is, respectively, their final and first 
cause.930 Finally, Charnock supports his doctrine of divine dominion based 
upon the preservation (preservatio or manutenentia) of the universe 
according to an ultimate purpose.931 Since preservation is an expansion of the 
                                                             
927 Idem., Works, 2: 410-414. 
928 Ibid., 410. 
929 Ibid., 411. 
930 Ibid., 412-413. 
931 Ibid., 413. 
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work of creation (continuata creatio) and since the power to create out of 
nothing is the only suitable power to preserve, Charnock infers that the same 
dominion exerted in the act of creation is manifested in the act of 
preservation: ‘God is the Lord of all, as he is the sustainer of all by his power, 
as well as the creator of all by his word.’932   
In the third segment, Dominion is said to be independent, absolute, not 
oppressive, universal, and eternal.933 The underlying assumption in this 
section is derived from the notion of divine simplicity, which established a 
relation between the divine essence and the divine dominion.934 Accordingly, 
Charnock argues that God’s dominion should be regarded to be independent, 
just as the divine essence is thought to be independent, that is, eternally 
subsisting  per se (by himself) and a se (from himself) considering that God 
‘receives his essence from none, so he derives his dominion from none’.935 
Since the doctrinal foundation for affirming the independence of God’s 
dominion rests upon an emphasis over the absolute autonomy of the divine 
essence, God cannot have an external rule to himself as nothing transcends 
the supremacy of his being and existence.936 Furthermore, given that the 
dominion of God is independent, it follows that it must be also absolute for 
                                                             
932 Ibid., 1: 9; ibid., 2: 413. 
933 Idem., Works, 2: 414-427. 
934 It is also worth noting that Charnock grounds his explanation on explicit or 
implicit    suggestions to divine attributes of the first order, e.g., independence, absoluteness, 
perfection, and infinitude.   
935 Charnock, Works, 2: 414. Charnock has already established that divine dominion 
comes from the excellency of God’s own being, see the discussion on divine dominion above, 
pp. 247-263.   
936 Ibid., 415. 
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divine dominion cannot be restricted by anything but God himself: ‘His 
actions are not regulated by any law without him, but by a law within him, the 
law of his own nature.’937 The absoluteness of God’s dominion can be seen in 
the nature of his works ad extra: (1) in creating the universe, God acted freely 
not under compulsion of any kind; (2) in redemption, rather than being 
bounded by a moral duty to act, God saves some sinners and preserves some 
angels by an efflux of his sovereign prerogative to act in behalf of the creature; 
(3) in allowing trials,  permitting afflictions, which are not brought by due 
penalty for sins, God rules according to his absolute sovereignty; (4) in the 
asymmetrical dispensation of his grace, God sovereignly distributes his 
blessings; and (5), in the suggestion that God may inflict torment on an {?} 
innocent person (not caused by the operation of divine justice) simply on the 
basis of his absolute dominion.938  
At face value, the assertion in (5) reveals a common problem inherited 
from medieval theologies prone to a strong form of theological voluntarism, 
specifically those linked to the notion of the absolute power of God wherein 
the divine action in establishing the moral law is thought to be constrained 
only by the laws of logic.939 However, as it has been shown before in this 
investigation, while there are occasional statements in the Discourses that 
taken in isolation from Charnock’s overall thought may sound as if he were a 
                                                             
937 Ibid. 
938 Ibid., 415-418. 
939 The resemblance with Ockham’s theology is noteworthy: ‘The scope of God’s 
options matches the range of His omnipotent power whose boundaries are defined only by the 
principle of noncontradiction.’ In Marilyn McCord Adams, "William Ockham: Voluntarist or 
Naturalist? ," in Studies in Medieval Philosophy, ed. John F. Wippel (Washington, D.C.: 
Catholic University of America Press, 1987), 241. 
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voluntarist, his theology does not fit into that particular categorisation. In any 
case, Charnock’s doctrine of divine dominion becomes liable to serious 
objections in regards to (5) by not providing a theological counterpoise for 
what it seems to be an unbalanced view about divine dominion, even though 
Charnock does not go as far as others in stressing the absolute sovereignty of 
God.940 In fact, Charnock asserts that God exercises his dominion over 
creation not by way of his absolute sovereignty, but in accord with the rule of 
his morally perfect nature: ‘In all the exercises of his sovereign right, he is 
never unattended with those perfections of his nature’ and hence ‘we cannot 
imagine a God without a law in his own nature, unless we would fancy him a 
rude, tyrannical, foolish being, that hath nothing of holiness, goodness, 
righteousness, wisdom.’941 In assessing this matter, one needs to consider the 
significance of other divine attributes for the operation of divine sovereignty 
in Charnock’s theology of the divine attributes. Particular attention is 
demanded to those occurrences wherein Charnock frames the operation and 
scope of divine dominion in light of the perfections of the divine intellect such 
as wisdom, goodness, and holiness: ‘Nor could God, without wisdom, exercise 
a just dominion in the world’ and those of the divine will such as goodness and 
holiness… Any dominion which is exercised without the rules of goodness is 
not a true sovereignty, but an insupportable tyranny… It is lawful for God to 
                                                             
940 Maccovius, for instance, argues, based upon God’s absolute Lordship over 
creation, that justice would not be forfeit had God subjected innocent people to infinite 
torture, in Johannes Maccovius, Loci Communes Theologici (Franeker: Ioannis Arcerii, 1650), 
XVIII/ii; p. 149. Velde has attempted to attenuate Maccovius’ views on the absolute 
sovereignty of God by placing them within the context of the polemics concerning the doctrine 
of eternal reprobation and by comparing Maccovius’ argument here with the explanation 
offered about the punitive justice of God. Consult Velde, The Doctrine of God: 241, n. 250.   
941 Charnock, Works, 2: 418-419. 
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do what he will, but his will being ordered by the righteousness of his nature, 
as infinite as will, cannot do but what is just’.942 This is closely related to the 
qualification made by some Reformed scholastics in reference to God’s 
absolutum ius (absolute right) wherein they indicated that in the absolute 
mode ‘right’ stood for the divine prerogative to determine at will everything 
concerning the affairs of creation, yet always in harmony with what is morally 
good necessarily.943 
The dominion of God is universal in extension, that is, it encompasses 
all creatures (particularly over men’s spirits and hearts), and all places (earth, 
heaven, and hell).944 Charnock operates under the metaphysical assumption 
that renders God’s being supreme over creation, from which it is inferred: (1) 
that everything depends on God at an ontological level and hence that all 
things must be under his dominion, and (2) that God’s nature is infinite and 
as such his dominion must extend without any limitation.945  
Following the mainstream of the Reformed tradition, Charnock 
includes the inclinations of the human will under the scope of God’s 
dominion.946 Though Charnock affirms both the dominion of God over the 
human will and the creature’s freedom of choice, he does not expound (at this 
point) on any form of compatibilism to account for these two seemingly 
                                                             
942 In ibid., 19, 209, 420. 
943 Turretin, Institutes: III/22, v-vi; 1:251.  
944 Charnock, Works, 2: 422-427. 
945 Ibid., 422.  
946 Ibid., 425-426. 
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contradictory claims. Without delving at length into the intricacies involved in 
theological theories of compatibilism, Charnock presupposes no contradiction 
between God’s sovereignty and human freedom: ‘He [God] is the father of 
spirits, and therefore hath the right of a paternal dominion over them… when 
he made man a free agent, and lord of the acts of his will, he did not divest 
himself of the sovereignty.’947 Furthermore, acquainted with the difference 
between immediate and mediate agency, Charnock asserts that a creature is 
not capable of persuading the will to act without the intervention of some sort 
of mediation, which it may come in the form of arguments for the 
understanding to grasp and subsequently to prompt the will to act in a 
determined manner.948 On the contrary, God needs no mediation to move the 
creature’s heart (i.e. understanding, will, and emotions) for he effects his will 
on others by means of the efficacy of his sovereign dominion.949 Similarly, 
arguing from the ontological distinction between first (prima) and second 
(secunda) causes and from the hierarchical order implied by it, Charnock 
asserts that God (prima causa) takes precedence over the creature’s will 
(secunda causa) in every contingent effect and because of it God can change 
the inclination of the human will one way or another without inflicting any 
compulsion on it.950  
In the last proposition, Charnock asserts that the dominion of God is 
eternal, not in the sense of its operation since the objects of God’s sovereignty 
                                                             
947 Ibid., 425. Cf. Turretin, Institutes: X/1, i; 1:659. 
948 Charnock, Works, 2: 425. 
949 Ibid. 
950 Ibid., 426. 
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are not eternal, but in the sense of its foundation since the essence of God is 
eternal.951 The presupposition here is the doctrine of divine simplicity from 
which Charnock assumes no ontological distinction in the being of God 
between his essence and his attributes.     
The dominion of God is manifested in at least four ways: (1) the giving 
of the law, (2) the decree of election, (3) the government of creation, and (4) 
the stipulations for the act of redemption. 952 The making of the law is the first 
act of divine sovereignty, and this an exclusive prerogative of God for no law 
can be compulsory had it not been preceded by the agreement of the divine 
law. Following Suárez, Charnock asserts that the dominion of God is more 
conspicuous in the divine command than in the divine promise since the latter 
suggests God being compelled by himself to himself whereas the former 
indicates God compelling the creature to obey his precepts.953 This suggest, 
among other things, the supremacy (in excellency and extend) of the law of 
God over any other form of legislation.  
The dominion of God with respect to his law includes the power of 
dispensing with what Charnock names ‘ordinary laws of nature in the inferior 
creature.’954 This implies that God’s sovereignty involves the supersession of 
the regular course of action of nature (miracles and wonders), changes with 
respect to God’s commands about ceremonial practices, and the elimination of 
                                                             
951 Ibid. 
952 Ibid., 427-461. Since the theme of divine providence and government has been 
included in other sections in this research, special attention is given to (1), (2), and (4).   
953 Ibid., 427. 
954 Ibid., 431. 
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the law of works as part of his covenantal demands. This suggests that there is 
an important distinction within the laws of God for although he, by a 
sovereign act, may overcome or modify certain established laws, there are 
other divine precepts such as the moral law, ‘which have an eternal reason in 
themselves and their own nature’, that cannot be displaced.955 
Since God is Lord over all of creation, his sovereignty extends to 
electing some for salvation and to the right of passing over (preterition) others 
for condemnation.956 That salvation is exclusively the result of God’s 
sovereignty can be observed in the fact that election is neither based on 
human merits (contrary to Roman Catholicism) nor in the foreseeing of works 
(contrary to Arminianism), but in the eternal determination of the divine will 
according to his good pleasure.957 What is more, the decree of predestination 
takes place in eternity before any transgression of the law and hence it 
excludes any efficient causation excerpted upon the decree by the temporal 
actions of the creature: ‘The redemption of the world is after the creation of 
the world, but the decree whereby the world was created, and whereby it was 
redeemed, was from eternity.’958 It is precisely for this reason that the merits of 
Christ are not considered to be the fundamentum electionis (foundation of 
election) since ‘[t]he decree of sending Christ did not [logically] precede, but 
                                                             
955 Ibid., 430. 
956 Ibid., 433. 
957 Ibid., 435, 436. This line of reasoning remains constant in Charnock’s soteriology, 
as it can be observed, for instance, in the monergistic understanding of the act of 
regeneration: ‘God's good pleasure is the original cause of this work upon the will, not the 
will's good pleasure. The work then depending on God's good pleasure, excludes any 
dependency on the will of man; it is therefore called a creation, to shew God's independence 
upon anything as to this work.’ In Idem., Works, 3: 437.   
958 Idem., Works, 1: 353. 
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followed in the order of nature, the determination of choosing some.’959 In 
consensus with others in his tradition, Charnock believes that the decree of 
God is absolute on the basis that no other medium or secondary cause take 
precedence over it.960 This in turn implies that the divine decree manifests the 
sovereignty of God as far as it involves all creaturely affairs by being the 
efficient cause of all good and the permissive (yet active) cause of evil.961   
Divine dominion also reveals the role of God as redeemer in the work of 
redemption: dominion is manifested in the sovereign acts of providence 
whereby God determines the salvation of the elect. To explain this point, 
Charnock turns to Christ to indicate that, though divine by nature, he also was 
the object of God’s dominion.962 This dominion has been eternally established 
according to the provisos of the covenantal relation between Father and Son. 
In it, Christ is said to be ‘under the legal covenant, having subjected himself to 
it, and covenanted to fulfil the conditions of it’.963   
In similar manner, God’s dominion is shown in the appointment of 
Christ as satisfaction for sin.964 That the Son subjects to the Father is, in this 
instance, a matter of divine ownership for it is argued that the Father 
                                                             
959 Ibid., 2: 434.  
960 Cf. Muller, Christ and the Decree: 153; Heppe, Reformed Dogmatics: 143. 
961 Also, the dominion of God is demonstrated, among other things, in the restrictive 
manner whereby saving grace is bestowed upon sinners, in the different effects of the means 
of grace, in the determination of when and how God dispenses his blessings. For details on 
each of these ways of manifesting God’s dominion in the decree of election, see Charnock, 
Works, 2: 441-449.      
962 Ibid., 457. 
963 Idem., Works, 3: 357.  
964 Idem., Works, 2: 458. 
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‘possesses’ the Son by an act of eternal generation.965 Once again, the 
dominion established over the Son by the act of eternal generation does not 
imply an essential subordination caused by ontological inferiority since in the 
act of eternal begetting the Father actively begets (generatio activa) by 
communicating his very infinite essence to the Son, who in turn is passively 
begotten (generatio passiva) by receiving it.966 Elsewhere, Charnock declares 
that eternal generation is the foundation for the sending of the Son. The 
mission of the Son has been sovereignly established on the basis of the 
Father’s ‘right of sending propter relationem originis [because of a relation of 
origin]; and because of Christ’s voluntary putting himself into the relation of a 
mediator.’967 
Furthermore, God demonstrates his dominion as a redeemer in his 
determination to transfer humanity’s sins upon Christ. Charnock argues his 
point from the theological concept of imputation, which in this case ultimately 
signifies God’s resolution to impute the penalty reserved for the creature onto 
Christ.968 This punitive act is, in turn, preceded by God’s sovereign resolve of 
transferring the creature’s sins upon Christ. The logical order in the temporal 
execution of God’s decree is of utmost significance for by transferring the sins 
of the sinner upon Christ before imputing the latter with the guilt of the 
                                                             
965 Ibid. The use of terms such as ‘possession’ to indicate the Father’s eternal 
ownership of the Son is not idiosyncratic. Brakel, for instance, speaks of the ‘second Person 
being eternally possessed by the Father’, in Brakel, Christian's Reasonable Service: 1:161. 
966 Charnock, Works, 4: 557. Cf. Velde, Synopsis, 190-193, 204-205, also editorial 
comments in p. 205, n. 6. 
967 Charnock, Works, 3: 411. 
968 Idem., Works, 2: 458-459. 
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former, the moral perfection of God in this act of justice is safeguarded: ‘A 
punishment for sin, as most understand it, which could not be righteously 
inflicted, had not sin been first righteously imputed by the consent of Christ, 
and the order of the Judge of the world.’969    
This unit concludes by indicating that the sovereignty of God is 
observed in the exaltation of Christ and in his appointment as redeemer (the 
means of redemption) and, by extension, in the dominion exercised over 
Christ’s offices of priest and king.970 The account begins with a rejection of 
such notions that ascribe Christ’s exaltation to a natural right resulting from 
his humanity being united to his divinity. Instead, it is claimed that Christ’s 
exalted dignity is founded upon God’s sovereign will. The argument 
presupposes a distinction between the sovereignty of the eternal Son as the 
second Person of the Trinity and the authority of Christ as the incarnated Son 
wherein the sovereignty of the former is said to be intrinsic whereas the 
authority of the latter is claimed to be conferred.971 If conferred, then, it must 
be by the determination of the Father in response to Son becoming flesh.972        
Patience (De Patientia Dei) 
Properly speaking, patientia is an attribute of the divine nature that 
figuratively describes an affectio (affection) or virtus (virtue) belonging to the 
                                                             
969  ibid., 459. Goodness itself, which serves as the ethical principle in the operation of 
the divine attributes, would have prevented the punishment of an innocent, see ibid., 34. 
970 Ibid., 460-461. 
971 Ibid., 460. 
972 Ibid.  
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divine will.973 Consequently, the subject of patientia Dei is found in the 
Reformed scholastic systems alongside other affections of the divine will such 
as veritas (truth), caritas (charity), amor (love), zelus (zeal), ira (anger), 
misericordia (mercy), and odio (hatred).974  
To speak of the affections of God in Charnock’s theology of the divine 
attributes, one needs to comprehend that in the faculty psychology of the 
seventeenth-century the concept of affectio Dei comprised various metaphoric 
or figurative descriptors manifesting the divine will (and intellect) in its 
motions ad extra, that is, affective manifestations of God in relation to finite 
objects.975 In what matters to this investigation, it is significant to note that the 
same anthropopathic description presented as divine affections in the 
Reformed scholastic systems is suggested in Charnock’s theology of the divine 
attributes.976   
                                                             
973 Muller explains that, when referring to God, the Reformed orthodox’ preferred the 
terms ‘affections’ or ‘virtues’ over that of ‘passions’ (passiones). The latter presupposes 
mutability and dependence on an external object, something that cannot be predicated of 
God. Muller, PRRD: 3:553. Cf. Westminster Confession of Faith (§II.1), which uses the 
qualification ‘without body, parts or passions’ to describe the nature of God. (Emphasis mine) 
Charnock, more precisely, qualifies the rejection of the term ‘passions’ to the description of 
God’s nature as human passions and within them particularly to those implying weakness or 
limitation, see Charnock, Works, 1: 400-402. Some scholars have used the word ‘virtue’ to 
describe divine patience in Charnock’s theology, see Beeke and Jones, A Puritan Theology: 
82.   
974 See Cocceius, Summa: III/x, 52, 67; pp. 151-153. Cocceius includes in the same 
group the attributes of sanctitas (holiness), iustitia (justice) and potentia (power), see ibid., 
III/x, 52-75; pp. 151-155. The Leiden divines speak of ‘virtues of his [God’s] intellect and will’, 
in Velde, Synopsis, 177. Both, the Summa and the Synopsis refer to the patience of God in 
terms of longanimitas (longsuffering). 
975 Muller, PRRD: 3:559. Accordingly, Thysius defines divine affections as ‘nothing 
other than God’s ardent will towards us, and its power and effect in creatures. These are 
classified by different names, according to the variety of things that are their object, and 
according to the ways in which they are performed, and their various effects.’ Velde, Synopsis, 
177-179. Cf. Ames, Marrow: I/iv, 62; p. 16.   
976 Take for instance, the references in the Discourses wherein terms such as ‘love’ 
and ‘delight’ are explicitly identified as affections belonging to the nature of God. In Charnock, 
Works, 1: 89, 91. Charnock also speaks of the ‘truth of God’ (in Idem., Works, 3: 269.), and the 
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Charnock begins this theological homily by presenting some general 
observations derived from the immediate context of the text selected for 
lecturing on the patience of God, Nahum (1.3): The Lord is slow to anger, and 
great in power, and will not at all acquit the wicked; the Lord hath his way 
in the whirlwind and in the storm, and the clouds are the dust of his feet.977 In 
what could be identified in homiletical studies as an expository style of 
presenting the content of the Bible, Charnock dissects verses 1-3 in sequential 
clauses to provide the exegetical background that would serve as the 
introduction for the key doctrinal formulation on the discussion of divine 
patience.978 There are some claims worth noting from Charnock’s exegetical 
analysis. For instance, one cannot ignore the importance Charnock gives to 
the disclosure implied by the name ‘God’; in it, Charnock observes a reference 
to the covenant as far as ‘God’ represents a covenantal name—in contrast to 
the signification of ‘Lord’, which imply the power of judgement, thus ‘the 
covenant runs “I am your God” or “the Lord your God;” mostly God without 
Lord, never Lord without God.’979 Also significant are Charnock’s comments 
concerning the first clause of verse 3, The Lord is slow to anger, from which it 
is noted: (1) the anthropomorphic nature of the text, and (2) a qualification of 
divine anger wherein it is indicated that while being an aspect of the nature of 
                                                             
‘anger of God’ (in Idem., Works, 1: 501.) in a context whereby it is implied that these are 
understood to be essential properties of the divine essence. 
977 These observations are (1) God is a comfort to his people in times of affliction, (2) 
The execution of God’s final judgement of God over the enemies of the church is a comfort to 
the latter, and (3) the providence of God allows that the victories of persecutors prompt the 
triumph of others over the former. Idem., Works, 2: 500. 
978 Ibid., 501-504.   
979 Ibid., 501. Charnock follows the insights of Francisco Ribera (1537-1591), the 
Jesuit scholar. Most certainly from Ribera’s commentary on the minor prophets. Cf. 
Millington, Bibliotheca Charnockiana, 3. 
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God, anger is not always in execution.980 Furthermore, the power cited in this 
verse is said to denote the strength of God in restraining his anger, from which 
Charnock deduces that the power of God is, by acting upon himself, that which 
produces the delay of his wrath.981 This does not mean, however, that God 
lacks of the power required to effect his justice for ‘his power is as great to 
punish, as his patience to spare’, but it simply means that God delays the 
execution of his punitive justice.982   
The main doctrinal claim of the discourse is succinct: patience is a 
property of the divine nature.983 Rather than being prompted by a simplistic 
approach, the simplicity observed in Charnock’s proposition is explained by 
the need of making a case for the theological legitimacy of invoking ‘patience’ 
to describe an aspect of the nature of God. At the outset of the doctrinal 
section, Charnock expands on the reference ‘God’s slowness to anger’ seeking 
to define divine patience more precisely; accordingly, ‘[God’s patience] 
signifies a willingness to defer, and an unwillingness to pour forth his wrath 
upon sinful creatures, he moderates his provoked justice, and forbears to 
revenge the injuries he daily meets with in the world.’984 In this explanation, 
                                                             
980 Charnock, Works, 2: 501-502. 
981 Ibid., 502. It can be argued, from Charnock’s theology of the divine attributes, that 
the wrath of God is contained by the power of God just as it is always directed by the rector 
principle of the wisdom of God. See ibid., 96. 
982 Ibid., 502. 
983 Ibid., 504. 
984 Ibid. Very similar definitions of divine patience are found amongst the Continental 
Reformed scholastics: Patientia est, qua ita iram suam moderatur Deus erga creaturas, ut 
vel poenas differat, vel iram uno momento non effundat. [Patience is that whereby God 
regulates his wrath towards the creature, either that punishment may be delayed, or that 
wrath may not be released for a moment] In Wendelin, Christianae Theologiae: I/i, xxv; p. 
106.  
  266 
 
divine patience is taken positively and negatively in relation to the divine will. 
Positively, patience implies a volitional act of God whereby he postpones the 
discharge of his wrath; negatively, patience is an intentional restrain on the 
divine will preventing the immediate release of God’s wrath.  
Charnock is evidently conscious of the problems of ascribing affections 
to God noted earlier, and thus he reckons necessary to explain that patience, 
when predicated of God, does not suggest suffering, as when predicated of the 
creature.985 This qualification of divine patience is warranted by Charnock’s 
commitment to the classical doctrine of divine impassibility.986 This is not to 
say, however, that by being impassible God is dispassionate in the sense of 
being apathetic or insensible to the affairs of creation; on the contrary, while 
being transcendent, immutable, and hence impassible (i.e., immune to 
emotional changes of state by being acted upon from without), God is capable 
of establishing loving relations with his creature: ‘We must conclude him an 
inapprehensive God, before we can conclude him an insensible God.’987 
Interestingly, this feature has been noted elsewhere; take for instance Robert 
Lister’s monograph on divine impassibility, wherein he concludes that, 
‘Charnock’s affirmation of divine impassibility did not thereby lead to him to 
                                                             
985 Charnock, Works, 2: 504. 
986 In general, impassibility is commonly explained in apophatic terms to deny: (1) 
that God can be imperilled by an external influence, i.e., that God can be acted from without, 
(2) that God can experience emotional change from within, and (3) that God can be subjected 
to experience pain, pleasure, or suffering caused by an external agent. Consult The Oxford 
Dictionary of the Christian Church,  s.v. "Impassibility of God."         
987 Charnock, Works, 2: 507. 
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the conclusion that God is entirely dispassionate, even when ‘“negative”’ 
emotions are in view.’988    
Charnock sees necessary to make a theological distinction between the 
divine attributes of patience, goodness, and mercy. While patience is a part of 
goodness and mercy, there are significant differences in regards to its objects; 
patience, for instance, is directed towards the sinners in their state of 
transgressors of the law (i.e., criminals) whereas mercy and goodness are 
aimed respectively at sinners in their state of misery and at the whole creation 
(humans, angels, and demons) in their creaturely status.989  
The conceptual similitude between the attributes of goodness, mercy, 
and patience lead Charnock to formulate other theological claims: (1) that the 
patience of God is not insensible, and (2) that the patience of God is neither 
limited in power nor hesitant in execution. In proposing (1), Charnock seeks to 
reject those notions of divine patience wherein God is conceived (allegedly by 
being patient) as indifferent to the provocations of his justice, indolent 
towards the sinner’s plight, and ignorant of the transgressions committed 
against him. In response, Charnock notes, on the one hand, that goodness 
would prevent patience to be caused by a flaw in the character of God, and, on 
                                                             
988 Lister, Impassible and Impassioned: 121. What is more, scholars have indicated 
that in earlier versions, the doctrine of impassibility did not carry the idea of indifference or 
inactivity neither was it thought to be incompatible with certain affections. G. L. Prestige, God 
in Patristic Thought (London: William Heinemann Ltd, 1936), 7; Paul L. Gavrilyuk, The 
Suffering of the Impassible God: The Dialectics of Patristic Thought (Oxford: Oxford 
University Press, 2004), 48. 
989 Interestingly, Watson understands the goodness of God in such manner that its 
definition includes mercy and patience also: ‘This relative goodness is nothing else but his 
mercy, which is an innate propenseness in God to pity and succour such as are in misery.’ In 
Watson, Body of Divinity: 93.   
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the other, that divine omniscience gives no space for attributing ignorance to 
God.990 Though Charnock does not mention it here, he could have added in 
response to this objection that God cannot but punish evil considering that the 
moral perfection of his nature entails retaliation for any violation against the 
divine law. Concerning (2), Charnock argues that God's slowness to anger is 
not the result of a decline in his power to enact his reprisal, this is so since 
there is no variation or fluctuation within the divine nature because God is 
pure actuality, actus purus; besides, ‘[h]is mercy would be a feeble pity, if he 
were destitute of power to relieve; and his justice a slighted scare-crow, 
without power to punish’.991 Furthermore, Charnock could have argued (based 
upon his claims elsewhere) that since patience and power share the same 
excellency (per divine simplicity), no attribute outranks ontologically the 
other, which is to say, in relevance to the point here discussed, that the same 
infinitude that clothes God’s slowness to anger must involve his power to 
punish.992  
Interestingly, Charnock establishes a link between the divine will and 
the attributes of patience, power, and holiness to say that patience is 
ultimately a manifestation of the fullness of God’s power, that is, an indication 
of a strength within God himself (in se) capable of restraining him from the 
                                                             
990 Charnock, Works, 2: 507.  
991 Ibid., 108. Cf. Ibid., 123. What is more, the power of God is manifested precisely in 
the moral and judicial government God exercises over creation. Ibid., 139-145. 
992 This is a matter that Charnock discusses later, there he notes that patience does 
not operate in contradiction with other divine attributes: ‘One perfection must not cloud 
another… Justice will be fully recompensed for the delay, when, after patience is abused, it 
can spread itself over the offender with a more unquestionable authority, it will haw more 
arguments to hit the sinner in the teeth with, and silence him.’ In ibid., 512. Cf. Idem., Works, 
4: 282. 
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immediate execution of his verdicts. This prompts Charnock to offer a 
theological interpretation of Nahum (1.3) wherein the clause ‘slow to anger, 
and great in power’ is understood to speak of God’s dominion over himself, a 
self-ruling by which God moderates his own affections in accordance to the 
moral perfection of his will.993 What is more, Charnock asserts that there is 
more evidence of the infinite power of God in the display of his patience than 
it would be in multiple acts of creation ex nihilo as far as the former implies a 
form of power that it would not be required for the actualisation of the latter, 
that is, ‘the dunatὀn aὑtoῦ, a power over himself.’994    
By conceiving patience as an extension of divine mercy, Charnock is led 
to conclude that the foundation of the former rests upon the death of Christ.995 
This affirmation is motivated by two interrelated factors; one is clearly 
Christological, the other is covenantal. On the one hand, Charnock explains 
that the sacrificial death of Christ is the condition sine qua non for the 
patience of God to flow in the direction of its objects.996 On the other hand, 
Charnock believes that Christ’s voluntary sacrifice is the Son’s fulfilment of the 
legal provisions established in the covenant of redemption.997 Therefore, since 
the covenant of redemption is the eternal foundation of the covenant of grace, 
patience is said to be explained ‘upon the account of the gospel, and a fruit of 
                                                             
993 Idem., Works, 2: 508-509. 
994 Ibid., 509. 
995 Ibid. 
996 Ibid. For Charnock on the necessity of Christ’s death, consult Idem., Works, 5: 3-
48. 
997 Idem., Works, 5: 10-11. 
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the covenant of grace, whereof Christ was mediator.’998 To explain how one 
can affirm that the death of Christ is the cause of God’s patience before the 
historical event at Golgotha had taken place, Charnock notes that it is 
assumed on the basis of the promises concerning the advent of Christ in his 
mediatory role of redeemer.999   
Interestingly, Charnock opts for not following his habitual threefold 
outline to elaborate on the manifestation of divine patience. Instead of looking 
at God’s acts ad extra (creation, redemption, and providence/government), 
Charnock focuses on three groups of people (ancient fathers, gentiles, and 
Israelites) and in one overall theme (divine judgment) to make his case in 
favour of the display of divine patience.1000 In brief, the patience of God is 
manifested in the delay to punish the sins of the ancient fathers immediately 
after they broke the divine command, in the delay to punish the sins of the 
gentiles considering that they were in a lower state of depravity, in the delay to 
punish the offenses of the Israelites for their ungratefulness and 
stubbornness.1001 Additionally, the patience of God is demonstrated 
particularly in the warnings that God issues before his judgment is enacted, in 
the delay of the execution of his judgments, in the unwillingness to execute his 
                                                             
998 Idem., Works, 2: 509. 
999 Ibid. As to why the death of Christ is necessary for the salvation of those preceding 
his advent, see Idem., Works, 5: 12-14.  
1000 Idem., Works, 2: 512-524. 
1001 Ibid., 512-514. 
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judgements and in the moderation of it, and finally in the abundant mercies 
after his justice has been provoked.1002  
In a segment, unique amid the discourses on the divine attributes, 
Charnock considers the reasons accounting for God's generous display of 
patience towards his creatures.1003 Six different explanations are provided; one 
involving the disclosure of an aspect of God’s nature, two including a purpose 
directed to humankind in general, two more particularly concerning the sake 
of the church, and one relating to the twofold functionality of patience.  
For Charnock, divine patience reveals that God is willing to placate his 
wrath on the condition of genuinely seeking after him, this is to say that there 
is a definite telos in the exercise of divine patience, and on God’s self-
disclosure of being appeaseable.1004 Theologically, this is important for it 
provides an explanation as to why God is patient and simultaneously it 
corrects the notions of divine justice understood only in terms of divine 
implacability.1005 Closely related to the previous explanation is Charnock’s 
                                                             
1002 Ibid., 514-524. 
1003 Ibid., 524-530. 
1004 Ibid., 524. Interestingly, the above resonates with the concern of one 
contemporary biblical scholar, who warns about the risks involved in losing sight of the 
‘personal and affective’ character of certain divine attributes. See D.A. Carson, "The Wrath of 
God," in Engaging the Doctrine of God: Contemporary Protestant Perspectives, ed. Bruce L. 
McCormack (Grand Rapids: Baker Academics, 2008), 48-49.          
1005 Not in a few instances tthroughout the Discourses, Charnock explains (implicitly 
or explicitly) the compatibility between the nature of attributes such as that of justice, wrath, 
anger, and the satisfaction of their demands, vis-à-vis attributes such as goodness, mercy, and 
patience. Noteworthy here is the role divine wisdom plays in Charnock’s theology of the divine 
attributes concerning this matter. For Charnock, the wisdom of God accounts for designing a 
scheme of redemption wherein it complies with the demands of divine justice whilst, at the 
same time, it serves as the foundation for the mercies of God. Consult, Charnock, Works, 2: 
52-55.  
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claim about the double function of divine patience.1006 Given that the finis 
proximus (the immediate purpose) of divine patience is to guide sinners to 
repentance, one needs to explain whether patience becomes ineffective when 
it is ultimately abused and rejected or whether it takes another role. Charnock 
opts for the latter option saying that in those instances patience becomes an 
amplifier of God’s wrath.1007 Drawing from a technical distinction used in 
medieval theology whereby the morality of a human action was evaluated 
according to the intentionality of the moral agent in doing X (finis operantis) 
and the end resulting from X itself (finis operis), Charnock writes: ‘The proper 
and immediate end [finis proximus] of his [God’s] long-suffering is to lead 
men to repentance; but after they have, by their obstinacy, fitted themselves 
for destruction, he bears longer with them, to magnify his wrath more upon 
them, and if it is not the finis operantis, it is at least the finis operis, where 
patience is abused.’1008 Though syntactically difficult to support, it seems 
sensible to construe Charnock’s words in the quote above as suggesting that 
the exacerbation of God’s wrath towards the unrepentant is not the finis 
operantis (the primary intention of God’s will) but the finis operis (the 
intrinsic consequence of abusing God’s patience).1009 
                                                             
1006 Ibid., 529-530. 
1007 Ibid., 530. 
1008 Ibid. For the meaning of the terms in Catholic medieval theology, see James T. 
Bretzke, Consecrated Phrases: A Latin Theological Dictionary,  s.v. "Finis Operantis."; Idem., 
Consecrated Phrases: A Latin Theological Dictionary,  s.v. "Finis Operis." 
1009 This interpretation takes in consideration the technical meaning of the terms finis 
operis and finis operantis while it assumes that Charnock would reject any notion of God 
wherein a contradiction between the intention of the divine will with respect to X and the 
resulting effect of the action X takes place. 
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Finally, God is slow to anger for the benefit of humankind, which can 
be manifested in at least two ways: (1) in delaying his judgments over the 
creature while inviting her to repent, and (2) in permitting the propagation of 
people by not destroying them though God could have executed the due 
punishment for sin (i.e., death) immediately after the first transgression took 
place.1010 More particularly, the patience of God takes place for the benefit of 
the church; on the one hand, God seeks the continuance of his people by 
providing the time necessary for it to grow in number; on the other hand, God 
seeks the instruction of the saints by temporarily sparing the wicked from his 
wrath for purposes concerning the safety or trial of his church.1011       
Pars Practica: Practical Application of the Doctrine 
In accord with his customary style, Charnock explains the practical use 
of the doctrine of divine power in terms of information, comfort, and 
exhortation.1012 The fact that omnipotence belongs exclusively to the divine 
nature makes of this sort of power an incommunicable property and thus 
impossible to be in possession of any other being but God, but since Christ’s 
omnipotence is inferred from Scriptures, then, it goes the argument, Christ 
must be God. The omnipotence of Christ is mainly revealed in his 
participation in the act of creation. According to Charnock, creation cannot be 
thought simply as the concurrence between the Son’s and the Father’s 
attributes to bring everything into existence but as a single operation of the 
                                                             
1010 Charnock, Works, 2: 526-528. 
1011 Ibid., 528-529. 
1012 Ibid., 164-187. 
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Triune God whereby the Son acts in the same manner of operation as that of 
the Father, ‘not by a delegated, but natural and essential power, by one 
undivided operation and manner of working’1013 In this manner, Christ’s role 
in creation is not instrumental, that is, he is simply not the medium by which 
God creates but, as with the Father and the Holy Spirit, the agent of creation 
itself. Moreover, had the Son be the instrumental cause of creation, he could 
have not been eternal, but Scripture testifies abundantly of the Son’s perpetual 
duration (Heb. 1. 10-11; Rev 1. 8), thus in creation he must have ‘acted by a 
divine omnipotency, which surmounts an instrumental cause.’1014 Additionally, 
the omnipotence of God serves as the foundation to apprise of other 
perfections in the divine nature such as divine aseity, immutability. The 
former by noting that omnipotence implies complete sufficiency and the 
former by arguing that an almighty being could not been liable to change as 
the consequence of forces outside of himself, ‘If God be almighty, he can want 
nothing… Since he is omnipotent, nothing can hurt him… so he is incapable of 
being forced to any change.’1015  
In acknowledging the omnipotence of God, Charnock see a source for 
comfort in all afflictions as there is no rival for divine power in acting on 
behalf of God’s people.1016 Likewise, the omnipotence of God provides a 
                                                             
1013 Ibid., 164. 
1014 Ibid., 168. It is worth noting that Charnock includes for the first-time the divinity 
of the Hole Spirit as one of the uses derived from knowing the divine perfections. Though 
Charnock does expand as much as he does when discussing the divinity of Christ, he notes 
that since omnipotence is predicated of the operations of the Spirit his deity must be inferred 
accordingly. Ibid., 169.        
1015 Ibid., 169-170. 
1016 Ibid., 180. 
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guarantee for the believer’s assurance of preservation, ‘It is the great comfort 
that the lowest distresses of the church are a fit scene for the discovery of this 
attribute, and that the glory of God’s omnipotence, and the church's security, 
are so straitly linked together.’1017  
In regards to the use of exhortation, the doctrine of the power of God 
urges the believer to meditate on its importance so that the name of God can 
be properly glorified in prayer by the constant remembrance of all his mighty 
acts in behalf of his church, ‘We cannot glorify God without due consideration 
of this attribute… Faith will be spiritless, and prayers will be lifeless, if power 
be not eyed by us in those things which cannot be done with an arm of 
omnipotence.’1018  
As holiness is a transcended attribute of the divine essence, reflection 
upon it provides an important number of practical principles. For instance, 
concerning God himself, holiness must be thought as that essential property of 
the divine being which prevents him from being the personification of a 
supreme but ‘deformed power’.1019 In fact, no proper conception of God must 
be conceived without the attribute of holiness.1020 Reflection upon holiness 
informs one about the essential otherness of God vis-à-vis creation. Though 
holiness is intrinsic and necessary for the being of God, the creature’s holiness 
is accidental and, in fact, derived: ‘No creature can be essentially holy but by 
                                                             
1017 Ibid., 182. 
1018 Ibid., 183, 186. 
1019 Ibid., 243.   
1020 Ibid., 191. Cf. Ibid., 251.  
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participation from the chief fountain of holiness, but we must have the same 
kind of holiness, the same truth of holiness’.1021 Likewise, the holiness of God 
as observed in the operations of his justice and the execution of his wrath 
guarantees that sin will not go unpunished. The fact that punitive justice and 
divine wrath are in tune with divine holiness prompted Charnock to speak of a 
doctrine of redemption in which ‘[t]here is therefore a necessity of a 
satisfaction of the holiness of God by some sufficient mediator.’1022  
In similar manner, Charnock argues that the knowledge of divine 
holiness brings comfort with it. God cannot but honour the determinations of 
the covenant: ‘God’s holiness engaged in an inviolable covenant.’1023 Therefore, 
God is a proper object of trust and dependence as far as his holiness 
guarantees that he will answer the prayers of his creatures, that he will 
comfort the believer during times of tribulation, and that he will maintain his 
protection upon his church.1024 Finally, the eminence of divine holiness exhorts 
us to have a proper notion about the nature of God, but also about ourselves. 
The benefits of attending to this exhortation include getting a proper sense of 
humility, orienting one’s affections in the right direction, displaying fear and 
reverence before the majesty of God, expressing a desire to be conformed in 
God’s image, and achieving a genuine sense of contentment.1025  
                                                             
1021 Ibid., 256-257, 266. 
1022 Ibid., 253. Interestingly, Charnock expands on this theme by framing his 
argument in consideration of some covenantal principles, namely, the eternal stipulations of 
the covenant of redemption in which the God the Father appoints God the Son to accomplish 
redemption on behalf of his church. In ibid., 255. 
1023 Ibid., 258. 
1024 Ibid., 257-258. 
1025 Ibid., 258-263. 
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Concerning the uses of knowing the doctrine of divine goodness, 
Charnock indicates that the essential goodness of God instructs the church 
about the different manners wherein this divine perfection could be debased. 
The list of transgressions against divine goodness include, among others 
things, ungratefulness, unbelief, distrust in divine providence, and ascribing 
one’s welfares to a different cause than that of divine goodness.1026 Likewise, to 
know that God is good provides instruction concerning the Fall. The argument 
is that the judgement pending over the created order cannot be explained as if 
it had been established from creation because ‘[i]nfinite goodness could never 
move infinite justice to inflict punishment upon creatures, if they had not 
highly merited it. We cannot think that any creature was blemished with a 
principle of disturbance as it came first out of the hand of God.’1027 Therefore, 
something calamitous must have happened to account for the precarious state 
wherein creation remains ever since, and this is the Fall. Furthermore, divine 
goodness instruct the church concerning the suitability of God to govern the 
world: just as power is the necessary principle whereby God executes his 
decree to create the universe, goodness is that necessary attribute which 
moves God to create and maintain the universe: ‘Power without goodness 
would deface, instead of preserving.’1028 What is more, the perfection of 
goodness is the foundation of all acceptable religion, devotion, and worship; in 
fact, even pagan religions were built upon the assumption of divine goodness 
                                                             
1026 Ibid., 365. 
1027 Ibid., 374. 
1028 Ibid., 376. 
  278 
 
as their adherents hoped to obtain assistance from their gods.1029 Lastly, divine 
goodness makes God the most desirable object of trust and confidence.1030 
Charnock asserts that it is the very being of God, more precisely his goodness, 
that which is the principal foundation of faith.1031 This somehow resonates 
with the Reformed scholastic axiom whereby God is thought to be the 
principia essendi theologiae.1032           
In the context of explaining how divine goodness makes God worthy of 
obedience and honour, Charnock affirms that God delights only in the 
execution of that which is good. Charnock explains that though divine 
sovereignty would allow God to order ‘that which is indifferent in its own 
nature’, that is, positive and ceremonial laws, God would not be able to dictate 
anything contrary to the righteousness of his nature neither would he be able 
to prompt the creature to do anything damaging to herself.1033 By being pure 
goodness, God cannot but command that which is in harmony with his own 
righteousness, otherwise God would be acting against his own nature.1034  
Here Charnock encounters a perennial conundrum for theologians and 
philosophers alike concerning with the ontological origin of the good: does 
God instruct an action X because it is morally right, or is X morally right 
                                                             
1029 Ibid., 378. 
1030 Ibid., 383-385. 
1031 Ibid., 383. 
1032 See pp. 54-58 above in this study. Cf. Muller, PRRD: 1:430-437.  
1033 Charnock, Works, 2: 386. 
1034 Ibid., 387. 
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because God instructs it? This rendering of the so-called Euthyphro’s dilemma 
poses an objection against ethical systems that are built up under the 
assumption of divine command theories of morality.1035 If the first clause is 
taken as the answer for the question above, then it follows that there is a 
criterion of goodness that is independent from God. On the contrary, if the 
second clause if preferred, then morality ends up being arbitrary. The former 
option assumes a non-voluntaristic view of morality wherein something is 
good regardless of the divine will whereas the latter alternative subscribes to 
ethical voluntarism, a notion wherein the good is thought to be determined 
exclusively by what God wills. Neither option is theologically desirable: one 
injures God’s moral freedom by placing an autonomous form of goodness 
above him whilst the other makes theistic-based morality irrelevant by 
assuming that God might impose whatever kind of moral law he wills.1036 
It is worth noting that by saying that the moral goodness of a thing is 
not dictated by the commands of the divine will, Charnock unequivocally takes 
side on the debate that took place within the Reformed orthodox concerning 
the ontological status of the good.1037 Indeed, Charnock was not the only 
                                                             
1035 Originally, the ‘dilemma’ is part of a dialogue between Socrates and Euthyphro 
described in Plato’s Euthyphro: ‘Is that which is holy loved by the gods because it is holy, or is 
it holy because it is loved by the gods?’ In Plato, Euthyphro, Apology, Crito, Phaedo, 
Phaedrus, trans. Harold North Fowler, Loeb Classical Library (Cambridge, Mass: Harvard 
University Press, 1977), 35. Interestingly, some have argued that the dilemma comes from an 
mistaken reading of Plato, see Timothy Chappell, "Euthyphro’s 'Dilemma', Socrates' 
Daimonion and Plato's God," in God, Goodness and Philosophy, ed. Harriet A. Harris 
(Farnham, Surrey, England: Ashgate, 2011), 63-65.    
1036 For a helpful description of the problems involved in the Euthyphro’s dilemma, 
consult David Baggett and Jerry L. Walls, Good God: The Theistic Foundations of Morality 
(Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2011), 31-48.  
1037 Simon J. G. Burton, "Samuel Rutherford's Euthrypho Dilemma: Reformed 
Perspective on the Scholastic Natural Law Tradition " in Reformed Orthodoxy in Scotland: 
Essays on Scottish Theology 1560-1775, ed. Aaron Clay Denlinger (London: T&T Clark, 2015), 
138-139; Velde, The Doctrine of God: 719; Heppe, Reformed Dogmatics: 93-94. 
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Reformed divine during the High Orthodoxy era who followed a similar line of 
reasoning. Heidegger, for instance, argued that neither God’s will nor his 
commands, but instead the absolute purity of the divine nature [quia ejus 
purissimae naturae] is that from which all kind of moral goodness 
conforms.1038 Likewise, Mastricht answers in the negative to the question 
whether all righteousness depend entirely in the will of God [An omnis iustitia 
pendeat a sola voluntate Dei?] He notes that though nothing antecedes the 
being of God, something may precede his will and thus some things may be 
righteous in themselves [quae sunt iuris naturalis.]1039  
Like Heidegger and Mastricht, Charnock believes that the ontological 
goodness of something does not depend on the will of God in commanding it; 
instead, when commanding something, God already considers it to be morally 
good: ‘The truth is, all his moral precepts are comely in themselves, and they 
receive not their goodness from God's positive command, but that command 
supposeth their goodness.’1040 As it has been noted, this position safeguards 
Charnock’s moral theology from the arbitrariness linked to some forms of 
theological voluntarism; however, it leaves it open to the question of whether 
the divine command has to conform to an autonomous rule of goodness apart 
from God himself. In response, Charnock reasons that if things receive their 
moral goodness by an antecedent dictate of the divine will, then a prior 
determination of the divine will would also be required for God to be good. 
                                                             
1038 Johann Heinrich Heidegger, Corpus Theologiae Christianae (Zurich: Joh. Henrici 
Bodmeri, 1700), III/Thes. 89-90; p. 95.    
1039 Mastricht, Theoretico-Practica: II/18, xi; p. 195.    
1040 Charnock, Works, 2: 387. 
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But this cannot be since God is good per essentiam, not by any posterior 
determination of his will and since God is pure goodness he is the summum 
bonum; thereby: ‘God’s loving himself doth not make him good, but 
supposeth him good. He was good in the order of nature, before he loved 
himself, and his being good was the ground of his loving himself’.1041 In this 
manner, Charnock secures the supremacy of God’s nature in relation to the 
good and places the divine ontology, i.e., the highest good, as the perfection of 
the divine being wherefrom the divine affections are grounded. Subsequently, 
Charnock asserts that just as the divine goodness comes prior than God's self-
love in one’s ordo cognoscendi [order of knowing], mutatis mutandi the 
moral goodness of a thing comes prior in its ordo essendi [order of being] 
than the divine mandate of it, so ‘if God should command the contrary, it 
would openly speak him evil and unrighteous.’1042 Finally, in saying that reason 
is capable of recognising the moral virtue that is embedded in the divine 
command alone apart from Scripture, Charnock’s argument suggests an 
intellectualist impulse.1043 This in turn leads to the conclusion that since the 
divine commands are intrinsically good, then the goodness of God directs his 
sovereign authority to take delight on them always.1044 In the final analysis, 
Charnock grounds the moral status of the things God commands in the being 
                                                             
1041 Ibid. 
1042 Ibid. 
1043 In the context above, the term ‘intellectualist’ must not be taken in view of divine 
but human agency. In this sense, ‘intellectualist’ conveys the medieval notion wherein the 
schoolmen stressed the precedence of human reason over human will. Consult Hoffman, 
"Intellectualism and Voluntarism."  
1044 Charnock, Works, 2: 387. 
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of God, for although things may be good in themselves they are not had not 
their moral value agreed with the goodness of God. 
The second and third uses of divine goodness are that of comfort and 
exhortation. In addition to the consolation that the nature of divine goodness 
(always compassionate and communicative) brings, the awareness of the 
goodness of God also provides relief from the burdens of life, reassurance of 
the bestowal of undefeatable felicity, and security amid all kinds of dangers.1045 
Additionally, a sense of the doctrine of divine goodness would urge the 
believer to enjoy God since he is ‘the purest, best, and most universal good’1046 
while it demands to abandon any form of arrogance, unfaithfulness, 
impatience, envy, and ungratefulness.1047 Finally, divine goodness invites the 
church to imitate God for ‘as God would not be a perfect God without 
goodness, so neither can any be a perfect Christian without kindness; charity 
and love being the splendour and loveliness of all Christians graces as 
goodness is the splendour and loveliness of all divine attributes.’1048   
In addition to the customary headings of information/instruction, 
comfort, and exhortation, Charnock appends two extra titles to his 
presentation of the practical use of the doctrine of divine dominion.1049 Though 
the inclusion of these two additional themes (dreadful considerations of and 
                                                             
1045 Ibid., 387-391. 
1046 Ibid., 391. 
1047 Ibid., 394-398. 
1048 Ibid., 398. 
1049 Ibid., 461-499.    
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meditations about divine dominion) seems superfluous considering that their 
content could have been included under the titles of information/instruction 
and exhortation, their discussion remains relevant to the practical use of the 
doctrine.1050 
For Charnock, the unrepentant should consider that her despise of 
God’s dominion would always be accompanied by an indictment of rebellion, 
which automatically would carry with it the greatest punishment: death.1051 
This is explained by noting that punitive acts of justice are a corollary of divine 
sovereignty in the understanding that God cannot but vindicate his right as 
supreme sovereign in the face of a challenge to his dominion posed by the 
creature on the basis that ‘[i]f God be an eternal King, he is an eternal 
Judge.’1052 This means that for God to ignore such transgressions against his 
divine right would be tantamount to inflict a self-attack on his sovereignty, 
which would a denial of his own being since ‘[t]o slight his sovereignty, is to 
stab his deity; since the one cannot be preserved without the support of the 
other, his life would expire with his authority.’1053 Concerning the effects 
resulting from meditating on God’s dominion, Charnock includes an 
assortment of benefits including a renewal confidence in God, a more diligent 
adoration, an awareness of the perils of temptation, a God-centred vision of 
afflictions, a profound sense of reliance on God, and a disinterest for vain 
                                                             
1050 These themes are treated respectively in ibid., 477-480; 483-487.  
1051 Ibid., 478.  
1052 Ibid. Therefore, this punishment must be inevitable in its execution and terrible in 
its effects, ibid., 478-480. 
1053 Ibid., 461. 
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curiosity.1054 Noteworthy, Charnock argues that by meditating on the dominion 
of God one would transition from acknowledging the role of secondary causes 
as means of divine grace to the recognition due to God as the first cause of all 
motions.1055 In sum, Charnock resolves, based upon the considerations just 
described, that a revile on God’s dominion is ultimately an irrational act of the 
human mind.1056    
An awareness of the sovereignty of God is instructive in the general 
sense by noting that all sins are essentially a repudiation of the authority of 
God as a lawgiver.1057 In like manner, a proper understanding of divine 
dominion informs one: (1) that the absolute sovereignty of God does not lead 
to divine injustice for the royal right of God over creation never works in 
isolation from the perfection of his own infinite righteousness, (2) that the 
dominion of God excludes human merit, that is to say that God does not owe 
anything to his creatures apart from what he has promised, and (3) that 
earthly magistrates operate under an authority that is subservient to God.1058  
A further instructive aspect that comes from the doctrine of divine 
dominion is an awareness of the fact that some different sins debase the 
authority of God in different manner. For example, the sovereignty of God in 
his role as universal lawgiver is neglected by: (1) issuing laws that are 
                                                             
1054 Ibid., 484-487. 
1055 Ibid., 485. 
1056 Ibid., 480. 
1057 Ibid., 461-464. 
1058 Ibid., 473-476. 
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essentially in opposition to the law of God, (2) adding human prescriptions to 
the laws of God, (3) opting for obeying the laws of the creature instead of the 
divine law.1059 Furthermore, sins of envy, theft, and the misuse of benefits 
given by God are actions that overlook the dominion of God in his office of 
sovereign proprietor. 1060 The dominion of God as sovereign governor of the 
world is at odds with the practice of idolatry, impatience, pride, careless 
worship, omission of service, censorship, and with imposing limitations to 
God’s mode of acting.1061   
  In addition, the doctrine of God’s dominion brings comfort to the 
people of God.1062 The point to highlight here concerns the claim that the 
presence of God as sovereign Lord is mediated through a federal (i.e., 
covenantal) relation whereby creator and creature are united by a bond of 
infinite affection. Charnock takes the biblical imagery in Hos. 2.16, 19ff to say 
that God is not only Lord, ‘but a husband by a marriage knot, admitting us to a 
nearness to him, and communion of goods with him.’1063 This covenantal 
implication is significant for it leads Charnock to conclude that the relation 
between God and his church is not one purely determined by the relation 
between a king and his servants, but one that is also mediated by a pact of 
                                                             
1059 Ibid., 464-468. 
1060 Ibid., 468-469. Charnock includes the use of God’s word as one of the benefits 
divinely conferred that may turn into an insult against the sovereignty of God when used for 
ends distinct to that of the exaltation of his glory: ‘When men will wrest his word for the 
favour of their lusts… and make interpretations of it according to their humours, not 
according to the will discovered in the Scripture, this is to pervert the use of the best goods 
and depositum he hath put into our hands, even divine revelations.’ In ibid., 469. 
1061 Ibid., 469-473. 
1062 Ibid., 480-483. 
1063 Ibid., 480. 
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divine grace: ‘His [God’s] government of his people is not only of absolute 
dominion, but also in a way of federal relation.’1064   
Lastly, divine dominion is an exhortation to be humble in regards of 
authority and propriety by knowing that no creature, as powerful she may be, 
is outside of the sovereign rule of God and by acknowledging that creaturely 
dominion is limited and temporal.1065  Once more, Charnock appeals to his 
covenantal understanding of history to say that the sovereignty of God should 
prompt the creature’s praise and thankfulness as God decides to enter in 
relation to his people by means of a covenant of grace instead of by absolute 
dominion only: ‘He doth not oppress us by the greatness of his majesty; he 
enters into covenant with us, and allures us by the cords of a man, shews 
himself as much as merciful as an absolute sovereign.’1066  
Finally, the doctrine of God’s dominion exhorts one to fear, revere, and 
obey God in all of his ways and to promote the glory of his sovereignty in the 
recognition that God is the efficient, preserving, and the final cause of 
everything (Rom. 9.36): ‘God being every way sovereign,—the sovereign being, 
giving being to all things; the sovereign ruler, giving order and preservation to 
all things,—is also the end of all things, to whose glory and honour all things, 
all creatures are to be subservient.’1067   
                                                             
1064 Ibid. Cf. Ibid., 1: 91. Additionally, knowing that God is sovereign is a source of 
comfort amid doubts concerning one’s eternal state, and in the face afflictions and public 
commotions.  
1065 Idem., Works, 2: 487-488. 
1066 Ibid., 488-489. 
1067 Ibid., 490. 
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By applying the knowledge concerning the doctrine of divine patience 
one may gain considerable instruction by considering the abuses against it. 
For example, exploitations directed at the patience of God are, in some case, 
evident by a gross misrepresentation of the divine nature as when some assert, 
based upon a faulty view of divine patience, that God neglects his providence 
of government over creation.1068 Knowing that God is patience brings comfort 
since just as the anger of God produces terror, his patience ‘is a mitigation of 
that terror’.1069 This comfort, though temporal, extends to everyone, 
particularly over the faithful as far as patience is the first aspect of the divine 
nature that acts for the sake of the sinner in the plan of redemption.1070 
This doctrine exhorts one to meditate on the loving character of God 
because his patience towards sinners ‘shews him [God] to be of a sweeter 
disposition than creating goodness to unoffending creatures, and 
consequently speaks a greater love in him, and bespeaks a greater affection 
from us.’1071 To contemplate upon God’s patience prompts an admiration for 
the character of God in enduring sin and in suffering a multitude of 
provocations. Furthermore, knowing that the patience of God is not contrary 
to his justice would lead one to acknowledge that the benefits of the former 
are temporal, not in terms of its essence for the patience of God is infinite, but 
concerning its role as containing the execution of God’s wrath; thus, 
                                                             
1068 Charnock attributes this view to medieval Islamic philosopher Ibn Rushd (1126-
1198), also known as Averroës. See ibid., 531.  
1069 Ibid., 536. 
1070 Ibid., 537. 
1071 Ibid., 538. 
  288 
 
Charnock: ‘The exercise of it [God’s patience] is not eternal; you are at present 
under his patience, yet while you are unconverted you are also under his 
anger’.1072 Charnock concludes this discourse by exhorting his audience to be 
divine by imitating the patience of God: ‘To conclude; as patience is God’s 
perfection, so it is the accomplishment of the soul. And as his slowness to 
anger argues the greatness of his power over himself, so an unwillingness to 
revenge is a sign of a power over ourselves, which is more noble than to be a 
monarch over others.’1073  
                                                             
1072 Ibid., 543. 
1073 Ibid., 544. 
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CONCLUSION 
This study concludes that Charnock structured his theological sermons 
on the existence and the attributes of God in a way that presupposes the style 
of theological investigation observed in the theological systems of the 
seventeenth-century. That scholasticism permeates the Discourses is proven 
by identifying the method of investigation framing Charnock’s works, by 
accounting for the order of exposition in his lectures, and by the substance of 
the theological argumentation exhibited on them.   
In discussing the doctrine of God, the Reformed scholastics appealed to 
a series of scientific questions dictated by the quaestio technique, the 
distinctive mode of inquiry of the scholastic method. Accordingly, the locus de 
Deo included an in-depth study on the existence of God, the divine nature (the 
perfections of God), and the divine persons (the doctrine of the Trinity). While 
not explicitly formulated, Charnock’s discourses concerning the doctrine of 
God are arranged according to a sequential order following the manner of 
investigation proposed by the quaestio: the subject of the existence of God is, 
then, discussed first in preparation for a full analysis of the divine attributes. 
Additionally, the discourses often included a section devoted to answering the 
objections raised against the doctrines asserted, another feature of the 
scholastic quaestio.  
In terms of order, Charnock begins by establishing the existence of God 
as the ontological principle for the theological task. This task is followed by 
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the exposition on the attributes of God according to an order that suggests 
familiarity with the patterns of classification commonly used in material 
explicitly scholastic in nature. Charnock begins his lectures on the perfections 
of God with a series of properties that belong to the so-called attributes of first 
order (incommunicable/absolute) and then it continues into the attributes of 
the second order (communicable/relative). Both categories are informed by 
the manner the schoolmen understood the ways of knowing God; therefore, 
Charnock determines the attributes belonging to the former category 
primarily by means of the via negativa whereas the latter category is resolved 
primarily by the via eminentiae.1074  
Regarding content, it is significant to note that the argumentation 
deployed in the discourses, while primarily homiletical in nature, is marked by 
a level of erudition and detail proper of the scholastic method. In addition to 
the order of inquiry dictated by the quaestio, Charnock’s discourses on the 
existence and the attributes of God exhibit an array of arguments indicating 
the influence of scholasticism. The use of sophisticated methods of biblical 
exegesis, the appeal to medieval rhetoric, and the importance of defining the 
terms with high precision, in addition to the significance of Aristotelian 
categories, the employment of the laws of logic and causality, and the use of 
syllogisms for postulating an argument, exhibit a style commonly found in 
scholastic material. 
                                                             
1074 Interestingly, the order for the attributes of the second order in Charnock’s 
discourses also reflect a scholastic distinction between attributes according to the divine 
intellect and those according to the divine will. See chapters VI and VII above.  
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At this point, it is necessary to highlight that this research enhances the 
current scholarship on the theology of Stephen Charnock and, incidentally, it 
contributes to the renewed academic interest for Reformed Orthodoxy. On the 
one hand, the findings of this dissertation add valuable information to the, 
still scarce, literature on the thought of prominent theologian such as 
Charnock. By identifying the Discourses as an example of theological sermons 
framed by the scholastic method, this investigation proves that the range of 
influence of scholasticism during the Protestant orthodox era extended 
beyond the genres of systema, compendia, and medulla. On the other hand, 
this study opens up the opportunity for further research on subjects that 
remain unexplored in Charnock’s theology. For instance, just to name two 
possible options, one could determine to what extent, if any, Charnock’s 
notion of God determines his theological convictions in matter concerning 
soteriology, Christology, or ecclesiology, themes that are treated to some 
degree in the remaining volumes of The Complete Works. Furthermore, one 
could investigate whether Charnock is committed to a meta-ethics based upon 
a Protestant variation of the natural law theory.  
It is worth mentioning that Charnock’s theology has met with some 
critics amongst contemporary theologians. They have raised important 
objections concerning the method of exposition and the theological content 
observed in Charnock’s lectures concerning the divine perfections. In terms of 
method, Millard Erickson has described Charnock’s material on the doctrine 
of God as an ‘excessive analysis’ wherein the meticulous study of the divine 
perfections resembles a ‘virtual autopsy’ that fits better for a textbook on 
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anatomy than for a work of Christian theology.1075 On the other hand, Colin 
Gunton has claimed that Charnock’s theology of God exhibits, in ‘many 
places’, a severe dislocation caused by the effects of a faulty method that 
results in ‘grave structural deficiencies.’1076 For Gunton, the problem is that 
apophatic theology is executed at the expense of biblical revelation. Such 
appeal to negative theology, says Gunton, has resulted in a conception of the 
divine nature purely in abstract terms whereby God ultimately becomes 
unknowable and impersonal.1077 
In closing, a proper reading of the Discourses would require a 
consideration of the scholastic method that frames Charnock’s theology of the 
existence and the attributes of God, but more significantly it would demand 
recognition of the homiletical aim of the material. Charnock’s insistence on 
moving beyond the academic apprehension of the things of God into the 
practice of meditation as a spiritual discipline for the edification of the soul is 
an exhortation that permeates the Discourses:  
He that would express the image of God must imprint upon his mind the purity 
of his nature, cherish it in his thoughts, that the excellent beauty of it may pass 
from his understanding to his affections, and from his affections to his practice. 
How can we arise to a conformity to God in Christ, whose most holy nature we 
seldom glance upon, and more rarely sink our souls into the depths of it by 
meditation! Be frequent in the meditation of the holiness of God.1078
                                                             
1075 Millard J. Erickson, Christian Theology (Grand Rapids: Baker Academic, 2013), 
235.     
1076 Gunton, Act and Being: 91. 
1077 Ibid., 91-92. This research treats in some detail Gunton’s critique in Chapter VI of 
this study, see pp. 165-169 above.  
1078 Charnock, Works, 2: 272. 
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